Minimum Attributes of God

[ThatGirlAgain]

Definitions aside, to me you have developed a supposition that there are no supernatural entities due to the fact that we have no evidence of any such beings; and because all that have been proposed so far by man are nonsensical; which is a much more reasonable position than adopting a superstition like Christianity. I am merely taking these ideas one step further to contend that since we really have no idea what a 'God' would entail, we have no basis upon which to claim 'God(s)' doesn't exist. Can you define this entity that you claim does not exist?

Does zxcvbnm exist? Since we have “no idea� what zxcvbnm means we cannot make a claim either way. Do we really have NO idea what God(s) means? If that is the case then there is no more reason to talk about God(s) than there is to talk about zxcvbnm. Conversation over.

But if there is some idea of what is meant by God(s), then we have a basis for conversation. Is there in fact anything we can say about God(s)?

I imagine there is something to be said. Many people throw the term around and seem to think it means something. Is there a bare minimum of meaning that is needed to merit the label God? Is it perhaps necessary to have several different meanings? For example, the Christian God is generally given the attribute of ‘Creator of the Universe’ but Apollo is not. Perhaps we should disregard gods, with a small ‘g’, like Apollo?

Debate question: What is the bare minimum of attributes that is required to deserve the label God?

[Janx]

...The universe as I see is a non-contingent THING. It appears we practice the same religion good sir...

Given that the universe appears to have had a beginning, before which time the physical laws as we know them could not have pertained, you'd have to tell us why the universe is non-contingent.

The world exists. I must assume it's existence is non-contingent until contrary information is available.

The big bang is simply an event we do not understand and therefore cannot look beyond. I have seen no evidence that it is non-contingent.

You'd also have to explain how the universe is capable of "intentional and efficacious causal action."

I do? Why?

Also, I posited "the simplest possible non-contingent reality," but our universe seems far from simple. If it were simple, then there would be no need for scientists to posit an infinity of unobservable universes for the sole purpose of diminishing the need for a designer.

Why can we not have a complex non-contingent reality?

[Wakefield]

That consciousness in humans requires a complex physical system does not demonstrate that a mind necessarily requires a complex physical system. You are more or less assuming that the only kind of consciousness which can exist is something that must be like a human consciousness.

Human consciousness is the only type of which we have experience, leaving the consciousness of other animals aside since there is controversy about that topic. So, we have evidence only of consciousness requiring a complex physical system.

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?


Edit to fix mistake in formatting

[AquinasD]

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?

What, in defining a mind, do we see that is material?

A mind thinks; thoughts are not material. A mind believes; minds are not material. A mind intends; intent is not material. A mind means; meaning is not material.

Anything important I'm missing, that is material?

[Goat]

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?

What, in defining a mind, do we see that is material?

A mind thinks; thoughts are not material. A mind believes; minds are not material. A mind intends; intent is not material. A mind means; meaning is not material.

Anything important I'm missing, that is material?

Why yes, I think there is. There is the physical material organ known as the "Brain" As far as can be determined, the mind is the emergent quality of the biochemical and neurological actions within that organ.

[Crazee]

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?

What, in defining a mind, do we see that is material?

A mind thinks; thoughts are not material. A mind believes; minds are not material. A mind intends; intent is not material. A mind means; meaning is not material.

Anything important I'm missing, that is material?

Why yes, I think there is. There is the physical material organ known as the "Brain" As far as can be determined, the mind is the emergent quality of the biochemical and neurological actions within that organ.

Or is the brain an emergent quality of the mind.

I understand the arguments that the mind emerges from the brain. But I also see an equally valid argument that the brain springs from the mind. I think that the most accurate thing to say is that both exist and feed each other.

We can change our brains by thinking. We can focus on certain parts of our reality, or certain qualities in ourselves, and have our brains change accordingly. Take for example, learning. When we learn, we can say that we are absorbing information around us that is changing our brain chemistry. Could this be seen as a way that the mind is changing the brain?

The brain could be seen as a physical manifestation of the mind that has similar properties and deals well with daily interactions. But, if you believe that consciousness does not disappear upon physical death, than the mind could be seen as our non-physical intelligence that does not disappear that continues on to form other brains.

[AquinasD]

Why yes, I think there is. There is the physical material organ known as the "Brain" As far as can be determined, the mind is the emergent quality of the biochemical and neurological actions within that organ.

Is the brain the mind? This is very unlikely. Where are the thoughts, the meanings, the beliefs? Can you point to some specific electrochemical state and say "This is the belief that Bob Dylan is an alright artist?" I strongly doubt this can be done; one might as well draw a picture of a plane and say "This is a plane."

[Goat]

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?

What, in defining a mind, do we see that is material?

A mind thinks; thoughts are not material. A mind believes; minds are not material. A mind intends; intent is not material. A mind means; meaning is not material.

Anything important I'm missing, that is material?

Why yes, I think there is. There is the physical material organ known as the "Brain" As far as can be determined, the mind is the emergent quality of the biochemical and neurological actions within that organ.

Or is the brain an emergent quality of the mind.

I understand the arguments that the mind emerges from the brain. But I also see an equally valid argument that the brain springs from the mind. I think that the most accurate thing to say is that both exist and feed each other.

When it comes to something being an emergent quality, you can operate on the brain without effecting the mind.. if specific structures are not damaged. However, the way the mind gets altered specifically depends on what structure of the brain gets stimulated or damaged. I don't see any methodology where you can try to modify the mind without first effecting the brain.. do you have one?

We can change our brains by thinking. We can focus on certain parts of our reality, or certain qualities in ourselves, and have our brains change accordingly. Take for example, learning. When we learn, we can say that we are absorbing information around us that is changing our brain chemistry. Could this be seen as a way that the mind is changing the brain?

