Peanut Gallery for Tanager & Wiploc on the Moral Argumen

[wiploc]

This is the peanut gallery thread for those who wish to comment on Tanager and wiploc's one-on-one discussion of the question of whether objective morality requires the existence of a god.

I couldn't fit all that in the title, above, so I just called it the moral argument.

Tanager and I won't post here until after our one-on-one thread closes. But we may respond to comments here in our one-on-one thread.

Exception: Once our one-on-one thread exists, one of us will come back here one time to post a link.

[wiploc]

Here's a general post trying to compare our two views again, but I will also respond to your post in the next one.

Let's start with your assumption that goodness is synonymous with happiness (or human flourishing). Then we need to look at what could and what does make humans happy.

Goodness is the sources of happiness. Anything that makes somebody happy is to that extent good. We are being imprecise when we say that happiness itself is good.

But that impreciseness is common and unobjectionable, which is why the problem of evil is often called the problem of suffering.

What could make humans happy? (This may be simplifying things, but I don't think expanding the list will affect my point.) It is logically possible that:

(A) pursuing net-happiness of the world makes an individual happy (or produces human flourishing). We both put ourselves in that category.

(B) pursuing selfish desires makes an individual happy (or produces human flourishing). Ethical egoists, like our Joe, are in that category.

Pursuing net-happiness tends to make the world happier. It doesn't necessarily make the individual making the sacrifice happy. Sometimes it does; it can be good to sacrifice for your community, say; but one can do a public duty for the benefit of the public, because you know this is good, without being made happy thereby.

In a way, that's what's heroic about it. Often, you are sacrificing your happiness to increase the happiness of others.

John Maynard Keynes wrote about the invisible hand. He argued that people advance the public good by pursuing their personal goals. I'm not saying that is true as opposed to false, but it is sometimes true. There is more than nothing to it.
We don't want to end up as happiness pumps like Dough Forcett in The Good Place. (Doug lived to increase other people's happiness, so he never really got any himself.) [Spoiler alert.] If you gave all your money to the poor, you'd have to start bumming money from more prudent people yourself.

So it's not clear to me that we have to choose between A and B. Rather, we want to try for a good mix.

What actually makes humans happy or leads to human flourishing? For moral realism to be true, you need there to be one answer from the above logical possibilities.

Neither of your "logical possibilities" seems likely to maximize happiness. That's true regardless of whether gods exist.

On my view...

1. God is a personal, intentional being.

2. God has subjective desires

It's strange that you build subjectivity into your system, but not into the system you ascribe to me, and then conclude that mine is subjective but yours is not.

3. God decides to create humans and, therefore, gets to decide what will be good for human flourishing.

4. God wants to have a community where everybody loves each other freely.

In the actual world, does everyone do that? No. So it cannot be true that an omniscient omnipotent god wants that.

Therefore, God makes it so that performing loving actions towards others is part of what it means for a human to individually flourish (chooses option 1 above). God creates humans with a moral sense to help guide them towards these actions for not only the good of the entire creation, but for their own individual good. Ultimately, however, the way for humans to best love others consistently comes through being in communion with the all-knowing and all-loving God. Also, God must give humans free will.

So he's not omnipotent.

5. Human free will may lead to humans rejecting this moral sense and performing unloving actions towards others.

In the actual world, this happens regardless of whether gods exist.

6. Humans have chosen to perform unloving actions towards others and, therefore, are not in the community God intended them to have, but God continues to gift life to them in hopes that they will rejoin the community.

If he knows the future, he doesn't have any hopes.

7. Jesus is God's answer to how people can rejoin that community.

Huh. You've taken enough unorthodox (as I see it) positions that I'd begun to wonder what kind of theist you are. Maybe you identified yourself as a Christian early on, but, if so, I had forgotten.

*If this is true, then there is only one actual reality from the logical possibilities mentioned above that is true. I think that shows moral realism is true.


On your view (I think)...

1. Unguided socio-biological evolution is an impersonal, blind process.

2. Unguided socio-biological evolution has no subjective desires, because it is not an agent with desires

So the subjectivity is in your system.

3. Unguided socio-biological evolution produces humans as we know them today.

4. Unguided socio-biological evolution produces humans of type A and type B (from above).

Both types exist regardless of whether gods exist.

Type A wants a community that seeks net-happiness of the world. Type B wants to be able to seek their own interests first. You are saying that everyone should follow option A,

No, I'm more for what Buddhists might call a middle path. I can go you this far: I think we should travel closer to path A than we do today.

in spite of their natural desire or opinion on the matter, so that option A will take place. But Joe would use the same logic about option B.

I doubt that most rapists are calling for more people to selfishly rape them. I think of rapists, and sociopaths generally, as people who are glad that other people are nice. They just want to do some free riding.

5. I'm not sure what you believe about whether a human can choose to reject their strongest desires and live out what the other desire would have them do, if they were to follow that. Your answer here would change the parallel points of (6) and (7).

*If this is true, then both logical possibilities above are true, depending on the person. I think this contradicts moral realism.

I don't know what the asterisks refer to.

And I don't see how any of this makes your morality more real than mine. There is a potential path, closer to path A than path B, which would increase happiness. That's a truth, a reality, an objective fact. It doesn't become more real if there are gods.

[wiploc]

Please forgive me if I skip over anything.

I skip a lot too.

If I do, I feel I've already answered that type of response (here or elsewhere), but it may be a misunderstanding of your critique.

We've probably covered the waterfront. I'm ready to stand down now if you are. Sometimes I think we're making progress, but other times I don't.

You believe a god has authority over us, the authority to dictate moral orders, to tell us what we ought to do. And, if you're right, then god has authority over us, has the right to dictate moral orders, to tell us what we ought to do.

How is that different from saying that if you're right you're right?

I believe that happiness is good, that we ought to be nice to each other, to make each other happy. If I'm right then I'm right. How is my argument weaker, less logical, less objective, or less real than yours?

