Emergent Dualism

[AgnosticBoy]

I've read, listened to, and watched many debates on consciousness between Christians and atheist philosophers and so far I'm left with more questions than answers. Then I read a book by Dr. David Chalmers called The Conscious Mind and realized that his position accounts for a lot of the evidence and objections that seem to plague the materialist and non-materialist sides.

In short, emergent dualism is the position that consciousness/mind is an emergent nonphysical property of the brain. Under this view, the brain is primary in that the mind depends on the brain, but what starts out as a physical process gives rise to a nonphysical nonphysical effect (i.e. the mind and its attributes). Another add-on to this position is that the mind has causal powers which it exerts on the brain - commonly referred to as 'downward' or 'top-down' causation. This turns the deterministic worldview (which also includes materialism) on its head.

After reviewing the arguments for emergent dualism, I'm left to conclude that materialism is incomplete when it comes to explaining consciousness. Substance dualism simply goes too far.

Debate requests: Leave materialism or explain why anyone should remain a materialists after learning about consciousness.

Have you considered emergent dualism? What are your objections?

[Divine Insight]

Debate requests: Leave materialism or explain why anyone should remain a materialists after learning about consciousness.

There are a few things to consider here. To begin with David Chalmers hasn't provided any evidence for his theoretical hypotheses. So it's not like he we need to accept his hypothesis and abandon all others.

Also, David Chalmers is ultimately supports panpsychism and includes this postulate in his hypotheses. He even further defines this in greater detail as panprotopsychism.

In other words, Chalmers is proposing that the material that the world is made of has a fundamental primal psychic attribute or property to it. He's basically suggesting that we need to introduce or postulate the existence of a type of quantum psychic attribute to the material world, not unlike how we have postulated the existence of electric charge to explain electromagnetism, etc.

So Chalmers is actually arguing that consciousness is fundamental. It only "emerges" as dualism in the brain because the brain provides a platform for this primal consciousness to experience self-awareness or sentience.

So in this sense Chalmers is basically supporting the hypothesis of panpsychism.

Have you considered emergent dualism? What are your objections?

Actually pure emergence of consciousness from a physical brain would still be a secular materialistic view. So this is not what David Chalmers is arguing for.

The emergence of consciousness from a purely materialistic brain could "theoretically" be explained via the natural electromagnetic and logical feedback loops of an analog computer which is what the brain is.

So this would be the secular materialist's view. There is nothing in David Chalmers' proposal that would cause a secular materialist to need to abandon a purely materialistic worldview.

David Chalmers' only objection is that he rejects the purely materialistic explanation. But that doesn't make it wrong. It simply means that David Chalmers doesn't personally buy into it.

But Chalmers hasn't provided any evidence for panpsychism either. And the materialists don't buy into panpsychism.

So they are at a stalemate. Either theory could still be true at this juncture.

In fact, if this wasn't the case then Chalmers would be awarded a Nobel prize for his "discovery" and the question of consciousness would have been answered.

Clearly that's not where we are at.

[Neatras]

The described process is analogous to any computer simulation. The computer has its own machinery and physical processes. It operates under a set of constraints, but when events happen in the simulation, the results cause the computer's processes to accommodate this change. For example, a simulation of two competing organisms. The computer could have a functional state in the case either one wins, but the process depends on the simulated actions of nonexistent entities (which are represented by physical data). The simulation then may store the data. But the transistors, capacitors, and processors alone didn't decide the outcome. They decided the outcome based on how the simulated objects acted under their own simulated rules.

Similarly, the mind is a product of the brain. It is a simulated singular and seemingly continuous process that gives the brain-and-body a means of interfacing with reality in complex ways, and storing information to further augment the capabilities of the organism. But this simulation is still physical, even if there is a relational connection between the "state" of the mind and the brain. The brain, simulating a mind that acts under specific rules, responds to the simulated outcome and experiences physiological changes.

To assert materialism is incomplete due to consciousness would be to assert that simulations have nonphysical components. You need to be mindful of the brain's internal machinery and data assignment or recollection.

