Epistemology requires consciousness, reason, and volition

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Is volition (real or illusory) required for epistemology?

Poll ended at Tue Jan 10, 2012 9:28 pm

Yes, genuine volition is required
4
44%
Yes, the illusion of volition is required
2
22%
No, volition is not required for epistemology
3
33%
 
Total votes: 9

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EduChris
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Epistemology requires consciousness, reason, and volition

Post #1

Post by EduChris »

McCulloch wrote:...epistemology...is meaningless without consciousness beings, with reason and volition, that can know stuff...
Is McCulloch correct? Do we need consciousness, reason, and volition in order to have a meaningful study of how we can know things?

I agree with McCulloch that all three components are necessary for epistemology. The requirement for "consciousness" seems unarguable--without it we couldn't know anything, and so obviously we couldn't know how we know things. The requirement for "reason" also seems unavoidable, since the lack of logic and rationality would doom any attempt at reasoned study of how we can know what we know.

This leaves "volition" as the one element that is perhaps possible to deny. We should probably separate the question of "Do we truly have volition?" from the question of "Does epistemology seem to require that attribute which we routinely perceive as our volition--i.e., our apparent ability to deliberate and make choices from the options available to us?"

In other words, let's leave aside for now the question of "Does volition actually exist?" Whether or not it actually exists, we certainly do at least have the inner sense or the illusion of being able to select from various options on the basis of desire or logic or perceived value (or perhaps even whim).

My background in education tells me that in order to get students to learn, you need to get them to want to learn. It is very difficult to force a student to learn something she doesn't really want to know. You can try to offer external rewards--i.e., prizes, praises, privileges, etc--but the very best way to motivate for learning comes from internal motivation. As educators, we want to help the student understand why it is important to her to learn the material. So it seems that volition is a vital aspect of general learning, and this would apply to epistemology as well.

Beyond that, we have to choose to think about epistemology rather than something else. We have to choose which arguments to analyze, and the standards by which we will analyze them. We need to choose which authors to read, which empirical studies to include. We need choose how we will rank the evidence, and we need to choose to carry all of this through to the conclusion which we adopt. The entire process is time-consuming and demanding; if we didn't want to do this, we probably wouldn't bother with it at all--and in fact most people don't think much about it as they go about their daily activities.

To me, it seems that volition--or at least the illusion of volition--is as necessary as consciousness and reason if we are to have a viable epistemology. What do you think?

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Post #51

Post by ThatGirlAgain »

EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...this theistic posit is ontologically more complex...
In the same way that the infinite set of numbers is less specific (less complex) than any arbitrary finite subset of numbers, so also the theistic posit would be the simplest possible personal being--without any arbitrary constraint in terms of knowledge or power or spatio-temporality, etc.

In some ways, the impersonal omniverse would be subject to greater arbitrary limitations (entailing greater complexity) than the simplest possible personal being. The simplest sort of God would have no arbitrary constraints of any kind, whereas the impersonal omniverse would be subject to arbitrary limitations in terms of knowledge, self-awareness, reason, and volition.
Knowledge, self-awareness, reason and volition are subjective and exist in the mind, which is a brain function as far as anyone can demonstrate. You are taking these attributes and assigning cosmic significance to them. Then to explain their existence at the cosmic level, you invoke a black box of non-explanation. The omni-verse requires only logic: that which can be, is. No further explanation is needed for anything. There are no limitations in the omni-verse except that logical contradictions do not co-exist. Potential contradictions are isolated in separate universes.
Dogmatism and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge or ignorance.
- Bertrand Russell

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Post #52

Post by EduChris »

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...the mind...is a brain function as far as anyone can demonstrate...
Numerous people claim to have had out-of-body experiences, and many of these claims are credible. While not conclusive, this is at least more evidence than we have for your hypothetical other universes (not to mention your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism which supposedly produces these universes).

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...You are taking these attributes and assigning cosmic significance to them...
Non-sequitur or empty rhetoric--take your pick.

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...a black box of non-explanation...
A black box of logical necessity. I don't see why this should be a controversial claim.

