Are atheists theists?

[Inquirer]

A recent discussion of a definition of "atheism" in this thread, brings up the view that to define atheism this way seems to lead to the fact that an atheist must also be a theist.

The definition borrows from the popular Flewsian definition, by use of the concept of an "absence of belief" that some proposition is true, as the sole criteria for one being an atheist.

Here is Tcg's proposed definition (the proposition part is red for clarity)

"Atheism is the condition of not believing that a God or deity exists."

But if we are prepared to accept such a definition then we can define theism as:

"Theism is the condition of not believing that a God or deity doesn't exist."

Now the Flewsian atheist is not a traditional atheist, the traditional atheist asserts, believes, that there is no God.

The Flewsian atheist does not assert that, which means that they fit the definition of theist given above.

Therefore a (Flewsian) atheist is also a theist.

The only way to escape this is to argue that "absence of belief that God exists" is insufficient to define atheism (this contradiction vanishes when we use the traditional, established definition).

So are atheists also theists? if not, why not?

[Tcg]

Here is Tcg's proposed definition (the proposition part is red for clarity)

"Atheism is the condition of not believing that a God or deity exists."

This is not my proposed definition. It is a definition I heard and asked about. I'll refrain from typing the two letters that would answer your query as the answer that would require those two letters is absurdly obvious.


Tcg

[Bust Nak]

But if we are prepared to accept such a definition then we can define theism as:

"Theism is the condition of not believing that a God or deity doesn't exist."

You can define theism that way, but good luck getting others to adopt it.

Therefore a (Flewsian) atheist is also a theist.

The only way to escape this is to argue that "absence of belief that God exists" is insufficient to define atheism (this contradiction vanishes when we use the traditional, established definition).

I can think of another way to escape: I am going to argue that "absence of belief that God does not exist" is insufficient to define theism. So no, atheists are not also theists.

[Miles]

Now the Flewsian atheist is not a traditional atheist, the traditional atheist asserts, believes, that there is no God.

The Flewsian atheist does not assert that, which means that they fit the definition of theist given above.

Therefore a (Flewsian) atheist is also a theist.

Okay, now knowing what a Flewsian atheist does not assert, just what do they assert?

.

[historia]

The only way to escape this is to argue that "absence of belief that God exists" is insufficient to define atheism (this contradiction vanishes when we use the traditional, established definition).

If the overarching point you're trying to make here is that defining something principally in negative terms (what it is not) can be less precise and meaningful than defining it in positive terms (what it is), then that is certainly well taken.

Your rhetoric, if not your actual argument, seems to run past that point, though, suggesting that there is something illogical about doing this, which seems odd.

In English, we have a plethora of words -- often beginning with the prefix 'non-' -- to describe things in negative terms. It doesn't seem a "contradiction" to us to speak of non-partisan organizations, for example, or non-White communities, or even non-Euclidean geometry.

This "Flewsian" definition of atheist, as you put it, is really just treating the word atheist as a synonym for 'non-theist', so presents no more of a "contradiction" than other 'non-' prefixed words we use. I'm on record as suggesting that it might be preferable just to use the word non-theist, in that case. But that ship has already sailed, as this broad definition of atheist is widely accepted.

[William]

[Replying to historia in post #5]

But that ship has already sailed, as this broad definition of atheist is widely accepted.

Perhaps the history of the transformation could be examined and we could pin-point to where atheists decided the old definition of Atheism was inadequate to their cause, thus the new was adopted?

[Inquirer]

The only way to escape this is to argue that "absence of belief that God exists" is insufficient to define atheism (this contradiction vanishes when we use the traditional, established definition).

If the overarching point you're trying to make here is that defining something principally in negative terms (what it is not) can be less precise and meaningful than defining it in positive terms (what it is), then that is certainly well taken.

Your rhetoric, if not your actual argument, seems to run past that point, though, suggesting that there is something illogical about doing this, which seems odd.

In English, we have a plethora of words -- often beginning with the prefix 'non-' -- to describe things in negative terms. It doesn't seem a "contradiction" to us to speak of non-partisan organizations, for example, or non-White communities, or even non-Euclidean geometry.

This "Flewsian" definition of atheist, as you put it, is really just treating the word atheist as a synonym for 'non-theist', so presents no more of a "contradiction" than other 'non-' prefixed words we use. I'm on record as suggesting that it might be preferable just to use the word non-theist, in that case. But that ship has already sailed, as this broad definition of atheist is widely accepted.

Anthony Flew argued in The Presumption of Atheism, that the term needed to be interpreted as "someone who is simply not a theist". In essence he wanted the atheist to have no case to answer, that being an atheist was a natural default state of mind until one has seen evidence to the contrary.