[Divine Insight]

The described process is analogous to any computer simulation. The computer has its own machinery and physical processes. It operates under a set of constraints, but when events happen in the simulation, the results cause the computer's processes to accommodate this change. For example, a simulation of two competing organisms. The computer could have a functional state in the case either one wins, but the process depends on the simulated actions of nonexistent entities (which are represented by physical data). The simulation then may store the data. But the transistors, capacitors, and processors alone didn't decide the outcome. They decided the outcome based on how the simulated objects acted under their own simulated rules.

Similarly, the mind is a product of the brain. It is a simulated singular and seemingly continuous process that gives the brain-and-body a means of interfacing with reality in complex ways, and storing information to further augment the capabilities of the organism. But this simulation is still physical, even if there is a relational connection between the "state" of the mind and the brain. The brain, simulating a mind that acts under specific rules, responds to the simulated outcome and experiences physiological changes.

To assert materialism is incomplete due to consciousness would be to assert that simulations have nonphysical components. You need to be mindful of the brain's internal machinery and data assignment or recollection.

For David Chalmers concerning your explanation is that your explanation fails to account for the phenomena of subjective experience. This is how Chalmers defines "consciousness".

In other words, a computer could do precise as you have described yet have no subjective experience of what has occurred. Therefore your explanation does not explain "consciousness". It merely explains how a computer simulation could be affected by "outside influence" (i.e. the sensory input from the physical world). And how this might determine the outcome or results of the simulation.

But all that could be done and there would still be no need for anything to have subjectively experienced this event.

So this type of explanation does not explain how subjective experience could arise. All it does is attempt to explain what the subject would experience if the subject could have a subjective experience.

So this doesn't explain "Consciousness" if consciousness is defined as subjective experience which is what David Chalmers is attempting to address.

I'm pretty sure that Chalmers has not claimed to have resolved this mystery. He merely points out the problems that have yet to be solved. He also proposes hypotheses that he feels might potentially address this mystery. (like panpsychism).

Of course there is no way to test for the reality of panpsychism. Just as their is no way to test for the reality of electric charge. We just assume that since electrons behave in a predicable way they must have this property. So we postulate that they have it.

In fact, this is part of what Chalmers is proposing. Since we recognize via our own subjective experience that subjective experience is an obvious property of this universe, then postulating that it's fundamental like electric charge makes as least as much sense as postulating that electrons have primal charge.

What else is there to do?

In fact, that is the question at hand.

And the answer is that their actually may be other possible explanations for how subjective experience can be explained.

But thus far we don't have our hands on a convincing explanation.

So in that regard Chalmers actually has the advantage since his proposal is no different from what we have already done for electric charge.

We just assume that this is an unexplained fundamental property of quarks and electrons. And that's where we leave it for electrons and quarks.

[AgnosticBoy]

There are a few things to consider here. To begin with David Chalmers hasn't provided any evidence for his theoretical hypotheses. So it's not like he we need to accept his hypothesis and abandon all others.

Also, David Chalmers is ultimately supports panpsychism and includes this postulate in his hypotheses. He even further defines this in greater detail as panprotopsychism.
..."

Panprotopsychism is one of Chalmers's new views. But in the book that I refer to, he considers panpsychism to be "metaphysical speculation" and instead adopts a position that he refers to as "naturalistic dualism". Here's an excerpt that describes his position in the book,

From The Conscious Mind - pgs. 114-115

Sometimes it is objected that consciousness might be an emergent property, in a sense that is still compatible with materialism. In recent work on complex systems and arti�cial life, it is often held that emergent properties are unpredictable from low-level properties, but that they are physical all the same. Examples are the emergence of self-organization in biological systems, or the emergence of flocking patterns from simple rules in simulated birds (Langton 1990; Reynolds 1987). But emergent properties of this sort are not analogous to consciousness. What is interesting about these cases is that the relevant properties are not obvious consequences of low-level laws; but they are still logically supervenient on low-level facts. If all the physical facts about a biological system over time are given, the fact that self-organization is occurring will be straightforwardly derivable. This is just what we would expect, as properties such as self-organization and flocking are straightforwardly functional and structural.

