Subjective Morality

[The Tanager]

I started this post out of another discussion with Divine Insight. DI has made some arguments for morality being subjective. I'm still trying to get the terminology straight.

If morality is not absolute, then it can only be subjective. A matter of opinion.

We need to get our terms straight when talking about our human morality. I agree with you concerning 'subjective' being a matter of opinion. Objective, then, would mean not being a matter of opinion. Just like the shape of the earth is not a matter of opinion. X is good or bad for everyone.

Absolute vs. situational is a sub-issue concerning objectivism. The absolutist would say X is good or bad for everyone (and thus objectivism) no matter the situation. The situationalist would say X is good or bad for everyone but qualified by the situation.

In this phrasing, morality can be objectivist without being absolute. Now, I don't care if these are the terms we agree upon or not, but there must be some term for each concept I've presented. If you want to use "absolute" for "objective" above, that's fine. But you've got to tell me what two terms you want to use for what I termed the "absolute vs. situational" sub-issue.

[The Tanager]

Because of gravity if we drop a book it should end up on the floor. Because of evolution and natural selection we should end up with a sort of "heaven".

Why? Why not extinction? Evolution and natural selection has led to extinction in other species.

[The Tanager]

Why do you think that? The two horns are objective morality independently from gods (loved by the gods because it is pious,) and morality tired to gods (pious because it is loved by gods) which is quite subjectivism.

Euthyphro initially ties moral objectivism to the gods, though. Socrates is arguing against that in the way you describe.

You would do that because you assume that Everton FC would be understood to be the same as The Blues, assumed to be the same as The Toffees. For someone like me who don't know much about English clubs, I am pretty confused without this presumed knowledge of club aliases.

But it's less confusing if I list it as: Everton FC/The Blues/The Toffees, versus all separate.

Right, you don't see music taste as a moral issue and neither do I, is that so surprising?

Obviously they are about different things. But the point is that you said you treated those different things (moral issues, music tastes, etc.) in the same way.

Wanting to turn to another station with respect to music taste, is the equivalent of wanting people punish with respect to moral issue.

I don't see how that is equivalent. In one you simply turn your attention to something that more suits your taste. That would be like starting to read a story on child abuse and then desiring to read a story about a child being saved by drowning instead.

So if you understand how wanting to switch station is the natural reaction to not liking certain music, it should be trivial that wanting to punish people for wrong doing is the natural reaction to not liking how they are acting?

I agree with these being the natural reactions (for most people), but those are different kinds of reactions that point to morality being in a different category.

Perhaps if you explain why you have the reaction of wanting to tune to another station upon some bad music, I can borrow your words to explain why I want to punish people for wrong doing.

When I have bitter gourds placed before me, I think about how it's going to taste bad to me. I think about how ice cream will taste better. I'm fine if others want to eat bitter gourds and I don't want to rid the world of bitter gourds. Therefore, I eat ice cream and am fine with the world going on as it is.

When most country music comes on the radio, I think about how I don't like listening to it and about better kinds of music I wish I was listening to. I'm fine if others want to listen to country music and I don't want to rid the world of country music. Therefore, I change the station and am fine with the world going on as it is. Same category as food taste.

When I hear about child abuse, I think about the pain and damage the child goes through and about how they deserve a better life. I'm not fine if others want children to feel pain and damage so that they can gain some distorted pleasure. I try not to just "change the station" so that I don't have to hear about pain others go through. I'm not fine with the world just going on as is. The priests need to be stopped. Not the same category as above, as far as my experience goes.

[Bust Nak]

Euthyphro initially ties moral objectivism to the gods, though. Socrates is arguing against that in the way you describe.

Are you sure about that? According to wiki, Euthyphro's first attempt was to give an example of what is pious, his second was to tie it to the gods, how is that objective?

But it's less confusing if I list it as: Everton FC/The Blues/The Toffees, versus all separate.

Granted.

Obviously they are about different things. But the point is that you said you treated those different things (moral issues, music tastes, etc.) in the same way.

Right. Perhaps in the equivalent way would be a better choice of words.

I don't see how that is equivalent. In one you simply turn your attention to something that more suits your taste... those are different kinds of reactions that point to morality being in a different category.

In one I am taking steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste; in the other I am also taking steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste.

When I have a kiddy fiddling priest before me, I think about how it's going to disgust me. I think about how a world without kiddy fiddling priests would be better suited to my taste. Therefore, I take steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste - i.e. punishing the priest.

You went on to say you are fine if others want to eat bitter gourds or listen to country music, but you are no longer talking about your own taste in food or music. You are talking about your taste when it comes to other people's action. In other words, you are switching the context to morality, and as I said before, these are different areas of taste/opinion.

[Artie]

Because of gravity if we drop a book it should end up on the floor. Because of evolution and natural selection we should end up with a sort of "heaven".

Why? Why not extinction? Evolution and natural selection has led to extinction in other species.

Because those who behave beneficial to the well-being and survival of the society are the ones who are selected for. So in theory you end up with only those who act beneficially. That hardly leads to extinction.

[The Tanager]

Are you sure about that? According to wiki, Euthyphro's first attempt was to give an example of what is pious, his second was to tie it to the gods, how is that objective?

Socrates says "And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?" Euthyphro agrees. This seems to me to imply moral objectivism.

