Free Will -- Achilles v McCulloch

[McCulloch]

There is reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions.

Achilles12604 affirms. McCulloch denies.

[achilles12604]

I think you misinterpret the position that I am arguing. I am not trying to prove determinism, although if I could it would win the debate for me. I am simply trying to show that free will cannot be proven and that each of your examples can be looked at, in a way consistent with determinism.

Example 1) The speeding driver.

You have shown that there are cases where biology overrides knowledge and the person behaves in a fashion which goes against his experiences due to the totallity of the influences. Likewise, you have suggested that someone's experiences can override biology resulting in a similar situation. The cornerstone of your entire argument is "The totallity of the influencers".

However, the speeding driver has biology working against him. Human's (despite your attempt to show the reverse) were not built by nature with speed. We were not built to travel more than 10 miles an hour and then only when you are a trained olympic athelete. So traveling at 40 MPH is enough, but to push it to 80 or 90, our biology is certainly not causing the speeder to go faster. So we turn to experiences to see if they can override our biology.

But there too, our experiences tell us not to speed. We know from watching TV that speed causes crashes which cause untold pain and suffering. We know that speeding results in tickets. We know that speeding is bad for our cars, and makes them fall apart sooner. We know that speeding costs us more money because we burn so much more fuel.

No help to determinism there either. Our biology is dead set against it. Our experiences are dead set against it. And yet you maintain that there is some other mysterious factor which we don't know about which causes us to overcome BOTH of these major influencers, and speed. I agree. It is called FREE WILL. We want to speed. Therefore, we do.

The operative question is why do we want to go fast? Is it necessarily free will?

My cousin Larry wants to go fast because he choose to want to go fast?

Choose to want?

I suppose that this sentence (although frightening coming from such a grammer champion) could work. I would have written "My cousin Larry goes fast because he chooses to indulge in his positive desire to go fast, and ignore his positive desire to be safe, maintain fuel, etc.

It is a bit wordy I admit, but it is much more clear about my position.

I will agree that it is not rational to want to go fast. It is dangerous, bad for the environment and possibly expensive. We are not naturally capable of going as fast as Larry wants to go. In fact, free will does not adequately explain the widespread desire to go fast. If we are free to choose, then wouldn't almost all people choose to be safe, save money and be better for the environment?

But the vast VAST majority of people DO CHOOSE this path. In fact almost all people do choose this path. Just as most people choose to go to the correct vacation spot (referring back to your previous analogy)

Are you suggesting that rational behavior indicates lack of free will?

Allow me to be clear. Most people act in a rational manner in line with the environmental, biological and experience factors. However some people do not. This rift is what I point to as evidence that a "pure determinism" philosophy needs to be re-worked just as exceptions to the theory of gravity would require explaination and possible re-working of that theory.

Example 2) The drunk driver.

This one is much like the speeder but has one additional factor which points to the ability to decide for oneself.

Like the speeder, we know that drinking (especially when combined with driving) is against our biology. Certainly you agree that putting poison into your body to slow it and make it more vulnerable is against our natural instincts (hmm . . . maybe drinking in itself defies determinism). But then combine that with our experiences, and we know for sure that we will either be killed, or go to prison.

And yet, people do this. Not only do they do this once, but twice, three times. I have seen repeat offenders get caught 9 times. Usually they are sent to prison for a good term after the 9th time.

But on the other hand, I have seen some people get caught 2, 3 or 4 times, and then suddenly stop.

Now you will say that their experience resulted in them stopping. But if this were true, why didn't they stop after one time? After 2? The experience of jail is the same. Same gaurds. Same inmates. What was the X factor which caused the cessation in the pattern of behavior? My answer? The person decided to stop. Free will. They decided to quit the behavior.

The experiences were identical. The resulting punishments were identical. So the difference was not part of the environment. It was not an influencer. It came from within. Free Will to stop.

We both agree that the person, for whatever reason, has decided to stop or to continue the dangerous criminal and antisocial behaviour. You have failed to show that the decision must have been made free from the combined influences of genes, environment, experiences and nature. The combination of these groups of factors is so complex that it is naïve to believe that they will ever be identical and that they, in combination, are insufficient to explain the behaviour in question.