If consciousness is an emergent property, it is emergent in a much stronger sense. There is a stronger notion of emergence, used by the British emergentists (e.g., Broad 1925), according to which emergent properties are not even predictable from the entire ensemble of low-level physical facts. It is reasonable to say (as the British emergentists did) that conscious experience is emergent in this sense. But this sort of emergence is best counted as a variety of property dualism. Unlike the more “innocent� examples of emergence given above, the strong variety requires new fundamental laws in order that the emergent properties emerge.

Actually pure emergence of consciousness from a physical brain would still be a secular materialistic view. So this is not what David Chalmers is arguing for.

The emergence of consciousness from a purely materialistic brain could "theoretically" be explained via the natural electromagnetic and logical feedback loops of an analog computer which is what the brain is.

So this would be the secular materialist's view. There is nothing in David Chalmers' proposal that would cause a secular materialist to need to abandon a purely materialistic worldview.

David Chalmers' only objection is that he rejects the purely materialistic explanation. But that doesn't make it wrong. It simply means that David Chalmers doesn't personally buy into it.

But Chalmers hasn't provided any evidence for panpsychism either. And the materialists don't buy into panpsychism.

So they are at a stalemate. Either theory could still be true at this juncture.

In fact, if this wasn't the case then Chalmers would be awarded a Nobel prize for his "discovery" and the question of consciousness would have been answered.

Clearly that's not where we are at.

Well Dr. Chalmers argues against materialism, or at least some of the materialistic explanations for consciousness. I agree with him. Basically, consciousness and certain aspects of the mind have been proven to be irreducible to any physical properties. Positing consciousness as a fundamental property just pushes the question back since it does not answer just how or why consciousness is "physical".

His view would go against the materialist worldview for two reasons:
- we have a nonphysical property in existence
- This nonphysical property is also able to control/direct a physical system which goes against determinism - the vehicle of materialism.

*BTW, there's also scientific evidence and reasons for each of these two points.

[AgnosticBoy]

The described process is analogous to any computer simulation. The computer has its own machinery and physical processes. It operates under a set of constraints, but when events happen in the simulation, the results cause the computer's processes to accommodate this change. For example, a simulation of two competing organisms. The computer could have a functional state in the case either one wins, but the process depends on the simulated actions of nonexistent entities (which are represented by physical data). The simulation then may store the data. But the transistors, capacitors, and processors alone didn't decide the outcome. They decided the outcome based on how the simulated objects acted under their own simulated rules.

Similarly, the mind is a product of the brain. It is a simulated singular and seemingly continuous process that gives the brain-and-body a means of interfacing with reality in complex ways, and storing information to further augment the capabilities of the organism. But this simulation is still physical, even if there is a relational connection between the "state" of the mind and the brain. The brain, simulating a mind that acts under specific rules, responds to the simulated outcome and experiences physiological changes.

To assert materialism is incomplete due to consciousness would be to assert that simulations have nonphysical components. You need to be mindful of the brain's internal machinery and data assignment or recollection.

The Computation theory of the mind (the mind being an information processing system like a computer) is a working theory that cognitive psychologist work with to understand the mind. That explains some of the "functional" roles of the mind but it does not address the metaphysics and phenomenology of the mind - like what is the nature of mind?! or What or why is there subjective experiences?! Divine Insight touched on these points in his response to you.

[Divine Insight]

If consciousness is an emergent property, it is emergent in a much stronger sense. There is a stronger notion of emergence, used by the British emergentists (e.g., Broad 1925), according to which emergent properties are not even predictable from the entire ensemble of low-level physical facts. It is reasonable to say (as the British emergentists did) that conscious experience is emergent in this sense. But this sort of emergence is best counted as a variety of property dualism. Unlike the more “innocent� examples of emergence given above, the strong variety requires new fundamental laws in order that the emergent properties emerge.

I partially agree with Chalmers on the above. By the way, I have been following Chalmers views for quite some time. I would actually very much enjoy sitting down with him for a discussion because I feel that I have ideas to offer him that he may actually embrace.

For example, I do have a "problem" with his final statement in the above paragraph. In some ways I agree with him, but in other ways I may see things a bit differently.

You might even simply say that I have a different perspective on the same idea that Chalmers may not have yet considered.