I'm not arguing like that. I'm saying that if what I believe is true (i.e., God has authority over us), then moral realism (i.e., that human moral truth exists outside of subjective human opinion/desires) is true. If A, then B...not If A, then A.

I thought you undertook to establish that if gods exist, then they have moral authority over us. Now you're reduced (as I see it) to arguing that if they have moral authority over us, then they do. Your premise and conclusion are the same; your argument is circular.

You phase them distinctly ("god has moral authority over us" vs "morality is real") but that's a distinction without a difference.

Or, if they are different, then I get to ask why we're supposed to obey god's authority, whereupon you won't have any answer that doesn't involve utilitarianism.

When you say that being nice to each other creates the most net-happiness in the world and that, therefore, we should be nice to each other, this says nothing about moral realism being true or not.

When you say that gods have authority over us, this (assuming your above argument isn't circular) says nothing about whether we should obey that authority.

It just says that if we want to work towards the most net-happiness of the world, then we should be nice to each other. It doesn't tell us why we should work towards that goal.

Why should we obey gods?

Assuming for the moment that slavery is actual ownership, an owner has the right to place obligations on their slaves and owns that slave against any other claims of ownership. That includes the slaves claim to "own" themselves or 'be free'. So, even in looking at cases of ownership involving free will, the owned cannot just choose to quit the relationship. The owner can place certain obligations on the owned. The slave can choose not to fulfill them, but that doesn't change what their obligations are.

Are you actually comfortable with this argument?

Absolutely. It's following the logic of ownership. I am uncomfortable with people reading other things into it and thinking I'm saying something I'm not.

I don't know what you think I'm reading into it, but it strikes me as ugly, reprehensible. You're a nice guy, nicer than me. You are not ugly or reprehensible. What I'm saying is that this particular dog won't hunt.

I recommend that you avoid this line of argument. I'm recommending a tactic. I think you'll be more persuasive if you don't field this argument.

You're back on my team. Utilitarianism wins. Where utilitarianism and god-made morality conflict, utilitarianism triumphs. Gods, if they exist, get to tell us what to do only insofar as their orders comply with utilitarian principles.

If this were a debate, I would claim total victory.

But I'm saying that utilitarianism 'wins' because God makes it so for humans.

You wrote, "If there is a conflict," between what makes people happy and what owners (like gods) order, "then I think what is good for the human's flourishing trumps what the owner obligates."

You can see how I was confused.

Utilitarianism, if it wins, is the guide to our actions only insofar as God made following utilitarian principles what leads to human flourishing.

Why is that? I don't see what gods have to do with it.

Utilitarianism tells us what to do only insofar as utilitarian principles comply with God's orders. Without God, utilitarianism is on the same level as egoism.

But your system is based on the subjective egosim of gods. How is that in any way better, more logical, more objective, or more real?

Regardless, this is a moot point as a critique of my view because there is no conflict between what is good for human flourishing and what God obligates humans to do.

I'm going to throw this back at you a little later. Right now I'll just remind you of the shark fin soup.

We test theories by taking parts of them away. If there's a theory that shark fin is what makes shark fin soup taste good, then we can test that theory by taking the shark fin out of the soup.

You have a theory that morality involves taking orders from gods and making people happy. You think taking orders is the good bit. But we can test that. If we take making people happy out of the soup, it no longer tastes good, whereas, if we take out following orders, the soup still tastes wonderful.

You don't get to object that this test isn't relevant because I've altered your recipe. Altering the recipe is how we test theories.

You have effectively conceded that utilitarianism makes so much sense that god-based morality makes sense only insofar as it agrees with utilitarianism. That's hardly a "moot point."

I have not effectively conceded that. The scorpion god critique is a moot point because it is not analogical to my view at all. Scorpion god's orders conflict with what he determined for human flourishing. That causes the problem. My view has no such conflict.

Then you don't get to criticize my view by complaining that I don't require following divine orders. In my view there are no such orders. And they wouldn't matter even if they did exist. Morality has nothing to do with gods.

If I'm right then I'm right, and your attempts to put orders into my soup are "not analogical to my view at all."

It's not about whether I agree that aggregate happiness matters, it's about the foundation of that agreement for us. We get the same answer, in one sense, but we are disagreeing on the foundation. I'm asking you to point to your foundation, not the answer that comes from the foundation.

I think happiness is good (or the causes of happiness are good). That's my foundation.

You think taking orders from gods is good. That's your foundation.

Every time I ask why taking orders is good, you say it makes people happy.

I don't see any appeal to your foundation. It seems pointless and ugly, justified by analogy to the human institution of slavery, which is one of the least appealing things about us.

I'm perfectly happy with my foundation; I'm in favor of happiness. You don't seem comfortable with your foundation, because you continually justify it in terms of my foundation.

I never justify my foundation in terms of yours. I never say, "We should try to make each other happier, because that way we'll be following orders."

In my worldview, the logic of the situation instills those rights.

Rape actually makes people unhappy; therefore it is wrong. If we express this in terms of rights, we say that Sara has a right not to be raped.

So, if the world ever got to a place where rapists banded together and imprisoned those who refused to rape, to use them as rape victims...if the rapists outnumber the victims, rape would actually make people happy. You would then say that rape is right?

Having more rapists is no way to maximize happiness.

If gods ordered us to rape, you would say rape is right. That's your position, and you're welcome to it.

My position is that rape would be good if people liked getting raped. If it made people happy, then it would be good. But rape isn't good. The reality is that rape decreases happiness; rape is bad.

This is real. It's an objective truth. And it's true regardless of what gods would say if they existed.

[William]

[Replying to post 90 by The Tanager]

But in step 6, God is still continually giving humans life (the sustaining part I've talked about with God) so there might still be same retainer of ownership. I have some more thinking to do there.

