If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

Hey folks!

I too am scaling down my posts--to Monday Wednesday Fridays, if I can. I too am spending too much time on these discussions. The difference between Harvey and me is that I enjoy these discussions. Which reminds me:

The funny thing is that I don't like to debate atheists because I see them as too close-minded. I came to debate Christians on the meaning of scripture, but that's another story...

Do you sense any irony here, Harvey? You don't want to debate with people who have an opposing view--why? Because they, you say, are too close-minded. You wish instead you could debate only with people who already agree with you about basic precepts. Based only on your own testimony above, are you sure it's the they who are close-minded? You do not seem to like debating with those who have opposing viewpoints, while I (for example) am eagerly debating with people of opposing views. I even provide arguments for the "opposing" side when I find good ones. I came to this site called "Debating Christianity and Religion" in order to debate the worth of Christianity and religion with people of views opposed to mine. I think this demonstrates a pretty open mind.

True, I have not changed my mind on major issues, no--but to be fair, if that's the test for an open mind, neither have you changed yours, right? So on that score we're equally "close-minded". Now, of course you think you have given me good reason to change my mind--but I think I have given you good reason to change yours. That's what we're here discussing.

And we have made some progress. I have opened myself to the possibility the laws of physics as an example of an immaterial substance. I have even granted that there is a halfway decent defense to the Problem of Evil out there--something I would not have said a few months ago. And I think you have changed your mind some too, right? You show new interest in Hinduism, for example, as a result of this thread, and do not seem so confident about your "evolution of ideas" as evidence in favor of the existence of Yahweh.

Now, on to the Problem of Evil. Harvey, I am tempted to give you a lecture on logic, deductive arguments, reductio's, and so on. If necessary, I will. For now, a few quick points of logic before the main issue:

• Reductios in their nature do not need, as you seem to think, to be proved for "every case". You say, for example, about the reductio proof that sqrt(2) is irrational: "if a mathematician provided a case where the square root of 2 is rational in just one case, then that argument would be defeated as well." I hope, when you look at this claim, you can see how this does not make sense. What on earth would it be to show that the square root of 2 is rational "in just one case"?! There are no cases here, except the obvious two: sqrt(2) is rational or it isn't. The reductio supposes it's rational, derives a contradiction from this supposition, and thereby shows it's irrational--end of story. Similarly, there are no cases about the existence of an all-good, all-powerful entity. Either there is such an entity, or there isn't. The claim that such a being exists is either true or false.
• You say, in the reductio form of the PoE I gave last time, that I don't need premise (2) (the conditional) because it's redundant with premise (1) (the supposition for contradiction). But this is very wrong, and it's important to see, because it may be at the heart of your misunderstanding about the nature of reductio arguments. To assert a conditional is not to assert its propositional components. To say "if I'm a monkey's uncle, I'll eat my hat" is not the same as saying that I'm a monkey's uncle. I do not assert that I am a monkey's uncle, nor that I'll eat my hat. I merely assert a certain relationship between those two: namely (for the indicative conditional) I rule out the case where the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Similarly, if I assert "if an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, there is no unnecessary evil", I do not assert there is such an entity. I merely rule out, with that premise, the case where there is such an entity and there is (divinely, deterministically, aerobically, whatever) unnecessary evil. Should I then furthermore assert that there is such an entity, I would be logically committed by those two propositions to the claim that there is no unnecessary evil.

Now, at one point you make a very different claim--that I am equivocating between different types of necessity. As I have said, I think your distinction between "deterministic" and "divine" necessity is muddled, not least because your terms are misleading. You really seem to mean "short-term" and "long-term" necessity. The tsunami was a short-term evil, you want to say, for the sake of less long-term evil. I get that, honest. But I am only concerned with long-term: is there, long-term, the minimal amount of evil necessary? That is, was every scrap of evil necessary in the sense that without it, there would be worse? I suppose you want to call this "divinely" necessary evil. I am saying there is "divinely unnecessary" evil.

So let's start over again, but at the heart of the issue, and take it a little slower this time. I'll try to reword the relevant propositions to make it clear I am not equivocating in the way you claim. And to avoid the issues of logical structure, I'll concentrate simply on the notion of inconsistency. Consider these three propositions:

1. If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, the amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is as minimal as possible.
2. The amount of evil (throughout our spacetime) is not as minimal as possible.
3. There is an all-good, all-powerful entity.

Now, I claim these three are inconsistent. This has a formal meaning: it means they cannot all be true. So first important question, Harvey (and anyone else who wants to join in): do you agree these three claims are inconsistent?

Now, anyone who wants to be rational tries to avoid such inconsistency. That means we must reject at least one claim in an inconsistent set. Since (1) and (2) have powerful prima facie plausibility, the Problem of Evil claims we must reject (3). A traditional theodicy tries to give reason to rejct (2) instead--it tries to defend this world as "the best of all possible worlds" despite apparent counterexamples like the tsunami. The Turner-Hudson response rejects (1)--a world with non-minimal evil is compatible with an all-good God, as long as God makes all worlds with positive value.

Now, Harvey, if you want to reject a claim other than (3), you need to provide a reason. Your discussion of the least action principle is an attempt in this direction--it is an attempt to throw out (2) by claiming that for God to act to prevent the tsunami would violate the least action principle (plausible), that God is subject to the least action principle (implausible), and that violating the least action principle would be a worse evil than drowning hundreds of thousands (implausible). But you don't stand my this argument, do you? Again: the least action God could do is nothing, right? So if God is constrained by the least action principle, God must do nothing, correct? And to say it is impossible to act is to say that, far from being all-powerful, you are indeed powerless, right?

It's brute fact that the World at the end is perfect and beautiful. God is bringing about that the best way possible.

What do you mean by "brute fact" here? Do you mean it is a belief for which a reason cannot be provided? That's how it sounds to me.


spetey

[spetey]

Either way, you'd be dealing with an entity that was "on-balance" benevolent instead of "omni-benevolent."