These "New Fundamental Laws" that he speaks of may not be fundamentally physical, but rather they could be fundamental to logical computing. In this case these so-called "New Fundamental Laws" actually emerge along with the logical complexity of the brain's processing capabilities.

If that's the case, then these "New Fundamental Laws" are still basically caused by physical complexity. They are simply new "laws" brought about by complex logic that does not exist at lower levels of complexity. So in this sense they are "emergent" laws, but they are still "fundamental" precisely because they did "emerge" from the fundamental physical material. (in short, this idea of Chalmers' would then not negate a materialistic worldview)

So both, materialism and Chalmers' ideas, could still be simultaneously compatible.

Actually pure emergence of consciousness from a physical brain would still be a secular materialistic view. So this is not what David Chalmers is arguing for.

The emergence of consciousness from a purely materialistic brain could "theoretically" be explained via the natural electromagnetic and logical feedback loops of an analog computer which is what the brain is.

So this would be the secular materialist's view. There is nothing in David Chalmers' proposal that would cause a secular materialist to need to abandon a purely materialistic worldview.

David Chalmers' only objection is that he rejects the purely materialistic explanation. But that doesn't make it wrong. It simply means that David Chalmers doesn't personally buy into it.

But Chalmers hasn't provided any evidence for panpsychism either. And the materialists don't buy into panpsychism.

So they are at a stalemate. Either theory could still be true at this juncture.

In fact, if this wasn't the case then Chalmers would be awarded a Nobel prize for his "discovery" and the question of consciousness would have been answered.

Clearly that's not where we are at.

Well Dr. Chalmers argues against materialism, or at least some of the materialistic explanations for consciousness. I agree with him. Basically, consciousness and certain aspects of the mind have been proven to be irreducible to any physical properties. Positing consciousness as a fundamental property just pushes the question back since it does not answer just how or why consciousness is "physical".

In this case, then my proposal actually works far better. And this does not rule out physical materialism at all.

His view would go against the materialist worldview for two reasons:
- we have a nonphysical property in existence

That doesn't rule out the possibility that this so-called "non-physical property" hasn't arisen from physical complexity. In other words, if what we are calling a "non-physical property" is actually logic itself, then there is still the question of why this logical processing even exists. If it exists because of the physical computer that is processing information, then calling it a "non-physical property" is premature. It would only appear to be "non-physical" at first glance because we have failed to take into consideration and recognize how it actually arose.

- This nonphysical property is also able to control/direct a physical system which goes against determinism - the vehicle of materialism.

But here again you are jumping to the unwarranted conclusion that this property is necessarily "non-physical" in nature.

There has not yet been any evidence that any such "non-physical" properties actually exist. If these properties arise from logical processing of information, then calling them "non-physical" is premature.

*BTW, there's also scientific evidence and reasons for each of these two points.

I would like very much to see that evidence.

It's extremely easy for people (even ambitious scientists) to proclaim to have evidence for things which may not actually be as they had first imagined.

If any scientist has evidence for the existence of an "non-physical" properties of this universe I would think that would be huge news!

I have yet to hear of any credible discoveries claiming to have evidence for non-physical properties that cannot be explained via physics.

That would be extremely interesting news to be sure. In fact, I'm hoping to hear of any major breakthroughs in science before I die. I think that would be fantastic. Thus far, I've been quite disappointed for many decades. We have indeed made some great discoveries to be sure, such as the Higgs field. But that was expected and remains within the bounds of the physical sciences.

So let me know where this evidence for non-physical properties is. I would love to read about it. That would clearly be a brand new frontier in science to be sure.

[AgnosticBoy]

The described process is analogous to any computer simulation. The computer has its own machinery and physical processes. It operates under a set of constraints, but when events happen in the simulation, the results cause the computer's processes to accommodate this change. For example, a simulation of two competing organisms. The computer could have a functional state in the case either one wins, but the process depends on the simulated actions of nonexistent entities (which are represented by physical data). The simulation then may store the data. But the transistors, capacitors, and processors alone didn't decide the outcome. They decided the outcome based on how the simulated objects acted under their own simulated rules.

