Emergent Dualism

[AgnosticBoy]

I've read, listened to, and watched many debates on consciousness between Christians and atheist philosophers and so far I'm left with more questions than answers. Then I read a book by Dr. David Chalmers called The Conscious Mind and realized that his position accounts for a lot of the evidence and objections that seem to plague the materialist and non-materialist sides.

In short, emergent dualism is the position that consciousness/mind is an emergent nonphysical property of the brain. Under this view, the brain is primary in that the mind depends on the brain, but what starts out as a physical process gives rise to a nonphysical nonphysical effect (i.e. the mind and its attributes). Another add-on to this position is that the mind has causal powers which it exerts on the brain - commonly referred to as 'downward' or 'top-down' causation. This turns the deterministic worldview (which also includes materialism) on its head.

After reviewing the arguments for emergent dualism, I'm left to conclude that materialism is incomplete when it comes to explaining consciousness. Substance dualism simply goes too far.

Debate requests: Leave materialism or explain why anyone should remain a materialists after learning about consciousness.

Have you considered emergent dualism? What are your objections?

[Swami]

Post 1 of 2

Interesting thread. David Chalmers has a newer book out than the one you posted from the 90s. The Character of Consciousness.. check it out on Amazon.com.

Excerpts:
pg. 16-17
"When simple methods of explanation are ruled out, we need to investigate the alternatives. Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness. Just as we explain familiar high-level phenomena involving mass in terms of more basic principles involving mass and other entities, we might explain familiar phenomena involving experience in terms of more basic principles involving experience and other entities.

In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles that tell us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience.
"

p. 126
"It is sometimes objected that distinct physical and mental states could not interact since there is no causal nexus between them. However, one lesson from Hume and from modern science is that the same goes for any fundamental causal interactions, including those found in physics. Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental."

[Swami]

Post 2 of 2

Nonreductive and nonmaterial consciousness according to Chalmers.. The Character of Consciousness:
p. 105
A reductive explanation of consciousness will explain this wholly on the basis of physical principles that do not themselves make any appeal to consciousness. 3 A materialist (or physicalist) solution is a solution on which consciousness is itself seen as a physical process. A nonmaterialist (or nonphysicalist) solution is a solution on which consciousness is seen as nonphysical (even if closely associated with p hysical processes). A nonreductive solution is one on which consciousness (or principles involving consciousness) is admitted as a basic part of the explanation.

[Sorry materialists..](*,) ]
It is natural to hope that there will be a materialist solution to the hard problem and a reductive explanation of consciousness, just as there have been reductive explanations of many other phenomena in many other domains. But we have already seen that consciousness seems to resist materialist explanation in a way that other phenomena do not.

[Divine Insight]

[Sorry materialists..](*,) ]
It is natural to hope that there will be a materialist solution to the hard problem and a reductive explanation of consciousness, just as there have been reductive explanations of many other phenomena in many other domains. But we have already seen that consciousness seems to resist materialist explanation in a way that other phenomena do not.

This is simply untrue. Consciousness has not yet resisted a materialistic explanation. We simply don't yet have enough information to draw that conclusion.

This is nothing but an exhibition of extreme impatience or anxiety on the part of those who desperately desire a non-materialistic explanation.

What these over-zealous non-materialists don't seem to realize is that science will ultimately come to the conclusion that a non-materialistic explanation is required should this turn out to be the case. Science will lead us to that conclusion should that result be true.

However, we are nowhere near in a position to make that determination yet. So the non-materialists crowd are just over-anxious to jump to unwarranted conclusions before we have sufficient information to draw those conclusions.

I certainly understand David Chalmers' position. I even tend to agree that his ideas are worthy hypotheses upon which to base studies. However, even Chalmers himself confesses that he has not been able to take his hypothesis to any actual conclusions.

All Chalmers has done thus far is argue for the worthiness of his alternative hypothesis to be investigated. I certainly wouldn't argue with him on that point. To the contrary I say, "more power to him".

If anyone can bring Chalmers' hypotheses to fruition that would be great. But at this current point in time he has no evidence to support his hypothesis.

Even a hypothesis for a "non-physicall" consciousness needs to have some evidence to back it up.

Where's the evidence?

All I've seen thus far are totally false accusations that the material approach has failed. That's false. It most certainly hasn't failed. It simply hasn't been fully explored.

There's a huge difference between a method of investigation failing versus having simply not been fully explored.

The non-materialists are telling falsehoods when they claim that the question of how the brain creates subjective experience has resisted a materialistic explanation.

We simply don't yet know enough to say that. Granted it's a "Hard Problem", but that doesn't automatically make it impossible.

[AgnosticBoy]

Post 1 of 2

Interesting thread. David Chalmers has a newer book out than the one you posted from the 90s. The Character of Consciousness.. check it out on Amazon.com.

Excerpts:
pg. 16-17
"When simple methods of explanation are ruled out, we need to investigate the alternatives. Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness. Just as we explain familiar high-level phenomena involving mass in terms of more basic principles involving mass and other entities, we might explain familiar phenomena involving experience in terms of more basic principles involving experience and other entities.

