God Must Exist: Infinite Regression is Impossible

[We_Are_VENOM]

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First off, by "universe", I mean all physical reality govern by natural law. This would include universes that we know/don’t know about.

1. If God does not exist, then the universe is past eternal.

Justification: We know that the universe exist, and if there is no transcendent supernatural cause, then either

A. the universe either popped into being, uncaused, out of nothing.
B. OR, it has existed for eternity.

I think we can safely remove posit A from the equation (unless there is someone who thinks it is a plausible explanation).

Let’s focus on posit B.

Based on posit B, we need not provide any naturalistic explanation as to the cause of our universe, considering the fact that the term “universe” applies (as mentioned earlier) to all physical reality, which means that any naturalistic explanation one provides is already accounted for as “eternal”.

And if God does not exist, then physical reality (the universe) is all there is, and thus must be eternal.

2. If the universe is not past eternal, then God exists.

Justification: If the universe (all physical reality) is NOT eternal, then it had a beginning.

Since natural law (mother nature) cannot logically be used to explain the origin of its own domain, then an external, supernatural cause is necessary.

If “nature” had a beginning, one cannot logically use nature to explain the origin of nature, and to do so is fallacious.

So, where nature stops, supernatural begins.

3. The universe is not past eternal.

Justification: If the universe is past eternal, then the causal chain of events (cause and effect) within the universe is infinite. But this is impossible, because infinity cannot be traversed or “reached”.

If the past is eternal, that would mean that there are an infinite amount of “days” which lead to today. But in order for us to have “arrived” to today, an infinite amount of days would have to be traversed (one by one), which is impossible, because infinite cannot be “reached”.

Consider thought analogy..

Sandman analogy: Imagine there is a man who is standing above a bottomless hole. By “bottomless”, of course if one was to fall into the hole, he would fall forever and ever and ever.

Now, imagine the man is surrounded by an infinite amount of sand, which is at his disposal.

Imagine if the man has been shoveling sand into this hole for an infinite amount of time (he never began shoveling, or he never stopped shoveling, he has been shoveling forever).

Imagine if the man’s plan was to shovel sand into the hole until he successfully filled the sand from the bottom, all the way to the top of the hole.

How long will it take him to accomplish this? Will he ever accomplish this task? No. Why? Because the sand is bottomless, so no matter how fast he shoveled, or how long he shoveled, the sand will never reach the top.

So lets put it all together…

The sand falling: Represents time travel, and the trajectory of the sand falling south of the top represents time traveling into the past, which is synonymous with past eternity.

The man shoveling: Represents the “present”, as the man is presently shoveling without halt. This is synonymous with our present causal reality. We are presently in a state of constant change, without halt.

Conclusion: If the sand cannot reach the bottom of the hole (because of no boundary/foundation) and it can’t be filled from the bottom-up to the present (man), then how, if there is no past boundary to precedent days, how could we have possibly reached the present day…if there is/was no beginning foundation (day).

However, lets say a gazillion miles down the hole, there is a foundation…then the hole will be filled in a finite amount of time, and it will be filled from the bottom-up.

But ONLY if there is a foundation.

Likewise, we can only reach today if and ONLY IF there is a beginning point of reference, a foundation in the distant past.

4. Therefore, an Uncaused Cause (UCC) must exist: As explained, infinite regression is impossible, so an uncaused cause is absolutely necessary.

This UCC cannot logically be a product of any precedent cause or conditions, thus, it exists necessarily (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC cannot logically depend on any external entity for it’s existence (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC is the foundation for any/everything which began to exist, which included by not limited to all physical reality…but mainly, the universe an everything in it.

This UCC would also have to have free will, which explains why the universe began at X point instead of Y point...and the reason is; it began at that point because that is when the UCC decided it should begin...and only a being with free will can decide to do anything.

This UCC would have to have the power to create from nothing (as there was no preexisting physical matter to create from, before it was created).

So, based on the truth value of the argument, what can we conclude of the UCC?