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...The omni-verse requires only logic: that which can be, is. No further explanation is needed for anything. There are no limitations in the omni-verse except that logical contradictions do not co-exist. Potential contradictions are isolated in separate universes.
Is consciousness logically possible? If not, then are we not conscious? Or if so, is your hypothetical omniverse-generating machine limited in conscious self-awareness? Is volition logically possible? If not, then have we no volition? Or if so, is your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism limited in volition? Why should your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism be limited in these ways--and if it is not limited, then how is it different from a volitional, self-aware theistic source?

Is there an upper or lower limit to the number of universes your hypothetical omniverse-generating entity can produce? Is there exactly one of each logically possible universe, or are there an infinite number of instances of each distinct logically possible "universe template"? What is the difference between a universe and a "universe template"? Is a "universe template" a new kind of thing (as opposed to another instance of the same thing)?

Where does all the matter and energy come from? Is there an unlimited supply? What happens to universes as they die out? Do all universes eventually die out? Is a perpetual universe logically possible? How many different perpetual universes are there, and is there an infinite number of instances of each "perpetual universe template"? Who decides what is logically possible? Who keeps account of the books to ensure that no logical possibility is overlooked?

If volition is possible, then how many volitional universes are there? There would seem to be a need to postulate a separate universe for each and every one of my moment-to-moment decisions, which could have been otherwise--except that if there is an entire universe specifically devoted to covering the full logical spectrum of each of the hundreds or thousands of decisions I make every day, then what happens to volition? If a universe X(n) is created just to account for my making decision (n) could I really have freedom to do other than (n) in universe X(n)? How did your hypothetical omniverse-generating machine know that I was going to freely choose to do (n) in the universe X(n) that it prepared in advance for me?

The more you think about it, the more your hypothetical omnniverse-generating contraption descends into absurdity.
Last edited by EduChris on Fri Dec 30, 2011 11:30 am, edited 1 time in total.

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Post #53

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Adamoriens wrote:I notice that throughout your response you give no probability of CRV arising given theism; you only argue that the probability of it arising on single-universe non-theism is small. But what reasons do we have to suspect a particular (higher) probability of CRV given theism? This is a necessary move to decide whether CRV favours one hypothesis...
We have evidence that like comes from like. We have no known instance where CRV has been produced from a non-CRV source (where that source is known). This provides more evidence to support a theistic source than a non-theistic source, no matter how many universes there are. Moreover, there is a greater probability of one universe than there is for more than one universe (since we know we have at least one universe, and we don't know whether additional universes are even possible, much less actual). Given one universe, which is the most probable number, a non-theistic source for our CRV-universe would be vanishingly small; but given a theistic source, the probability remains undiminished.

Adamoriens wrote:...On simplicity: it seems more sensible to think of ontological simplicity in terms of kinds rather than instances...
But you have more than just additional instances of universes; you also have a universe-generating mechanism, and perhaps even something like "universe templates," where for each logically possible "template" there might be instantiated an infinite number of identical universes which derive from that pattern or template. Volitional UR (theism) is one possible universe-generating system; non-volitional UR (non-theism) is another possible universe-generating system, but since we know that like produces like, the CRV source becomes more probable than the non-CRV source.

Adamoriens wrote:...it's coherent to think of universes as instances of a single (broad) ontological kind...
So here you have not only a universe-generating mechanism, you also have a "kind" or a "template," as well as any number of instances for each and every "kind."

Adamoriens wrote:...the minds we know of are temporally and spatially bound to a body. The concepts which make up a mind (intentions, inferences, emotions, sensations) are in some way tied up with time and space. In addition to these conceptual difficulties, there are particular facts about minds that suggest they're more integrated with physical reality than one would initially think...
Again, there are plenty of claims for out-of-body experiences, and many of these are credible. This constitutes greater evidence than we have for your universe-generating mechansim, your universe "kinds," and your multiple instances of each and every "kind."