And this is begging the question.

1) Why was his behavior deterministic?
A) Because there are so many variables it must be determined.

I may not have concrete proof that EVERY variable is accounted for, but I have shown in both examples that the majority of the factors (especially the major ones) are actually working AGAINST the end results. And as you pointed out above, not everyone behaves in this manner. So comparing them side by side, the majority of the factors we can determine working against the outcome, My conclusion is that these factors are accepted by some and acted upon in a rational manner, and rejected by others who choose to act in an irrational manner.

As you have done several times thus far, the only way to combine these facts with determinism, is to appeal to unknown, unprovable, and probably non-existence very minor factors which somehow are more powerful than all the accounted for and proven factors I list above.

The sum total of the experiences of the drunk drivers are never identical. The physiological difficulty faced by the drunk trying to quit is never identical. So why should the determinist expect that the behaviours should be as easy to predict as you seem to say that we should?

You keep inserting the word identical when similar is good enough in pure determinism. You keep putting forth that very minor (so minor we can't detect them or figure out what they are) factors over ride all the major influencers . . . But only in these few cases. On the other hand, when people do behave rationally, you point to the major factors and say "See . . . All the factors lead to the expected result."

Now we touched on the subject of weather before. You and I agree that weather does not possess free will. Given the same circumstances, the same result will occur. Despite your objection earlier, I say that given SIMILAR circumstances, the same result will occur. The updraft, and down draft do not need to be identical to result in a tornado. They can be similar. In fact if they are within a certain range of power, they will result in a tornado of some sort.

But the simple fact of the matter is that the scientists who try to predict weather, often still don't get it right. Certain human behaviour is quite predicable. Ask an election pollster or an economist. Other human behaviour is not. But like the weather, unpredictability does not necessarily imply free will.

But when the weather men are wrong, they are able to explain WHY things changed. This is still consistent with pure determinism.

Weather man predicts a snow storm for Weds. because there is moisture coming off the Pacific ocean and it is going to impact a cold front from Canada on Monday. On Tuesday, the jet stream moves, and the cold front is pushed out towards Nebraska. Hence Wendsday is cloudy in Colorado but no snow.

The weather man was wrong. . . . but we know exactly WHY he was wrong, and had the weather man been working 24/7 that week, his prediction would have been right.

On the other hand, If there was a cold front, and moisture which did impact over colorado on Weds, but instead of a snow storm, the temperatures rose to 70 degrees and it was summer like weather all day long, this would really be something to behold.

You state that the weather is sometimes unpredictable and therefore human behavior's unpredictablility can be accounted for through pure determinism. But I put forth that weather patterns ARE predictable and even if they do something different or unexpected, the result is still rational. Humans on the other hand have totally irrational resulting behavior (70 and sunny) given the conditions we can measure.

There is a vast difference between changing factors, and irrational results.

You have taken the position that everything in the universe is determined. But if you compare nature to human behavior, you clearly see a rift. In nature similar circumstances always result in the same action. In chemistry if you mix Magnesium, and heat in an oxygen rich environment, you get Magnesium Oxide. In weather if you put together two similar fronts, (not necessarily IDENTICAL) you get a tornado.

But with humans, the result COULD follow the expected course, or it COULD result in a totally weird and strange action.

Some systems are known to be chaotic. This is a technical term which means that very small changes in the initial factors of a deterministic system may have a large impact on the outcome. There are good reasons to believe that human behaviour is, at many times, such a chaotic system. A small noise can set off an avalanche.

Are you going to appeal to Chaos theory to prove determinism? You know as well as I do that these theories are polar opposites.

[McCulloch]

Are you suggesting that rational behavior indicates lack of free will?

No, I am not. Are you suggesting that the lack of rational behaviour indicates that there must be free will? We both admit that humans at times behave irrationally. I believe that our irrational behaviour is caused by various factors that could potentially be identified. My mother-in-law behaves irrationally more and more as the Alzheimer's syndrome continues to affect her neurons. You seem to indicate that irrational behaviour can only prove that humans have free will.

Most people act in a rational manner in line with the environmental, biological and experience factors.