1. It is a supernatural, metaphysically necessary being
2. A being of whom has existed for eternity and can never cease existing
3. A being with the greatest power imaginable (being able to create from nothing)
4. A being with free will, thus, a being with a mind

This being in question is what theists have traditionally recognized as God. God exists.

In closing, I predict the whole "well, based on your argument, God cannot be infinite".

My response to that for now is; first admit the validity of the presented argument, and THEN we will discuss why the objection raised doesn't apply to God.

[William]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #869]

1. If I flip a coin, randomness dictates that I can't flip: HTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHT

Nope.

If you flip a coin prediction tells you that it will end up pretty much heads or tails - with the even less chance of it landing on its edge.
Because of this prediction we can therefore know that that coin will not always land consecutively heads and then tails, no matter how many times it is tossed.

At some point, regardless of the odds, there has to be a grouping - a collection of TT or HH, or TTTTT or HHHHH.

Which may be a clue to there being some type of hard to predict order involved.

Consider this in a huge sea made up of nothing but energy. In some areas, there MUST be more energy than other areas, otherwise it would be completely uniform.

Do you agree?

Not necessarily as it is equally plausible that there must be no area which is is unaffected by energy. There may not really such a thing as "more" or "less" energy as far as we know re cause and effect. Even what may be extremally hard for us to measure can still be assumed to be effected by the presence of energy, if indeed, we observe any effect.

So "completely uniform" only applies to the rate or frequency the energy causes whatever is seen and/or measured, to vibrate - so within the uniformity of the rate of vibration, we could say that this was "completely uniform" but not that all of it together is "completely uniform".

Also to note, you seem to be forgetting that physicists don't claim that a "huge sea made up of nothing but energy" is the only thing involved.

[boatsnguitars]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #869]

1. If I flip a coin, randomness dictates that I can't flip: HTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHTHT

Nope.

If you flip a coin prediction tells you that it will end up pretty much heads or tails - with the even less chance of it landing on its edge.
Because of this prediction we can therefore know that that coin will not always land consecutively heads and then tails, no matter how many times it is tossed.

At some point, regardless of the odds, there has to be a grouping - a collection of TT or HH, or TTTTT or HHHHH.

Which may be a clue to there being some type of hard to predict order involved.

Consider this in a huge sea made up of nothing but energy. In some areas, there MUST be more energy than other areas, otherwise it would be completely uniform.

Do you agree?

Not necessarily as it is equally plausible that there must be no area which is is unaffected by energy. There may not really such a thing as "more" or "less" energy as far as we know re cause and effect. Even what may be extremally hard for us to measure can still be assumed to be effected by the presence of energy, if indeed, we observe any effect.

So "completely uniform" only applies to the rate or frequency the energy causes whatever is seen and/or measured, to vibrate - so within the uniformity of the rate of vibration, we could say that this was "completely uniform" but not that all of it together is "completely uniform".

Also to note, you seem to be forgetting that physicists don't claim that a "huge sea made up of nothing but energy" is the only thing involved.

Philosophers, and some physicists, argue that *that* nothing isn't the same as "real" nothing. Different physicists see different things as nothing, from nothing is classical vacuum, to the idea of nothing as undifferentiated potential.

Even if you could remove all the particles, shield against all electric and magnetic fields, your box would still contain gravity, because gravity can never be shielded or cancelled out. Gravity doesn't go away, and it's always attractive, so you can't do anything to block it. In Newton's physics that's because it is a force, but in general relativity space and time *are* gravity.

So, imagine if you could remove all particles, energy, gravity… everything from a system. You'd be left with a true vacuum. Even at its lowest energy level, there are fluctuations in the quantum vacuum of the Universe. There are quantum particles popping into and out of existence throughout the Universe. There's nothing, then pop, something, and then the particles collide and you're left with nothing again. And so, even if you could remove everything from the Universe, you'd still be left with these quantum fluctuations embedded in spacetime.

https://phys.org/news/2014-08-what-is-nothing.html

Perhaps they said it better, but this is exactly what I was trying to say. Any difference between this description and mine is due to my inability, not that I intend to say something else.