Adamoriens wrote:...Do I have to provide evidence that CRV is logically possible given non-theism? I think not. It is epistemically conceivable that it is possible, and at this stage of my development I take my modal intuitions to be at least somewhat reliable, such that evidence or conceptual analysis is required to defeat them, not bolster them...
All the evidence we have is that like comes from like. There is no known instance of CRV arising from non-CRV wherever the source is known.

Adamoriens wrote:...On multiverses: I maintain that it's epistemically possible that a multiverse of whatever size exists, such that the probability of CRV given non-theism is uncertain. It's irrelevant to opine that non-theists posit this to escape theism, and there's reason to think theists are often guilty of the same psychological bias anyway...
Okay, so if it's okay to posit unobservable universe-generating mechanisms, unobservable universe "kinds" (templates), and an infinite supply of actually instantiated but unobservable universes, then it should be epistemically justified to posit the most simple entity possible: non-contingent reality that is not arbitrarily limited in terms of knowledge, self-awareness, temporal-spatiality, relationality, information processing and generating, volition, and so on. In other words, theism becomes at least as well justified as non-theism, and probably better justified since we have greater evidence for it. Moreover, theism seems to better account for our normal human experience of conscious, self-aware, reason and volition.

Adamoriens wrote:...Going back to simplicity then, it's unclear whether the multiverse or God is more ontologically complex or otherwise weird, such that the prior probability is not distinguishably (significantly) different...though our assessment of what the simplest possible being is will probably be determined precisely by our theism vs. non-theism dichotomy; I find the notion that the simplest possible being is a person exotic, while you will find it familiar. I shouldn't put words in your mouth, though. You've only said that God is the simplest possible personal being. Do you think he's also the simplest possible being?
Yes, I think that a non-personal universe-generating mechanism would be arbitrarily limited in numerous ways that a personal universe-generating source would not be; therefore, the personal source would be the simplest possible sort of entity.

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Post #54

Post by ThatGirlAgain »

EduChris wrote:
ThatGirlAgain wrote:...the mind...is a brain function as far as anyone can demonstrate...
Numerous people claim to have had out-of-body experiences, and many of these claims are credible. While not conclusive, this is at least more evidence than we have for your hypothetical other universes (not to mention your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism which supposedly produces these universes).
There is not one single credible, verifiable case of a human personality surviving the actual permanent death of the body out of all the many billions of people who have died. If out of body experiences demonstrate the independence of conscious personality from the body why have we not heard from any of the truly dead?

If we disconnect the eyes from the brain, the person no longer sees. If we disconnect the ears from the brain, the person no longer hears. If we disconnect the amygdala in a certain way, form the rest of the brain, memories are no longer permanently recorded. Yet a personality disconnected from the body sees and hears and remembers? Does the disconnected personality see things in the same color spectrum or hear in the same sound spectrum? Suppose they were color blind. Are they still color blind when outside the body? If no, then what is the exact deailed nture of the color sense that they experience? Why?