The idea is that IF 'GOD=life' THEN in order for GOD to sustain any thing with life (such as a biological form as an obvious example) GOD has to actually BE that life within that form. The idea of separating GOD from humanity by neglecting to include that understanding and promoting the contrary as a 'truth', naturally enough, creates its own problems. Such problems resolve themselves when acceptance of the 'IF/THEN' above is applied.

I think you misunderstand what I'm saying there. I agree with what you say about organized religions that have gained power. I agree atheists are involved in fighting for rights of others. I'm not presuming theists are better at this than atheists; I'm not making that kind of comparison. I'm talking about the worldviews of theism vs. atheism being logically connected to moral realism.

And I am speaking to how and why that is possible.

In the case of Sara, her actions were limited to having to deal with being raped as best she could, because her owner-GOD gave up his rights of ownership over HIS actions, (and inaction's). He allowed his property to be raped, which as I argued, is neglect of said property, by wanting his other property (the rapist) to have the freedom to exercise his will to rape Sara or not.

One can see that whatever such a GOD decides, these induce 'rules'. Allowing a rapist to rape on the grounds that the rapists 'free will' cannot be tampered with, is a rule.

I think God must (and does) take responsibility for allowing human free will. I think it was the better choice of those available.

Your answer does not cover the context of my argument.

Again, if one is to understand that GOD as the life within the forms doesn't own said forms, but is simply utilizing them for the experience, GOD can indeed still hold GODs-Self as responsible for all the actions made in relation to this.

This is why I often write about what I think happens in 'afterlife' or the next phase of this experience into individuality through GOD-Consciousness divesting Itself into individuate forms for the experience. There is - by all accounts - a reckoning which is created by those individuate aspects of GOD-LIFE, which allow for justice to be served for both wrong and right doing and the consequences are meted out by the individuals themselves, somewhat more free from the prior limitations experienced through the density of human form.

It is by this manner that the aspects of GOD reconcile with the Wholeness of GOD without having to abandon individuality in the process.

In that sense, the analogy is that the 'lesser' GOD reunites with the 'greater' through the process of being responsible for one's actions and always having the opportunity of doing something pro-active about that.

I do recall previous conversations with you on this matter, where I was clear that 'time' is irrelevant to such process in that - it does not matter how long such process takes to occur, (in every sense it is occurring continuously) as there are phases set up to assist the process of the end game...individual by individual.

As I recall, your opposing argument was along the lines that 'this one life experience on earth should be long enough for such to occur' and then it was either the individual was 'saved' or 'exterminated'.
This belief itself stems from the idea that GOD is separate from the individual, but I think it paints the picture of an extremely limited entity, both in ideas and in patience.

There is no hurry.

That 'community' is Heaven. I think Heaven is breaking into this world, into my personal life as well, but I'm not fully in that community now, nor is it fully in the world. There are Sara's who are seeking to be in that community and those who are not. Raping any of them is wrong, in my view.

'Done on earth as it is in heaven' is one phrase among many which promote the idea of "To love GOD is to love one another" which is sullied through introductions of needless dogma.

A Christian may not see GOD within all life forms, any more than an atheist does. But if either are loving towards me. a non-Christian/non-atheist, then whether they understand it or not, they are effectively recognizing GOD within the form I occupy, and supporting that, without condition. Thus the idea of making heaven on earth a reality has nothing to do with either position. It only has to do with the fairly simply support of a basic notion. "Namaste" as it is known in one culture. Even so, it is not what it is called, but whether it is done, which effectively gets the thing actually done.

"To love GOD is to love one another"

Those in whom the community is breaking into have responsibility to protect each other from those who want nothing to do with such a community.

The idea that the community has to protect itself shows that there is no need to believe is any separate entity GOD as the 'owner' of the community, or for that matter, even the 'protector' of that community.

It could be argued that GOD had no absolute moral values, and the created environments made for the opportunity to examine the legitimacy of any claim that such a state existed.

Perhaps the idea of property ownership is a false right created by humans on each other and their ideas of GOD, and this because the environment created, enable such a thing to happen?

If you are arguing that there is no absolute good/bad or right/wrong, then this isn't really the thread to analyze your view. This thread is about what views can adequately account for moral realism.

I think it is important in understand this idea of moral realism that it is acknowledged that there is no such thing as absolute good/bad or right/wrong as it clears the air of that foggy misconception and helps us to focus on remembering moral realism has no absolutes. The idea of any GOD being absolutely good also forces the idea that, therefore GOD has to be separate from humanity in that special way, which of course creates issues of its own.

The environment we are within creates the opportunity to explore such notions through experience and potentially learn from them. Effectively we are altogether a GOD doing just that.

I think what our human flourishing is is entirely dependent on God as our Creator. That's when the ownership point plays a role.

In the sense that we are GOD, we do not 'own' our self. We do own our actions, whether it is in creating this environment to experience and explore, or whether it is how we behave while experiencing and exploring it. We gave our self a limited time in which to do so in human form - swimming, as it were between the flags of birth and death - and have also designed the next stage (and the prior one) in relation to the overall experience and its unavoidable consequences -short and long term.

I do think people are something other than God.

Well our forms are.

I think we are dependent on God for life, consciousness, etc.

Whereas I think we ARE that life, consciousness etc.

I do think God placed a moral sense in humans.

Whereas I think we are GOD in human forms, and the sense of morality has been amplified to a noticeable condition due to the nature of the environment itself. Because we are GOD in form, we naturally notice it, as the form is designed to help accomplish that, albeit in subtle ways which can go unnoticed.

In that, we each have choices - here in the now, between the flags - and some chose to ignore the moral sense - or their forms work toward them not easily being able to do much about that, because of faults in said forms.

Problematic to that is the fact that there is no absolute. We can imagine a GOD-idea which allows for us to attempt to create an an absolute, but this itself contradicts the nature of the environment such a GOD 'placed us into' to which I have already addressed in this post.

3: What we know about this particular idea of GOD is that he never changes - and thus there is no negotiation. This may in fact not be the case, so please correct me if it isn't.

What do you mean negotiation?

