If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

Hello again! Wednesday!

Look: the fact that you can make up a lot of horrible arguments that look vaguely like mine does not show my argument is bad.

It demonstrates that your argument is based on a format that is easily defeated.

No, Harvey, no no. There is nothing wrong with my argument form. Modus tollens is a classic valid form. Your "arguments" are not even vaguely similar to the form of my argument, since they do not contain if-then claims. They would not be formalized in the same way, and that's what it means to say they do not have the same form. (As I say, it's not clear they could be formalized, since they don't contain proper propositions.) I say again: if you want to attack my argument form, please give some reference to back it up, because for now it looks for all the world like you don't have any ability to make claims about the relative worth of logical forms.

You try to make an absurd conclusion (i.e., that the world contains unnecessary evil and a world where we suppose unnecessary evil).

My conclusion is not that the world contains unnecessary evil (I suppose that's the conclusion you meant to state in that ungrammatical parenthetical above). That there is unnecessary evil is a premise, as I've clearly labeled many times now. My conclusion, I've emphasized, is that "there is no all-good, all-powerful being." It may seem again like mere nit-picking to you, Harvey, to emphasize the difference between a premise and a conclusion. But this distinction is not a mere cavil. It is fundamental to the nature of argumentation to be able to distinguish things like propositions from non-propositions, and valid arguments from invalid arguments, and for goodness' sake you should certainly be able to tell premises from conclusions when you discuss relative merits of arguments!

Notice also, Happy Humanist, that my conclusion is not that an all-good all-powerful being cannot (possibly) exist. That is too strong a claim. I chose my conclusion carefully. I am aware of the distinction between arguing that something doesn't exist, and that something couldn't possibly exist. I think unicorns don't exist, but I wouldn't argue that they couldn't possibly. Similarly, I wouldn't argue that Hitler could not possibly have been a good person. In fact I think it is possible that Hitler was a good person, as the possibility of powerful blackmailing anti-Semitic space aliens would show. The mere possibility that Hitler was bribed defeats a conclusion to the effect that Hitler was not possibly a good person. But it doesn't defeat the conclusion that Hitler was not actually a good person. I think that actually, Hitler was not a good person. I do not think the space alien possibility and other such actually obtain.

Similarly, Harvey and HH, the mere possibility that God must drown children in order to prevent evil paradoxes would defeat a conclusion that it's impossible for an all-good, all-powerful being and the tsunami to exist. But that is not my claim. My claim is that such a being doesn't actually exist. The tsunami is excellent evidence for this claim. To defeat it, you must argue it's actually the case that the tsunami prevented a worse evil.

So the lesson is, this is another important distinction in logic: modal claims about possibility and necessity vs claims about the actual world. Are we clear on this distinction? Can I cease the tiresome logic lecture? My argument is airtight in terms of validity, I assure you. That is, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be. So let's discuss the relevant point: why you think one of the premises isn't true?

I'm not criticizing your format as bad, I'm merely pointing out that you've been dupped into thinking that you have offered premises to an argument that are infallible or have somehow transferred the burden of proof to the theist, neither are true.

Harvey, look again at my first quotation of you on this post, above. There you say "your argument is based on a format that is easily defeated". Do you think this is not a criticism of my format? You can't have it both ways, Harvey. Is the form of my argument, modus tollens, good, or not? If not, please cite some reference to the effect that it is a bad form, or at least give some reason for thinking MT is an invalid form of reasoning. If you think it is a good form, then please drop the point about the logical form.

I haven't been "duped" into the argument. I just have an argument. It's a valid argument, and the conclusion is that there is no all-good, all-powerful being. If you accept the premises, you must accept the conclusion. Since the premises are utterly plausible, if you want to reject the conclusion then the burden shifts to you to show what's wrong with the premises that appear true. Rhetoric about being duped into this argument does not constitute a response. I'd only considered myself duped by this argument if you gave good reason to resist it.

Good for you! However, your understanding of ontological proofs is still incorrect.

Okay ... what about ontological proofs do I not understand? Please teach me the formal logic I am lacking, preferably with some references. (Notice here again you attack my form, since you seem to think my argument is "ontological" in some way, and that makes for some special weird burden.)

Also, Harvey, is the ":lalala:" emoticon really the image you want to present of yourself on this forum? Someone who, when presented with a contrary point, sticks his fingers in his ears to block out the possibility of hearing reasons for a contrary position?

and what these concepts are ("deterministic evil" and "divine evil") on which you claim I'm equivocating. You haven't answered--you've just asserted that I must be equivocating somewhere. I've even reworded my premises to be more explicit about what I mean by "evil"--pain, suffering, and the like.

Yes, I'm afraid I have answered your questions, Spetey. But, you haven't replied to my arguments, just gone back to the beginning of our discussion (at least three times you've done this). So, as a history, here are my answers which you haven't replied to: ...

Harvey, all those posts merely mention "deterministic evil" and "divine evil", assuming ahead of time that there is such a distinction and that I equivocate on it. That is very different from defining these terms, and showing why you should interpret my argument as equivocating between them. But that is what I have been asking for. Please, I ask as clearly as I can, for the fifth time now: define these terms, and provide evidence to the effect that I meant one in my first premise and another in my second premise. My response to all your mentioning of and reliance on "deterministic evil" remains the same: what in the Sam Hill is that?

If you like, we can sidestep this problem. Here is another version of my argument:

1. If there is an all-good, all-powerful entity, then there is an absolutely minimal amount of pain and suffering in the world (premise).
2. The amount of pain and suffering in the world is not minimal (premise).
3. Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful entity (conclusion).

Now of course you can claim that I'm equivocating on 'pain', that I mean "deterministic pain" in the first premise and "divine pain" in the second. But then you would need to explain what these kinds of pain are, and why you think I equivocated on them. If you can't do that, your equivocation charge is obviously just a bad evasion.

I wish I could say that I don't have to repeat the above yet more times, but I'm afraid that looks impossible. It seems no matter how often I say it, you just don't get it. ](*,)

I must say, I know the feeling.

If someone doesn't think they [good / goodness] have the same meaning, then the argument is not valid.

Yes, I agree that equivocation makes arguments invalid. I have agreed to that many times. What I need to hear from you is why you think my argument equivocates, and on what exactly.

And again, arguments are not the kind of thing that can be "false". This is simply a category mistake, like asking what color 17 is. Only individual propositions (statements, claims, whatever you want to call them) can be true or false.

You make way too many cavils. In any case, the term "false argument" is a common term, and although you are technically right that arguments are neither "true" or "false," the term does not warrant wasting our time on this cavil.

Yes, it does, when you suggest the logical form of the argument is bad, we need to talk (over and over again) about very basic facts of argumentation to get clear on it. What would it mean for an argument to be "false"? This is ambiguous among "invalid", "unsound", "false conslucion", etc. But it is important to make these distinctions, in order to think clearly about an issue.

... possibilities of how to interpret a premise almost always have a way of casting doubt on a reductio ad absurdum argument (i.e., an argument constructed using premises that lead to an absurd result so that one of the premises are rejected).