Similarly, the mind is a product of the brain. It is a simulated singular and seemingly continuous process that gives the brain-and-body a means of interfacing with reality in complex ways, and storing information to further augment the capabilities of the organism. But this simulation is still physical, even if there is a relational connection between the "state" of the mind and the brain. The brain, simulating a mind that acts under specific rules, responds to the simulated outcome and experiences physiological changes.

To assert materialism is incomplete due to consciousness would be to assert that simulations have nonphysical components. You need to be mindful of the brain's internal machinery and data assignment or recollection.

The Computation theory of the mind (the mind being an information processing system like a computer) is a working theory that cognitive psychologist work with to understand the mind. That explains some of the "functional" roles of the mind but it does not address the metaphysics and phenomenology of the mind - like what is the nature of mind?! or What or why is there subjective experiences?! Divine Insight touched on these points in his response to you.

This is to add further to my response. William Hasker is another philosopher who endorses 'emergent dualism'. He lays out some detail of what's required to have a good theory of consciousness. Your explanation would not be considered good because it leaves out or simply ignores a lot of details about the mind. I'll let William Hasker pick up from hereon:

From book, The Emergent Self ,pg. 189
What a good theory of mind should involve?

But if our theory should be realist about the results of the sciences, it should also be realist about the phenomena of the mind itself. John Searle has noted that a great deal of recent philosophy of mind is extremely implausible because of its denial of apparently "obvious facts about the mental, such as that we all really do have subjective conscious mental states and that these are not eliminable in favor of anything else."2

From book, The Emergent Self, Pg. 189-190
What is emergent dualism in comparison with Cartesian or substance dualism?

So far, perhaps, so good. But stating that we are realists both about the physical and about the mental brings to the fore once again the vast differences between the two: the chasm opens beneath our feet. Cartesian dualism simply accepts the chasm, postulating the soul as an entity of a completely different nature than the physical, an entity with no essential or internal relationship to the body, which must be added to the body ab extra by a special divine act of creation. This scheme is not entirely without plausibility, at least from a theistic point of view, but I believe (and have argued above) that it carries with it serious difficulties.

In rejecting such dualisms, we implicitly affirm that the human mind is produced by the human brain and is not a separate element "added to" the brain from outside. This leads to the further conclusion that mental properties are "emergent" in the following sense: they are properties that manifest themselves when the appropriate material constituents are placed in special, highly complex relationships, but these properties are not observable in simpler configurations nor are they derivable from the laws which describe the properties of matter as it behaves in these simpler configurations. Which is to say: mental properties are emergent in the sense that they involve emergent causal powers that are not in evidence in the absence of consciousness.

From book, The Emergent Self, pg. 192
Advantages of emergent dualism over Cartesian dualism?

The theory's advantages over Cartesian dualism result from the close natural connection it postulates between mind and brain, as contrasted with the disparity between mind and matter postulated by Cartesianism.
...
There is evidence both from sub-human animals and from human beings (e.g., commissurotomy) that the field of consciousness is capable of being divided as a result of damage to the brain and nervous system.7 This fact is a major embarrassment to Cartesianism, but it is a natural consequence of emergent dualism. Beyond this, the theory makes intelligible, as Cartesian dualism does not, the intimate dependence of consciousness and mental processes on brain function. The detailed ways in which various mental processes depend on the brain must of course be discovered (and are in fact being discovered) by empirical research.
...
And, finally, this theory is completely free of embarrassment over the souls of animals. Animals have souls, just as we do: their souls are less complex and sophisticated than ours, because generated by less complex nervous systems.

From book, The Emergent Self, pg. 193
Advantages of emergent dualism over materialism?

The theory's advantages over materialism will depend on which variety of materialism is in view. As compared with eliminativist and strongly reductive varieties of materialism, our theory has the advantage that it takes the phenomena of mental life at face value instead of denying them or mutilating them to fit into a Procrustean bed. In contrast with mind-body identity theories and supervenience theories that maintain the “causal closure of the physical,� the view here presented recognizes the necessity of recognizing both teleology and intentionality as basic-level phenomena; they are not the result of an “interpretation� (by what or by whom, one might ask?) of processes which in their intrinsic nature are neither purpose-driven nor intentional. The view proposed here has more affinity with "property dualism" and views which postulate a strong form of property emergence--but these already are views to which many will hesitate to accord the label "materialist."