I don't really believe that. Most people sometimes behave irrationally at times. Determinism is not dependent on people behaving rationally any more than economics is. The undisputed truth is that people behave irrationally. But I believe that when they do, there is a reason for it, environment, neurology, psychology, pharmacology and genetics.

exceptions to the theory of gravity would require explanation and possible re-working of that theory.

Lighter than air crafts do not necessitate the re-working of the theory of gravity.

I do not think that I am begging the question. If the question was, "There is reason to believe that humans do not have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. " then I would be begging the question. But the question that we agreed to debate is, "There is reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. "

[McCulloch]

Are you going to appeal to Chaos theory to prove determinism? You know as well as I do that these theories are polar opposites.

The really odd thing about chaos theory is that is is entirely deterministic. Here is an example. There is a series of numbers between 0 and 100% which is defined deterministically this way. Each number is the previous number in the series multiplied by one minus that number times 3.7.

X(n) = 3.7 × X(n-1) × (1-(X(n-1))

This is a classic example of chaos.
If X(0) is 25% then X(22440) is 76.8%
If X(0) is 25.001% and X(22440) is 66.7%
If X(0) is 25.002% and X(22440) is 26.1%
If X(0) is 25.000001% and X(22440) is 70.2%
If X(0) is 25.000002% and X(22440) is 76.6%
If X(0) is 25.000000001% and X(22440) is 81.2%
If X(0) is 25.000000002% and X(22440) is 77.2%

Now change the constant to 3.70000001
If X(0) is 25 then X(22440) is 58.7%
If X(0) is 25.001% and X(22440) is 77.5%
If X(0) is 25.002% and X(22440) is 74.9%
If X(0) is 25.000001% and X(22440) is 59.7%
If X(0) is 25.000002% and X(22440) is 28.3%
If X(0) is 25.000000001% and X(22440) is 85.2%
If X(0) is 25.000000002% and X(22440) is 83.0%

As you can see, very small changes to the initial conditions, either X(0) or the constant, makes for unpredictable and significant changes to the outcome.

Chaos theory is an excellent example to show that a completely deterministic system can be unpredictable. My conclusion from chaos theory is that unpredictability cannot be used to prove free-will. There have been some research which points to the idea that human behaviour and the human mind is in many ways a chaotic system, complex, unpredictable yet deterministic.

[achilles12604]

POST 1 of 2

Are you suggesting that rational behavior indicates lack of free will?

No, I am not. Are you suggesting that the lack of rational behavior indicates that there must be free will? We both admit that humans at times behave irrationally. I believe that our irrational behavior is caused by various factors that could potentially be identified. My mother-in-law behaves irrationally more and more as the Alzheimer's syndrome continues to affect her neurons. You seem to indicate that irrational behavior can only prove that humans have free will.

You are attempting to simplify my position and in doing so you are continually removing key elements. My ideas do not boil down to something as simple as your "Everything is determined therefore everything is determined." You are constantly attempting to place the entire burden of proof on me, when really in the OP, you are supposed to make a case AGAINST free will, not simply say that yours is the default position a priori.

But no matter. If you insist on placing the entire burden of proof upon me, and then change the agreed upon criteria usable to defend our positions, then at the very least allow me the FULL USE of my words instead of attempting to cut out crucial parts of my ideas.


This being said I shall restated my position in full with regards to rational and irrational behavior.

Your statement above

Are you suggesting that the lack of rational behaviour indicates that there must be free will

? is only a small part of my position.

What I suggest is that given the criteria YOU put forth for determinism (ie the combination of all the influencing factors), if such a case can be found (and has as I continue to point out) where an otherwise normal person acts in a manner which goes against all the major factors of determinism and the end result is irrational behavior, this example can not be purely deterministic.

Yes lack of rational behavior, under very specific conditions with known influencers, does indicate free will because if that person were determined by the sum of the influences upon them, they would not have reacted in such a way.

Your defense to this is chaos theory, which I shall certainly address because you left out a HUGE factor there as well in an attempt to prove your case. Leaving out huge numbers in a equation to get the result you desire is a severe no no.