No, that's only if God only makes a so-so world. But according to that defense, God is all-good because God maximizes value by making all worlds with net positive value. If God failed to make a world that was net good, then God would be failing to make as much goodness as possible. Because God is all-good, God creates as much goodness as possible. Alternatively put, God minimizes the evil by making sure each world God chooses to make concrete contributes to the sum total of good, rather than detracting from it.

Or as one commenter on that same site put it, "It is just beyond credibility that a morally perfect being may allow Jane to be raped and killed in Oslo since John is tickled pink in Cleveland…"

I tend to agree, though it's hard to say why, if John is more tickled than Jane is unhappy, and if you (plausibly) think that what's good is net value-maximization. Actually I think that is a poor example because one person being tickled cannot plausibly outweigh the horrors of rape, and so this person is pushing unfair intuitions--all else equal, we wouldn't make such a world because it would obviously be a net bad one. But consider instead a world where the horrors of one person's rape are outweighed by millions of others who are tickled pink... then it's more complicated. You might be tempted to make such a world.


spetey

[harvey1]

and do not seem so confident about your "evolution of ideas" as evidence in favor of the existence of Yahweh.

What made you think that I am not so confident about it? I'm confident about it.

Now, on to the Problem of Evil. Harvey, I am tempted to give you a lecture on logic, deductive arguments, reductio's, and so on. If necessary, I will. For now, a few quick points of logic before the main issue:[*] Reductios in their nature do not need, as you seem to think, to be proved for "every case".

Reductio's need to be true for every case. Did I say proved for every case? If I did, it was a mistake on my part.

You say, for example, about the reductio proof that sqrt(2) is irrational: "if a mathematician provided a case where the square root of 2 is rational in just one case, then that argument would be defeated as well." I hope, when you look at this claim, you can see how this does not make sense. What on earth would it be to show that the square root of 2 is rational "in just one case"?! There are no cases here, except the obvious two: sqrt(2) is rational or it isn't. The reductio supposes it's rational, derives a contradiction from this supposition, and thereby shows it's irrational--end of story.

Exactly. I have no argument with that. I'm only saying that if someone could provide a counter case to a reductio argument, even a mathematical one, this would stand out as a big problem for any reductio argument.

Similarly, there are no cases about the existence of an all-good, all-powerful entity. Either there is such an entity, or there isn't. The claim that such a being exists is either true or false.

That's not what I'm saying. If someone can show one or more of the premises are in error by demonstrating the terms are ill-defined, or the logic is faulty, then the reductio falls apart.

[*] You say, in the reductio form of the PoE I gave last time, that I don't need premise (2) (the conditional) because it's redundant with premise (1) (the supposition for contradiction). But this is very wrong, and it's important to see, because it may be at the heart of your misunderstanding about the nature of reductio arguments. To assert a conditional is not to assert its propositional components. To say "if I'm a monkey's uncle, I'll eat my hat" is not the same as saying that I'm a monkey's uncle. I do not assert that I am a monkey's uncle, nor that I'll eat my hat. I merely assert a certain relationship between those two: namely (for the indicative conditional) I rule out the case where the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Similarly, if I assert "if an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, there is no unnecessary evil", I do not assert there is such an entity. I merely rule out, with that premise, the case where there is such an entity and there is (divinely, deterministically, aerobically, whatever) unnecessary evil. Should I then furthermore assert that there is such an entity, I would be logically committed by those two propositions to the claim that there is no unnecessary evil.

It's funny that you use as your example of a monkey's uncle since that is actually used by this site as an example of reductio (albeit in a slightly different conditional form). Note the basic propositional structure of a propositional reductio has an "if p" in the structure.

Now, at one point you make a very different claim--that I am equivocating between different types of necessity. As I have said, I think your distinction between "deterministic" and "divine" necessity is muddled, not least because your terms are misleading. You really seem to mean "short-term" and "long-term" necessity.

No, I don't mean to say "short-term" and "long-term."

The tsunami was a short-term evil, you want to say, for the sake of less long-term evil. I get that, honest. But I am only concerned with long-term: is there, long-term, the minimal amount of evil necessary?

There is deterministic (unavoidable) evil that even God cannot prevent without bringing about paradox. That evil is why there is evil in the World, and it reduces to there being tsunamis and other "short-term" evils.

That is, was every scrap of evil necessary in the sense that without it, there would be worse? I suppose you want to call this "divinely" necessary evil. I am saying there is "divinely unnecessary" evil.

There is no divinely unnecessary evil since an all-good God would not allow more evil than is necessary to accomplish a very important objective, and I say that main objective is to avert a paradox. It is necessary that God prevent a paradox and accomplish the divine will, therefore there exists necessary evil that God allows (what I call divinely necessary evil).

[*] If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, the amount of [divinely necessary] evil (throughout our spacetime) is as minimal as possible.

Not my correction to make this statement palatable to me.

[*] The amount of [deterministic] evil (throughout our spacetime) is not as minimal as possible.

If you accept my correction, then I would agree that there is evil that is not minimal (i.e., not zero). There's a whole lot of evil out there. Way too much for my standards.

[*] There is an all-good, all-powerful entity [that cannot eliminate deterministic evil].

I added the phrase at the end to make this conclusion consistent with the second premise.

Now, I claim these three are inconsistent. This has a formal meaning: it means they cannot all be true. So first important question, Harvey (and anyone else who wants to join in): do you agree these three claims are inconsistent?

With my corrections, I believe all three statements are consistent and compatible with a Christian view of God. I think no Christian would say that God sacrificed Jesus unless it accomplished a purpose, and it could only accomplish a purpose if God is unable to control deterministic evil without some major setback to the divine will (e.g., paradox).

Now, Harvey, if you want to reject a claim other than (3), you need to provide a reason. Your discussion of the least action principle is an attempt in this direction--it is an attempt to throw out (2) by claiming that for God to act to prevent the tsunami would violate the least action principle (plausible), that God is subject to the least action principle (implausible), and that violating the least action principle would be a worse evil than drowning hundreds of thousands (implausible). But you don't stand my this argument, do you? Again: the least action God could do is nothing, right? So if God is constrained by the least action principle, God must do nothing, correct? And to say it is impossible to act is to say that, far from being all-powerful, you are indeed powerless, right?

