Machines and morality

[Inquirer]

Given that humans are believed to be mechanisms (albeit of great complexity) on what basis can we say that murder or torture is wrong? Why is destruction of a machine regarded as having no moral component yet destruction of a person is? Surely destroying any mechanism is the same irrepestective of the mechanism.

[Inquirer]

[Replying to Inquirer in post #196]

Wikipedia wrote:
Emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviors which emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole

You'll notice the definition does not state or imply that such behaviors are or can be non-deterministic, case closed.

They don't have to be. You're equating non-deterministic with not understanding the mechanisms in enough detail.

Not at all, you'll find no post of mine where I make such an assertion.

This has been the crux of your entire argument throughout this thread, and a couple of others. You've claimed, repeatedly, that the ability to make decisions and choose one action over another (free will) cannot arise from the material brain acting as a system. There must be "something else." You cast this as free will being non-deterministic and therefore it cannot arise from any collection of deterministic components acting together. How can you claim you've never made such an assertion? It is your entire case!

Not at all, you'll find no post of mine where I make the assertion "You're claiming that no collection of deterministic molecules, assembled in any form whatsoever, can ever produce a system having capabilities beyond what its components individually are capable of.". This is what you orginally claimed I said and now your claiming something different:

First claim: (I never said this hence you'll find no supporting post)

You're claiming that no collection of deterministic molecules, assembled in any form whatsoever, can ever produce a system having capabilities beyond what its components individually are capable of.

New adjusted claim: (Yes, I have said that free will cannot arise from determinism)

You've claimed, repeatedly, that the ability to make decisions and choose one action over another (free will) cannot arise from the material brain acting as a system.

So you're arguing there's no such thing as free will? because free will is not something that can emerge from a system that does not have free will, because although unanticipated macro behaviors can and do emerge in systems they are always regarded as deterministic and by definition free will is not determinism, they are mutually exclusive concepts.

Again ... you're claiming that free will cannot arise from a material brain working as a system to produce this emergent property. I believe it can, which is the point of contention. I don't agree with your continued argument that this is impossible, for two basic reasons:

1) A purely materialistic description of the brain's functions has not been ruled out from any scientific or logical viewpoint.

2) The supernatural (or "something else") has yet to be identified as being anything that actually exists, so attributing it as the source for something is premature.

Free will means non-deterministic, uncaused, so how can there be a cause for something that's uncaused? Its a blatant contradiction, why are you perpetuating this?

Lets get something cleared up, do you or do you not believe that non-deterministic behavior can be emergent from deterministic components? do you actually believe that we can assemble components that always do things for a reason to end up with a system that can do things for absolutely no reason at all?

I believe that the ability to make decisions is a deterministic process based on the brain's components and subsystems all working together, but that these decisions can vary according to the thought processes any individual undergoes to weight various outcomes and arrive at a decision. If you want to call this a non-deterministic process go ahead, but ultimately it is the result of very complex interactions in the brain that create the ability to make different decisions, which is not "for absolutely no reason at all."

Very well but that is not free will, free will means uncaused and uncaused means non-deterministic. The terms deterministic and non-deterministic are mutually exclusive.

Really, I doubt anyone can read our conversation and walk away with the slightest idea of what it is you are actually arguing.

One minute you say something I disagree with and I say so, then you argue back but say something I do agree with and I say so, but then you claim that we are not in agreement and say something else that I disagree with and on and on and on it goes in a cycle.

[DrNoGods]

[Replying to Inquirer in post #201]

Very well but that is not free will, free will means uncaused and uncaused means non-deterministic.

So you keep insisting. Free will means the ability to make decisions as we see fit, it does not mean uncaused. To use another Wikipedia definition:

"Free will is the capacity of agents to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded."

Uncaused is nowhere to be found in that definition ... case closed. There's no reason to believe that this capacity does not arise from complex processes occurring in a working brain, all deterministic at the molecular level.

Really, I doubt anyone can read our conversation and walk away with the slightest idea of what it is you are actually arguing.

Why not? My argument is very simple and I haven't changed it throughout ... consciousness, free will, etc. are emergent properties of a working brain. That's it.

[Inquirer]

[Replying to Inquirer in post #201]

Very well but that is not free will, free will means uncaused and uncaused means non-deterministic.

So you keep insisting. Free will means the ability to make decisions as we see fit, it does not mean uncaused. To use another Wikipedia definition:

"Free will is the capacity of agents to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded."