You use the example above of someone with Alzheimer's syndrome behaving irrationally. But if you consider what this disease does as an influencing factor (a major one at that), the end result of irrational behavior is really, quite rational. It makes sense so behavior which for a person not suffering from this disease would be irrational, becomes quite rational and expected from this person. Thus your example fails because you have altered my point to fit your own criteria.

Stick with a "normal" person, no genetic disorders, no mind altering ailings, and then tell me that you place irrational behavior by this person into the same category as irrational behavior by someone suffering from Alzheimer's syndrome.

You can't because YOU added in a very important influencer thus changing the base.

Most people act in a rational manner in line with the environmental, biological and experience factors.

I don't really believe that. Most people sometimes behave irrationally at times. Determinism is not dependent on people behaving rationally any more than economics is. The undisputed truth is that people behave irrationally. But I believe that when they do, there is a reason for it, environment, neurology, psychology, pharmacology and genetics.

Or choice.

If I asked you to prove your case that every irrational behavior was indeed caused by some untraceable tiny factor, you would declare (rightly) that I am putting forth a demand for unreasonable evidence.

HOWEVER - Since I am not putting forth such a demand, I must once again point out something, which you very neatly cut out of my previous posts and ignored totally.

The position which I have bolded above is once again a non-falsifiable position. You are stating that no matter what occurs it was determined.

1) Position one: The person's behavior is the logical result from the major determining factors and is what we consider rational.

Your explaination: His behavior was determined due to the sum total of the influencers, Major and minor.

My explanation: The person considered these influencers and made the rational choice of his various options.

2) Position two: The person's behavior is totally irrational given all the major influencers which we are able to detect.

Your explanation: There must be some sort of minor changes which somehow over ride every single major contributing factor we can detect, and it results in him behaving the way he did.

My explanation: The person considered these influencers and made the irrational choice of his various options.



Of our two positions, yours is the only one which flys in the face of the evidence we do have. Yours is the position which is based upon the assumptions of factors which are totally undetectable and unknown. Yours is the position which demands special pleading to make it work.

exceptions to the theory of gravity would require explanation and possible re-working of that theory.

Lighter than air crafts do not necessitate the re-working of the theory of gravity.

Lighter than air crafts do not defy the theory of gravity but rather work within that sound theory in a manner we are able to measure and test.

Your position depends upon unknown variables which are in direct conflict with known variables, are un-testable, and therefore, your analogy once again does not fit the picture.

If you could explain how tiny, undetectable un-testable variables could over power major variables, and force a particular outcome, then you would have a point. But you have not done so.

Your below chaos theory I shall address as this is your attempt to make this explanation, however it contains major flaws as large factors are not included in your math and thus, your end numbers are flawed.

BTW - Did you happen to ever teach math of Physics? I just ask because I recognize the below as I am majoring in physics right now.

I do not think that I am begging the question. If the question was, "There is reason to believe that humans do not have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. " then I would be begging the question. But the question that we agreed to debate is, "There is reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. "

If we are going to stick with the original wording, and place the entire burden upon me, then we should also stick with the wording that once an example is provided, you are required to explain it in deterministic framework.

I have written above my full explanation without summary and without additional "what ifs" (like Als Synd) which distract from the point I was making rather than disprove it.






Final note

Now we touched on the subject of weather before. You and I agree that weather does not possess free will. Given the same circumstances, the same result will occur. Despite your objection earlier, I say that given SIMILAR circumstances, the same result will occur. The updraft, and down draft do not need to be identical to result in a tornado. They can be similar. In fact if they are within a certain range of power, they will result in a tornado of some sort.

But the simple fact of the matter is that the scientists who try to predict weather, often still don't get it right. Certain human behaviour is quite predicable. Ask an election pollster or an economist. Other human behaviour is not. But like the weather, unpredictability does not necessarily imply free will.

But when the weather men are wrong, they are able to explain WHY things changed. This is still consistent with pure determinism.

Weather man predicts a snow storm for Weds. because there is moisture coming off the Pacific ocean and it is going to impact a cold front from Canada on Monday. On Tuesday, the jet stream moves, and the cold front is pushed out towards Nebraska. Hence Wendsday is cloudy in Colorado but no snow.