"Nothing", like the state of things before the BB, still includes some energy (low energy is still energy). However, it couldn't have been perfectly uniform, because that would be like getting HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH.... for eternity. There would have had to have been a moment when the energy fluctuated.
We know this because we've observed quantum fluctuations in a vacuum. We know this because the BB happened.

[Bust Nak]

Why does the axiom exist, though? Because mathematicians felt the concept helpful for certain abstract calculations, not because such a thing actually exists in reality. Making up a definition isn’t good reason to believe the thing actually exists. If square circles helped calculations, an axiom would exist, but that wouldn’t mean square circles were real things.

We haven't even got that far yet, you were disputing the definition itself. First we have to agree on definition before we examine if the concept defined exists or not.

Simplicity is about which explanation requires the fewest assumptions; it’s not about the numerical comparison between one specific assumption within each explanation.

But you were suggesting that the assumptions themselves cannot be simpler than one another.

This would mean that we already know there are different kinds of finite quantities, not that there are quantities that aren’t finite.

Okay, but you said it was an assumption that there are different kinds of quantities, when we know there are different kinds.

That doesn’t follow. {..., X, …, e} and {P, …, X, …, e} are different kinds of circumstances. They aren’t different degrees on the same spectrum, but two entirely different spectrums. The first is a beginningless series, while the second is a series with a beginning.

So? What does that have to do with what I said? If this isn't true for {..., X, …, e}, you can without starting at X and count to 2, then there must be a lowest P.

[The Tanager]

We haven't even got that far yet, you were disputing the definition itself. First we have to agree on definition before we examine if the concept defined exists or not.

No, I agree with the definition of an actual infinite, just like I can agree with the definition of a square circle. I have been examining if the concept defined exists or not. All of my critiques are about that.

But you were suggesting that the assumptions themselves cannot be simpler than one another.

No I wasn’t. I was saying your explanation of the appearance of every point being the center is not simpler than my explanation for that appearance.

Okay, but you said it was an assumption that there are different kinds of quantities, when we know there are different kinds.

I was speaking specifically about a finite/infinite dichotomy, not that there aren’t other different kinds.

So? What does that have to do with what I said? If this isn't true for {..., X, …, e}, you can without starting at X and count to 2, then there must be a lowest P.

Why? These are two different questions. Must there be a lowest P? No, because numbers are potential infinites. This is true, whatever additional questions we ask.

We are asking if we can we count to 2 without starting at any number. This second question is still valid even though there is no lowest P. What your analysis has done is say that we know we can count to 2 by starting at any P, realizing there is no lowest P in saying so. That doesn't support the answer to the second question you want, namely, that we can count to 2 without starting at any number.

[boatsnguitars]

We haven't even got that far yet, you were disputing the definition itself. First we have to agree on definition before we examine if the concept defined exists or not.

No, I agree with the definition of an actual infinite, just like I can agree with the definition of a square circle. I have been examining if the concept defined exists or not. All of my critiques are about that.

But you were suggesting that the assumptions themselves cannot be simpler than one another.

No I wasn’t. I was saying your explanation of the appearance of every point being the center is not simpler than my explanation for that appearance.

Okay, but you said it was an assumption that there are different kinds of quantities, when we know there are different kinds.

I was speaking specifically about a finite/infinite dichotomy, not that there aren’t other different kinds.

So? What does that have to do with what I said? If this isn't true for {..., X, …, e}, you can without starting at X and count to 2, then there must be a lowest P.

Why? These are two different questions. Must there be a lowest P? No, because numbers are potential infinites. This is true, whatever additional questions we ask.

We are asking if we can we count to 2 without starting at any number. This second question is still valid even though there is no lowest P. What your analysis has done is say that we know we can count to 2 by starting at any P, realizing there is no lowest P in saying so. That doesn't support the answer to the second question you want, namely, that we can count to 2 without starting at any number.

Man, you scared me. I was reading through that thinking, "I have no memory of writing this! Am I going senile!?!?!?!"