What? This strikes me, a relative expert on the matter of logic, as nonsense. So can you please give a reference here about how reductio ad absurdum arguments are special in that "possibilities" will "almost always" manage to "cast doubt" on them? Can you also give a reference to the effect that modus tollens arguments like mine are thereby reductio as absurdum arguments (not reductio at falsum and such--careful!)?

In case of God, anything is a reasonable possibility since we simply do not know much of anything with regard to what constraints God is working under. For some reason, I just can't seem to communicate this to you and other atheists.

No, theists manage to communicate that God works in mysterious ways and so on. We hear and understand this point. We just don't see it as reason to believe. How is 1=3? "God works in mysterious ways." How come so many people suffer needessly? "God works in mysterious ways." How can something be intelligent and immaterial? "God works in mysterious ways." Communication isn't the problem. It's that we don't see mystery as a reason to believe. How could something be both invisible and pink? "The Invisible Pink Unicorn works in mysterious ways."

It reminds me of the kid that is sure that the products at the back of comic books are going to do everything as advertised, only you just can't talk any sense into them not to buy it. You so much want to not believe in God, that you allow your reasoning abilities to become obsessed on some small detail (e.g., knowing that God would not be constrained by something that you cannot know about) that you completely lose yourself in a losing argument.

I know that you think we reason poorly. Of course we think you reason poorly (about these issues anyway). So we are here to discuss the matter and compare reasons.

Okay, Spetey. Try to give me reasons why I should accept your reductio since I've clarified what I mean by the terms you have equivocated on. Do you have any reasons that an all-good, all-powerful God cannot exist that do not involve equivocating on those terms?

For the Nth time, I don't have a reductio. But the reason you shouldn't believe in an all-good, all-powerful God is that there is unnecessary evil (just-plain evil, not "deterministic" or "divine" evil, whatever those are), and unnecessary evil is incompatible with any all-good, all-powerful being.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

No, Harvey, no no. There is nothing wrong with my argument form. Modus tollens is a classic valid form. Your "arguments" are not even vaguely similar to the form of my argument, since they do not contain if-then claims.

Add an "if-then" if that makes you happy. I'm not going to waste my time to make such a trivial adjustment to an example.

They would not be formalized in the same way, and that's what it means to say they do not have the same form. (As I say, it's not clear they could be formalized, since they don't contain proper propositions.) I say again: if you want to attack my argument form, please give some reference to back it up, because for now it looks for all the world like you don't have any ability to make claims about the relative worth of logical forms.

I'm not attacking your argument's form.

My conclusion is not that the world contains unnecessary evil (I suppose that's the conclusion you meant to state in that ungrammatical parenthetical above). That there is unnecessary evil is a premise, as I've clearly labeled many times now. My conclusion, I've emphasized, is that "there is no all-good, all-powerful being."

Your conclusion is based on the reductio ad absurdum form of argument by "[d]isproof of a proposition by showing that it leads to absurd or untenable conclusions." The untenable (or self-contradictory) conclusion you wish to draw is that premise one and premise two both cannot be correct, and therefore one or both premises are false. You assume in your conclusion that premise one is false since (you assume) premise two cannot be false. If they were both true (e.g., particle-wave duality), then this would be untenable (or self-contradictory) and therefore we should reject such a situation. If you wish to show how you reached your conclusion using a different line of thought, then be my guest to point it out. Btw, reductio ad falsum is a wrong conclusion based on whether something is true or false (1 or 0 in binary). You cannot say by combining both propositions that you have a true or false proposition (i.e., by combining both premises) since it is neither true or false to say that "unnecessary evil cannot exist" and "unnecessary exists." Such a proposition is self-contradictory, and therefore it is a reductio ad absurdum. (I guess it could be considered a reductio ad impossibile, but in fact we cannot say such a situation is impossible just like we cannot say if Schrodinger's cat is both dead and alive is an impossible situation--just absurd or self-contradictory (not necessarily false I might add)).

Similarly, Harvey and HH, the mere possibility that God must drown children in order to prevent evil paradoxes would defeat a conclusion that it's impossible for an all-good, all-powerful being and the tsunami to exist. But that is not my claim. My claim is that such a being doesn't actually exist. The tsunami is excellent evidence for this claim. To defeat it, you must argue it's actually the case that the tsunami prevented a worse evil.

No. To defeat it, you can argue on many different fronts. I argue it based on what I believe to be true, but if I just wanted to dispute it just to dispute it, I could argue about each and every term (e.g., whether there is even such a thing as unnecessary evil, etc...).

So the lesson is, this is another important distinction in logic: modal claims about possibility and necessity vs claims about the actual world. Are we clear on this distinction? Can I cease the tiresome logic lecture? My argument is airtight in terms of validity, I assure you. That is, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be. So let's discuss the relevant point: why you think one of the premises isn't true?

"(I)f the premises are true" is very vague. If we understand the premises exactly as you do, that is, every term is understood exactly the way you understand it, then the conclusion leads to either premise one or premise two being false (btw, it doesn't mean necessarily that premise two is true as you assumed).

I'm not criticizing your format as bad, I'm merely pointing out that you've been dupped into thinking that you have offered premises to an argument that are infallible or have somehow transferred the burden of proof to the theist, neither are true.

Harvey, look again at my first quotation of you on this post, above. There you say "your argument is based on a format that is easily defeated". Do you think this is not a criticism of my format? You can't have it both ways, Harvey.

Your argument is based on a reductio argument, and such arguments are so tenuous that contructivists won't even use them in mathematics. See this link.

Is the form of my argument, modus tollens, good, or not? If not, please cite some reference to the effect that it is a bad form, or at least give some reason for thinking MT is an invalid form of reasoning. If you think it is a good form, then please drop the point about the logical form.

MT is used in reductio ad absurdum argumentation.

I haven't been "duped" into the argument. I just have an argument. It's a valid argument, and the conclusion is that there is no all-good, all-powerful being. If you accept the premises, you must accept the conclusion. Since the premises are utterly plausible, if you want to reject the conclusion then the burden shifts to you to show what's wrong with the premises that appear true.

Spetey, let me use a different tact since the others aren't getting through to you. Do you buy into your premise 2 that evil does not necessarily have to happen? On what evidence do you base that premise? Sheez Louise.

However, your understanding of ontological proofs is still incorrect.

Okay ... what about ontological proofs do I not understand? Please teach me the formal logic I am lacking, preferably with some references. (Notice here again you attack my form, since you seem to think my argument is "ontological" in some way, and that makes for some special weird burden.)

Why do I need references? You are trying to establish that an all-good, all-necessary God cannot exist, you allow that God cannot do the impossible, so prove to me that evil is not due to something that is impossible for God to stop. This, afterall, is what you are saying, and you haven't given a shred of evidence that you can show that the universe can be any different than what it is. You only put things like God could do such and such, but that is assuming what God could do and not do.