The weather man was wrong. . . . but we know exactly WHY he was wrong, and had the weather man been working 24/7 that week, his prediction would have been right.

On the other hand, If there was a cold front, and moisture which did impact over colorado on Weds, but instead of a snow storm, the temperatures rose to 70 degrees and it was summer like weather all day long, this would really be something to behold.

You state that the weather is sometimes unpredictable and therefore human behavior's unpredictablility can be accounted for through pure determinism. But I put forth that weather patterns ARE predictable and even if they do something different or unexpected, the result is still rational. Humans on the other hand have totally irrational resulting behavior (70 and sunny) given the conditions we can measure.

There is a vast difference between changing factors, and irrational results.

Did this make sense as to the difference between changing factors, and a totally irrational result?

[achilles12604]

POST 2 of 2

Are you going to appeal to Chaos theory to prove determinism? You know as well as I do that these theories are polar opposites.

The really odd thing about chaos theory is that is is entirely deterministic.

You know what . . . you are right. My mistake. However, I do not think that this effects my conclusion. Allow me to explain why.

Here is an example. There is a series of numbers between 0 and 100% which is defined deterministically this way. Each number is the previous number in the series multiplied by one minus that number times 3.7.

X(n) = 3.7 × X(n-1) × (1-(X(n-1))

This is a classic example of chaos.
If X(0) is 25% then X(22440) is 76.8%

First let us be on the same page mathematically.

X(0) = 3.7(X(0-1))(1-X(0-1))

This would be your first equation.

X(0) = 3.7(-X)(1+x)
X(0) = 3.7(-X-X2)
X(0) = -3.7X-3.7X2

My math correct thus far?

25%=-3.7X-3.7X2


Then

X(22440)= 3.7(X(22440-1)(1-X(22440-1)

X(22440) = 3.7(22439X)(1-22439X)

X(22440) = 3.7(22439X-503508721X2)

X(22440) = 83024.3X-1862982267.67X2

76.8% = 83024.3X-1862982267.67X2


Ok. The math has been broken down into an equation and frankly, I do not see how it works. The numbers are not correct. Mind filling in the blanks?

Show us that this theory actually works before I point out that you have included a disproportionately small factor while omitting the additional larger factors which would also be impacting the system.

[McCulloch]

Side Trip down Chaos Lane.

The problem is a semantic one. I have used × to indicate multiplication and brackets to indicate subscript (since there does not seem to be a BB Code for subscript).

X(n) = 3.7 × X(n-1) × (1-(X(n-1))
then means
the nth item in the series is equal to 3.7 times the item just before the nth item times one minus the item just before the nth item.

So if the starting point [written as X(0)] is 0.25 then the first number in the series is X(1) 3.7 × 0.25 × (1-0.25) = 0.69375

The second number in the series X(2) is 3.7 × 0.69375 × 0.30625 = 0.78610546875

The 22,440th number in the series is 0.768...

You see this is an unusual function. If the constant is between 2 and 3, the series converges and the 22,440th item is equal to or very nearly equal to the 22,441th item. If the constant is increased past 3, bifurcation occurs. That is the series converges alternately upon two values and the 22,440th item is equal to or very nearly equal to the 22,442nd item. Increase the constant again and another bifurcation occurs and the series converges on four values. Then eight, then sixteen.
At each bifurcation, the number of converging values doubles. But one can observe that the bifurcations come closer and closer together until at about 3.6 there is total chaos and there are no values that the function converges upon at all.


Here is a diagram that illustrates how the values of this series converge with different values of the constant.

Now, as I tried to point out, and failed because I chose ambiguous terminology, in this series, a very small change in the initial value or a very small change in the constant yields a significant and unpredictable change in the values further down the series. Yet this is a completely deterministic system.

The human mind has been likened to a more complex but similarly chaotic phenomenon known as a Strange Attractor.

[McCulloch]

You are constantly attempting to place the entire burden of proof on me, when really in the OP, you are supposed to make a case AGAINST free will, not simply say that yours is the default position a priori.

From the OP, the question being debated is, "There is reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. Achilles12604 affirms. McCulloch denies." I might be wrong, but I thought that the burden of proof normally falls on the side of the one who affirms a statement.