No, Spetey, you misunderstand what I'm saying. God cannot control deterministic evil to the point of waiving a magic wand and eliminating it. I don't know of any religion that says that God could rid the world of evil and still accomplish the same thing, but God just enjoys seeing people suffer. That is certainly not a Christian perspective.

The reason for rejecting your argument is in the brackets. Notice that there is no reference to least action. If you want to know a reason for what is in the brackets, then that reason I give is because God is averting paradoxial consequences. Paradox is the real reason why an all-good, and all-powerful God can co-exist with deterministic evil, and even allow a good deal of evil to exist.

Now, you want me to go a step further by providing a science of paradoxes (e.g., what causes them, how are they eliminated, etc.). But, I say this is a lot like the challenges made to Newton on what actually causes the effects of gravity on earth if the massive objects that cause gravity (e.g., the Sun, and Jupiter) are way out in space. Newton didn't even really try to give an answer since he didn't know. Even today the graviton is still theoretical and hasn't been detected.

All I need to show that your argument does not stand is a reason that satisfies the conflict in premise 1 and premise 2. How can there be evil with an all-good and all-powerful God, and the answer is very simple (nothing really complex about this "problem" at all). An all-powerful God is one that overcomes evil (i.e., nothing can stop God from accomplishing the divine will), and not one that controls deterministic evil.

You are really making this problem far more complicated than it has to be. Really.

It's brute fact that the World at the end is perfect and beautiful. God is bringing about that the best way possible.

What do you mean by "brute fact" here? Do you mean it is a belief for which a reason cannot be provided? That's how it sounds to me.

No. It means that the "beginning state" and "end state" of the Universe is "higher up" in precedence than the states that connect the beginning and the end. The Alpha (beg state), and Omega (end state) have to be connected, and that connection is where we see evil in the world. However, Alpha and Omega cannot be compromised, so the only area where compromise is possible, is God allowing evil. The good news though, is that the Omega state is victory for all those who have a claim of existence in that state, and it is a heavenly state. So, all the evil that occurs in the middle is wiped away. It's main role is a causal link, and after it has accomplished its role is limited to the "past."

[spetey]

Hey again... oops, not Wednesday anymore, in my time zone. Okay, but I won't post tomorrow!

and do not seem so confident about your "evolution of ideas" as evidence in favor of the existence of Yahweh.

What made you think that I am not so confident about it? I'm confident about it.

Sorry... I was just trying to think of examples of ideas where maybe you'd demonstrated a mind open to change. I thought maybe you were no longer confident of it because you haven't pushed it for months, and at one time you seemed to think it was the answer to all arguments.

Reductio's need to be true for every case. Did I say proved for every case? If I did, it was a mistake on my part.

What does it mean for an argument of any kind to be "true for every case"? Arguments are not (literally, strictly speaking) true. Arguments are valid or sound or interesting or fallacious or inductive or logically strong or given while drunk or statable in Klingon or whatever ... but arguments are not the type of thing that can be "true"--only propositions are. What does it mean for the proof that sqrt(2) is irrational to be "true for every case"? It is a valid argument, an argument by reductio ad absurdum.

I'm only saying that if someone could provide a counter case to a reductio argument, even a mathematical one, this would stand out as a big problem for any reductio argument.

I don't know what you mean by a "counter case". Maybe you mean showing one of the premises false. If so, then again I agree: if someone could show a premise to an argument false, this would be a problem for the argument--granted. So you know what work you have ahead: show one of my premises false.

If someone can show one or more of the premises are in error by demonstrating the terms are ill-defined, or the logic is faulty, then the reductio falls apart.

Granted! So, show that the premises are wrong or the logic is faulty. (Good luck trying to dispute the modus tollens inference rule.) Now, your equivocation charge--that is something we'll have to discuss. It doesn't seem fair to introduce two new undefined phrases into my premises ("deterministic evil" and "divine evil") and then accuse me of using ill-defined words. I'm just talking about evil, of which innocent children dying painful deaths is a good example.

It's funny that you use as your example of a monkey's uncle since that is actually used by this site as an example of reductio (albeit in a slightly different conditional form). Note the basic propositional structure of a propositional reductio has an "if p" in the structure.

Note further the site says those kinds of reductio are "a rather wider and looser sense of the term", the reductio ad falsum and such. A strict reductio ad absurdum supposes the opposite of what is to be shown and derives a contradiction. However, if you're talking about this looser sense, fine. Again: the structure of the argument is not relevant here. What's relevant is that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be, and further it seems the premises are true.

As for the equivocation: I think there is just evil--you know, bad things... pain, suffering, thwarting of rational desire, whatever. You now want to introduce "deterministic evil" and "divine evil". What are these? On what ground do you say that my argument is best read as equivocating between these two? It seems to me that the evil I think an all-good all-powerful God would eliminate is the same evil that there is too much of in this world. Why do you say they're different?

There is no divinely unnecessary evil since an all-good God would not allow more evil than is necessary to accomplish a very important objective, and I say that main objective is to avert a paradox. It is necessary that God prevent a paradox and accomplish the divine will, therefore there exists necessary evil that God allows (what I call divinely necessary evil).

Again: I know what you say. You say that the tsunami had to happen in order to prevent worse evil (a paradox of some kind). As it stands, this is just a denial of my second premise, that there is unnecessary evil (as evidenced by the tsunami). What I want to know is why you say it. We have agreed, I think, that at least on the face of it, the tsunami was a horrible thing. Other than not wanting to accept my conclusion, what reason do you have to say that the tsunami was the best thing that could have happened? Why are you so sure that the tsunami was needed to prevent worse evil?

No, Spetey, you misunderstand what I'm saying. God cannot control deterministic evil to the point of waiving a magic wand and eliminating it.