Uncaused is nowhere to be found in that definition ... case closed. There's no reason to believe that this capacity does not arise from complex processes occurring in a working brain, all deterministic at the molecular level.

It is inarguably implied. Laws of nature contain nothing corresponding to "choose" everything is cause and effect and if an outcome is a consequence of a preceding cause then there's no scope for a "choice".

Read further into that Wikipedia article:

Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will.

Case closed? yes, I think so.

[William]

Free will means non-deterministic, uncaused, so how can there be a cause for something that's uncaused?

It is simply a case of choosing one definition over another.

Therefore, the best position to take on such matters is the middle position.

Until free will can be defined in any correct manner, it has to remain in the basket of conceptual items...something which exists in the mind, and can be used by the personality in relation to the physical universe, but does not appear to exist as an object in the physical universe, interactively dependent of other objects.

[Inquirer]

Free will means non-deterministic, uncaused, so how can there be a cause for something that's uncaused?

It is simply a case of choosing one definition over another.

Therefore, the best position to take on such matters is the middle position.

Until free will can be defined in any correct manner, it has to remain in the basket of conceptual items...something which exists in the mind, and can be used by the personality in relation to the physical universe, but does not appear to exist as an object in the physical universe, interactively dependent of other objects.

Well even if something exists "in the mind" it exists. If the mind exists then "things" in that mind must also exist, they might not be what we claim they are but that's a different matter, they still must exist. Your position of being non-committal is itself a commitment, a choice, you must have chosen to adopt the position you have and no doubt have your reasons, but I chose my position too just as you have and I too have my reasons for the choice.

[Miles]

The explanation for decisions made in a system with free will is and can only ever be "I chose to" they are never the result of laws.

Which is why a system predicated on free will fails in reality. In reality choosing and choice are illusions concocted so as to hold determinism at bay; the insidious truth of existence, which few are inclined to look at much less investigate.

What does "fails" mean here? how are you measuring or quantifying failure or success?

It fails as a workable concept because it never addresses the ultimate question, "Why did I freely select this rather than that."

Surely we can argue equally that denial of free will is an illusion concocted so as to hold non-determinism at bay? All you've done here is make assertions without justifying them, they are therefore simply your beliefs and if that's the basis of your position, that your beliefs are better than mine just because they're your beliefs, then we really won't get very far.

And to be fair, I'm not up to explaining why right now. However, here is something I wrote in part some years ago for another website that hopefully explains my position.

"Determinism is the philosophical idea that every event or state of affairs, including every human decision and action, is the inevitable and necessary consequence of antecedent states of affairs"

Source: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... inism.html

__________


Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Typically, very interesting notions on both sides come out of such conversations, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be pretty much on point and helpful.

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.


Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."


For many people the notion of free will is important because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton; a "machine" that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed or praised for what they do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given, and often touted in some religions---Christianity comes to mind here.

Any exception to free will is often regarded as an interfering constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes along and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have chosen to have hot dog instead."

Those who most ardently disagree with this are hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog---therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we did or not? I say, No you were not. Free will is an illusion.


Here's how I see it. (significantly condensed)

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely" randomly I mean utterly randomly, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the quantum level, which has no effect on superatomic events, the level at which we operate.* And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely or even partially randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions and thoughts. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal events leading up to the Doing in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events necessarily led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.


What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do anything differently than what we are caused to do. Our life is solely determined by previous causal events, including intervening outside events (also causes), and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no ability to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choosing, selecting, opting, etc..

This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter.

Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as simply being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

__________________________

*Any proposition that the mind can be affected by random quantum events has to take into consideration the fact that "quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." This argument was elaborated on by MIT physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.
source

Please not that I'm currently not up to defending what I've said here (feeling a bit under the weather) but am willing to answer any questions about it.

For one thing, if determinism actually runs mankind, which it does, sin and salvation are robbed of their legitimacy, an idea Christians are loath to consider. In fact, Christians are obligated to a knee-jerk denial of determinism, which is understandable, they have no choice in the matter.

There are huge numbers of Christians that deny we have free will, it seems your research here is rather incomplete.

Then I have to believe that none of them considered what the lack of free will does to the Christian concepts of sin and salvation. It leaves them dead in the water.

You've also skipped over the puzzle that if the universe is deterministic then what caused determinism to exist?

Ti's a puzzlement for sure, but no more so than it is for the free willer. We simply don't know what brought the universe into existence if, in fact, it ever had a beginning at all.