In the second post, I wrote, "The question is, "There is reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions. " Achilles' job is simple. He can either present a reason or reasons to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose OR he can demonstrate that humans can freely choose. My job is to show that whatever reason he may present is not valid or that whatever demonstration he performs can be adequately explained from a determinist point-of-view." I apologize if what I wrote led you to believe that you did not have the burden of proof or that I was required to prove determinism. In our discussions prior to starting the debate, you pointed out, and I agreed that determinism is non-falsifiable, so I now wonder at your insistence that I prove it.

What I suggest is that given the criteria YOU put forth for determinism (ie the combination of all the influencing factors), if such a case can be found (and has as I continue to point out) where an otherwise normal person acts in a manner which goes against all the major factors of determinism and the end result is irrational behavior, this example can not be purely deterministic.

I don't know what an otherwise normal person is. From what I have seen, you have found some cases where the behaviour of the individual varies from what you would expect the behaviour to be, given the factors that you know about for that individual and given the way that you understand those factors to work for what you call normal people. Without getting into specifics, I have pointed out that unpredictability and the lack of knowledge of how a behaviour came about does not prove free-will.

Yes lack of rational behavior, under very specific conditions with known influencers, does indicate free will because if that person were determined by the sum of the influences upon them, they would not have reacted in such a way.

Your case:

1. Given this set of factors, I would expect a person to behave that particular way.
2. At least one person, under those factors does not behave the expected way.
3. Therefore, the person must have free-will.

I fail to see how such a conclusion is warranted. Other possibilities you dismiss out-of-hand:

1. There are factors influencing this behaviour that you are not aware of.
2. The mechanism by which the factors affect the behaviour are more complex and less understood than you had assumed.

Unless you can disprove these two objections, the jump to free-will as a necessary explanation is unwarranted.

You use the example above of someone with Alzheimer's syndrome behaving irrationally. But if you consider what this disease does as an influencing factor (a major one at that), the end result of irrational behavior is really, quite rational. It makes sense so behavior which for a person not suffering from this disease would be irrational, becomes quite rational and expected from this person. Thus your example fails because you have altered my point to fit your own criteria.

I was using Alzheimer's syndrome to illustrate that a person's decisions cannot be considered as being independent from that person's neurology. Neurologists have learned more about how the brain works from those who's neurology is damaged (stroke, Alzheimer's etc. ) than from normally function brains.

But I believe that when they [most people] do [behave irrationally], there is a reason for it, environment, neurology, psychology, pharmacology and genetics.

Or choice.

Possibly, but not necessarily.

If I asked you to prove your case that every irrational behavior was indeed caused by some untraceable tiny factor, you would declare (rightly) that I am putting forth a demand for unreasonable evidence.

You're correct.

[mrow][mcol]Achilles' representation of McCulloch's Explanation [mcol]Achilles' Explanation [mcol]Response [row]Position one: The person's behavior is the logical result from the major determining factors and is what we consider rational. [col]His behavior was determined due to the sum total of the influencers, major and minor. [col]The person considered these influencers and made the rational choice of his various options. [col]His behaviour fit our expectations of what a person under those circumstances would do. It could be that we understand all of the relevant factors and how they influence the person's decision and correctly predicted his behaviour or it could be that our understanding of this individual is wrong but coincidently the outcome matches our expectations. [row]Position two: The person's behavior is totally irrational given all the major influencers which we are able to detect. [col]There must be some sort of minor changes which somehow over ride every single major contributing factor we can detect, and it results in him behaving the way he did. [col]The person considered these influencers and made the irrational choice of his various options. [col]The person's behaviour does not fit our expectations of what a person should do under thoser circumstances. It could be that we do not understand all of the relevant factors and/or it could be that we do not understand how the factors interact to influence his decision. Very obviously, there are some factors which we consider to be minor which are having a major effect. Achilles' unanswered question is why would a free agent choose to behave irrationally? If it is his free choice, why would he choose anything other than what is best? Irrational behaviour, to me, is more of an indicator that the person's behaviour is beyond his control than an indicator that his behaviour is freely chosen. No special pleading required.