In the sense that...if one believes in the idea of a GOD who never changes, then the belief is nonnegotiable.

I think being part of the community requires one to be in relationship with God.

I think heaven on earth is an idea which envisions human beings working together for the greater good of all - the whole environment.
I myself understand that the earth itself is the form of a living, creative, intelligent, conscious self aware Entity. In relation to ideas of GOD, I think of this entity as 'the local GOD' in which we are all aspects of and thus having relationship with, whether we consciously know it or not, or even if we assign other ideas of GOD to it and relate to those, and therefore have an indirect relationship which by default, is not the best way to go about forming relationship...but its a start at least...an potentially could either develop, or fall by the wayside.


The relationship necessary for 'heaven on earth' has to be more specific to the reality than the ideal in order for this to actualize at any level of awareness where humanity can focus on the task, so anything which directly or even indirectly is identified as contrary to that vision and in that, working against the actual manifestation of heaven on earth, need to be treated as such and dismissed accordingly.

For example, tens of millions of Christians have been led to believe that a GOD is going to 'come down from heaven' and fix the current problems on earth and MAKE that community a reality.
So those numbers supporting such belief are essentially working against humanity working out the problem and helping to fix it, because they have accepted the belief that 'GOD will do the job' because otherwise the job won't get done.

The job cannot easily get done when the majority of the workforce who can make it so are idle and dreaming.

I think that we can't live out the community ethic without God's help.

As per the idea of GOD I wrote of above, we have all the help we need but are not treating the relationship respectfully for that. Most are looking to other ideas of GOD which are less real and in one's face, but more attractive in the eye of ones mind.

That does not mean I think atheists can't be good or even act better than a professing Christian. Any comparison I would make would be only for the individual. I think every individual can do better than they currently are, if they are connected to God. I think all of us fall short of perfect morality. Knowing what to do and doing it are two different things.

I think I answered this adequately in those paragraphs above.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to post 92 by wiploc]

[Replying to post 93 by William]

I don't feel like I'm just repeating myself in the same way, so (some of) these five posts may help move the discussion forward. If not, I'm fine with standing down. The first post is a general one, then one on my view in response to wiploc, then one on my view in response to William, then two smaller ones on wiploc's view and then William's view.

I thought you undertook to establish that if gods exist, then they have moral authority over us. Now you're reduced (as I see it) to arguing that if they have moral authority over us, then they do. Your premise and conclusion are the same; your argument is circular.

You phase them distinctly ("god has moral authority over us" vs "morality is real") but that's a distinction without a difference.

Or, if they are different, then I get to ask why we're supposed to obey god's authority, whereupon you won't have any answer that doesn't involve utilitarianism.

I look at it as though we have two categories (moral realism and moral subjectivism) and we are placing our views in either of those categories. And, in that, we are talking about human morality. We don't fault sharks for some behavior that we fault humans for, for instance. In other words, we are looking at morality from the human perspective. Moral realism is the view that in one situation there is one right way for all humans to act. Moral subjectivism is the view that in that situation what is right depends upon the person. We are asking under which category our views (if true) logically should be placed.

We are working off your claim for what 'right' means here. Goodness is the source of happiness. So, the 'right' action is to create happiness. But we must be more precise than just saying 'create happiness.' A thought experiment will help us talk more precisely. Liam has $500 after meeting his physical necessities. Liam loves watching sports and wants to get a new, bigger TV to watch them on. Liam also does not like helping the poor, because he thinks it just helps them to remain lazy.

Let's assume that it is an objective fact that world net-happiness would be increased if Liam gave his money to help care for the poor (and he could do it in ways that don't actually reinforce laziness, even though he doesn't think that is the case) and decreased if Liam gets the TV. Whether Liam-happiness would decrease or not is up for debate and, I think, a major point to look at considering our views (and I will in the next posts). Liam does not care about world net-happiness, but cares about Liam-happiness.

A moral realist view says there is one right action for Liam (or anyone) in this same situation. A moral subjectivist view says what is right depends on the person.

Pursuing net-happiness tends to make the world happier. It doesn't necessarily make the individual making the sacrifice happy. Sometimes it does; it can be good to sacrifice for your community, say; but one can do a public duty for the benefit of the public, because you know this is good, without being made happy thereby.

In a way, that's what's heroic about it. Often, you are sacrificing your happiness to increase the happiness of others.

John Maynard Keynes wrote about the invisible hand. He argued that people advance the public good by pursuing their personal goals. I'm not saying that is true as opposed to false, but it is sometimes true. There is more than nothing to it.
We don't want to end up as happiness pumps like Dough Forcett in The Good Place. (Doug lived to increase other people's happiness, so he never really got any himself.) [Spoiler alert.] If you gave all your money to the poor, you'd have to start bumming money from more prudent people yourself.

So it's not clear to me that we have to choose between A and B. Rather, we want to try for a good mix.

I'm not sure what I think here. In one sense, I help those in need simply out of love (just like doing something for my wife and kids) and, sometimes I even sacrifice a little of my comfort or entertainment or other things to do so. But in another sense, I am still gaining personal happiness by doing so. The giving of love can be a very rewarding experience in many ways or I get to miss out on the guilty feeling I would have had or whatever.

[The Tanager]

Huh. You've taken enough unorthodox (as I see it) positions that I'd begun to wonder what kind of theist you are. Maybe you identified yourself as a Christian early on, but, if so, I had forgotten.

I'm not sure that I identified my particular theism early on. I would consider myself orthodox, but labels are a tricky business and are affected by even how loosely or tightly people wield them. I only shared this to freshen up our analysis of my view. We had been looking at theism generally through the lens of ownership. William and yourself made me question whether I should be doing that, based on my particular theism. I figured I should lay out my view more fully without the ownership talk and then look back at whether ownership did fit into my view like I'd been thinking it did.