Sorry but I cannot credit purported out of body experiences as something actually being out of the body.
EduChris wrote:
ThatGirlAgain wrote:...You are taking these attributes and assigning cosmic significance to them...
Non-sequitur or empty rhetoric--take your pick.
And so you dismiss any disagreements with your beliefs with one liners rather than engage in debate on those points.
EduChris wrote:
ThatGirlAgain wrote:...a black box of non-explanation...
A black box of logical necessity. I don't see why this should be a controversial claim.
The black box is only necessary to hide what cannot be explained in your scenario from the necessity of explaining it.
EduChris wrote:
ThatGirlAgain wrote:...The omni-verse requires only logic: that which can be, is. No further explanation is needed for anything. There are no limitations in the omni-verse except that logical contradictions do not co-exist. Potential contradictions are isolated in separate universes.
Is consciousness logically possible? If not, then are we not conscious? Or if so, is your hypothetical omniverse-generating machine limited in conscious self-awareness? Is volition logically possible? If not, then have we no volition? Or if so, is your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism limited in volition? Why should your hypothetical omniverse-generating mechanism be limited in these ways--and if it is not limited, then how is it different from a volitional, self-aware theistic source?
Consciousness and volition are subjective phenomena like music. None of them exists in any absolute sense. A few modifications to the brain and they disappear. In fact look closely at how the brain works via brain scans and conscious volition disappears. It is a product of brain function. It is not fundamental to reality.
EduChris wrote: Is there an upper or lower limit to the number of universes your hypothetical omniverse-generating entity can produce? Is there exactly one of each logically possible universe, or are there an infinite number of instances of each distinct logically possible "universe template"? What is the difference between a universe and a "universe template"? Is a "universe template" a new kind of thing (as opposed to another instance of the same thing)?
In the omniverse scenario every logically possible universe exists simply because it is possible. There is one of every possibility because it is one possibility. Since universes are isolated from each other by the law of non-contradiction there is no way to assign meaning to counting instances of the same thing.
EduChris wrote: Where does all the matter and energy come from? Is there an unlimited supply? What happens to universes as they die out? Do all universes eventually die out? Is a perpetual universe logically possible? How many different perpetual universes are there, and is there an infinite number of instances of each "perpetual universe template"? Who decides what is logically possible? Who keeps account of the books to ensure that no logical possibility is overlooked?
The matter and energy in each universe, or whatever entities we might want to put labels on in the local physics, are part of the unique possibility of that universe. Where they come from depends on what laws are part of that unique possibility. One might argue that each universe in fact sums to zero in some way, e.g., in our universe positive mass-energy generates negative gravitational energy in exact proportion, but I see no need to make that a mandatory requirement.

There is no one and no thing keeping track. That which can be, is. Limiting what exists leads to the need for black box divine volition hypotheses. The omniverse requires no black box and no mysterious volition that arbitrarily chooses one thing over another with no prior means of informing such a decision. That is not what volition means in a human. And so attempts to demonstrate volition in humans has no bearing on the existence of any ‘volitional but no not that kind of volitional but some mysterious new thing I am making up and hiding in a black box’ style deity.
EduChris wrote: If volition is possible, then how many volitional universes are there? There would seem to be a need to postulate a separate universe for each and every one of my moment-to-moment decisions, which could have been otherwise--except that if there is an entire universe specifically devoted to covering the full logical spectrum of each of the hundreds or thousands of decisions I make every day, then what happens to volition? If a universe X(n) is created just to account for my making decision (n) could I really have freedom to do other than (n) in universe X(n)? How did your hypothetical omniverse-generating machine know that I was going to freely choose to do (n) in the universe X(n) that it prepared in advance for me?

The more you think about it, the more your hypothetical omniverse-generating contraption descends into absurdity.
Volition is an illusion, a convenient label we throw onto a complex physical phenomenon. You are not freely choosing anything except as a convenient shorthand label for something much more detailed. Every unique universe exists, including all the variations on the physical phenomena that you call decisions.
Dogmatism and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge or ignorance.
- Bertrand Russell

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Post #55

Post by EduChris »

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...There is not one single credible, verifiable case of...
...an impersonal hypothetical omniverse-generating contraption...

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...why have we not heard from any of the...
...hypothetical infinitude of other universes...

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...Sorry but I cannot credit purported...
...hypothetical infinitudes of other universes...

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...And so you dismiss any disagreements with your beliefs with one liners rather than engage in debate on those points...
What was the point of your empty rhetoric?

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...Consciousness and volition...None of them exists in any absolute sense...
There goes the only reality any of us can ever truly know...

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...every logically possible universe exists simply because it is possible. There is one of every possibility because it is one possibility...Where they come from depends on what laws are part of that unique possibility...
And where do all of these distinct and isolated sets of laws come from?