Then I saw that you probably had my name copied, probably from your other post, as you pasted.

[William]

[Replying to boatsnguitars in post #872]

Are we agreeing or disagreeing?

[Bust Nak]

No, I agree with the definition of an actual infinite, just like I can agree with the definition of a square circle. I have been examining if the concept defined exists or not. All of my critiques are about that.

So what did you mean when you challenge me as to whether infinity is a quantity or not? If you agree with the definition, then it is by definition a quantity, whether it exists or not is a separate question.

No I wasn’t. I was saying your explanation of the appearance of every point being the center is not simpler than my explanation for that appearance.

But when I asked you why it's not simpler, you told me it is because this explanation have the same number of assumptions as your alternative. Why would that there being the same number of assumptions matter, if assumptions can be ranked in terms of simple to complex?

I was speaking specifically about a finite/infinite dichotomy, not that there aren’t other different kinds.

Okay, so what's wrong with my point that we know there are different kind, because the math works out again?

Why? These are two different questions. Must there be a lowest P? No, because numbers are potential infinites. This is true, whatever additional questions we ask.

We are asking if we can we count to 2 without starting at any number. This second question is still valid even though there is no lowest P.

What your analysis has done is say that we know we can count to 2 by starting at any P, realizing there is no lowest P in saying so. That doesn't support the answer to the second question you want, namely, that we can count to 2 without starting at any number.

That's what the proof is for, we know we can count to 2 by starting at any P, therefore (via the steps outlined in my proof,) we can conclude deductively that we can we count to 2 without starting at any number. You aren't even willing to grant me the premise that it is possible to start at P, through X and count to 2.

[The Tanager]

So what did you mean when you challenge me as to whether infinity is a quantity or not? If you agree with the definition, then it is by definition a quantity, whether it exists or not is a separate question.

One can give a definition of the shape of a square circle, but that doesn’t mean the concept is an actual shape. One can give a definition of the quantity of infinity, but that doesn’t mean the concept is an actual quantity.

But when I asked you why it's not simpler, you told me it is because this explanation have the same number of assumptions as your alternative. Why would that there being the same number of assumptions matter, if assumptions can be ranked in terms of simple to complex?

Because simplicity is about having a fewer number of assumptions, not the numerical value of those assumptions.

Okay, so what's wrong with my point that we know there are different kind, because the math works out again?

The math only works out if we assume there are different kinds. So, this is your reasoning:

How do we know there are different kinds of quantities? Because the math works out. How does the math work out? Well, it doesn’t work out if there aren’t different kinds of quantities (in the finite/infinite categorization), but it does if there are different kinds of qualities. Okay, so there are different kinds of quantities if the math works out and the math works out if there are different kinds of quantities.

Looks like you are thinking in a circle. What, outside of this circle, leads to either different kinds of quantities or the math working out regardless of if there are different kinds of quantities?

That's what the proof is for, we know we can count to 2 by starting at any P, therefore (via the steps outlined in my proof,) we can conclude deductively that we can we count to 2 without starting at any number.

Which is a flawed argument as I have shared. You obviously see that because you continually have reshaped your attempted proof. The problem in your latest formulation is that you jump from (1) being able to start at any P and counting through to e to (2) not starting at any P and counting through to e without any rational support for doing so.

You tried to defeat my critique by talking about how this would mean there would have to be a lowest P. I shared why that’s not the case. You can either respond to how that’s incorrect or try to defeat it a different way.

You aren't even willing to grant me the premise that it is possible to start at P, through X and count to 2.

Why in the world do you think that? I have constantly granted you that you can start at P, go through X, and reach 2.

[Bust Nak]

One can give a definition of the shape of a square circle, but that doesn’t mean the concept is an actual shape. One can give a definition of the quantity of infinity, but that doesn’t mean the concept is an actual quantity.

Okay, but how am I supposed to interpret someone saying to me "prove to me that a square circle is both a square and a circle," or "you are just assuming that a square circle is both a square and a circle," if not as a rejection of the definition of square circles? It still looks to me like we are stuck on definition rather then if the concept exists.