I think it still fits in there, at least at the point of creation, even if God gives up most/all of that ownership. In the same way that artists own their creations when they make them. They can choose to give up any claim of ownership, but that points to the fact that they did, at one point, own their creation. When God gives free will, God gives up at least much of that ownership. One point I'm unclear on right now is whether God sustaining our existence (or in other words, continually being the source of life to us) is not also some kind of ownership, since it is a continual giving of something we can't have on our own, but maybe ownership is not the right term there.

I don't know what you think I'm reading into it, but it strikes me as ugly, reprehensible. You're a nice guy, nicer than me. You are not ugly or reprehensible. What I'm saying is that this particular dog won't hunt.

I recommend that you avoid this line of argument. I'm recommending a tactic. I think you'll be more persuasive if you don't field this argument.

I don't think that I first brought up that example, but (if that is true) I'm also not saying it was a deceitful thing for you or another to do. If I brought it up, then I agree that I should have used only other examples, if at all possible (and it seems that would be possible).

I don't know what you are reading into it, but I know what some people might be reading into it. So, to be clear: If one understands me to be saying that human slavery is not ugly and reprehensible, then I think that would be misreading my statement. If one understands me to be saying that God's ownership of humans is identical to human slavery, then I think that would be misreading my statement. I used it as an analogy, which means focusing on one aspect, but not the other ones. The one point of comparison I was looking at was about the concept of ownership.

In regards to Liam (from the last post), my view says that Liam ought to do what makes Liam personally happier. And, no, this is not a change of what I've been saying all along. For what I think would make Liam personally happier is to help care for the poor over buying a nicer TV. Liam thinks the TV would make him happier, and it might in the immediate. But, ultimately, I think Liam would be most happy if he did things like use extra resources to help others be cared for (in a way that allows them to eventually care for themselves and use future extra resources to help others be cared for).

If my theism is true, then this would be an objective fact of reality because God would be responsible for designing what it means for an individual like Liam to flourish, to be personally happiest. And I think God created all humans in His image, which includes His subjective desire to be other-centered rather than self-centered. If this is true, then there is one right action for Liam, not because of some unconnected after-creation command from God, but because of how God designed reality at creation to work. If there is one right action, founded in God's pattern of what causes personal human happiness in every human, then moral realism would result. This would put my view under the category of moral realism based on the character of the view, not circular reasoning.

When you say that gods have authority over us, this (assuming your above argument isn't circular) says nothing about whether we should obey that authority.

If good is the source of happiness, then you (I think) are asking me why should I follow God's idea of what will make me happy. If God exists and created me, then God alone was able to choose what would make me happy. God designed us in a certain way that certain actions would lead to our happiness. God's commands are an instruction book on what makes us flourish because God designed us. If you want to know how best to "use" something, you read the instruction manual.

You wrote, "If there is a conflict," between what makes people happy and what owners (like gods) order, "then I think what is good for the human's flourishing trumps what the owner obligates."

You can see how I was confused.

I could definitely have been clearer. This was in the context of a scenario like the scorpion god thought experiment, which I think does not represent reality if my theistic worldview is true. But even in that thought experiment, utilitarianism 'wins' because scorpion god, at creation, decides "what makes people happy". Scorpion god makes it so that it is bad (i.e., will lead to their own unhappiness) for humans to obey his commands.

You have a theory that morality involves taking orders from gods and making people happy. You think taking orders is the good bit. But we can test that. If we take making people happy out of the soup, it no longer tastes good, whereas, if we take out following orders, the soup still tastes wonderful.

You don't get to object that this test isn't relevant because I've altered your recipe. Altering the recipe is how we test theories.

I don't think "taking orders from gods," as you isolate that, is the good bit. I've critiqued the scorpion god numerous times, saying that we (meaning people who are made to flourish through disobedience to scorpion god's moral command) should not follow his order. My theory involves "taking orders from God" and "making people happy" as identical things, both reflecting God's subjective nature. So, I can't be saying one is the 'good bit' and the other is not.

I think a more precise analysis would be that my theory involves "making people happy" and "God designing humans" as the recipe. If we take out "God designing humans," then we get multiple, sometimes contradictory things making different people happy. Some of us like one soup, others hate the taste of it. If we take out "making people happy," then we would have one way humans are designed to be, whatever way that is.

Having more rapists is no way to maximize happiness.

If gods ordered us to rape, you would say rape is right. That's your position, and you're welcome to it.

If that happened and the gods owned us, I would say that is an obligation placed on us by an authority. But I'm ultimately basing whether it is right or not (in the way I think you mean that) on what would make us personally happy. It is 'right' or 'good' to seek one's happiness. If gods made all humans to experience personal happiness through raping each other and trying to avoid being raped themselves, then rape is 'right,' I think, by the very logic of how you are defining goodness and its connnection to happiness. But since I think God made humans to experience personal happiness through caring for each other, which includes not raping each other, I believe rape is wrong.

Even if God or gods came along later and gave a command to rape another person, it would be wrong because of how our Creator initially designed us to work best. In my view, God is consistent and, therefore, would never come along later and give such a command.

It's strange that you build subjectivity into your system, but not into the system you ascribe to me, and then conclude that mine is subjective but yours is not.

Subjectivity has to be a part of the system because good is a relative term. But the question I've been discussing is whether the subjectivity is at the human level or not. In mine, it's not. In yours, it appears to be.

But your system is based on the subjective egosim of gods. How is that in any way better, more logical, more objective, or more real?

If God created the universe, then God's subjective desire decides objective facts about the planet Earth. From the human perspective those are objective facts, even though they are sourced in a subjective being.

In the actual world, does everyone do that? No. So it cannot be true that an omniscient omnipotent god wants that.

How are you defining 'omniscience' and 'omnipotent'?

[The Tanager]

The idea is that IF 'GOD=life' THEN in order for GOD to sustain any thing with life (such as a biological form as an obvious example) GOD has to actually BE that life within that form. The idea of separating GOD from humanity by neglecting to include that understanding and promoting the contrary as a 'truth', naturally enough, creates its own problems. Such problems resolve themselves when acceptance of the 'IF/THEN' above is applied.