Also, Harvey, is the ":lalala:" emoticon really the image you want to present of yourself on this forum? Someone who, when presented with a contrary point, sticks his fingers in his ears to block out the possibility of hearing reasons for a contrary position?

Well, I wasn't the one spouting about myself. If you want to prove a point, then use that logic to show contradiction by your opponents. There's no need to say things like "I'm a Yale grad, I lecture around the world, etc.."

Harvey, all those posts merely mention "deterministic evil" and "divine evil", assuming ahead of time that there is such a distinction and that I equivocate on it. That is very different from defining these terms, and showing why you should interpret my argument as equivocating between them. But that is what I have been asking for. Please, I ask as clearly as I can, for the fifth time now: define these terms, and provide evidence to the effect that I meant one in my first premise and another in my second premise. My response to all your mentioning of and reliance on "deterministic evil" remains the same: what in the Sam Hill is that?

I have defined my terms. (Oh boy, you're going to make me look and waste more time....) Here it is.

If you like, we can sidestep this problem. Here is another version of my argument:

1. If there is an all-good, all-powerful entity, then there is an absolutely minimal amount of pain and suffering in the world (premise).
2. The amount of pain and suffering in the world is not minimal (premise).
3. Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful entity (conclusion).

Now of course you can claim that I'm equivocating on 'pain', that I mean "deterministic pain" in the first premise and "divine pain" in the second. But then you would need to explain what these kinds of pain are, and why you think I equivocated on them. If you can't do that, your equivocation charge is obviously just a bad evasion.

I wouldn't complain that you are equivocating on pain and suffering, I would complain that you are equivocating on minimal amount for the same reason that you are equivocating on unnecessary evil. In each case, we are talking about something that doesn't need to be the case, and that involves a different level of perspective; a perspective that we do not have access to. In the case of God, we don't know what constraints God is under in bringing about the minimal amount of p&s, and in case of premise two, we don't know what constraints are on the Universe in having less minimal p&s. So, again, you argue based on your ignorance, and based on your ignorance you claim knowledge!

If someone doesn't think they [good / goodness] have the same meaning, then the argument is not valid.

Yes, I agree that equivocation makes arguments invalid. I have agreed to that many times. What I need to hear from you is why you think my argument equivocates, and on what exactly.

Okay, let me try (again)... In premise one, you assume an all-good, all-powerful God does not allow unnecessary evil (or >min p&s), so you are talking in terms of God's constraints, that's assumed. Also, very importantly, you are talking in terms of the world as it is. In the second premise, you aren't trying to say that the doctrine of determination is false, you are talking in terms of the world as it appears to us. So, premise 1 is God's constraints and how it is, and premise 2 is just how it appears. Hence, unnecessary evil in premise 1 is "unnecessary" in the sense that God would not allow more evil than that which God is not constrained from preventing. If God is constrained from preventing, then that cannot be unnecessary evil by definition of "unnecessary," since it is in fact necessary evil by the fact that God is somehow constrained to prevent it. In addition, whatever necessary evil that does exist, it would be how the world is, not how we might view it. We can easily be fooled to believe that what appears as unnecessary evil (premise 2), can actually be necessary evil (i.e., God is constrained from preventing it). Therefore, your terms do not reflect these differences in what is meant by the terms in premise 1 and premise 2. The same goes for minimal amount. We are talking in terms of God's constraints (i.e., if God is constrained, the minimal amount includes that p&s which God cannot reduce because God is constrained), and we are talking in terms of the way the world actually is (i.e., minimal amount in premise 1 can be different than the minimal amount as it appears in premise 2).

Since the terms do not reflect these differences between P1 and P2, you need to change your terms. You can use uNE1 for P1, and uNE2 for P2. However, if you make that switch, then your conclusion of your reductio is not valid since you have not established that uNE1=uNE2.

... possibilities of how to interpret a premise almost always have a way of casting doubt on a reductio ad absurdum argument (i.e., an argument constructed using premises that lead to an absurd result so that one of the premises are rejected).

What? This strikes me, a relative expert on the matter of logic, as nonsense. So can you please give a reference here about how reductio ad absurdum arguments are special in that "possibilities" will "almost always" manage to "cast doubt" on them?

Well, I'm referring to the argument from ignorance:

Argument by lack of imagination is sometimes expressed in the form "Y is absurd (because I can not imagine it), therefore it must be untrue." This is sometimes confused with the logically valid method of argument, reductio ad absurdum. A logical argument using reductio ad absurdum would be framed as "X logically leads to a probably impossible (absurd) conclusion, therefore it must be false." In reductio ad absurdum, it is necessary to show that X implies a contradiction (such as "not X", or "Y and not Y" for some other proposition Y). In an argument from ignorance, X implies something which the speaker considers absurd rather than something which the speaker can prove to be a contradiction.

Notice how simple it is for the reductio ad absurdum to fall into the argument from ignorance fallacy. If the terms uNE1 and uNE2 (see above) are assumed to be the same, then you have a reductio ad absurdum argument. If uNE1 and uNE2 terms mean different things (i.e., your assumption is wrong), then you easily fall into the argument from ignorance fallacy. This is the fallacy that I think you've fallen into here. Now, you ask me to show that uNE1 and uNE2 are not the same, but actually the situation should be reversed. It is you making the claim that an all-good, all-powerful God does not exist (a very strong claim), so you should show that uNE1 and uNE2 have the same meaning. Actually, you must prove it since I doubt it, and to win me over you have to provide evidence that I should be forced to accept to remain a rational individual with my particular beliefs on this subject. I think you want your assumptions to go unchecked, and that is itself incorrect.

Can you also give a reference to the effect that modus tollens arguments like mine are thereby reductio as absurdum arguments (not reductio at falsum and such--careful!)?

The last few references have covered this issue. The last one in particular is clear that you are trying to demonstrate X and not-X by your two terms (uNE1 and uNE2)

In case of God, anything is a reasonable possibility since we simply do not know much of anything with regard to what constraints God is working under. For some reason, I just can't seem to communicate this to you and other atheists.

No, theists manage to communicate that God works in mysterious ways and so on. We hear and understand this point. We just don't see it as reason to believe. How is 1=3? "God works in mysterious ways." How come so many people suffer needessly? "God works in mysterious ways." How can something be intelligent and immaterial? "God works in mysterious ways." Communication isn't the problem. It's that we don't see mystery as a reason to believe.

You can't claim that unnecessary evil exists unless you know it exists. And, you must prove it exists, which you haven't done. Likewise, you can't claim that God is under no constraints unless you have this knowledge, and you don't have this knowledge. You are making claims that you have no knowledge!

[spetey]

I can't resist one quick note! I'll save the bulk of my response for Friday.

My conclusion is not that the world contains unnecessary evil (I suppose that's the conclusion you meant to state in that ungrammatical parenthetical above). That there is unnecessary evil is a premise, as I've clearly labeled many times now. My conclusion, I've emphasized, is that "there is no all-good, all-powerful being."