I don't know what "deterministic evil" is, but this sure sounds like a limit on God's power. On what grounds do you say God is omnipotent if God cannot eliminate this evil? Is it, according to you, because the evil is necessary (ie it was evil needed to prevent more evil in the long run)? If so, the problem is that this is the very claim for which you have to argue. I claim that the tsunami is an example of unnecessary evil. If the evil was unnecessary, this means it's possible to eliminate that evil without more evil elsewhere. And if it's possible to do and God can't do it, then God is not all-powerful. It's that simple. (Of course, I do not think it is I who is complicated things by adding muddled distinctions in necessity.)

I don't know of any religion that says that God could rid the world of evil and still accomplish the same thing, but God just enjoys seeing people suffer. That is certainly not a Christian perspective.

Right, the Christian perspective is that God is all-good. I am not claiming that according to Christianity God is not good. My point is that the Christian perspective conflicts with the obvious unnecessary evil in the world. Therefore, something about the Christian perspective is wrong.

If you want to know a reason for what is in the brackets, then that reason I give is because God is averting paradoxial consequences. Paradox is the real reason why an all-good, and all-powerful God can co-exist with deterministic evil, and even allow a good deal of evil to exist.

I know you say that the tsunami was needed to avert paradox. But you see, this is not an obvious claim. It is not at all clear how, in order to prevent paradox, you must drown hundreds of thousands of people. Most people do not read about the tsunami in the newspaper and say "oh, that's too bad, but thank goodness we've been saved from a far worse paradox." As The Happy Humanist put it, your posit of this worse "paradox" that God prevented with the tsunami seems ad hoc--there is no motivation for the claim other than to rescue God as both all-powerful and all-good, which is just the issue at stake. If you could say what paradox was prevented, and how the tsunami prevented it, and how the paradox would be worse than drowning hundreds of thousands of innocents--then we'd be getting somewhere.

But, I say this is a lot like the challenges made to Newton on what actually causes the effects of gravity on earth if the massive objects that cause gravity (e.g., the Sun, and Jupiter) are way out in space. Newton didn't even really try to give an answer since he didn't know. Even today the graviton is still theoretical and hasn't been detected.

This is very different, since positing gravity explains a great deal. We have independent reason to think there is this gravitational force keeping the planets in orbit (famously, Newton had apples falling from trees). That's why it was accepted in the community. If instead Newton said only "the planets orbit as they do to prevent some evil paradox", we would consider that a poor explanation--indeed, no explanation at all.

It's brute fact that the World at the end is perfect and beautiful. God is bringing about that the best way possible.

What do you mean by "brute fact" here? Do you mean it is a belief for which a reason cannot be provided? That's how it sounds to me.

No. It means that the "beginning state" and "end state" of the Universe is "higher up" in precedence than the states that connect the beginning and the end. The Alpha (beg state), and Omega (end state) have to be connected, and that connection is where we see evil in the world. However, Alpha and Omega cannot be compromised, so the only area where compromise is possible, is God allowing evil.

I'm sorry to say this makes no sense to me. What is the "precedence"? What does it mean to be "higher up" in this "precedence"? Of course I agree that evil occurs between the beginning and end of the world. But I don't see why God is required to allow this evil because it occurs in the middle.

The good news though, is that the Omega state is victory for all those who have a claim of existence in that state, and it is a heavenly state. So, all the evil that occurs in the middle is wiped away. It's main role is a causal link, and after it has accomplished its role is limited to the "past."

This is another credo: it states what you believe without giving me any reason to believe similarly. I point out your credos as a way to remind you that they are not arguments. I know you think God will make sure all is for the best in the end. I want to know why you think that, given tons of apparently crappy circumstances like the tsunami. I claim the tsunami is good reason to think there is no God making sure that all works out for the best.


spetey

[harvey1]

As for the equivocation: I think there is just evil--you know, bad things... pain, suffering, thwarting of rational desire, whatever. You now want to introduce "deterministic evil" and "divine evil". What are these? On what ground do you say that my argument is best read as equivocating between these two? It seems to me that the evil I think an all-good all-powerful God would eliminate is the same evil that there is too much of in this world. Why do you say they're different?

Spetey, if someone held someone else's arm and forced them to open the dam gates to flood a town, or if the same someone walked in and opened the dam gates because they liked the sound of rushing water, wouldn't you forgive one and condemn the other? It's important to make a distinction so that we know exactly what is unnecessary about the evil we are saying is unnecessary evil. It shows why this reductio fails to demonstrate God's non-existence.

There is no divinely unnecessary evil since an all-good God would not allow more evil than is necessary to accomplish a very important objective, and I say that main objective is to avert a paradox. It is necessary that God prevent a paradox and accomplish the divine will, therefore there exists necessary evil that God allows (what I call divinely necessary evil).

Again: I know what you say. You say that the tsunami had to happen in order to prevent worse evil (a paradox of some kind). As it stands, this is just a denial of my second premise, that there is unnecessary evil (as evidenced by the tsunami). What I want to know is why you say it. We have agreed, I think, that at least on the face of it, the tsunami was a horrible thing. Other than not wanting to accept my conclusion, what reason do you have to say that the tsunami was the best thing that could have happened? Why are you so sure that the tsunami was needed to prevent worse evil?

As I said before, it really is not relevant to the reductio whether it is sure that God is limited by paradoxes, all that is relevant is that if God is constrained by paradox, then the reductio fails. You seem to want to know why I think this "if" is more than a passing curiosity of mine, well, that whole argument that you ignored when I first entered this thread discussed the background as to why I think paradox is important to God. In fact, I think aversioin of paradox is the main explanation for God's motives in creating the world. In the other thread we are talking about motives, well, a being must have motives.

But, more than that, paradox aversion also provides a very simple explanation as to why there is something rather than nothing. Overall, it does what no atheist "explanation" can do, and that is show us why there is a universe. It is not a scientific discovery, of course, but it answers many questions and it does so in a cogent manner.