Are you saying that is my idea? Or a tenet within your theism? The point of this thread is to analyze worldviews to see if they lead to moral realism. If you are saying that my view, because of this exact point, could not logically lead to moral realism, then I'm not making the connection and could use some help.

3: What we know about this particular idea of GOD is that he never changes - and thus there is no negotiation. This may in fact not be the case, so please correct me if it isn't.

be

What do you mean negotiation?

In the sense that...if one believes in the idea of a GOD who never changes, then the belief is nonnegotiable.

I'm still confused on what you are saying here. That I'm not willing to change my mind? Maybe an example of where a belief is negotiable would help me?

The relationship necessary for 'heaven on earth' has to be more specific to the reality than the ideal in order for this to actualize at any level of awareness where humanity can focus on the task, so anything which directly or even indirectly is identified as contrary to that vision and in that, working against the actual manifestation of heaven on earth, need to be treated as such and dismissed accordingly.

For example, tens of millions of Christians have been led to believe that a GOD is going to 'come down from heaven' and fix the current problems on earth and MAKE that community a reality.
So those numbers supporting such belief are essentially working against humanity working out the problem and helping to fix it, because they have accepted the belief that 'GOD will do the job' because otherwise the job won't get done.

The job cannot easily get done when the majority of the workforce who can make it so are idle and dreaming.

I agree that Christians should not think God is going to come down and magically fix the problems. I think God calls (and empowers) His followers to do the work.

The idea that the community has to protect itself shows that there is no need to believe is any separate entity GOD as the 'owner' of the community, or for that matter, even the 'protector' of that community.

I think I need to explain more what I mean about the community. I'm not using any particular terminology, but it could probably be given more Biblical phrases to make it sound more traditional. Honestly, I'm not wanting to take the time to do that work.

In one sense, every human is a part of the world community. In another sense, humans are either a part of the 'heavenly community' or the 'hellish community'.

I don't "put" people in one community or the other based on how they act. I think the heavenly community has God as a member and our relationship to Him will affect how we act towards everyone else in the world community. I think people in this community often mistreat people in the world community, but are getting better by generally leaning on God for guidance and wisdom.

I think the hellish community is simply those disconnected from God's guidance and wisdom. I do not think that means that they don't do any good for the world community. Some do more good things than many on the "heavenly" path currently do. I think both communities have humans that could be doing a lot better than we currently are in loving one another and ourselves.

Because of free will, God can't logically be the protector, for His protection would negate free will. At creation God called humans to have dominion over the world. I think that means to take care of it. I think all of us in some way(s) abdicate that responsibility towards each other. Those in the hellish community are very often trying to care for each other, but I think those in the heavenly community have an omniscient and omnibenevolent source wanting to help people care for each other better.

In light of that, I would ask you to bring back responses you were asking me that I missed and you still feel are pertinent to what I've said about the communities.

[The Tanager]

wiploc,

What do you think Liam should do in the thought experiment? If world net-happiness is increased by Liam giving his money to the poor, then aren't you saying that Liam should give the money away?

No, I'm more for what Buddhists might call a middle path. I can go you this far: I think we should travel closer to path A than we do today.

Or are you saying that Liam should spend part of the money on a new TV and help a few people who are poor? If so, that seems to me to go against world net-happiness, which means I've been misunderstanding your view all along.

I think happiness is good (or the causes of happiness are good). That's my foundation.

That's too vague because an ethical egoist would agree. The point of disagreement is on who's happiness matters. You were saying, I thought, that the world's happiness considered as a whole matters more than an individual's happiness when those two things conflict. The egoist says the reverse.

My position is that rape would be good if people liked getting raped. If it made people happy, then it would be good. But rape isn't good. The reality is that rape decreases happiness; rape is bad.

This is real. It's an objective truth. And it's true regardless of what gods would say if they existed.

First off, that may be logically impossible. I'm not sure you can like getting raped, because being raped means going against your will and liking something means being in line with your will. Regardless of that, why only look at the act from one perspective? Why is it just about the one being raped? Why not consider the happiness of the one doing the raping? Is every act's morality only about one human agent? If not, why this one?

The objective truth is that rape decreases net-world happiness. It increases some people's individual happinesses. And I'm not sure you answered the thought experiment. If we lived in such a world that it was an objective fact that rape increased net-world happiness (because rapists control the world and rape only specific people breed for that purpose, not each other), would rape, therefore, be good?

[The Tanager]

I think it is important in understand this idea of moral realism that it is acknowledged that there is no such thing as absolute good/bad or right/wrong as it clears the air of that foggy misconception and helps us to focus on remembering moral realism has no absolutes. The idea of any GOD being absolutely good also forces the idea that, therefore GOD has to be separate from humanity in that special way, which of course creates issues of its own.

I need some clarification on what you are saying here. How would you respond to the Liam thought experiment? Are you saying that rape is not always bad or wrong? How do you define moral realism?

[wiploc]

I look at it as though we have two categories (moral realism and moral subjectivism) and we are placing our views in either of those categories.

I find that I am confused. I'd have put subjectivism opposed to objectivism, and realism opposed to, say, unrealism.

But the internet isn't being entirely supportive. For instance, Wikipedia, in the entry on ethical subjetivism, says that subjectivists believe that ethical sentences express propositions, and some such sentences are true. If they believe moral claims are true, doesn't that mean subjectivists are realists?

Maybe I shouldn't worry about definitions too much. I'll say this: If it is true that one ought not torture babies for fun--or if any other moral imperative is true--then morality is real. Thus, moral realism is right. The alternative to moral realism is that any behavior is as good as any other; there is nothing that we ought to do.

I don't insist that I'm right, or that people agree with me. I'm just trying to convey what I mean by realism.

And, in that, we are talking about human morality.