As I explained already non-deterministic "will" has far greater explanatory power because free will can - if it so chooses - appear to behave deterministically yet the latter is not possible. Deterministic behavior can emerge from free will, yet free will cannot emerge from determinism.

Which, as I see it, is why free will doesn't exist in a deterministic universe.

.

[Inquirer]

The explanation for decisions made in a system with free will is and can only ever be "I chose to" they are never the result of laws.

Which is why a system predicated on free will fails in reality. In reality choosing and choice are illusions concocted so as to hold determinism at bay; the insidious truth of existence, which few are inclined to look at much less investigate.

What does "fails" mean here? how are you measuring or quantifying failure or success?

It fails as a workable concept because it never addresses the ultimate question, "Why did I freely select this rather than that."

Surely we can argue equally that denial of free will is an illusion concocted so as to hold non-determinism at bay? All you've done here is make assertions without justifying them, they are therefore simply your beliefs and if that's the basis of your position, that your beliefs are better than mine just because they're your beliefs, then we really won't get very far.

And to be fair, I'm not up to explaining why right now. However, here is something I wrote in part some years ago for another website that hopefully explains my position.

"Determinism is the philosophical idea that every event or state of affairs, including every human decision and action, is the inevitable and necessary consequence of antecedent states of affairs"

Source: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... inism.html

__________


Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Typically, very interesting notions on both sides come out of such conversations, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be pretty much on point and helpful.

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.


Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."


For many people the notion of free will is important because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton; a "machine" that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed or praised for what they do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given, and often touted in some religions---Christianity comes to mind here.

Any exception to free will is often regarded as an interfering constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes along and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have chosen to have hot dog instead."

Those who most ardently disagree with this are hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog---therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we did or not? I say, No you were not. Free will is an illusion.


Here's how I see it. (significantly condensed)

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely" randomly I mean utterly randomly, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the quantum level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate.* And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely or even partially randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions and thoughts. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal events leading up to the Doing in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.


What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do anything differently than what we are caused to do. Our life is solely determined by previous causal events, including intervening outside events (also causes), and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no ability to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choosing, selecting, opting, etc..

This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter.

Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as simply being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

__________________________

*Any proposition that the mind can be affected by random quantum events has to take into consideration the fact that "quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." This argument was elaborated on by MIT physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.
source

Please not that I'm currently not up to defending what I've said here (feeling a bit under the weather) but am willing to answer any questions about it.

For one thing, if determinism actually runs mankind, which it does, sin and salvation are robbed of their legitimacy, an idea Christians are loath to consider. In fact, Christians are obligated to a knee-jerk denial of determinism, which is understandable, they have no choice in the matter.

There are huge numbers of Christians that deny we have free will, it seems your research here is rather incomplete.

Then I have to believe that none of them considered what the lack of free will does to the Christian concepts of sin and salvation. It leaves them dead in the water.

You've also skipped over the puzzle that if the universe is deterministic then what caused determinism to exist?

Ti's a puzzlement for sure, but no more so than it is for the free willer. We simply don't know what brought the universe into existence if, in fact, it ever had a beginning at all.

As I explained already non-deterministic "will" has far greater explanatory power because free will can - if it so chooses - appear to behave deterministically yet the latter is not possible. Deterministic behavior can emerge from free will, yet free will cannot emerge from determinism.

Which, as I see it, is why free will doesn't exist in a deterministic universe.

.

It must exist else determinism could never come to exist, from what could a deterministic universe arise? Determinism cannot be the source of determinism, only free will can bring determinism into existence and it is through choice, the capacity to choose what to do is a necessity if we are to explain the presence of the universe, causality, laws. We've known this too for centuries, it was revealed to us and written down "In the beginning God created..." there you have it, that IS the explanation there can be no other.

The very term "create" implies free will, choice, else it isn't creation. Can you create anything without being able to choose between options? without being able to define those options?

[Miles]

The explanation for decisions made in a system with free will is and can only ever be "I chose to" they are never the result of laws.

Which is why a system predicated on free will fails in reality. In reality choosing and choice are illusions concocted so as to hold determinism at bay; the insidious truth of existence, which few are inclined to look at much less investigate.

What does "fails" mean here? how are you measuring or quantifying failure or success?

It fails as a workable concept because it never addresses the ultimate question, "Why did I freely select this rather than that."