No, Spetey, you misunderstand what I'm saying. God cannot control deterministic evil to the point of waiving a magic wand and eliminating it.

I don't know what "deterministic evil" is, but this sure sounds like a limit on God's power. On what grounds do you say God is omnipotent if God cannot eliminate this evil?

God can and does eliminate deterministic evil, that's what Omega is all about. The grounds are that if a being can impose their will on all of creation and maintain that will, then that being is all-powerful. If another being is successful doing that, then that being is all-powerful. That's what it means to be all-powerful, and not the trivially false definition that you'd like to present (i.e., all-powerful means having control over all obstacles and constraints).

Is it, according to you, because the evil is necessary (ie it was evil needed to prevent more evil in the long run)? If so, the problem is that this is the very claim for which you have to argue.

No, it is not. The deterministic evil is caused by the fact that existence is how it is. The additional fact that God overcomes that evil shows that God is all-powerful, and all-good since God is fighting the good fight to end all evil, not just in our world, but all the World forever and ever. Rather than criticize it, you should be thanking God for it. (I know, I know, you don't have to say what you will say anyway.)

I claim that the tsunami is an example of unnecessary evil. If the evil was unnecessary, this means it's possible to eliminate that evil without more evil elsewhere.

I'm glad you can claim it, but you know nothing beyond the limits of human beings. It appears to you that evils can be eliminated by God without having any repercussions to the World, however you would say the same thing to an individual who is a timetraveller from the future who just witnessed an evil that they could have prevented. From your limited perspective it would look like an easy evil to stop, but you know nothing of the future and the reason why that timetraveller had to refrain from any kind of intervention.

I know you say that the tsunami was needed to avert paradox. But you see, this is not an obvious claim. It is not at all clear how, in order to prevent paradox, you must drown hundreds of thousands of people. Most people do not read about the tsunami in the newspaper and say "oh, that's too bad, but thank goodness we've been saved from a far worse paradox." As The Happy Humanist put it, your posit of this worse "paradox" that God prevented with the tsunami seems ad hoc--there is no motivation for the claim other than to rescue God as both all-powerful and all-good, which is just the issue at stake. If you could say what paradox was prevented, and how the tsunami prevented it, and how the paradox would be worse than drowning hundreds of thousands of innocents--then we'd be getting somewhere.

Let me ask this straightout. If you accept my insertions within those brackets of your 3-prong argument, do you accept that there is no contradiction? If not, then tell me what the contradiction is. If so, then why do we need this other than you want a full account for evil in terms of a complete theory. There is no complete theory, and that's because we don't know the behind the scenes scoop. We don't know if there are timetravellers walking around either, and if we did, I'm sure you'd want to know the whole scoop on why they don't prevent evil or what paradoxes they see, etc. The point is that all we can do is speculate, but that's fine, we don't need to know the paradoxes in question to have your 3-prong argument to be defeated.

If instead Newton said only "the planets orbit as they do to prevent some evil paradox", we would consider that a poor explanation--indeed, no explanation at all.

And, if I provided to you what Newton provided, we'd all be going to church together. However, there's a big difference in all going to church together and there not being a resolution to your reductio. Your reductio is false if God is limited by paradox. It's as simple as that.

I'm sorry to say this makes no sense to me. What is the "precedence"? What does it mean to be "higher up" in this "precedence"? Of course I agree that evil occurs between the beginning and end of the world. But I don't see why God is required to allow this evil because it occurs in the middle.

If paradox is the major constraint God is working under, then solutions to paradox fall in a line of precedence. For example, the axioms are most important. The theorems immediately constructed from those axioms are of the most high precedence, and precedence is less for postulates, introduction of variables, etc. Our world is not as high of a precedent as the status of there being a beginning and an end, so the way in which our world is constructed is much more flexible, albeit evil is allowed to exist in order to protect the higher precedence (to save the World from paradox). In Christianity, such an example is that Jesus was allowed to be put to death by torture rather than give up on a higher precedence of God (namely, the salvation of humanity).

[spetey]

Happy April Fools' Day, all!

As for the equivocation: I think there is just evil--you know, bad things... pain, suffering, thwarting of rational desire, whatever. You now want to introduce "deterministic evil" and "divine evil". What are these? On what ground do you say that my argument is best read as equivocating between these two? It seems to me that the evil I think an all-good all-powerful God would eliminate is the same evil that there is too much of in this world. Why do you say they're different?

Spetey, if someone held someone else's arm and forced them to open the dam gates to flood a town, or if the same someone walked in and opened the dam gates because they liked the sound of rushing water, wouldn't you forgive one and condemn the other? It's important to make a distinction so that we know exactly what is unnecessary about the evil we are saying is unnecessary evil. It shows why this reductio fails to demonstrate God's non-existence.

I notice you fail to say what the distinction is. Again I ask: what is the difference between "deterministic evil" and "divine evil"? On what grounds do you claim I mean one and then the other in my argument? As I have said, I think I just mean evil--bad things happening.

Of course morally there is a difference between one person being forced to open a dam gate and another who opens it just because she feels like it. Your point is ...? Do you want to say that God was like the person forced to open the gate? But then, in what sense is God all-powerful? I thought you wanted to say that God is like someone who had to open the dam gate in order to save some other, bigger town on the other side. (In other words, the evil of flooding the small town was necessary in order to minimize overall evil.)

I know what you say. You say that the tsunami had to happen in order to prevent worse evil (a paradox of some kind). As it stands, this is just a denial of my second premise, that there is unnecessary evil (as evidenced by the tsunami). What I want to know is why you say it. We have agreed, I think, that at least on the face of it, the tsunami was a horrible thing. Other than not wanting to accept my conclusion, what reason do you have to say that the tsunami was the best thing that could have happened? Why are you so sure that the tsunami was needed to prevent worse evil?

As I said before, it really is not relevant to the reductio whether it is sure that God is limited by paradoxes, all that is relevant is that if God is constrained by paradox, then the reductio fails.

