The "Goodness" of God & the Euthyphro Dilemma

[Jagella]

The Euthyphro Dilemma, attributed to the Greek Philosopher Plato, might be applied to the god of Christianity in the following way:

Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?

This question poses a dilemma to Christians regarding how they may base their morality in their god. On the one hand if their god must command what is good, then not only is he limited in that he must adhere to moral standards beyond his will, but he is not needed for morality. All one must do to know what is moral is to look to those moral standards, and any god is irrelevant.

On the other hand, if morality is simply what the Christian god commands, then morality reduces to "my god said so, and that's that." If the Christian god commands men to rape their mothers, then they must do so, and doing so would then be "moral"!

It should come as no surprise that Christian apologists have resolved the Euthyphro Dilemma, or so they believe. A common way of slipping out of this sticky situation is for apologists to simply say that God commands what is good because he is good! His very nature is moral, and therefore what he commands is moral. Problem solved.

Question for Debate: Have apologists adequately resolved the Euthyphro Dilemma?

I don't think so. Note that the "solution" to this problem involves saying that the Christian god is "good" and "moral." Apologists are unwittingly comparing their god to some standard of goodness. In doing so they demonstrate that the Christian god must live up to this standard of goodness to be moral, and he is not needed to know what is moral.

[Mithrae]

It should come as no surprise that Christian apologists have resolved the Euthyphro Dilemma, or so they believe. A common way of slipping out of this sticky situation is for apologists to simply say that God commands what is good because he is good! His very nature is moral, and therefore what he commands is moral. Problem solved.

Question for Debate: Have apologists adequately resolved the Euthyphro Dilemma?

I don't think so. Note that the "solution" to this problem involves saying that the Christian god is "good" and "moral." Apologists are unwittingly comparing their god to some standard of goodness. In doing so they demonstrate that the Christian god must live up to this standard of goodness to be moral, and he is not needed to know what is moral.

Seems to me that goodness is a word loosely describing a particular category of things. There's no external standard of goodness any more than there is an external standard of a sphere, for example. The only way we can know what a sphere is, is by existing in a universe with spatial relationships from which a spherical concept can be derived. A cube is not a sphere and never will be, but that's because it doesn't fit the category which the word sphere describes; not because there actually exists some platonic ideal of 'spherishness' which the cube fails to live up to. Similarly the Christian position you've described does not seem to imply any external standard of goodness, nor does it deny that goodness can only be known through God; it simply states that the category described by our word 'goodness' is perfectly matched by (and presumably ultimately derived from) the nature of God.

Thw 'goodness' category seems rather more important to us than the 'sphere' category of course. So the next dilemma is whether we place such value on goodness because of God, or for some other reason. (IE, is the nature of God 'only' measuring up to a human category, or are we impelled towards valuing goodness because of God's nature?)

[Jagella]

...the Christian position you've described does not seem to imply any external standard of goodness, nor does it deny that goodness can only be known through God; it simply states that the category described by our word 'goodness' is perfectly matched by (and presumably ultimately derived from) the nature of God.

I'm not sure if you're answering the question for debate. Can I safely assume that you are answering no, the Euthyphro Dilemma has not been resolved by apologists? The dilemma still stands because Christians judge the Christian god according to their own understanding of the word, "good." If they get their idea of goodness from what they believe the Christian god commanded, then goodness is arbitrary and is anything he commands. If they get their idea of goodness from something or somebody else, then the Christian god is not needed to base morality upon. To say that his goodness results from his nature does not resolve the dilemma because the Christian god is still being compared to some idea of "goodness."

[Mithrae]

Christians judge the Christian god according to their own understanding of the word, "good."

To some extent, yes; that's unavoidable and laudable.

If they get their idea of goodness from what they believe the Christian god commanded, then goodness is arbitrary and is anything he commands.

That doesn't follow; if God's very nature is good, then neither goodness nor his commands are arbitrary.

If they get their idea of goodness from something or somebody else, then the Christian god is not needed to base morality upon.

That also doesn't follow; the proximate causes for someone's moral views may be their family, their society and their biology, but that doesn't preclude God as an ultimate and perhaps necessary cause.

To say that his goodness results from his nature does not resolve the dilemma because the Christian god is still being compared to some idea of "goodness."

Which does not imply either that there is any actual external moral standard or that God is unnecessary for goodness; any more than there exists an external standard of 'spherishness' or that a spatial reality is unnecessary for conceiving spheres.

[dio9]

[Replying to post 1 by Jagella]

the dilemma in Judeo-Christian terms is what is holy? Jesus challenged the Pharisee position . The pious Pharisee is loved by God because he is pious.

Jesus said people are good and to be loved because they simply are loved by God . Unconditionally God loves everybody it rains on the good and the bad, behaviors are right of wrong in themselves God loves us even if we don't know the Law. (take healing the sick on the Sabbath ) The historic cultural tragedy is Jesus was crucified for teaching God's love is unconditionally. What's good is good ,.can you agree, even God can't change the ten commandments ,

Matthew 5:45 " that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous."