But when the weather men are wrong, they are able to explain WHY things changed. This is still consistent with pure determinism.

If we always knew why he was wrong, then we would be able to avoid such errors in the future. We know, for instance that a cold front went where it was not expected to go, therefore the forecast was incorrect. We don't know why the cold front did not go where it was expected to go. Or if we do, we don't know why whatever affected the direction of the cold front did not behave as expected. No, we do not know exactly why the weather prediction was wrong. We know something about what went wrong, maybe, but we have not got the whole thing wrapped up, yet.

You state that the weather is sometimes unpredictable and therefore human behavior's unpredictability can be accounted for through pure determinism. But I put forth that weather patterns ARE predictable and even if they do something different or unexpected, the result is still rational. Humans on the other hand have totally irrational resulting behavior (70 and sunny) given the conditions we can measure.

I state that weather is sometimes unpredictable even though it is a deterministic system therefore it is wrong to conclude that unpredictability necessitates the conclusion of free will.

If it is true, as you frequently assert, that determinism is non-falsifiable, then it's negation, free-will must also be non-falsifiable. Then you admit that there is no reason to believe that humans have the ability to freely choose when making decisions.

[achilles12604]

Side Trip down Chaos Lane.

The problem is a semantic one. I have used × to indicate multiplication and brackets to indicate subscript (since there does not seem to be a BB Code for subscript).

X(n) = 3.7 × X(n-1) × (1-(X(n-1))
then means
the nth item in the series is equal to 3.7 times the item just before the nth item times one minus the item just before the nth item.

So if the starting point [written as X(0)] is 0.25 then the first number in the series is X(1) 3.7 × 0.25 × (1-0.25) = 0.69375

The second number in the series X(2) is 3.7 × 0.69375 × 0.30625 = 0.78610546875

The 22,440th number in the series is 0.768...

You see this is an unusual function. If the constant is between 2 and 3, the series converges and the 22,440th item is equal to or very nearly equal to the 22,441th item. If the constant is increased past 3, bifurcation occurs. That is the series converges alternately upon two values and the 22,440th item is equal to or very nearly equal to the 22,442nd item. Increase the constant again and another bifurcation occurs and the series converges on four values. Then eight, then sixteen.
At each bifurcation, the number of converging values doubles. But one can observe that the bifurcations come closer and closer together until at about 3.6 there is total chaos and there are no values that the function converges upon at all.


Here is a diagram that illustrates how the values of this series converge with different values of the constant.

Now, as I tried to point out, and failed because I chose ambiguous terminology, in this series, a very small change in the initial value or a very small change in the constant yields a significant and unpredictable change in the values further down the series. Yet this is a completely deterministic system.

The human mind has been likened to a more complex but similarly chaotic phenomenon known as a Strange Attractor.

Ah ha. (lightbulb)

Ok I understand the math portion now. Yes, we need to be careful to start from the same place as in my little math world (8)(4) = 32.

Ok now that we have that figured out, I see three issues with your equating this graph to the human mind.

1) Your graph depends upon the original base (3.7) and then additional factors (n). This is all well and good if you are accounting for all the (n)'s in the formula. However, you have included the small (n)'s, which of course would be the unknown and untestable variables from our previous posts, but your graph totally ignores the testable and much larger (N)'s. So your formula should really look more like . . .

X(n) = 3.7 × X(n-1) × (1-(X(n-1)) x (1+(x+N^1))x(N^2)x(1-N^4)x(N^3)

N^#= larger factors which also influence your system numbered 1-4 for simplicity sake.

You have left out the influence of the larger factors. So while I agree that the small factors in either the base, or the influencers can have significant change, you have inadvertantly focused on these small factors and forgotten to include the larger and testable factors which we know to be influencing the system.

This would severely alter your results don't you think?


Second issue, you are hypothesizing about the mere existence of these smaller factors and if they do exist, you are hypothesizing about the influence they would have. Thus, determinism can be at best, a theory with some contradictory data which is theorized away with unknown variables.

Am I wrong?


Third issue, this formula would have a difficult time accounting for similar conditions within the same base (or person). If the base is exactly the same (3.7) and the conditions were quite similar n=1 or n=2, even your own graph proves that while the result would not be identical, it would certainly be similar.