Can you show that the thinking change the brain, or is the thinking the result of the brain activity?? The evidence shows that the thinking is part of the brain activity. Yes, the brain can physically change as you learn, without the brain changing (i.e. new neuron patterns forming), you can't learn. It can be shown that the mind and the brain are so intimately linked, you can not have a mind without a brain.

Although, you CAN have a brain without a mind!

[EduChris]

...The world exists. I must assume it's existence is non-contingent until contrary information is available...The big bang is simply an event we do not understand and therefore cannot look beyond. I have seen no evidence that it is non-contingent...

Logically, our universe could have been other than it is; therefore, it cannot be logically necessary. Science also takes the contingency of our universe as a given. Our universe appears designed for life, and hence science has been forced to postulate a multitude of other unobservable universes just to avoid the implication that our universe was in fact designed. But even if the universe were non-contingent, my argument for theism (see next post) still pertains.

You'd also have to explain how the universe is capable of "intentional and efficacious causal action."

I do? Why?

Because that was part of the definition of God to which you claimed assent. If you are now reversing your assent, then you can no longer claim to believe in the same God that I believe in.

...Why can we not have a complex non-contingent reality?

Such might be the case; however, from the standpoint of epistemology, we wish to avoid unnecessary assumptions; we wish to assume as little as possible. A simple non-contingent reality is epistemically preferred over a complex non-contingent reality.

[Wakefield]

I'm not sure how one can define a mind independent of a complex physical system. What would its limits be? How could one keep one such mind from melding with another? How could we tell them apart?

What, in defining a mind, do we see that is material?

A mind thinks; thoughts are not material. A mind believes; minds are not material. A mind intends; intent is not material. A mind means; meaning is not material.

Anything important I'm missing, that is material?

Well, all of it, within materialism.

I thought you had drawn the conclusion that human minds were always seen in conjunction with a complex physical system. With that I agree. The only minds with which I have any experience have occurred in conjunction with a complex physical system. I would go so far as to say that I have no experience of a mind that did not arise in a complex physical system.

So, what about minds is material? As far as I can tell all of it; unless mind is a primary substance and matter is an action of mind (matter arises through thought in idealism). And I have no way of telling that isn't the case.

The problem we have in discussing this issue is that we use nouns for all these words but some 'things' are not nouns but actually verbs. Human thoughts are not 'things' but instead are actions of complex neural networks. Stop the functioning of the neural network and you stop the thought/thinking.

This is starting to get far afield of the original OP, so to return it to the original issue -- I see no way that any of us can determine what ontology prevails. We tend to speak of three possible monisms (material, ideal, neutral) and substance dualism. One of these monisms precludes anything that we would call God except for Spinoza's God, and that is materialism. Some forms of idealism depend on a God -- the mind that is the ultimate substance with everything else being an action of that mind. Neutral monism, for me is just dressed up dualism, so I don't usually discuss it. But, really all the talk of different monisms misses the point -- we can't understand what a single substance is or could be (it is eternal, infinite, etc.) And substance dualism obviously has room for an intender.

Issues over what constitutes a god really revolve around the issue of intention as far as I can tell. Everyone ends up with an eternal ground of being when thinking about metaphysics -- there is no avoiding it. The difference between an atheist and theist depends on whether or not one believes that intention as an integral part of the ground of being.[/i]

[EduChris]

...Is there a logical argument linking necessary ground of being with intention?

I've given it a go several times, including here.

Basically the idea is that there is some logically necessary "ground of all being" which is responsible for all contingent existence. We don't know what this "ground of being" is, so we put it inside a "black box" and attempt to analyze it by means of logic (it is inaccessible to us empirically, since we don't even know what it is).

Given that this "black box" is the cause of contingent effects (e.g., our universe and our selves) we need to have causal factor(s) involved inside this "black box." The three causal factors we know of are: 1) chance, 2) necessity, and 3) volition.

What we're after is an epistemically justified explanation for our universe and our selves. We cannot eliminate any of the three known causal factors from the "black box" unless we have some epistemically justified reason for doing so.

If the "black box" contains volition, then theism is true; if it contains no volition, then non-theism is true. Non-theism needs to show that volition does not inhere within the "black box"; non-theism need to find some epistemically justified explanation for our universe and our selves that does not require having voltion present within the "black box" of necessary reality.

If chance is the ultimate cause of our universe--if our universe didn't need to be, and if it wasn't intended to be--then we have no epistemically justified explanation. Chance is a euphemism for "we cannot determine the full set of identifiable cause(s)." If we have no explanation at all, then obviously we cannot have an explanation which is epistemically justified.

If necessity is the ultimate cause of our universe, then genuine volition is impossible, and hence human volition is necessarily a mirage. In other words, if genuine volition is the product of necessary causal factors, then volition itself would become necessary, in which case it would have had to reside within the "black box" in the first place, in which case theism would be true. So non-theism must insist that human volition is a mirage. But our human volition, along with our consciousness and reason, is an unavoidable aspect of our inner mental life, which is the most real thing that we can ever know. If the most real thing that we can ever know is a mirage, then we lose epistemic justification for anything and everything. Epistemic justification becomes meaningless in the absence of a genuine inner mental life.

So it seems that if we are to have an epistemically justified explanation, and if our inner mental life is genuine, then volition must involved as a cause for our universe and our selves.

At the end of the day, the question is not, "Is theism true?" Rather, the question is, "Is there an epistemically justified explanation for our universe and our selves, and are we the volitional beings that we think we are?" If the answers to those questions are "yes," then theism must be true.