Because simplicity is about having a fewer number of assumptions, not the numerical value of those assumptions.

Which leads me back to my point, how is this not imply that the individual assumptions themselves are always equally simple? You are solely measuring simplicity by fewer number of assumptions, not how simple each assumption is.

The math only works out if we assume there are different kinds. So, this is your reasoning:

How do we know there are different kinds of quantities? Because the math works out. How does the math work out? Well, it doesn’t work out if there aren’t different kinds of quantities (in the finite/infinite categorization), but it does if there are different kinds of qualities. Okay, so there are different kinds of quantities if the math works out and the math works out if there are different kinds of quantities.

Looks like you are thinking in a circle. What, outside of this circle, leads to either different kinds of quantities or the math working out regardless of if there are different kinds of quantities?

It also works out in modelling everyday stuff outside of this circle, calculus is a prime example that make use of infinity math.

Which is a flawed argument as I have shared. You obviously see that because you continually have reshaped your attempted proof.

I don't think adjusting my proof to appease your choice of wording qualify as a flaw. You will note that the form of my proof remains the same through out.

The problem in your latest formulation is that you jump from (1) being able to start at any P and counting through to e to (2) not starting at any P and counting through to e without any rational support for doing so.

THAT'S WHAT THE PROOF IS FOR!!!! IT IS LITERALLY STEP BY STEP RATIONAL SUPPORT FOR GOING FROM 1 to 2. The conclusion of the whole thing is that you don't have to start at any P, when you are still hung up at around step 2.

Why in the world do you think that? I have constantly granted you that you can start at P, go through X, and reach 2.

Great, so take the next step admit that you can indeed reach 2 without starting at X.

[The Tanager]

Okay, but how am I supposed to interpret someone saying to me "prove to me that a square circle is both a square and a circle," or "you are just assuming that a square circle is both a square and a circle," if not as a rejection of the definition of square circles? It still looks to me like we are stuck on definition rather then if the concept exists.

If you agree (you said "Okay"), why waste our time clarifying your misunderstanding of my words or my lack of clarity? Show that an infinite quantity is an actual quantity.

Which leads me back to my point, how is this not imply that the individual assumptions themselves are always equally simple? You are solely measuring simplicity by fewer number of assumptions, not how simple each assumption is.

No, it keeps us from equivocating on numeric value and simplicity of a theory.

It also works out in modelling everyday stuff outside of this circle, calculus is a prime example that make use of infinity math.

How is calculus outside math (which is part of what is in your logical circle)?

THAT'S WHAT THE PROOF IS FOR!!!! IT IS LITERALLY STEP BY STEP RATIONAL SUPPORT FOR GOING FROM 1 to 2. The conclusion of the whole thing is that you don't have to start at any P, when you are still hung up at around step 2.

And I’ve shared what I think your latest flaw is (#859). Your premise 2.1) is false. The premise should read: 2.1’) For all x: If there are P in circumstances of this type {..., X}, then you can B in circumstances of this type {P, …, X}.

Your attempt to defeat that critique was to say that there must be a lowest P (#873). I shared why that’s not the case (#874). Your response to that was to say that’s what the proof was for. That’s circular reasoning:

You offered a proof (let’s call this P). I critiqued (let’s call that C1) premise 2.1. If true, then P is unsound. You critiqued (let’s call this C2) your C1. If true, C1 disappears and P is not shown to be unsound. I critiqued (let’s call this C3) your C2. If true, C2 disappears, leaving C1 intact and, thus, P being unsound. Your latest critique (let’s call this C4) was to say that’s what the proof is for. Thus, C4 is identical to P. Okay, so C1 is calling P into question and your support against that is C4/P. So, P is true because P is true. Circular reasoning.

Great, so take the next step admit that you can indeed reach 2 without starting at X.

You can reach 2 in some circumstances without starting at X. That’s all you’ve shown. Now take me the next step to: You can reach 2 without starting at all.