Yes, I remember you said that too. And remember my response was essentially to point out, relatively patiently I thought, that it is not enough to suggest that a premise might be false in order to defeat an argument. You have to try to show the premise is false. The tsunami seems like a clear case of unnecessary evil. You say "maybe it had to happen to minimize some other evil." Okay, maybe it did. But this is not a reason to believe it did. Maybe Hitler did all he did in order to save us from powerful anti-Semitic aliens who were blackmailing us. But that mere possibility does not defeat an argument to the effect that Hitler was a bad person--right? You would actually have to give reason to think Hitler was in that position before I decided that Hitler was a hero after all. Similarly, you have to give good reason to believe that God drowned all those children in order for some greater good. It is not enough to say "maybe there was some paradox that God needed to prevent and that would be much worse."

You seem to want to know why I think this "if" is more than a passing curiosity of mine, well, that whole argument that you ignored when I first entered this thread discussed the background as to why I think paradox is important to God.

I remember that too. As I said later, I ignored that stuff out of charity to you--because it was a highly speculative credo, not an argument. When you brought it up later, I responded in that linked post that if you really stand by it as an argument, we could go over it together and see what the claims are and how plausible they are. You dropped the point. Now, I will ask again: do you want to go over that "argument" and examine it closely? If not, you don't get to keep using it as though it were some established thesis.

But, more than that, paradox aversion also provides a very simple explanation as to why there is something rather than nothing.

Harvey. First of all: why would it be paradoxical for there to be nothing? It seems pretty consistent to me.

Look, I agree that by its nature, the universe cannot be inconsistent or paradoxical. You have yet to show why God stopping a simple tsunami on a tiny planet in God's universe would create some enormous paradox. You just assume it. If we humans managed to find a way to prevent tsunamis, would we have accidentally released some huge evil paradox on the world?

If another being is successful doing that, then that being is all-powerful. That's what it means to be all-powerful, and not the trivially false definition that you'd like to present (i.e., all-powerful means having control over all obstacles and constraints).

Harvey, this is maddening--this is at least the second time you've attributed to me some weird strawman definition of "all-powerful" to which I do not subscribe. I said clearly in this post that I agreed with your definition: to be all-powerful is to be able to do anything possible. That is, if it's possible to have less total evil in the world, then an all-powerful being can arrange things so that there is less overall evil.

The deterministic evil is caused by the fact that existence is how it is.

This is a good explanation for tsunami-like evil--but only atheists get to use it. A theist has to explain why existence is that way when it sure seems like God could have made it a lot better.

The additional fact that God overcomes that evil shows that God is all-powerful, and all-good since God is fighting the good fight to end all evil, not just in our world, but all the World forever and ever.

This "fact", of course, is just what is in question, so appealing to it is begging the question.

I claim that the tsunami is an example of unnecessary evil. If the evil was unnecessary, this means it's possible to eliminate that evil without more evil elsewhere.

I'm glad you can claim it, but you know nothing beyond the limits of human beings.

This is the old "mystery" response to evil. "We pitiful creatures just don't understand God's mysterious ways, and how truly wonderful it was of God to send us that tsunami. Our little brains cannot comprehend how kind God was to those victims by drowning them horribly." The question is: why think God had good reasons for the tsunami? The appeal to mystery is merely an appeal to faith.

I know you say that the tsunami was needed to avert paradox. But you see, this is not an obvious claim. It is not at all clear how, in order to prevent paradox, you must drown hundreds of thousands of people. Most people do not read about the tsunami in the newspaper and say "oh, that's too bad, but thank goodness we've been saved from a far worse paradox." As The Happy Humanist put it, your posit of this worse "paradox" that God prevented with the tsunami seems ad hoc--there is no motivation for the claim other than to rescue God as both all-powerful and all-good, which is just the issue at stake. If you could say what paradox was prevented, and how the tsunami prevented it, and how the paradox would be worse than drowning hundreds of thousands of innocents--then we'd be getting somewhere.

Let me ask this straightout. If you accept my insertions within those brackets of your 3-prong argument, do you accept that there is no contradiction?

I do not accept your insertions--you have not yet explained why you think I was equivocating, or indeed what those concepts on which you claim I was equivocating ("deterministic evil" versus "divine evil") are. I agree that if I was equivocating, then my argument was not good. Similarly I accept that if one of my premises is false, my argument is not good. But I have been given no reason to think that I am accidentally equivocating on 'evil', or that my premises are false. And so my argument stands as a good argument. You should eiher a) accept the conclusion or b) deny a premise or c) show that my argument is not valid (perhaps because it equivocates) or d) confess to believing inconsistently.

Your reductio is false if God is limited by paradox. It's as simple as that.

My argument is not sound (again, arguments are not "true" or "false") if premise (2) is false. Agreed. But it seems utterly plausible. You think God had to drown hundreds of thousands to prevent worse evil elsewhere in "paradox" form. In other words, you think even that evil was strictly necessary. In other words, you think premise (2) is false. You have stated this several times. But why do you think premise (2) is false?

If paradox is the major constraint God is working under, then solutions to paradox fall in a line of precedence. For example, the axioms are most important. The theorems immediately constructed from those axioms are of the most high precedence, and precedence is less for postulates, introduction of variables, etc. Our world is not as high of a precedent as the status of there being a beginning and an end, so the way in which our world is constructed is much more flexible, albeit evil is allowed to exist in order to protect the higher precedence (to save the World from paradox). In Christianity, such an example is that Jesus was allowed to be put to death by torture rather than give up on a higher precedence of God (namely, the salvation of humanity).

Oh boy. Harvey, can I safely neglect this as a highly speculative credo on your part, or are you going to claim later that this is a definitive argument of some kind that should persuade me of something?


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey Spetey,

Based on what grounds for differentiating types of evil?

• I notice you fail to say what the distinction is. Again I ask: what is the difference between "deterministic evil" and "divine evil"? On what grounds do you claim I mean one and then the other in my argument? As I have said, I think I just mean evil--bad things happening.