ThatGirlAgain wrote:...Volition is an illusion...You are not freely choosing anything...Every unique universe exists, including all the variations on the physical phenomena that you call decisions.
Infinitudes of unobservable hypothetical universes are real and actual. Infinitudes of hypothetical unobservable universe templates are real and actual. An unobservable hypothetical perpetual omniverse-generating contraption is real and actual. But the only thing that we have direct and unmediated access to--that is an illusion! :roll:

Where is Joey when we need him? :lol:

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Post #56

Post by Adamoriens »

EduChris wrote:We have evidence that like comes from like. We have no known instance where CRV has been produced from a non-CRV source (where that source is known). This provides more evidence to support a theistic source than a non-theistic source, no matter how many universes there are. Moreover, there is a greater probability of one universe than there is for more than one universe (since we know we have at least one universe, and we don't know whether additional universes are even possible, much less actual). Given one universe, which is the most probable number, a non-theistic source for our CRV-universe would be vanishingly small; but given a theistic source, the probability remains undiminished.
I don't know what you mean by "CRV only comes from CRV." A number of non-CRV causes occur prior to the emergence of a creature instantiating CRV (fertilisation etc.). Granted, a CRV-cause is present in each causal chain, but the suggestion that this indicates a proto-CRV is no stronger than the suggestion that there was a proto-copulation (hello Mormonism!). Could you be more specific?
EduChris wrote:Again, there are plenty of claims for out-of-body experiences, and many of these are credible. This constitutes greater evidence than we have for your universe-generating mechansim, your universe "kinds," and your multiple instances of each and every "kind."
There's evidence that the mind is intimately connected with the brain, such that we're able to correlate mental content to an amazing degree with brain states. The alteration of normal brain states with drugs, injury and even magnets correlates with a change in mental states. The notion, then, that the mind can be divorced from the brain is counter-suggested by modern neuroscience, such that we're at least back to parity on the relative familiarity of a mind beyond time, space and the cerebral cortex.
EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...On multiverses: I maintain that it's epistemically possible that a multiverse of whatever size exists, such that the probability of CRV given non-theism is uncertain. It's irrelevant to opine that non-theists posit this to escape theism, and there's reason to think theists are often guilty of the same psychological bias anyway...
Okay, so if it's okay to posit unobservable universe-generating mechanisms, unobservable universe "kinds" (templates), and an infinite supply of actually instantiated but unobservable universes, then it should be epistemically justified to posit the most simple entity possible: non-contingent reality that is not arbitrarily limited in terms of knowledge, self-awareness, temporal-spatiality, relationality, information processing and generating, volition, and so on. In other words, theism becomes at least as well justified as non-theism, and probably better justified since we have greater evidence for it. Moreover, theism seems to better account for our normal human experience of conscious, self-aware, reason and volition.
It's not that I'm positing multiverses as a hypothesis, merely that the possibility it exists messes with these macro probability assessments. Of course I have no a priori objection to positing God as the cause of our universe and CRV, but just question whether that's the rationally compelling position.
EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...Going back to simplicity then, it's unclear whether the multiverse or God is more ontologically complex or otherwise weird, such that the prior probability is not distinguishably (significantly) different...though our assessment of what the simplest possible being is will probably be determined precisely by our theism vs. non-theism dichotomy; I find the notion that the simplest possible being is a person exotic, while you will find it familiar. I shouldn't put words in your mouth, though. You've only said that God is the simplest possible personal being. Do you think he's also the simplest possible being?
Yes, I think that a non-personal universe-generating mechanism would be arbitrarily limited in numerous ways that a personal universe-generating source would not be; therefore, the personal source would be the simplest possible sort of entity.
I'm not sure whether the mechanism required to generate multiple universes is at all (or significantly) greater in complexity than that required to generate a single universe. A mechanism designed specifically to produce our universe would, to take your line, have more arbitrary limitations than one which was designed to produce within whatever parameters. In the same way, the mechanism designed to produce a particular grain of sand would be more complex than the mechanism designed to produce whatever objects correspond with "grains of sand."

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Post #57

Post by EduChris »

Adamoriens wrote:...I don't know what you mean by "CRV only comes from CRV."...a CRV-cause is present in each causal chain...
To me, you've explained my point rather well: "a CRV-cause is present in each causal chain." This in itself is enough to tip the scales toward the CRV source, if ever so slightly, as compared to the non-CRV source.