In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles that tell us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience.
"

p. 126
"It is sometimes objected that distinct physical and mental states could not interact since there is no causal nexus between them. However, one lesson from Hume and from modern science is that the same goes for any fundamental causal interactions, including those found in physics. Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, for example; rather, the relevant laws are simply fundamental."

I appreciate the source but I'm currently reading a good book that called Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene. This book covers the issue from a scientific perspective which is what I've been focused on lately. I feel pretty confident that I've already made a strong case for nonphysical mind based on the scientific evidence that I've presented. I've supplied enough strong points that even others can argue my case for me after I end my participation here.

Bottom line, there is NO scientific peer-reviewed based evidence to explain how a physical brain gives rise to first-person/nonphysical experience. We can't even build such a computer!

[DrNoGods]

[Replying to post 123 by AgnosticBoy]

I appreciate the source but I'm currently reading a good book that called Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene.

Hope you enjoy it. I've referenced that book 4-5 times here previously (I read it earlier in the year), and it does not provide any evidence for nonphysical processes being involved in consciousness. In fact the bulk of his work is in trying to figure out exactly how the physical processes do work to explain consciousness.

[AgnosticBoy]

[Replying to post 123 by AgnosticBoy]

I appreciate the source but I'm currently reading a good book that called Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts by Stanislas Dehaene.

Hope you enjoy it. I've referenced that book 4-5 times here previously (I read it earlier in the year), and it does not provide any evidence for nonphysical processes being involved in consciousness. In fact the bulk of his work is in trying to figure out exactly how the physical processes do work to explain consciousness.

Thanks. I noticed that you referenced it earlier and decided to check it out. I am enjoying the first chapter so far which explains how subjective experience (consciousness included) was once shunned by science.

Of course, I read plenty of reviews about the book before purchasing it myself. The author does not claim to solve the mind/body problem - no credible scientist does. In fact, if the author does not cover mental causation which is an emergent feature, then I doubt his views will do much to solve the problem and that's because the mind plays a causal role in generating consciousness. Mental causation is being empirically validated more and more, and its even shown to control/change brain structure/function. I have my own views on why materialists don't cover this evidence.

[Divine Insight]

Mental causation is being empirically validated more and more, and its even shown to control/change brain structure/function. I have my own views on why materialists don't cover this evidence.

Actually this is precisely what any materialist who is familiar with how analog computers work would expect.

So why you suggest that materialists don't cover this "evidence" is beyond me. This isn't evidence for anything non-material.

You seem to think that mental activity is necessarily non-material. But that actually isn't the case at all.

In fact, I have noticed that most of your conclusions seem to be based on erroneous premises that various things are necessarily non-material, when in fact, there is no reason to make that premise.

It's really no different from your claim that mental images are necessarily non-physical when that's simply not the case at all.

So you are probably applying "correct reasoning". You're simply starting with invalid premises. Logic will always lead you in the wrong direction if you start the logical reasoning based on faulty premises.

Moreover, if you have already convinced yourself that anything is "non-physical" then you have already put the cart before the horse. Once you have embraced that as a premise how could you ever hope to reach any other conclusion? You've already decided what the conclusion must be by having accepted unproven premises.

Currently there is no evidence that any brain activity or resulting experience is "non-physical". Yet you keep acting like as if it has already been established that some things are non-physical.

So like I say, you've already put the cart before the horse. You apparently already believe you have the answer before the answer has been discovered.

[By Grace]

[Replying to post 112 by AgnosticBoy]

Okay, lets say that rocks and soda cans have "experiences"...

Since this is my first post here, I can say that I hope there is more rational content than is in this sentence above on the rest of the forum.

No, I am not making a slam at the one who posted it, but I am legitimately questioning the notion that inanimate objects somehow have sensory organs and brains sufficient to record "experiences".

[William]

[Replying to post 112 by AgnosticBoy]

Okay, lets say that rocks and soda cans have "experiences"...

Since this is my first post here, I can say that I hope there is more rational content than is in this sentence above on the rest of the forum.

No, I am not making a slam at the one who posted it, but I am legitimately questioning the notion that inanimate objects somehow have sensory organs and brains sufficient to record "experiences".

Hi By Grace and welcome to the forum.

My particular theology has it that the Earth (planet) is a living entity and that 'GOD-Consciousness' pervades all that is the universe. In that, the whole universe is the 'form' of a living entity.

The details of this theology can be examined in the following thread-link.

♦ What I think about consciousness in relation to this reality.

Also to note.

It is a good practice to quote someone in context to ensure any following comment is also within context.

In that, the contextual quote reads thus;

Okay, lets say that rocks and soda cans have "experiences". Are you actually equating this to human experience? Not even those born blind have visual experiences, not even visual dreams. So I fail to grasp how a rock with NO sensory organs nor stimuli can have any experience like sentient, organic, thinking and feeling beings.

Which, in all fairness, apparently agrees with what you stated anyway. The so-called 'rational content' is within the paragraph, rather than the sentence.

Enjoy The Ride.

[By Grace]

My bad