Surely we can argue equally that denial of free will is an illusion concocted so as to hold non-determinism at bay? All you've done here is make assertions without justifying them, they are therefore simply your beliefs and if that's the basis of your position, that your beliefs are better than mine just because they're your beliefs, then we really won't get very far.

And to be fair, I'm not up to explaining why right now. However, here is something I wrote in part some years ago for another website that hopefully explains my position.

"Determinism is the philosophical idea that every event or state of affairs, including every human decision and action, is the inevitable and necessary consequence of antecedent states of affairs"

Source: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... inism.html

__________


Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Typically, very interesting notions on both sides come out of such conversations, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be pretty much on point and helpful.

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.


Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."


For many people the notion of free will is important because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton; a "machine" that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed or praised for what they do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given, and often touted in some religions---Christianity comes to mind here.

Any exception to free will is often regarded as an interfering constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes along and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have chosen to have hot dog instead."

Those who most ardently disagree with this are hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog---therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we did or not? I say, No you were not. Free will is an illusion.


Here's how I see it. (significantly condensed)

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely" randomly I mean utterly randomly, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the quantum level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate.* And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely or even partially randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions and thoughts. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal events leading up to the Doing in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.


What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do anything differently than what we are caused to do. Our life is solely determined by previous causal events, including intervening outside events (also causes), and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no ability to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choosing, selecting, opting, etc..

This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter.

Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as simply being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

__________________________

*Any proposition that the mind can be affected by random quantum events has to take into consideration the fact that "quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." This argument was elaborated on by MIT physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.
source

Please not that I'm currently not up to defending what I've said here (feeling a bit under the weather) but am willing to answer any questions about it.

For one thing, if determinism actually runs mankind, which it does, sin and salvation are robbed of their legitimacy, an idea Christians are loath to consider. In fact, Christians are obligated to a knee-jerk denial of determinism, which is understandable, they have no choice in the matter.

There are huge numbers of Christians that deny we have free will, it seems your research here is rather incomplete.

Then I have to believe that none of them considered what the lack of free will does to the Christian concepts of sin and salvation. It leaves them dead in the water.

You've also skipped over the puzzle that if the universe is deterministic then what caused determinism to exist?

Ti's a puzzlement for sure, but no more so than it is for the free willer. We simply don't know what brought the universe into existence if, in fact, it ever had a beginning at all.

As I explained already non-deterministic "will" has far greater explanatory power because free will can - if it so chooses - appear to behave deterministically yet the latter is not possible. Deterministic behavior can emerge from free will, yet free will cannot emerge from determinism.

Which, as I see it, is why free will doesn't exist in a deterministic universe.

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It must exist else determinism could never come to exist, from what could a deterministic universe arise? Determinism cannot be the source of determinism, only free will can bring determinism into exist and it is through choice, the capacity to choose what to do is a necessity if we are to explain the presence of the universe, causality, laws. We've known this too for centuries, it was revealed to us and written down "In the beginning God created..." there you have it, that IS the explanation there can be no other.

The very term "create" implies free will, choice, else it isn't creation. Can you create anything without being able to choose between options? without being able to define those options?

Sorry, but if your ultimate reasoning rest upon the unproven existence of some supernatural deity to make free will work then I have nothing more to say.

Have a nice day.

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[Inquirer]

The explanation for decisions made in a system with free will is and can only ever be "I chose to" they are never the result of laws.

Which is why a system predicated on free will fails in reality. In reality choosing and choice are illusions concocted so as to hold determinism at bay; the insidious truth of existence, which few are inclined to look at much less investigate.

What does "fails" mean here? how are you measuring or quantifying failure or success?

It fails as a workable concept because it never addresses the ultimate question, "Why did I freely select this rather than that."

Surely we can argue equally that denial of free will is an illusion concocted so as to hold non-determinism at bay? All you've done here is make assertions without justifying them, they are therefore simply your beliefs and if that's the basis of your position, that your beliefs are better than mine just because they're your beliefs, then we really won't get very far.

And to be fair, I'm not up to explaining why right now. However, here is something I wrote in part some years ago for another website that hopefully explains my position.

"Determinism is the philosophical idea that every event or state of affairs, including every human decision and action, is the inevitable and necessary consequence of antecedent states of affairs"

Source: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... inism.html

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Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Typically, very interesting notions on both sides come out of such conversations, many well thought out and others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be pretty much on point and helpful.

Will The capacity to act decisively on one's desires.