  I do not accept your insertions--you have not yet explained why you think I was equivocating, or indeed what those concepts on which you claim I was equivocating ("deterministic evil" versus "divine evil") are. I agree that if I was equivocating, then my argument was not good. Similarly I accept that if one of my premises is false, my argument is not good. But I have been given no reason to think that I am accidentally equivocating on 'evil', or that my premises are false. And so my argument stands as a good argument. You should eiher a) accept the conclusion or b) deny a premise or c) show that my argument is not valid (perhaps because it equivocates) or d) confess to believing inconsistently.

In what sense is God all-powerful?

• Of course morally there is a difference between one person being forced to open a dam gate and another who opens it just because she feels like it. Your point is ...? Do you want to say that God was like the person forced to open the gate? But then, in what sense is God all-powerful? I thought you wanted to say that God is like someone who had to open the dam gate in order to save some other, bigger town on the other side. (In other words, the evil of flooding the small town was necessary in order to minimize overall evil.)

  to be all-powerful is to be able to do anything possible. That is, if it's possible to have less total evil in the world, then an all-powerful being can arrange things so that there is less overall evil.

In what way does a paradox save the world from more evil than what is inflicted?

• it is not enough to suggest that a premise might be false in order to defeat an argument. You have to try to show the premise is false. The tsunami seems like a clear case of unnecessary evil. You say "maybe it had to happen to minimize some other evil." Okay, maybe it did. But this is not a reason to believe it did. Maybe Hitler did all he did in order to save us from powerful anti-Semitic aliens who were blackmailing us. But that mere possibility does not defeat an argument to the effect that Hitler was a bad person--right? You would actually have to give reason to think Hitler was in that position before I decided that Hitler was a hero after all. Similarly, you have to give good reason to believe that God drowned all those children in order for some greater good. It is not enough to say "maybe there was some paradox that God needed to prevent and that would be much worse."

  My argument is not sound (again, arguments are not "true" or "false") if premise (2) is false. Agreed. But it seems utterly plausible. You think God had to drown hundreds of thousands to prevent worse evil elsewhere in "paradox" form. In other words, you think even that evil was strictly necessary. In other words, you think premise (2) is false. You have stated this several times. But why do you think premise (2) is false?

  Look, I agree that by its nature, the universe cannot be inconsistent or paradoxical. You have yet to show why God stopping a simple tsunami on a tiny planet in God's universe would create some enormous paradox. You just assume it. If we humans managed to find a way to prevent tsunamis, would we have accidentally released some huge evil paradox on the world?

Does God have a choice not to create at all?

But, more than that, paradox aversion also provides a very simple explanation as to why there is something rather than nothing.

Harvey. First of all: why would it be paradoxical for there to be nothing? It seems pretty consistent to me.

Is strict determinism of evil a warranted belief by a theist?

• The deterministic evil is caused by the fact that existence is how it is.

  This is a good explanation for tsunami-like evil--but only atheists get to use it. A theist has to explain why existence is that way when it sure seems like God could have made it a lot better.

How much detail must be provided about "what we know not" in order to defeat the reductio?

• This is the old "mystery" response to evil. "We pitiful creatures just don't understand God's mysterious ways, and how truly wonderful it was of God to send us that tsunami. Our little brains cannot comprehend how kind God was to those victims by drowning them horribly." The question is: why think God had good reasons for the tsunami? The appeal to mystery is merely an appeal to faith.

So, here are the questions and answers to the above:

• Based on what grounds for differentiating types of evil?
• In what sense is God all-powerful?
• In what way does a paradox save the world from more evil than what is inflicted?
• Does God have a choice not to create at all?
• Is strict determinism of evil a warranted belief by a theist?
• How much detail must be provided about "what we know not" in order to defeat the reductio?

Based on what grounds for differentiating types of evil?

On the grounds that we need to be talking about the same thing or we won't understand each other. If you want to know why I consider your premise as invalid, then you have to understand that I don't accept your universal description of evil, especially when you suggest that God allows evil unnecessarily.

In what sense is God all-powerful?

Being all-powerful means to reach one's goals without anyone or anything being able to stop them. In terms of evil, it means allowing a minimum amount of deterministic necessary evil and still accomplish one's goals.

In what way does a paradox save the world from more evil than what is inflicted?

We've been arguing as to what is the standard by which a premise must be accepted or rejected. A premise is normally accepted if there is good reason to believe it, but in case of claims about things that actually exist (i.e., beyond a warranted belief), the burden falls on those making the claim. An antirealist would naturally reject all such claims since they would say that we can never meet the burden required for such ontological claims.

Otherwise, a whole bunch of people will be making a whole bunch of claims that might sound good (e.g., realism), but in fact they have not proved their claim by providing overwhelming evidence that their case is the only valid possibility. This is why I think your premise must be rejected. You have not provided enough strong evidence to disallow other possibilities. Just because you don't like those possibilities (e.g., avoiding paradoxes that save the world from more evil) does not mean that you have such overwhelming evidence.

Contrary to your view, you have not shown that paradox avoidance is not a feasible explanation as to why God could allow evil and still be all-powerful and all-good. If this were an epistemological issue, then I would say your burden of proof only has to be that we have good reason to believe such and such, but this is an ontological claim, and even assuming that humans can make such claims, such claims require at least some claim of knowledge about the subject at hand. Certainly you have nothing close here to "overwhelming evidence" against other possibilities. Actually, you have no evidence whatsoever other than a poor argument that assumes what cannot limit God, or what cannot cause evils in our world. Ignorance is no excuse to claim knowledge!

Does God have a choice not to create at all?

We don't know, however if God had a choice, God's choice must be compliant with any constraints that God's existence makes on the divine will. If God was in a position not to create anything to avoid evil, then this choice would have to be compliant with an all-good, all-powerful God. My personal view is that God does not have a choice in making a Universe, however God has a choice on what universe comprises that Universe. The choices of what universe is made is a balancing act that must ultimately satisfy the deterministic requirements that God's existence brings, so assuming God has choices, those choices are within a narrow path--the path that leads to success. This is just my view. Either case, choices or no choices, God would not make a universe unless the divine will was consistent with the existent issues of being all-good, and all-powerful.