Your conclusion is based on the reductio ad absurdum form of argument by "[d]isproof of a proposition by showing that it leads to absurd or untenable conclusions." The untenable (or self-contradictory) conclusion you wish to draw is that premise one and premise two both cannot be correct, and therefore one or both premises are false. You assume in your conclusion that premise one is false since (you assume) premise two cannot be false.

No no no. You just don't understand the format of the argument. I am not trying to draw a contradictory conclusion, that would be nonsense. Please look at, and study, that link on modus tollens. I claim both premises are true. That's what makes them premises. I claim it's true that unnecessary evil is incompatible with an all-good, all-powerful entity. And I claim it's true that there is unnecessary evil, like the tsunami (prima facie, certainly) is. From these two true premises follows, deductively, my conclusion that there is no all-powerful, all-good god. I do not claim that premise 1 is false because of the conclusion. I need the truth of premise 1 to get my conclusion. I need the claim that all-powerful, all-good entities are incompatible with evil.

Do you see how the argument goes now? Please, think carefully about it, and let's just get the logic here straight, okay? Now if you'd care to amend your comments in light of this correction, I can perhaps respond to something more insightful on my Friday post.


spetey

[harvey1]

I claim both premises are true... I claim it's true that unnecessary evil is incompatible with an all-good, all-powerful entity.

Spetey, I'm surprised that you would use a modus tollens argument when both premises are not accessible in terms of our knowledge of them. Let me give an example of why I think this way:

P1: If the big bang happened, there would be magnetic monopoles
P2: There are no magnetic monopoles
C: There was no big bang

Notice that the conclusion in this instance is that the universe did not have a big bang. But, we can re-word the argument to produce a different conclusion:

P1: If there are magnetic monopoles, the big bang caused it
P2: The big bang did not cause magnetic monopoles
C: There are no magnetic monopoles

Now, notice why I thought you wanted a reductio:

P1: If the big bang happened, there would be magnetic monopoles
P2: There are no magnetic monoples
C1: It is absurd that there is a big bang without magnetic monopoles
C2: Either (P1, P2) or both are incorrect

This latter argument makes sense since it asks that we evaluate all of our premises. It doesn't require that we construe some incorrect slanted view where we arbitrarily decide which conclusion we wish to reach.

However, and this is important, inflation theory has come along and explained why it is that we haven't observed magnetic monopoles. So, let this be a lesson to all those who wish to construe such "logical arguments"--a lack of imagination (or argument from ignorance) is no basis to construct an argument.

[spetey]

Hi all!

First, Harvey, I'm cheered somewhat by your last short post. Your first two arguments are of genuine modus tollens form, and this gives me more confidence that you now understand this argument form and its validity. Those first two are valid arguments. Of course, they're not good arguments, because they're not sound (it turns out they have false premises, at least so you say--I don't know anything about these monopoles, myself!). I still don't get why you thought I was trying something like the third argument instead, but as long as you get the logic of the argument now, then good.

So, let's turn to the comments that remain relevant from your post-before-last.

First, here's my argument again for review:

1. If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, then the amount of evil (pain, suffering, etc) is absolutely minimal. (premise)
2. The amount of evil is not absolutely minimal. (premise)
3. Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful entity. (conclusion)

Spetey, let me use a different tact since the others aren't getting through to you. Do you buy into your premise 2 that evil does not necessarily have to happen? On what evidence do you base that premise? Sheez Louise.

I agree that it's very hard to say what's possible and what's not. But I take it for granted that it's possible, for example, that I could have gotten four pieces of mail today instead of five. I would have to hear special reason why it would be impossible for me to have gotten four pieces of mail--so that even an all-powerful god couldn't have arranged things that way.

In a similar way it seems possible that the tectonic plates had slid against each other in a way that did not cause an earthquake. I would have to hear special reason to think this was impossible, so that even an all-powerful god couldn't prevent it.

Now, as you're aware, there is a difficulty here: perhaps it was possible to prevent the tsunami, but impossible to have less evil. That is, perhaps God didn't stop the tsunami because it would have just resulted somehow in more evil to prevent that disaster. In other words, you want to say that though it was possible to stop the tsunami, it was impossible to have less evil. This is a traditional, "best of all possible worlds" theodicy.

But I want to know why you think this. Most of us, when we find out about the tsunami and the hundreds of thousands drowned, do not clap for joy that God has saved us from some even more horrifying evil. Most of us think, intuitively, that the tsunami and its huge resulting pain and suffering was a horrible thing to happen, and not that it was the best thing that could have happened that day. You have to defend the idea that the tsunami was the best thing that could have happened to this world.

I know you think the tsunami had to happen to prevent some paradox, and you think genuine paradoxes are evil (rather than just-plain impossible). It is possible that there's an all-good, all-powerful God who was doing us a favor, I grant. But it is similarly possible that Hitler was a really good guy bribed by space aliens to kill the Jews. But I will continue to think that Hitler was a bad person until I hear reasons to think he was good after all. Similarly, I will hold my intuitive assessment of the tsunami as a horrible disaster--one that did not magically prevent further evil--until I have reason to believe otherwise.

Please, I ask as clearly as I can, for the fifth time now: define these terms, and provide evidence to the effect that I meant one in my first premise and another in my second premise. My response to all your mentioning of and reliance on "deterministic evil" remains the same: what in the Sam Hill is that?

I have defined my terms. (Oh boy, you're going to make me look and waste more time....) Here it is.

Notice these define deterministically necessary and divinely necessary. I reworded my premises to avoid this possible equivocation (though I did not grant the equivocation). So then you started talking about deterministic evil and such, but without defining them. You just hoped that somehow they meant something similar to your previous definition. When I gave another example, you were sure I would be equivocating on minimal that time, not evil. But you seem strangely confident that I must be equivocating on something.

Now here I think is the best way to make sense of your point: my argument relies essentially on notions of what is possible and necessary. My first version talks openly about necessity, and you think there is an ambiguity there. My next version talks about minimal evil, and though you claimed I was equivocating on 'evil', you probably want to say in retrospect I was equivocating on 'minimal'. This would be consistent with your previous accusation, since really this "absolutely minimal" stuff obscures an appeal to possibility and necessity: to be "absolutely minimal" is probably to be as minimal as possible.

So can we agree that your real claim is that I'm equivocating all along on these notions of possible and necessary (and related stuff like "minimal"), and not on 'evil'? If so then we should look carefully at your definitions from that post. Before I just said they were "muddled", I guess hoping that you would agree in retrospect and give them up without too much effort on my part. But it seems you want to hold on to them, so we have to discuss them in detail. Here they are quoted verbatim, with my comments in green:

Let's get our terms right so there is no future confusion. How about:

• Deterministically necessary: should mean that something is evil as a matter of some deterministic feature that the laws of the Universe (e.g., logic) require. spetey says: is logic meant to be the same as the "laws of the Universe"? Or do you include physics and such in the latter? If so, then you're being unclear. If you just mean logical laws, then this is close to a notion of necessity ("logical necessity"), and "deterministic" is a misleading term for it.
• Divinely necessary: should mean that something is evil if God allows it to maintain a Greater Good (and we'll leave that open as to what that means).spetey says: here you define what's necessary in terms of what's evil. This is very strange; it seems things can be necessary even if good, or neutral--like 1+1=2. But perhaps you mean something is "divinely necessary" if God had to permit it, even if it's evil, in order to make this the best of all possible worlds.