But this definition ultimately - IMHO - leads to epistemological problems and furthermore demands that not being a theist must be the correct position for everyone until some decision is made to become a "believer".

A default position of "God exists" is very natural, was very natural for thousands of years, the majority of people who contributed to the scientific revolution were theists, creationists. The universe exists, minds exist, beauty exists and therefore God exists is a rational way to reason, of course it isn't "proof" in the sense of objective proof but so what?

By my analysis the statement "I do not hold a belief in God" describes a conscious decision has been made, that despite evidence for God a person has chosen to not interpret that evidence as evidence for God. They are free to do so too, they might conceivably be correct but it is a subjective interpretation just as is the theists.

Why would atheists not declare "I do not hold a belief that God exists nor do I hold a belief that God does not exist"? On what grounds could they object to such a definition?

[Miles]

The only way to escape this is to argue that "absence of belief that God exists" is insufficient to define atheism (this contradiction vanishes when we use the traditional, established definition).

If the overarching point you're trying to make here is that defining something principally in negative terms (what it is not) can be less precise and meaningful than defining it in positive terms (what it is), then that is certainly well taken.

Your rhetoric, if not your actual argument, seems to run past that point, though, suggesting that there is something illogical about doing this, which seems odd.

In English, we have a plethora of words -- often beginning with the prefix 'non-' -- to describe things in negative terms. It doesn't seem a "contradiction" to us to speak of non-partisan organizations, for example, or non-White communities, or even non-Euclidean geometry.

This "Flewsian" definition of atheist, as you put it, is really just treating the word atheist as a synonym for 'non-theist', so presents no more of a "contradiction" than other 'non-' prefixed words we use. I'm on record as suggesting that it might be preferable just to use the word non-theist, in that case. But that ship has already sailed, as this broad definition of atheist is widely accepted.

Anthony Flew argued in The Presumption of Atheism, that the term needed to be interpreted as "someone who is simply not a theist". In essence he wanted the atheist to have no case to answer, that being an atheist was a natural default state of mind until one has seen evidence to the contrary.

Which is quite reasonable. It's the very approach science uses. Until one has sufficient evidence that X is true there is no reason to accept that it is, which is not the approach of religious believers. Most believers rely on faith: the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have adequate evidence.'

But this definition ultimately - IMHO - leads to epistemological problems and furthermore demands that not being a theist must be the correct position for everyone until some decision is made to become a "believer".

But isn't that how everyone starts out, with no belief in god until we understand the concept and are then convinced it's true or not? I see no epistemological problem.

A default position of "God exists" is very natural, was very natural for thousands of years, the majority of people who contributed to the scientific revolution were theists, creationists. The universe exists, minds exist, beauty exists and therefore God exists is a rational way to reason, of course it isn't "proof" in the sense of objective proof but so what?

Not quite sure what you mean by "natural," but as I see it, simply because a position has existed for many years does not make it a natural one. Or that because many people subscribe to it somehow makes it natural. As I pointed out, we all come into the world with No belief in any god. It isn't until we can process the concept of god that we accept it as true or not, all of which depends to a great extent on those whose opinions we've come to respect and rely on. NOT on any actual truth it may or may not hold.

By my analysis the statement "I do not hold a belief in God" describes a conscious decision has been made, that despite evidence for God a person has chosen to not interpret that evidence as evidence for God.

It isn't "not to interpret that evidence as evidence for God," but simply finding such interpretation insufficient. Present sufficient evidence and most atheists will very likely choose to accept it as such: the evidence does, in fact, show that god exists.

Why would atheists not declare "I do not hold a belief that God exists nor do I hold a belief that God does not exist"? On what grounds could they object to such a definition?

Don't know, although a few do claim that god does not exist.

.

[William]

[Replying to Miles in post #8]

Which is quite reasonable. It's the very approach science uses. Until one has sufficient evidence that X is true there is no reason to accept that it is, which is not the approach of religious believers.

Most believers rely on faith: the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have adequate evidence.'

Congrats - you just defined Theism...something which requires more than science can provide.

[Miles]

[Replying to Miles in post #8]

Which is quite reasonable. It's the very approach science uses. Until one has sufficient evidence that X is true there is no reason to accept that it is, which is not the approach of religious believers.

Most believers rely on faith: the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have adequate evidence.'

Congrats - you just defined Theism...something which requires more than science can provide.

Personally, I don't define a philosophical position by how we arrived at it, but on the basis of its constituent logic.

Theism: The belief in the existence of god
Atheism: The lack of belief in the existence of god (although some atheism outright deny the existence of god)

.