Free will "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."


For many people the notion of free will is important because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton; a "machine" that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed or praised for what they do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given, and often touted in some religions---Christianity comes to mind here.

Any exception to free will is often regarded as an interfering constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes along and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the issue of free will is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have chosen to have hot dog instead."

Those who most ardently disagree with this are hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog---therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we did or not? I say, No you were not. Free will is an illusion.


Here's how I see it. (significantly condensed)

There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely" randomly I mean utterly randomly, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the quantum level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate.* And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely or even partially randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions and thoughts. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal events leading up to the Doing in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.


What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do anything differently than what we are caused to do. Our life is solely determined by previous causal events, including intervening outside events (also causes), and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it was. We have no ability to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choosing, selecting, opting, etc..

This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter.

Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as simply being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .

This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.

__________________________

*Any proposition that the mind can be affected by random quantum events has to take into consideration the fact that "quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." This argument was elaborated on by MIT physicist, Max Tegmark. Based on his calculations, Tegmark concluded that quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.
source

Please not that I'm currently not up to defending what I've said here (feeling a bit under the weather) but am willing to answer any questions about it.

For one thing, if determinism actually runs mankind, which it does, sin and salvation are robbed of their legitimacy, an idea Christians are loath to consider. In fact, Christians are obligated to a knee-jerk denial of determinism, which is understandable, they have no choice in the matter.

There are huge numbers of Christians that deny we have free will, it seems your research here is rather incomplete.

Then I have to believe that none of them considered what the lack of free will does to the Christian concepts of sin and salvation. It leaves them dead in the water.

You've also skipped over the puzzle that if the universe is deterministic then what caused determinism to exist?

Ti's a puzzlement for sure, but no more so than it is for the free willer. We simply don't know what brought the universe into existence if, in fact, it ever had a beginning at all.

As I explained already non-deterministic "will" has far greater explanatory power because free will can - if it so chooses - appear to behave deterministically yet the latter is not possible. Deterministic behavior can emerge from free will, yet free will cannot emerge from determinism.

Which, as I see it, is why free will doesn't exist in a deterministic universe.

.

It must exist else determinism could never come to exist, from what could a deterministic universe arise? Determinism cannot be the source of determinism, only free will can bring determinism into exist and it is through choice, the capacity to choose what to do is a necessity if we are to explain the presence of the universe, causality, laws. We've known this too for centuries, it was revealed to us and written down "In the beginning God created..." there you have it, that IS the explanation there can be no other.

The very term "create" implies free will, choice, else it isn't creation. Can you create anything without being able to choose between options? without being able to define those options?

Sorry, but if your ultimate reasoning rest upon the unproven existence of some supernatural deity to make free will work then I have nothing more to say.

Have a nice day.

.

As you wish, you too, have a wonderful day.

[William]

Free will means non-deterministic, uncaused, so how can there be a cause for something that's uncaused?

It is simply a case of choosing one definition over another.

Therefore, the best position to take on such matters is the middle position.

Until free will can be defined in any correct manner, it has to remain in the basket of conceptual items...something which exists in the mind, and can be used by the personality in relation to the physical universe, but does not appear to exist as an object in the physical universe, interactively dependent of other objects.

Well even if something exists "in the mind" it exists. If the mind exists then "things" in that mind must also exist, they might not be what we claim they are but that's a different matter, they still must exist. Your position of being non-committal is itself a commitment, a choice, you must have chosen to adopt the position you have and no doubt have your reasons, but I chose my position too just as you have and I too have my reasons for the choice.

I am not denying my ability to choose. I choose the best position on the matter, since it has not otherwise been established either way.
My position therefore, is the most reasonable one, under the circumstances. It may not provide answers filtered through beliefs, but that it a plus.

Thoughts about things are real but may not be correct about what is real. You may believe you have free will, and it may be real in your understanding, but your understand may be off, in which case the better thing to do is not to establish a position of an absolute nature. Otherwise, hell nor high water can change one’s mind.

I would rather be ignorant and proven to be correct than wise [in belief] and proven to be incorrect.

But for now, we are all in the same boat as no such thing either way has been proven, and so any established theory based upon belief, acts more as a leak in said boat and is best plugged with the sensible acceptance of our collective ignorance on such matters of subject.

Further to that, I cannot say for sure that it was an accident of mindless nature, or a mindful and deliberate act on the part of said nature that lead me to find the correct position.