But you posit a non-human moral agent, so restricting this to humans seems twisted, weird, self-serving. Why are we carving out exceptions for gods, androids, Vulcans, and fairies? Why doesn't morality apply equally to them?

We don't fault sharks for some behavior that we fault humans for, for instance. In other words, we are looking at morality from the human perspective.

Not me.

Moral realism is the view that in one situation there is one right way for all humans to act.

If we make exception for sharks, why not for humans with similar disability? Or gods. Really, if a god simply didn't know any better than to drown everybody and torture them forever, then maybe we couldn't blame him for doing that. Unless he ought to know better.

But, if he didn't know better, I'd hardly look to him for moral guidance.

Moral subjectivism is the view that in that situation what is right depends upon the person. We are asking under which category our views (if true) logically should be placed.

We are working off your claim for what 'right' means here. Goodness is the source of happiness. So, the 'right' action is to create happiness. But we must be more precise than just saying 'create happiness.' A thought experiment will help us talk more precisely. Liam has $500 after meeting his physical necessities. Liam loves watching sports and wants to get a new, bigger TV to watch them on. Liam also does not like helping the poor, because he thinks it just helps them to remain lazy.

Let's assume that it is an objective fact that world net-happiness would be increased if Liam gave his money to help care for the poor (and he could do it in ways that don't actually reinforce laziness, even though he doesn't think that is the case) and decreased if Liam gets the TV. Whether Liam-happiness would decrease or not is up for debate and, I think, a major point to look at considering our views (and I will in the next posts). Liam does not care about world net-happiness, but cares about Liam-happiness.

A moral realist view says there is one right action for Liam (or anyone) in this same situation. A moral subjectivist view says what is right depends on the person.

A few points I can make about those comments. First, let me say again that I've just discovered that I'm confused about what some of these words mean. I'd have said that moral realism is true if some things are right and others wrong. Take the claim, "X is right for Liam but wrong for Joe." I'd have said that if X really is right for one and wrong for the other, then right and wrong exist, and morality is therefore real.

Suppose there's a rule that a gentleman should tip his hat to a lady. Suppose we say that Liam should follow that rule but Joe need not do so (because he lacks a hat or arms). Is that relativism? Subjectivism?

Suppose one ought to drive on the right in America, but one ought to drive on the left in Ruritania. A few minutes ago, I'd have been confident enough to call that relativism. But as long as the rules are true, as long as you ought to drive on the right in America and the left in Ruritania, then I'd have said moral realism is true.

Does Liam have a positive duty to provide for the poor rather than buy that TV? I tend to drag my feet when it comes to claiming claim positive duties. I'm happy to say that it is more admirable to provide for the poor, or even that it is better to provide for the poor. But does Liam have a duty in every case? Can he not sometimes provide for himself beyond his necessities?

As I said before, I think we should travel closer to path A (the path where we entirely dedicate ourselves to the happiness of others) than we do now, but I hardly think we should actually be on that path.

There is more than nothing to the invisible hand. Liam thinks helping the poor makes them lazy, and I think that's an evil belief. But imagine a world in which so many people gave their all to helping the poor that Liam's belief became true. That wouldn't be good. (It might be better than this world, but it wouldn't be the best.)

So I'm for a middle path. Sometimes it can be good to indulge yourself.

I can go you this far: Sometimes, Liam ought to help the poor.

I'm not sure what I think here. In one sense, I help those in need simply out of love (just like doing something for my wife and kids) and, sometimes I even sacrifice a little of my comfort or entertainment or other things to do so. But in another sense, I am still gaining personal happiness by doing so. The giving of love can be a very rewarding experience in many ways or I get to miss out on the guilty feeling I would have had or whatever.

That's wonderful. It is a great thing to get joy from giving, from helping others. I have nothing to say against that.

But imagine some curmudgeon who is incapable of feeling that pleasure. Does this excuse him from moral duty? I think not.

[wiploc]

In regards to Liam (from the last post), my view says that Liam ought to do what makes Liam personally happier.

Moral egosim. Theistic moral egoism.

And, no, this is not a change of what I've been saying all along. For what I think would make Liam personally happier is to help care for the poor over buying a nicer TV.

This sounds like theistic egoism plus a signpost god. The god isn't creating morality; he's just pointing the way to what is moral, and what would still be moral even if the god didn't exist.

Enlightened selfishness rules. The fact that Liam's generosity will help the poor is byproduct. Morality requires Liam to help the poor because that will help him.

Liam thinks the TV would make him happier, and it might in the immediate. But, ultimately, I think Liam would be most happy if he did things like use extra resources to help others be cared for (in a way that allows them to eventually care for themselves and use future extra resources to help others be cared for).

So why can't I think all your rapists (in your rapist-majority world) would be happier if they gave that up for being nice to people and collecting stamps?

I imagine your response saying that I'm dodging and weaving, not really answering the question. What if they really would be happier if they went on raping? That's your question.

But when I bring up the scorpion god, you don't think of your responses as dodging and weaving, because my scorpion gods scenario isn't the same as your nice god scenario. So I'll point out that I believe that rape reduces happiness, and your happy-rapist scenario isn't the same as my scenario.

If I don't get to question aspects of your scenario, then you don't get to question aspects of mine.

If my theism is true, then this would be an objective fact of reality because God would be responsible for designing what it means for an individual like Liam to flourish, to be personally happiest.

If my atheist morality is true, then rape is bad regardless of what gods think.

And I think God created all humans in His image,

But not so much in his image. He needn't avoid genocide, for instance. He isn't bound by moral rules. For him they are subjective and therefore not real.

We aren't in his physical image, nor do we have his capabilities, nor do we have his freedom from morality. I doubt there is any meaning at all to this in-his-image stuff.

which includes His subjective desire to be other-centered rather than self-centered. If this is true, then there is one right action for Liam, not because of some unconnected after-creation command from God, but because of how God designed reality at creation to work. If there is one right action, founded in God's pattern of what causes personal human happiness in every human, then moral realism would result. This would put my view under the category of moral realism based on the character of the view, not circular reasoning.