Adamoriens wrote:...the suggestion that this indicates a proto-CRV is no stronger than the suggestion that there was a proto-copulation...Could you be more specific?...
Information infusion is the necessary ingredient; as modern fertility medicine demonstrates, there is no need for copulation.

Adamoriens wrote:...The notion, then, that the mind can be divorced from the brain is counter-suggested by modern neuroscience...
As theoretical physicist John Polkinghorne says, "We shouldn't be misled by the triumphalist claims of the reductionists that the age-old problem of mind and brain is about to be solved...the physical world is, first, not mechanical and, second, interconnected" (Quarks, Chaos & Christianity, pp. 68-69).

Adamoriens wrote:...I'm not sure whether the mechanism required to generate multiple universes is at all (or significantly) greater in complexity than that required to generate a single universe...
But in either case we each have a universe-generating system. Yours is an impersonal system which is limited in ways that mine is not, since the personal system is not arbitrarily limited in consciousness, volition, etc. Moreover, my system best accords with our common and unavoidable perception that our consciousness and volition are real, rather than illusory.

Adamoriens wrote:...the mechanism designed to produce a particular grain of sand would be more complex than the mechanism designed to produce whatever objects correspond with "grains of sand."
Perhaps, but a system that was capable of (but not limited to) "just one," on the on hand, or "every single one," on the other hand, would have the fewest arbitrary limitations of any possible system.

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Post #58

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EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...I don't know what you mean by "CRV only comes from CRV."...a CRV-cause is present in each causal chain...
To me, you've explained my point rather well: "a CRV-cause is present in each causal chain." This in itself is enough to tip the scales toward the CRV source, if ever so slightly, as compared to the non-CRV source.

Information infusion is the necessary ingredient; as modern fertility medicine demonstrates, there is no need for copulation.
My point is that there are a number of non-CRV causes in each causal chain, such that we have equal reason to extrapolate those to the proto CRV. But an explanation of CRV is more than identifying where and with what it occurs. For example, property dualism posits that there is one substance which will possess mental properties if the substance takes up a certain configuration (such as a brain). Thus, the explanation for each instance of CRV arising is actually non-CRV that has reached a certain level of sophistication. In this case a non-CRV creature might well be part of the causal chain leading to the emergence of creatures with CRV. So, it's not certain that our macro-level observations even suggest that the mental cannot emerge from the non-mental (given property dualism, it may well occur for each instance of CRV) and the only way we could get to that conclusion would be some argument for substance dualism.
EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...The notion, then, that the mind can be divorced from the brain is counter-suggested by modern neuroscience...
As theoretical physicist John Polkinghorne says, "We shouldn't be misled by the triumphalist claims of the reductionists that the age-old problem of mind and brain is about to be solved...the physical world is, first, not mechanical and, second, interconnected" (Quarks, Chaos & Christianity, pp. 68-69).
Observing the intertwined nature of mind and brain is not the same as reducing one to the other. As such this cannot be hand-waved away.
EduChris wrote:
Adamoriens wrote:...I'm not sure whether the mechanism required to generate multiple universes is at all (or significantly) greater in complexity than that required to generate a single universe...
But in either case we each have a universe-generating system. Yours is an impersonal system which is limited in ways that mine is not, since the personal system is not arbitrarily limited in consciousness, volition, etc. Moreover, my system best accords with our common and unavoidable perception that our consciousness and volition are real, rather than illusory.
Your point does not follow. An impersonal necessary cause does not even possess the attributes of CRV, much less instantiate them in some limited way, so it's not more complex by that metric. Also, there are more possibilities than eliminative materialism and substance dualism, such that non-theistic or even naturalistic causes do not entail the falsity (and illusion) of CRV.

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Post #59

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Adamoriens wrote:...a non-CRV creature might well be part of the causal chain leading to the emergence of creatures with CRV. So, it's not certain that our macro-level observations even suggest that the mental cannot emerge from the non-mental...
Well with all this, we seem to be back to my original argument. The black box (or the "hypothetical universe-generating system") necessarily entails one of the following three options:

1) All logical possibilities necessarily instantiated

2) A sufficiently high number of "at bats" to instantiate our universe (and undoubtedly many others as well) before a cessation from further activity so as not to instantiate the infinitude of all logical possibilities

3) A volitional decision to instantiate our universe

None of these three options can be observed or demonstrated or proven in any way. There doesn't seem to be any natural "default" position.