[Jagella]

If they get their idea of goodness from what they believe the Christian god commanded, then goodness is arbitrary and is anything he commands.

That doesn't follow; if God's very nature is good, then neither goodness nor his commands are arbitrary.

I'm not assuming here that the Christian god's nature is good. So what I'm stating follows logically.

If they get their idea of goodness from something or somebody else, then the Christian god is not needed to base morality upon.

That also doesn't follow; the proximate causes for someone's moral views may be their family, their society and their biology, but that doesn't preclude God as an ultimate and perhaps necessary cause.

The Christian god is here excluded by assumption. (See what I highlighted in bold.) I am considering what logically follows if Christians get their idea of goodness from something other than the Christian god.

To say that his goodness results from his nature does not resolve the dilemma because the Christian god is still being compared to some idea of "goodness."

Which does not imply either that there is any actual external moral standard or that God is unnecessary for goodness; any more than there exists an external standard of 'spherishness' or that a spatial reality is unnecessary for conceiving spheres.

I'm not sure how you can conclude that a moral standard independent of theism is not implied. If no nontheistic standard is implied, then to say "God is good" is to say that he is himself or that whatever he says is good because he says so! So if Christians wish to avoid this needless repetition, they must appeal to some idea of goodness that is not based in their god. If they do appeal to some nontheistic idea of good, then they don't need their god to know what is good.

So the Euthyphro Dilemma stands. Apologists cannot escape this dilemma by arguing that their god's nature is "good." To do so is to either state a tautology or to appeal to a nontheistic idea of good.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is no mere irrelevant philosophical quandary hatched by Plato long ago. In the modern, developed world we are increasingly seeing that we need a new morality and are moving away from mortality based in gods. We see the folly of adopting morals just because some god presumably said so. We need to be able to use reason to judge what is good, and even apologists are using reason to try to convince people that their god is good.

[Jagella]

Jesus said people are good and to be loved because they simply are loved by God .

Why should we love anything if the Christian god presumably loves it or them? If the Christian god loved excrement, then would we be required to love excrement too? I don't need any gods to tell me that it's generally best to have a positive attitude toward other people. Since I can figure that out on my own, anything the Bible god says is irrelevant.

[dio9]

[Replying to Jagella]

I think you are twisting the meaning of my words. The Euthyphro dilemma of Plato was between real genuine original inherent goodness and wanna be goodness for those who wanna be good but don't feel self motivated enough and rely on the belief in the reported goodness of others. I give them credit for trying but they just haven't yet found it within themselves. Therefore they believe and practice hoping to someday discover that real goodness within themselves. Euthyphro is simply about those who have it and those who want to have it. Can't say what's keeping those who don't from it but its there to be found.

PS actually manure is good fertilizer. I wish I had some for my garden.

[Jagella]

The Euthyphro dilemma of Plato was between real genuine original inherent goodness and wanna be goodness for those who wanna be good but don't feel self motivated enough and rely on the belief in the reported goodness of others.

I've never heard of this version of the Euthyphro Dilemma before. Where did you get it?

PS actually manure is good fertilizer. I wish I had some for my garden.

Well, I guess anything can be loved.

[Mithrae]

If they get their idea of goodness from what they believe the Christian god commanded, then goodness is arbitrary and is anything he commands.

That doesn't follow; if God's very nature is good, then neither goodness nor his commands are arbitrary.

I'm not assuming here that the Christian god's nature is good. So what I'm stating follows logically.

If they get their idea of goodness from something or somebody else, then the Christian god is not needed to base morality upon.

That also doesn't follow; the proximate causes for someone's moral views may be their family, their society and their biology, but that doesn't preclude God as an ultimate and perhaps necessary cause.

The Christian god is here excluded by assumption. (See what I highlighted in bold.) I am considering what logically follows if Christians get their idea of goodness from something other than the Christian god.

If you assume that the Christian God is false, then yes, the Christian view of God is false. That's not exactly going to win any prizes for outstanding philosophical insight however. Considering goodness to be inherent in God's nature seems to be a logically consistent answer which does not demonstrably conflict with any known facts. That you don't think it's true does not make it any less of an answer.

To say that his goodness results from his nature does not resolve the dilemma because the Christian god is still being compared to some idea of "goodness."

Which does not imply either that there is any actual external moral standard or that God is unnecessary for goodness; any more than there exists an external standard of 'spherishness' or that a spatial reality is unnecessary for conceiving spheres.

I'm not sure how you can conclude that a moral standard independent of theism is not implied. If no nontheistic standard is implied, then to say "God is good" is to say that he is himself or that whatever he says is good because he says so! So if Christians wish to avoid this needless repetition, they must appeal to some idea of goodness that is not based in their god.

As I said, they might base that evaluation on morals which are proximately derived or justified from their upbringing, culture, biology and reasoning. What would you base moral evaluations on? As far as I can tell those, particularly biology and reasoning, seem to be about the best foundation we could hope for. Yet none of them preclude the possibility of God using them - particularly biology and reasoning - to instill in humanity a reflection, perhaps imperfect, of his own nature.