So for one thing, I don't think these are strong distinctions. But if reworded according to amendments above, then perhaps there is a distinction to be made. You want to say the tsunami was deterministically unnecessary and divinely necessary, which means you want to say the tsunami was preventable (it wasn't logically necessary!), but God couldn't prevent the tsunami because it would have made a worse world (it was "divinely" necessary to have it). Of course, that's just what I guessed you meant by this distinction, here and elsewhere.

But anyway, my claim has been all along that the tsunami wasn't "divinely necessary" in your sense--that is, it didn't prevent worse evil. If you like, for clarity's sake, we can put my argument this way:

1. If there is an all-good, all-powerful god, there is no "divinely unnecessary" evil.
2. There is "divinely unnecessary" evil, as the tsunami demonstrates.
3. Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful god.

Now, I know, of course, that you do not agree that the tsunami was "divinely unnecessary". In other words, you think the tsunami had to happen to prevent something worse. And again, I need to know why you think this. It looks for all the world you believe it simply because you assume ahead of time that there is an all-good, all-powerful being.

Well, I'm referring to the argument from ignorance:

Argument by lack of imagination is sometimes expressed in the form "Y is absurd (because I can not imagine it), therefore it must be untrue."

Yes, mystery is not a reason not to believe, and it is not on its own reason to disbelieve. Notice, for example, that you and I don't believe in the Invisible Pink Unicorn (may her hooves never be shod) because she just doesn't fit in with a good explanation of how the world works. We don't just say "I can't imagine how there could be such a thing, therefore there isn't." But we do appeal to considerations about how plausible it is that such a thing exists given the explanatory coherence of views that do not refer to her.

Similarly, I don't claim that the tsunami was bad because I have no idea what God's plans are. That would be appeal to ignorance. I think the tsunami was bad because it caused an enormous amount of pain and suffering for many hundreds of thousands of people, and these are bad things. These are independent reasons to think the tsunami was a horrible thing to happen.

Your response, on the other hand, is an appeal to ignorance. "We have no idea why God permitted the tsunami, so we must trust that it's for the best." In other words, "I don't know how the tsunami prevented evil, and that's why I believe." Of course, if you can tell me why God had to drown so many people for our sake, then we would be getting somewhere. But pure mystery is not a reason to believe, and that's the point of the appeal to ignorance fallacy.

You can't claim that unnecessary evil exists unless you know it exists. And, you must prove it exists, which you haven't done.

Proof is too high a standard. I can't prove that there's a desk before me--I might be dreaming, in the Matrix, whatever. But I have good reason to think there's a desk here. Similarly I have a good reason to think that the tsunami was a crappy thing to happen. To convince me there's no desk here, you'd have to give me special reason. And to convince me that the tsunami was a great thing that saved us from far worse consequences, you'd have to give me special reason. Surely you must grant that the intuitive position on the matter is that the tsunami was a horrible tragedy. I appeal to it as a premise because I think it's true that the tsunami was an unnecessary evil, even though I can't prove it. I would also appeal to my desk being here as a premise, and I would not give up an argument that relied on this premise without being told why I should believe there is no desk here after all.


spetey

[harvey1]

I agree that it's very hard to say what's possible and what's not. But I take it for granted that it's possible, for example, that I could have gotten four pieces of mail today instead of five. I would have to hear special reason why it would be impossible for me to have gotten four pieces of mail--so that even an all-powerful god couldn't have arranged things that way.

It surely is possible to get four pieces of mail than five, if what you mean by possibility is that no laws of physics would be violated (as far as we know). However, this is not the issue. The issue is whether the universe has evil that is at a minimum. According to the classical deterministic thesis, the universe is operating deterministically and couldn't be otherwise (at a classical level). In order to contradict the deterministic thesis, you'd have to prove how the universe has the option of choice which would lead to less evil on a statistical scale comprising all of spacetime.

In a similar way it seems possible that the tectonic plates had slid against each other in a way that did not cause an earthquake. I would have to hear special reason to think this was impossible, so that even an all-powerful god couldn't prevent it.

Whoa... It seems in this case you are presenting a different argument. You are arguing against a deterministic universe, and you are assuming that God can prevent a deterministic universe by keeping at a minimum. Here seems to be your argument:

• [P1]If this is a deterministic Universe (P), then an all-powerful, all-good entity has control by keeping evil to an absolute minimum (Q)
  [P2]This is not a deterministic Universe (not P) ("I would have to hear special reason why it would be impossible for me to have gotten four pieces of mail")
  [C3]Therefore there is no all-powerful, all-good entity that keeps evil to an absolute minimum (not Q).

In other words:

• If P then Q
• Not P
• Therefore, not Q

If that is your argument, then you've committed the fallacy of denying the ancedent.

Now, as you're aware, there is a difficulty here: perhaps it was possible to prevent the tsunami, but impossible to have less evil. That is, perhaps God didn't stop the tsunami because it would have just resulted somehow in more evil to prevent that disaster. In other words, you want to say that though it was possible to stop the tsunami, it was impossible to have less evil. This is a traditional, "best of all possible worlds" theodicy.

Not traditional since this is only one of the possible worlds, not necessarily the best. However, as I've said before, our world exists in the only possible World (with a capital W), because there is only one possible World (if another world was possible, it would exist as part of our World). So, yes, it's the best, but that's misleading since no other World exists.

But I want to know why you think this. Most of us, when we find out about the tsunami and the hundreds of thousands drowned, do not clap for joy that God has saved us from some even more horrifying evil. Most of us think, intuitively, that the tsunami and its huge resulting pain and suffering was a horrible thing to happen, and not that it was the best thing that could have happened that day. You have to defend the idea that the tsunami was the best thing that could have happened to this world.

I don't defend it was the best thing that could have happened to this world, it is one of the possible outcomes that is consistent with our World (i.e., all possible worlds) not being thrown in paradox by any action to violate the laws of the Universe.

I know you think the tsunami had to happen to prevent some paradox, and you think genuine paradoxes are evil (rather than just-plain impossible).

Paradoxes are impossible because God won't allow them to happen.

It is possible that there's an all-good, all-powerful God who was doing us a favor, I grant. But it is similarly possible that Hitler was a really good guy bribed by space aliens to kill the Jews. But I will continue to think that Hitler was a bad person until I hear reasons to think he was good after all. Similarly, I will hold my intuitive assessment of the tsunami as a horrible disaster--one that did not magically prevent further evil--until I have reason to believe otherwise.