[To this I'll add the apparent irreducibility of consciousness to physical properties]

From book, The Emergent Self, pgs. 194-195
The costs of emergent dualism to Christians?

I have described the advantages of emergent dualism, but what of the costs? So far as I can tell, there is only one major cost involved in the theory, but some will find that cost to be pretty steep. The theory requires us to maintain, along with the materialists, that the potentiality for conscious life and experience really does exist in the nature of matter itself.9 And at the same time we have to admit, as McGinn has pointed out, that we have no insight whatever into how this is the case.10 It is not necessary to endorse McGinn's assertion that the brain-mind link is "cognitively closed" to us--that is, that human beings are inherently, constitutionally incapable of grasping the way in which matter produces consciousness--though that possibility deserves serious consideration. And yet, in purely physiological terms, what is required for consciousness--or at least, some kind of sentience--to exist, must not be all that complex, since the requirements are apparently satisfied in relatively simple forms of life

[Divine Insight]

And yet, in purely physiological terms, what is required for consciousness--or at least, some kind of sentience--to exist, must not be all that complex, since the requirements are apparently satisfied in relatively simple forms of life

This is an important observation that seems pretty iron-clad. And when this observation is accepted as being reasonable (which I certainly accept) then the hypothesis of some form of panpsychism seems to be to be next to unavoidable.

So I actually favor panpsychism as a very likely component of the explanation of subjective experience.

In fact, it would seem to me that panpsyhcism is almost a necessary part of the overall answer. So much so, that it would seem to me that we can confidently chalk this up as being a confirmed piece of evidence.

Of course, in truth, we cannot confirm that life forms lower than humans are actually having any subjective experience at all. None the less, I think it is extremely reasonable to assume that this is indeed the case.

In fact, it would seem to me that the only way it could not be the case would be if there is a sentient knowing God who has purposefully created the false illusion that animals are actually having a subjective experience.

In other words, for panpsychism to be false, would basically require that we have been created by a highly deceitful creator who has purposely created animated zombie animals that are not having any subjective experiences at all.

Occam's Razor would certainly point to panpsychism over an elaborate deceitful creator for sure.

[Neatras]

I'll withhold judgment of panpsychism until I understand it better, both the classical definition (that consciousness is a primordial feature of all things), and the definitions each of you subscribes to; as a note, this does not mean I am prescribing you a belief in panpsychism, but a belief that panpsychism means a specific concept to you.

If the description DI puts to me is aptly made into an alternative example: Water behaves as a fluid because of its chemical properties, but the property of an entire body of water is not shared by its individual molecules. Namely, hydrogen and oxygen atoms bonded to form H2O have specific chemical interactions with each other, causing them to interact, bounce around, and do whatever else it is that molecules do, leading to a phenomenon where a great many water molecules lead to a pool of liquid.

I think we can all agree that due to the apparent consistency of universal laws (barring some unforeseen discovery where laws of nature are overturned when we turn a corner into a bad universal neighborhood), water's "wetness" will be a common feature of all groups of water molecules in a specific range of temperature, pressure, and physical forces. So wherever we might find water molecules, we should expect the resulting water it composes to be "wet." And yes, I'm being very imprecise, not pointing out the different phase states of matter every time. I urge everyone to see the forest for the trees here, or the water for the molecules as the case may be.

Is that an accurate summation of panpsychism? That wherever the physical components that can give rise to the emergence of consciousness are located, consciousness is certain?

I ask because I cannot yet buy into the idea that a 'primordial feature of all things' is that they are conscious. Given that we have no evidence to show that a rock is conscious, after all, presupposing that it is in fact conscious seems like a non sequitur conclusion just due to the attempt at resolving a dilemma regarding subjective experience. If the person having the subjective experience accepts they are a simulated mind resultant from a dynamic and physical brain state, the dilemma doesn't really present itself to me. Or maybe I've either resolved the dilemma on a personal level without removing naturalistic explanation, or I am too blind to the real dilemma and have need of it being explained more concretely. Less of the "subjective experience exists, therefore something nonphysical is going on," which reeks of non sequitur.