As I have shown before, human illogical behavior results in extremes (speeding or being careful to remain in the limits). Notice that unless you have a significant change in your (n), your resulting change in your graphs results, while not necessarily predictable, are also fairly insignificant and certainly not a total reversal in behavior.

[McCulloch]

You have left out the influence of the larger factors. So while I agree that the small factors in either the base, or the influencers can have significant change, you have inadvertantly focused on these small factors and forgotten to include the larger and testable factors which we know to be influencing the system.

This would severely alter your results don't you think?

No, I don't. The point I am making is there are completely determinate systems which are unpredictable and that small changes in some of the factors can yield large effect on the outcome. If the human brain were a complex yet determinate system, we should expect that the outcome cannot always be predicted from the factors.

Second issue, you are hypothesizing about the mere existence of these smaller factors and if they do exist, you are hypothesizing about the influence they would have. Thus, determinism can be at best, a theory with some contradictory data which is theorized away with unknown variables.

Am I wrong?

Yes. But I will address this concern later.

Third issue, this formula would have a difficult time accounting for similar conditions within the same base (or person). If the base is exactly the same (3.7) and the conditions were quite similar n=1 or n=2, even your own graph proves that while the result would not be identical, it would certainly be similar.

As I have shown before, human illogical behavior results in extremes (speeding or being careful to remain in the limits). Notice that unless you have a significant change in your (n), your resulting change in your graphs results, while not necessarily predictable, are also fairly insignificant and certainly not a total reversal in behavior.

Actually for n < 3, over the long haul, the value converges. This is a non-chaotic, deterministic situation. The human brain is not nearly so simple as this example, but may be closer to a strange attractor. But the math for a strange attractor is more difficult to explain.

[McCulloch]

Example 2) The drunk driver.

This one is much like the speeder but has one additional factor which points to the ability to decide for oneself.

Like the speeder, we know that drinking (especially when combined with driving) is against our biology.

I know of no biological principle that rules out the consumption of alcohol or driving. Given the propensity to become addicted, one might say the opposite, that we have a biological drive towards its use.

Certainly you agree that putting poison into your body to slow it and make it more vulnerable is against our natural instincts (hmm . . . maybe drinking in itself defies determinism).

I think that such behaviour defies free will. You say that humans are free to choose to do this or to do that. Why then would anyone freely choose to do that which he knows is against his own self-interest?

But then combine that with our experiences, and we know for sure that we will either be killed, or go to prison.

And how many people get behind the wheel with the idea that something bad is going to happen to them? Isn't it more often that they say, "I didn't think I'd get caught", or something along those lines?

And yet, people do this. Not only do they do this once, but twice, three times. I have seen repeat offenders get caught 9 times. Usually they are sent to prison for a good term after the 9th time.

But on the other hand, I have seen some people get caught 2, 3 or 4 times, and then suddenly stop.

People are different. My father-in-law quit smoking in his 40's with his first heart attack. My neighbour still smokes in spite of her chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Is your argument that because different people react in different ways to similar situations, they must have free-will?

Now you will say that their experience resulted in them stopping. But if this were true, why didn't they stop after one time? After 2? The experience of jail is the same. Same gaurds. Same inmates. What was the X factor which caused the cessation in the pattern of behavior? My answer? The person decided to stop. Free will. They decided to quit the behavior.

We agree, the difference is that one decided to stop and another did not. You stop there and assign that difference the name free-will, whereas I don't and say that people do not make arbitrary decisions. The person who decided to stop and the person who did not each made their decisions for a reason. The reasons are different. The various factors which weigh in on the decision are given different levels of importance by each person, but the decision is not made freely or arbitrarily.

The experiences were identical. The resulting punishments were identical. So the difference was not part of the environment. It was not an influencer. It came from within. Free Will to stop.

Only superficially are the experiences identical. Incarceration for a person with claustrophobia is more of a deterrent than it is for someone without. The social stigma and criminal record is more of a deterrent for someone who has a greater need for social approval than one who does not. There are a lot of what you call influencers which you may think are minor which impact these situations.