Hitler wasn't bribed by space aliens, and that's not a reasonable belief to hold. However, there's nothing unreasonable about God being constrained by laws that limit what God can and cannot do. You've acknowledged this already. And, despite what you say, none of us have any basis of knowing the details as to what constrains God's actions since we have no access to this information. This is a different story with Hitler. We do have access to Hitler's timeperiod, and this does give us reason to doubt that Hitler was bribed by space aliens.

Now here I think is the best way to make sense of your point: my argument relies essentially on notions of what is possible and necessary. My first version talks openly about necessity, and you think there is an ambiguity there. My next version talks about minimal evil, and though you claimed I was equivocating on 'evil', you probably want to say in retrospect I was equivocating on 'minimal'. This would be consistent with your previous accusation, since really this "absolutely minimal" stuff obscures an appeal to possibility and necessity: to be "absolutely minimal" is probably to be as minimal as possible.

I already stated that you are equivocating on minimal amount just like you were equivocating on necessary evil:

I wouldn't complain that you are equivocating on pain and suffering, I would complain that you are equivocating on minimal amount for the same reason that you are equivocating on unnecessary evil. In each case, we are talking about something that doesn't need to be the case, and that involves a different level of perspective; a perspective that we do not have access to. In the case of God, we don't know what constraints God is under in bringing about the minimal amount of p&s, and in case of premise two, we don't know what constraints are on the Universe in having less minimal p&s. So, again, you argue based on your ignorance, and based on your ignorance you claim knowledge!

So can we agree that your real claim is that I'm equivocating all along on these notions of possible and necessary (and related stuff like "minimal"), and not on 'evil'?

For now, let's treat minimal amount of evil and necessary evil as the concepts where we disagree on the meaning (necessary basically means satisfying a minimum or required amount). The term "evil" should remain even though we might have different concepts of evil, so far that hasn't presented a problem.

Let's get our terms right so there is no future confusion. How about:[*]Deterministically necessary: should mean that something is evil as a matter of some deterministic feature that the laws of the Universe (e.g., logic) require.

is logic meant to be the same as the "laws of the Universe"? Or do you include physics and such in the latter? If so, then you're being unclear. If you just mean logical laws, then this is close to a notion of necessity ("logical necessity"), and "deterministic" is a misleading term for it.

By the laws of the Universe, I mean whatever has a causal role in explaining or determining the properties of the Universe. Mathematical, logical and physical laws are the most obvious, but there might be more elusive laws such as laws that allow different logics/maths to co-exist, laws that allow causality to vary in different worlds, or even laws that allow truth to be defined differently (e.g., correspondence theory works in one universe but not the other, etc.).

[*]Divinely necessary: should mean that something is evil if God allows it to maintain a Greater Good (and we'll leave that open as to what that means).

here you define what's necessary in terms of what's evil. This is very strange; it seems things can be necessary even if good, or neutral--like 1+1=2. But perhaps you mean something is "divinely necessary" if God had to permit it, even if it's evil, in order to make this the best of all possible worlds.

No, I meant "divinely necessary evil," but I got lazy in my typing. Everything we are talking about is in context of necessary and unnecessary evil (not necessary good, etc.).

So for one thing, I don't think these are strong distinctions. But if reworded according to amendments above, then perhaps there is a distinction to be made. You want to say the tsunami was deterministically unnecessary and divinely necessary, which means you want to say the tsunami was preventable (it wasn't logically necessary!), but God couldn't prevent the tsunami because it would have made a worse world (it was "divinely" necessary to have it). Of course, that's just what I guessed you meant by this distinction, here and elsewhere.

Not exactly correct. I want to say that the tsunami may have been deterministically unnecessary with respect to our world, but there may exist a quota that made events like the tsunami (and which ultimately entail our tsunami) deterministically necessary. However, it was definitely divinely necessary meaning that God may have been able to prevent it as an event it, but God choose in this instance to allow it to either meet a quota imposed by deterministic necessity, or God may have been directly forced to allow it because it was a deterministic evil event in and of itself. My view is that it is part of a wider quota. I don't think every event is a question of paradox, and God has options on where and when the divine will can prevent some kind of evil from happening.

[*] If there is an all-good, all-powerful god, there is no "divinely unnecessary" evil.
[*] There is "divinely unnecessary" evil, as the tsunami demonstrates.
[*] Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful god.

Now, I know, of course, that you do not agree that the tsunami was "divinely unnecessary". In other words, you think the tsunami had to happen to prevent something worse. And again, I need to know why you think this. It looks for all the world you believe it simply because you assume ahead of time that there is an all-good, all-powerful being.

Again, it's not like I have to believe it (even though I do). Just like we don't know if there are magnetic monopoles, I don't have to believe there are magnetic monopoles to argue against someone who proposes a modus tollens argument to show that there are no magnetic monopoles. As a matter of good practice, I might like to show that person that magnetic monopoles can exist if inflation caused space to inflate and putting monopoles out of our observable range. Of course, to the person who made the argument, they will look upon that quite suspiciously and say, "I need to know why you think this strange theory that monopoles are unobservable. It looks for all the world you believe it simply because you assume ahead of time there was a big bang." Yes, I do believe in a big bang, but that's because of the evidence that brings me to that view. I don't believe in the big bang because of monopoles, I believe in monopoles because of the evidence for the big bang. Likewise, even if I didn't believe in the big bang, I can reject the ontological argument against monopoles because it is based on the argument from ignorance fallacy, and as a curious bystander, I might challenge the argument for the sake of rationality in the world. So, I don't think my motives really matter. You've stated an argument from ignorance, and I'm challenging it, and I don't need to provide evidence of monopoles to show the argument is faulty, I only need to show that monopoles can reasonably exist.

Yes, mystery is not a reason not to believe, and it is not on its own reason to disbelieve. Notice, for example, that you and I don't believe in the Invisible Pink Unicorn (may her hooves never be shod) because she just doesn't fit in with a good explanation of how the world works. We don't just say "I can't imagine how there could be such a thing, therefore there isn't." But we do appeal to considerations about how plausible it is that such a thing exists given the explanatory coherence of views that do not refer to her. Similarly, I don't claim that the tsunami was bad because I have no idea what God's plans are. That would be appeal to ignorance. I think the tsunami was bad because it caused an enormous amount of pain and suffering for many hundreds of thousands of people, and these are bad things. These are independent reasons to think the tsunami was a horrible thing to happen.

The terribleness of the tsunami is not the issue, all of us agree it was a horrible thing that we wish didn't happen. Your argument from ignorance is the one based on what we know about God's constraints. We don't know anything, just like we didn't know much as to what constrains us from observing monopoles up until inflation came along. Of course, we can doubt there was a big bang that caused monopoles, just like we can doubt that an all-good, all-powerful God exists, but that doesn't make an argument based on ignorance justified. In order to show there are no monopoles you could do it by arguing against the big bang theory or by showing that there's no possibility that monopoles could exist in principle. The latter is what you are trying to do with evils like the tsunami cannot exist if an all-powerful, all-good God does, but this is a very hard argument to make since showing monopoles cannot reasonably exist encounter theories like inflation that explain their unobservability it by saying that they are too far to see. Monopole skeptics will think that is very convenient reasoning, but convenient or not, it defeats an ontological argument (or modus tollens argument) against magnetic molopoles.