If you're right, you're right. If we are supposed to follow our blueprints, then it follows that morality is real. Because if we are supposed to do anything then morality is real. That's what we mean by morality. Morality is about what we ought to do. If we ought to do something, morality is real.

But you can't give us any reason that we ought to perform according to our design specifications. This model is way better than your old master/slave model, but you still cannot give a reason for anyone to agree. You don't even agree yourself (when we discuss the scorpion god).

In what sense is it better for us to behave according to our design specifications? Why would that be good?

When you say that gods have authority over us, this (assuming your above argument isn't circular) says nothing about whether we should obey that authority.

If good is the source of happiness, then you (I think) are asking me why should I follow God's idea of what will make me happy.

No. You argue that obeying gods is good, or that following our design specifications is good. But you don't give any reason--ever--aside from utilitarianism. That's why I bring up scorpion gods and such, to give you opportunity to say what is actually good about obeying or following design specs.

You don't have an answer. Aside from the fact that you think following orders or blueprints is utilitarian, you have no defense of your moral claims.

But you think utilitarianism is insufficient when I use it to defend my moral claims.

...
the scorpion god thought experiment, which I think does not represent reality if my theistic worldview is true.

Just like the majority-rapist thought experiment doesn't represent reality if my worldview is true.

But even in that thought experiment, utilitarianism 'wins' because scorpion god, at creation, decides "what makes people happy". Scorpion god makes it so that it is bad (i.e., will lead to their own unhappiness) for humans to obey his commands.

So, once again, it seems that utilitarian morality trumps divine-command morality.

You have a theory that morality involves taking orders from gods and making people happy. You think taking orders is the good bit. But we can test that. If we take making people happy out of the soup, it no longer tastes good, whereas, if we take out following orders, the soup still tastes wonderful.

You don't get to object that this test isn't relevant because I've altered your recipe. Altering the recipe is how we test theories.

I don't think "taking orders from gods," as you isolate that, is the good bit. I've critiqued the scorpion god numerous times, saying that we (meaning people who are made to flourish through disobedience to scorpion god's moral command) should not follow his order.

I'm surprised to learn that you think you've been consistent on that point. If I recall correctly, you originally said we had to obey the scorpion god. Then you said that, while we still had to obey, you weren't okay with that. And now, if I understand, you say that we have to obey the god's blueprint but not his orders.

Why the blueprint but not the orders? Because utilitarianism.

My theory involves "taking orders from God" and "making people happy" as identical things, both reflecting God's subjective nature. So, I can't be saying one is the 'good bit' and the other is not.

My theory involves rape having a strong tendency to reduce happiness, so I can't be saying that rape would be good in a majority-rapist world.

I think a more precise analysis would be that my theory involves "making people happy" and "God designing humans" as the recipe. If we take out "God designing humans," then we get multiple, sometimes contradictory things making different people happy. Some of us like one soup, others hate the taste of it. If we take out "making people happy," then we would have one way humans are designed to be, whatever way that is.

You say that everyone is the same in your worldview. You further say that--still according to your worldview--people differ in my worldview. That's really frustrating to me.

How would you feel if I said that according to my worldview people differ in your worldview?

We both agree that Joe is for rape and Sara is against it. Yet you insist that they are the same in your view and different in mine.

This is my view: Joe and Sara are no more different in your my view than they are in yours.

Having more rapists is no way to maximize happiness.

If gods ordered us to rape, you would say rape is right. That's your position, and you're welcome to it.

If that happened and the gods owned us, I would say that is an obligation placed on us by an authority. But I'm ultimately basing whether it is right or not (in the way I think you mean that) on what would make us personally happy.

Utilitarianism wins again.

Wait, "personally happy"? Okay, ethical egoism wins.

It is 'right' or 'good' to seek one's happiness. If gods made all humans to experience personal happiness through raping each other and trying to avoid being raped themselves, then rape is 'right,' I think, by the very logic of how you are defining goodness and its connnection to happiness.

But wait, you get to dismiss the scorpion god scenario as not analogous to the way you see the world. So I get to dismiss your happy-rapist-scenario as not analogous to the way I see the world.

But since I think God made humans to experience personal happiness through caring for each other, which includes not raping each other, I believe rape is wrong.

So we're back to the ethical egoist theory which you are so against when you project it on me.

Even if God or gods came along later and gave a command to rape another person, it would be wrong because of how our Creator initially designed us to work best. In my view, God is consistent and, therefore, would never come along later and give such a command.

Morality, then, comes down to "firsties" or "dibs."

It's strange that you build subjectivity into your system, but not into the system you ascribe to me, and then conclude that mine is subjective but yours is not.

Subjectivity has to be a part of the system because good is a relative term.

No, I defined it. Not relative at all. Not unless you're going to do one of those according-to-my-system-it's-subjective-in-your-system moves.

But the question I've been discussing is whether the subjectivity is at the human level or not. In mine, it's not. In yours, it appears to be.

If I understand your current stance--and I don't insist that I do--if a human had come first, and created our blueprint, then the subjectivity would be at the human level.

Everything would be the same. Morality would be the same. Our obligations would exactly as real. But you would call morality "subjective" because of the arbitrary claim that objective morality can't be at a "human level."

How are you defining 'omniscience' and 'omnipotent'?

Omniscience is knowing everything. That includes the future. Plantinga says god knew, from the getgo, everything that would ever happen in every possible and every impossible world. That makes no sense to me--the bit about impossible worlds--but I think it fair to say he would know everything that would ever happen in every possible world.

When he created a world, he did so knowing, for instance, exactly how Eve would respond to the apple.

Omnipotence is just punk omnipotence, not true omnipotence. A punk omnipotent god can do anything except violate logic. I put this restriction on omnipotence in order that we be able to logically discuss omnipotence. There'd be no point in trying to logically discuss a god whose very existence made logic unreliable.