The first option rules out volition, which entails a contradiction if in fact volition exists. Since my direct inner mental life assures me that I have volition, it is impossible for me to adopt this "all-is-necessary" position.

The second option appears arbitrary. Need justification for some claim? Just dial up the number of universes required to ensure that the probability demands of your claim are met. This seems to violate my direct inner sense of rationality, so again it is impossible for me to adopt this "enough-at-bats-for-anything-as-long-as-anything-is-less-than-everything" position.

The third option best accords with our human intuitions. There is nothing arbitrary about it. And it cannot be deemed impossible or even improbable, in comparison to the only other available options.

Thus, theism is a properly justified belief. Others can certainly choose to adopt one of the other options, but they cannot plausibly make the claim that theism provides less justification than either of those other remaining options.

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Post #60

Post by Adamoriens »

What is an explanation? According to wikipedia, it is "a set of statements constructed to describe a set of facts which clarifies the causes, context, and consequences of those facts." I suggest that good explanations should have a reasonably high probability, but at the very least it must be above 0.5. Bayes theorem states that probability of an explanation given a specified body of evidence is equal to the probability of the evidence given the explanation (which is in turn divided by the probability of our evidence; in epistemological terms, our degree of confidence in our evidence), all multiplied by the prior probability of the explanation (or, how plausible we find it apart from the specified evidence).

So, the probability of theism given CRV is equal to:

[(the probability of CRV given theism)x(probability of theism alone)]/(probability of CRV)

As you can see, we must have some reason to think that God would create creatures with CRV, and it seems to me this can only be a theological reason. In this configuration, your argument that CRV only comes from CRV and God is similar to CRV would, if successful, only give us a reason to think that the prior probability of theism is close to the probability of CRV (say, 0.8 prior for theism divided by 0.95 degree of confidence that CRV is real, equalling 0.84). But without a specified probability of CRV given theism, we still can't know whether theism is buttressed by the appearance of CRV in our world.

You've made the criticism that any claim can be justified by invoking a multiverse. I think I can show this to be false.

To know whether CRV gives us reason to favour theism over all other hypotheses, we have to run the same calculation for all hypotheses mutually exclusive with theism; namely, non-theism. I won't write it all out, but notice that we still have to state how probable CRV is given non-theism. It doesn't matter that (as you allege) the prior probability of a multiverse is quite low (0.25, say), if (as I allege) we are unable to specify the probability of CRV given non-theism due to the possibility of the multiverse. We are unable to say whether creatures instantiating CRV are a liability for non-theism. In the end we'd only be able to compare (A x 0.84) with (B x 0.26), and that's not epistemically significant. (This is subject to the caveat I mentioned before about theism and the multiverse)

So, it seems that the multiverse undermines certain claims rather than justifies them.

Modern science, of course, restricts itself to hypotheses which involve causes, contexts and consequences which are already familiar to us, those which populate the particular corner of the single universe we inhabit. If your suggested prior probabilities are plausible, and you possess a good theological reason to think God would create CRV, and the atheist you are attempting to persuade restricts her considerations to single-universe naturalism (and CRV is unlikely given SUN), then you would have a compelling case that CRV favours theism. Interestingly, that may describe a few atheists within this community.

There is one more way that you can argue. From your talk of "theism is not diminished by CRV while non-theism is", I've got the impression that you think we can assign a "holding-place" probability to (CRV|theism) and (CRV|non-theism) despite the lack of theological motives and certainty about the multiverse. In other words, we can pragmatically say that CRV is as likely as not (0.5) given theism/non-theism, and this allows us to successfully run the argument anyway. In some cases this move would be legitimate; however, in this case I think that assignment requires justification, so I don't accept it.

I hope this clarifies where I'm coming from.

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