Euthyphro then uses himself as an example of piety in that he is prosecuting his own father of murder. He says "Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety." It is objectively true that one should prosecute the one who commits murder.

Euthyphro then offers his proof of this, "For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned."

Now, I think Socrates is quite right that Euthyphro's thinking, if true, results in human morality being subjective (not because it comes from a god but that he ties it to multiple gods who disagree) but Euthyphro is under the impression that his view results in a human morality that is objectively grounded.

In one I am taking steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste; in the other I am also taking steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste.

When I have a kiddy fiddling priest before me, I think about how it's going to disgust me. I think about how a world without kiddy fiddling priests would be better suited to my taste. Therefore, I take steps to get rid of what I don't like, moving closer to a situation closer to my taste - i.e. punishing the priest.

You move closer to a situation closer to your food taste by simply ignoring food you dislike, so why not just ignore kiddy fiddling priests and go watch Netflix, so that you don't have to feel disgusted?

You went on to say you are fine if others want to eat bitter gourds or listen to country music, but you are no longer talking about your own taste in food or music. You are talking about your taste when it comes to other people's action. In other words, you are switching the context to morality, and as I said before, these are different areas of taste/opinion.

Not wanting to punish country musicians and their fans seems to be talking about my taste when it comes to other people's actions.

But even if it doesn't, this gives morality a special feature the other things don't have. They are all alike and morality is unique. This switch points to it being a different kind of thing.

[The Tanager]

Because those who behave beneficial to the well-being and survival of the society are the ones who are selected for. So in theory you end up with only those who act beneficially. That hardly leads to extinction.

People who act selfishly within a larger community that wants to benefit all of society are also selected for. So, it's not clear that you'll end up with only those who act beneficially. That is why I think your gravity analogy fails. Gravity works one way; humans with different kinds of moral views both survive. Evolution and natural selection don't care which way wins out or if all of them do. There is no "supposed to be".

[Artie]

Because those who behave beneficial to the well-being and survival of the society are the ones who are selected for. So in theory you end up with only those who act beneficially. That hardly leads to extinction.

People who act selfishly within a larger community that wants to benefit all of society are also selected for.

LOL if their selfishness is detrimental to their community or has a negative effect on the people around them their selfishness will be selected against. They are less likely to receive needed help for example.

So, it's not clear that you'll end up with only those who act beneficially. That is why I think your gravity analogy fails. Gravity works one way; humans with different kinds of moral views both survive.

If their moral views are detrimental enough to be a great danger to the well-being and survival of the society they might end up shot in the street or in prison TT. They and their genes are selected out. The more detrimental they behave the more likely they are to be selected out. I'm afraid it's not my gravity analogy that fails TT it's your reasoning...

[Bust Nak]

Socrates says "And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?" Euthyphro agrees. This seems to me to imply moral objectivism.

They seemed to be talking about morality that is immutable which is absolute morality, not the same thing as moral objectivism.

Now, I think Socrates is quite right that Euthyphro's thinking, if true, results in human morality being subjective (not because it comes from a god but that he ties it to multiple gods who disagree) but Euthyphro is under the impression that his view results in a human morality that is objectively grounded.

Which bit exactly is giving you that impression? Merely insisting that human be consistent implies he believe morality is objectively grounded? I think people ought to be consistent too, yet I am a subjectivist through and through.

You move closer to a situation closer to your food taste by simply ignoring food you dislike, so why not just ignore kiddy fiddling priests and go watch Netflix, so that you don't have to feel disgusted?

Because the mere awareness of that it has happened fills me with disgust.

Not wanting to punish country musicians and their fans seems to be talking about my taste when it comes to other people's actions.

Exactly my point. They are all matters of taste thus belong in the same category of taste, even as they are dealing with different are - people's actions, food taste, music taste, visual aesthetics and so on.

But even if it doesn't, this gives morality a special feature the other things don't have...

If it doesn't seem like that, sure, but it does, so that's moot. Assuming I am reading you right here? This switch is not unique in morality because you have the same switch when you go from food taste to music taste, from music taste to visual aesthetics.

[Artie]

Which bit exactly is giving you that impression? Merely insisting that human be consistent implies he believe morality is objectively grounded? I think people ought to be consistent too, yet I am a subjectivist through and through.

"The subjectivist viewpoint suggests that a person's own perceptions of the world are undeniably correct for that person, thus morality isn't dependent upon social norms. It rejects not only objectivism, the idea that there are overriding moral standards for every culture, but also relativism, in which one's culture determines what one should and shouldn't do. Moral subjectivism reduces morality to pure nihilistic solipsism -- whatever is right for you, is absolutely right. This worldview is great for serial killers and other sundry antisocial types, as it explains away any need to consider others in one's actions.
In a taped statement given by Ted Bundy from prison to one of his surviving victims, Bundy defends moral subjectivism as the reason behind his actions."
https://everything2.com/title/Ted+Bundy ... bjectivism

[Bust Nak]

[Replying to post 239 by Artie]
I've already made my critique of that piece in the other thread, so I won't repeat them here.

I have to ask though, in what way does that article answer my question? At a glace it appears to be a red herring: It had nothing to do with Euthyphro's dilemma, nor the second part re: whether consistency being consistent with moral subjectivism.