Your response, on the other hand, is an appeal to ignorance. "We have no idea why God permitted the tsunami, so we must trust that it's for the best." In other words, "I don't know how the tsunami prevented evil, and that's why I believe." Of course, if you can tell me why God had to drown so many people for our sake, then we would be getting somewhere. But pure mystery is not a reason to believe, and that's the point of the appeal to ignorance fallacy.

But, the monopole skeptic will say the same thing to the inflationist who says that monopoles are just too far to see. They will say to the inflationists:

your response... is an appeal to ignorance. 'We have no idea where the monopoles are from the big bang, but we must trust that they are too far away to be detected.' In other words, 'I don't know how we're ever going to detect monopoles to confirm our theory, and that's why I believe.' Of course, if you can tell me why inflation had to occur and carry monopoles so far away, then we would be getting somewhere. But pure mystery is not a reason to believe, and that's the point of the appeal to ignorance fallacy.

The monopole skeptic has just made an invalid argument. True, they will go after inflation theory, and they can easily show that inflation has problems because not one model works properly, and such and such down the line. However, most explanations about tough stuff is like that. We cannot say monopoles do not exist as the monopole skeptic asks that we do for the simple fact of matter that we don't know enough about the early evolution of our universe to eliminate them. In fact, the reasons for accepting them are very good, even though they are not detected. Similary, the reasons to believe an all-good, all-powerful God is based on good reasons, and for that reason, we can feel comfortable about believing that God is constrained in some manner to allow certain evils. Even if we don't believe that, we still cannot allow people to abuse rational arguments by misconstruing their arguments as arguments of knowledge when they are arguments of ignorance. You will even admit that you don't know what constrains God. Your only answer is that your ignorance justifies your statements about those constraints, but it doesn't, and how could it? Ignorance is not a reason to claim knowledge. The most you can say is that we don't know how God's constraints could bring about a tsunami, but we must admit that due to our ignorance anything is possible, including paradox battles that prevent God from acting in every situation throughout the world to prevent evil. We have not a shred of evidence that God is able to overpower a deterministic set of criteria that necessitate evil in the world.

You can't claim that unnecessary evil exists unless you know it exists. And, you must prove it exists, which you haven't done.

Proof is too high a standard. I can't prove that there's a desk before me--I might be dreaming, in the Matrix, whatever. But I have good reason to think there's a desk here.

By proof I don't mean that you can demonstrate it as a formal proof. I mean it in the realist-antirealist sense where antirealists ask realists to prove that our scientific knowledge is knowledge about the way the world actually is (e.g., entities of science actually exist and physical theories are true), and not useful fictions of some sort.

Similarly I have a good reason to think that the tsunami was a crappy thing to happen. To convince me there's no desk here, you'd have to give me special reason. And to convince me that the tsunami was a great thing that saved us from far worse consequences, you'd have to give me special reason. Surely you must grant that the intuitive position on the matter is that the tsunami was a horrible tragedy. I appeal to it as a premise because I think it's true that the tsunami was an unnecessary evil, even though I can't prove it. I would also appeal to my desk being here as a premise, and I would not give up an argument that relied on this premise without being told why I should believe there is no desk here after all.

You can believe that the tsunami was a crappy thing, as I do. However, what you cannot do is take that belief and try and construe a "proof" that an all-good, all-powerful God does not exist simply because it does not square with our horrible experience of the tsunami. We are ignorant of God's constraints, and therefore we don't have enough knowledge to prove anything. Comparing that to their being no desk is not a good comparison since we have empirical knowledge of the desk, but we don't have empirical knowledge about God's constraints. We base our whole frame of knowledge on experience (i.e., either our direct experience or experience from others including our ancestors), and we make sound judgements based on those experiences. Since we don't have experience of God's constraints, we can't produce knowledge from ignorance. That's what the argument from ignorance fallacy points out as an error in reasoning.

[The Happy Humanist]

Lawdy, lawdy, you guys are getting so far out there...

Why don't you try shifting to a different approach, say, comparative analysis?

A) There is a God. He is all-good and all-powerful. The tsunami happened because [unknowable].

[everything in between ignored for argument's sake]

B) No God. Stuff happens.

Which seems to be the better explanation? I go with B, because, first, it's the default position, and second, it is consistent with everything observed so far.

Comments?

[harvey1]

Which seems to be the better explanation? I go with B, because, first, it's the default position, and second, it is consistent with everything observed so far. Comments?

The default position is always one in which we believe what is passed onto us from our parents, caretakers, society, culture, educational system, etc.. If that were not the case, then we should at 4 years old stop our parents as they say, "don't eat that, it's dirty" by saying, "mom, dad, I know that's what you believe, but let me form my own opinions as to what is dirty for me." That's just plain foolishness!

Rather, as we age, we gain critical reasoning, and then we start evaluating the things that were told as a youth, some of the things that were used as an explanation, etc., and then we decide if that belief chimes with what we've come to understand about the world. If that belief is mostly correct, but in need of some slight revision, then we slightly modify that belief. Sometimes beliefs are dumped altogether.

This is the default position. It's also the default position as we approach scientific understanding. We don't rush into science classes as a bull in a glass shop and say, "this theory doesn't explain everything to my philosophical satisfaction, I choose to disbelieve everything about that theory." That too is ridiculous. We usually approach a scientific belief as converts unless we never fully comprehend the reasons for that belief and we hold lingering doubts. As those doubts grow over the months and years and our knowledge increases to the point to where we feel have reason to be skeptical, then we move from a default position of believing because people we trusted believe it (or so they let on), and move to a position of skepticism and looking for a belief to replace the old one. (Perhaps we are only looking for a minor revision, or perhaps we are looking for a total revamping of the old belief.)

So, as we approach this question of A and B, we can look at it two ways. The first way is that the world does appear "natural" and not given to considerations of whether something is evil or not. The natural world acts as if there is no distinction between one creature being eaten and another creature having a meal. It all depends on your point of view. If you are a gazelle, then being eaten by the lion is a bad thing, and if you are a lion, eating the gazelle is a good thing. Nature appears not to care who wins. The odds seem to be equally in each others favor (all things being equal), so they struggle for survival. The theory of natural selection is a byproduct of this uncaring and ruthless nature of evolution, a world in which humanity evolved.

The second way to approach this question is in terms of what we've learned by becoming human. As humans, we've been blessed with significant reasoning abilities, and also we've become distinctly aware of our existence in ways that perhaps no other creature has going for them. That's made us aware of our own mortality, and the dangers that exist beyond the meadow in which we are currently browsing. But, more significantly, it's made us realize what a miracle it is that we are here at all. This is the point to where B looks very doubtful.

Let me illustrate. Many of us have taken a trip to Las Vegas, and we've been exposed to all the gambling that takes place. Some of us have even been lucky and won a few bucks as a result (while most of us have lost). However, I doubt many of us have won it big in Vegas. Most of our experience is that you lose your money when you gamble, simply because the odds are against us. There's no one looking out for us, such as the owner of a casino, who sees us coming into the gambling establishment and says, "I want you to make sure Harvey and The Happy Humanist win big today. They are special people whom I read on that Christian website." No, that never happens, at least to scrubs like us. We lose. And, if we gamble big, we lose big.

Hence, the problem with B. We are saying in effect, that the world is a big Las Vegas, and we have beginner's luck. That is, the world is such that if you could spin the existence wheel over and over, perhaps each time it would come up deuces, but in our case, the only case our World has ever gambled, it came up 7's. Not only do we exist (happily so), but the gambling non-existent gods were looking down on us and gave us a world that was rich enough in variation that it could produce big bangs, inflations, galaxies, stars, planets, water, life, and could even evolve intelligence to comprehend just how lucky, lucky we are. This worldview, I'm afraid, is someone having rose colored glasses. No such luck exists in nature, and it sure as heck doesn't favor us first time gamblers. We are, I'm afraid, unlucky in terms of gambling odds.

This makes us look at option A. Now, this at first seems even worse than option B. Not only do we have to gamble for there to be a universe rich enough to be capable of bringing forth life, we have to have intelligence and a supreme being on the first roll of the dice. Perhaps this is why so many, after they've ignored the traditions of humanity, have come to think that option B is the only way to think on how the world came to exist.

But, they would be wrong, of course! Option A has a trick up its sleeve that Option B cannot propose, at least without having some kind of theistic belief. The option that B cannot propose is that if nothing cannot exist (let's just assume that), then whatever it is that decides that nothing cannot exist is also smart enough to also know what must exist. This is the first hint of intelligence existing independent of the universe. If it is smart enough to know what must exist, then that clears the way to accepting Option A over Option B. B loses its appeal because of dumb odds seem too overwhelming to consider it, while A gains appeal because whatever it is, it is smart enough to know what must exist, it may also be smart enough to not only know that universes like ours must exist, but has the ability to make sure that such universes do exist.

But, that's a big leap on my part. Something being smart enough to "know" that nothing cannot exist only means that the phenomenal world does not meet some criterion, and that criterion could be something really simple (e.g., 0 <> a). Why do I say that this something (i.e., some fundamenal phenomena of the World that decides that nothing is not sufficient for the phenomenal world to be that) is intelligent? Well, very simple. If there is a criterion, even a short criterion such as 0<>a, then this is a language. If a language exists, and that's why there's something other than nothing, then Houston you have a problem. As far as we know, language requires an enormous amount of intelligence in order to comprehend what it is that is being proposed by a criterion. If, for example, there is a simple criterion 0<>a, then how does this Something know that the criterion is being met unless it can comprehend what it means for that criterion to be met in the phenomenal world?

The answer is clear to me. That Something is intelligent. But, how intelligent? Also clear to me. It would have to be supremely intelligent since any criterion would require an exhaustive background of knowledge to be able to provide any meaning to "0<>a" (for example). That exhaustive knowledge would have to comprise all-knowledge (i.e., everything that can be known) for the same reason that any question of "why does that work that way?" comprises all of our current scientific knowledge. We cannot answer one question of the world without bringing up 100 other questions, which bring up 100 more, and so on. Similarly, a claim to any real tidbit of knowledge can only be successfully claimed if all knowledge is known. Hence, we are dealing with an all-knowing being: God.

Now, it might be asked why an all-knowing being can exist even if it must exist. That is, just because I must eat to survive doesn't mean I will eat. The answer here is even simpler. If the phenomenal world must exist, and it can only exist if God exists, then whatever does not meet that criteria will not exist (i.e., it's not really part of the World), while God will exist simply because when you eliminate all that does not exist, it is only what must exist that is left over to claim its place as the rightful owner of the World.

So, yes, option B is ridiculous, and option A is the most likely one. Comments?

[QED]

[Hence, the problem with B. We are saying in effect, that the world is a big Las Vegas, and we have beginner's luck. That is, the world is such that if you could spin the existence wheel over and over, perhaps each time it would come up deuces, but in our case, the only case our World has ever gambled, it came up 7's. Not only do we exist (happily so), but the gambling non-existent gods were looking down on us and gave us a world that was rich enough in variation that it could produce big bangs, inflations, galaxies, stars, planets, water, life, and could even evolve intelligence to comprehend just how lucky, lucky we are. This worldview, I'm afraid, is someone having rose colored glasses. No such luck exists in nature, and it sure as heck doesn't favor us first time gamblers. We are, I'm afraid, unlucky in terms of gambling odds.

Isn't it marvelous how pleasant it can be to bask in the sunshine breathing in the delightful seaside air? Twenty degrees warmer or colder and we would not feel so comfortable. Climb to the rarified heights of a mountain and we'd be gasping for breath.

You seem to have fallen into the anthropic trap, we have evolved as we are to suit the conditions -- not the other way around. It's not luck that puts just the right amount of oxygen in the atmosphere. For life starting out on this planet the atmosphere was very different. Try and calculate the odds for the existence of a harvey1, through all the twists and turns of evolution. Your probability is indistinguishable from the number zero.

I know of nothing that allows us to make a special case for the universe, so I agree with B. No god, stuff happens; and because we can discuss it, it had to happen exactly the way it did.

[harvey1]

Isn't it marvelous how pleasant it can be to bask in the sunshine breathing in the delightful seaside air? Twenty degrees warmer or colder and we would not feel so comfortable. Climb to the rarified heights of a mountain and we'd be gasping for breath. You seem to have fallen into the anthropic trap, we have evolved as we are to suit the conditions -- not the other way around. It's not luck that puts just the right amount of oxygen in the atmosphere. For life starting out on this planet the atmosphere was very different. Try and calculate the odds for the existence of a harvey1, through all the twists and turns of evolution. Your probability is indistinguishable from the number zero. I know of nothing that allows us to make a special case for the universe, so I agree with B. No god, stuff happens; and because we can discuss it, it had to happen exactly the way it did.

You're misunderstanding my argument in this case. This argument shouldn't be confused with the one I made to MY about the cosmological evidence of coincidences for life (the anthropic principle). Rather, what I'm talking about here has less to do with the anthropic principle, and more to do with why is the universe here in the first place. Okay, I'll assume there had to be something. But, that's all the assumptions you get. Now, you have to go inside the casino and gamble, and good luck.

Now, my first inclination is that all there is a one-dimensional Euclidean space that's as if you pressed pause on your DVD player. Now, QED, why isn't the world like that? Why do you feel so lucky as to live in a non-Euclidean world with more complexity than a one-dimensional world? Remember, I'm talking about a "beginning state" where nothing precedes it. It is the "given" of the world. A freebie. Why is it that you ask so much from this freebie and I ask very little (actually I ask only that it be a logical structure that's it).