Is strict determinism of evil a warranted belief by a theist?

A theist, in my view, must put the highest necessity of existence on the fact that God exists. All else, including the will of God, flow from this brute fact of the world. Theists and atheists agree that there is some brute fact about the World that makes it structured as it is. For many theists, that brute fact is that God is all-powerful and all-good. Deterministic evil comes into play as a result of this fact. However, this is brute fact. The non-brute fact is that God has choices on how to conquer the evil in a manner that overthrows deterministic evil. The manner that God choose to end deterministic evil means that evil will still take place (i.e., because deterministic evil exists), however that evil is finally put down in a manner that conforms to an all-good, all-powerful God. So, yes, theists can claim that strict determinism of evil as a valid belief just so long as it is something that God did not cause more than there had to be due to some necessary constraints (due to God's existence).

How much detail must be provided about "what we know not" in order to defeat the reductio?

Again, since your reductio is making a very, very strong claim about things we really know not, then that argument must be strong enough to rule out other possibilities (or at least rule out enough so that we can't really consider those possibilities as reasonable). In your reductio you have assumed that divinely necessary evil is the same as deterministic necessary evil, and the only basis of making that assumption is that it sounds right to you. I don't have to provide all that much detail about more stuff we know not since all I have to show is that in principle it is easily possible that deterministic necessary evil can bring about tragedies such as tsunamies. I showed that with the least action principle, and that was just using it as an example, or what-if. You didn't have a response for the least action principle in which I cannot make a suitable reply. Hence, your assumption that deterministic necessary evil cannot exist for God is a very poor assumption and one in which you haven't provided sufficient proof.

[Overcomer]

God has destroyed evil already. He did so at the cross of Jesus Christ. It's important to know that God exists outside of time and space. Everything is NOW to him. So he has already dealt successfully with evil. Christ defeated sin, death, the devil and evil through his death and resurrection. However, the annhilation of those things has to be lived out in real time.

Let me put it another way. When Christ came, he reported that the Kingdom of God had come. The thing is, the kingdom of God has an "already-but-not-yet" quality. It was initiated with the coming of Christ to earth and therefore can be enjoyed in part right now. It will be fulfilled fully at his Second Coming.

Christians who have a personal relationship with Jesus and are filled with the Holy Spirit have the ability to experience that victory over evil right now in their lives. And the good news is that anybody can have a personal relationship with Jesus and enjoy that victory by going to him and sincerely asking him into his or her life.

[spetey]

Harvey, we obviously need to look at the dialectic of the argument some more. Let me show you once again the argument from the problem of evil:

1. Premise: If an all-good, all-powerful entity exists, there is no unnecessary evil (the amount of pain, suffering etc. in existence is absolutely minimal, as small an amount as is possible).
2. Premise: There is unnecessary evil--the amount of pain, suffering etc. is not absolutely minimal. (Children die horribly in tsunamis and such.)
3. Conclusion: Therefore there is no all-good, all-powerful entity.

This is not an "ontological" proof--it does not try to prove the existence of something. Even if it counts as "ontological" because it tries to show something doesn't exist, that doesn't imply some extra special burdens. This argument is also not of the formal reductio ad absurdum format. And there are no "cases" for proving or disproving. And it is never enough to defeat an argument to suggest that a premise might be wrong. That's just not how arguments work. Otherwise you could defeat any argument (with merely contingent premises) by saying "but the premise might be false! Ah-ha, I have defeated you!"

So first important question, which I'll ask again: do you agree this argument is valid in the formal sense--that is, do you agree that if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true?

If so, you have to give active reason to reject one of the premises, or else accept the conclusion. Compare this argument:

1. If you are a good person, you do not want to kill all Jews.
2. Hitler wanted to kill all Jews.
3. Therefore, Hitler was not a good person.

Here I try to establish that Hitler was not a good person. Now it's possible that (2) false. It's possible that Hitler was framed, that Hitler actually loved the Jews, and he was forced to order their death by some unknown power behind him (like perhaps powerful anti-Semitic space aliens). But this mere possibility does not defeat the argument, right? Put it this way: now that I've pointed out this mere possibility, without giving any reason to think it's true, do you think Hitler must have been a good guy after all?

This is the second important question: do you agree for the Hitler argument that merely suggesting the second premise might be false is not enough to defeat the argument?

Similarly, the mere possibility that God drowned hundreds of thousands in order to prevent something worse is not enough to defeat my argument. You have to give reason to think that the tsunami prevented something worse, and in general you must give reason to think that the amount of bad things in this world is absolutely minimal, despite all appearances. That is what I'm waiting to hear. I know you think some horrible paradox would have taken place, had God prevented the tsunami. But why do you think this? Again I ask: do you think we humans should stop earthquake-prevention research, because we might commit a similar horrible paradox if we managed to prevent an earthquake ourselves?


spetey

[hannahjoy]

spetey wrote:

Of course that's an option. But of course racists, for example, have the same option. We could give them reasons not to be racist, and they could just "reject them and go on [their] way", continuing to vote in a dangerous way, without giving reasons for their position. But of course I think that just dismissing an argument without reasoned response like that is a bad thing to do.

It's not always the best thing to do to give reasons for a position to someone attacking it. It's often a complete waste of time.

And I think the laws should be based on (many of) my beliefs because I can give good reasons for (many of) them. I think they should not be based on positions that don't withstand the test of reason.

And I think the laws should be based on (many of) my beliefs because I can give good reasons for (many of) them. The problem is, reason is not the objective guide many people seem to think it is.

So why was that tsunami, in particular, necessary, given the existence of human sin? It seems totally unrelated.

The reasons would vary from person to person. For some it was a judgement because they had rejected God long enough; for others it was a merciful deliverance, for those who survived it was no doubt meant to teach them certain things (again depending on the individual needs). I don't know all the reasons, anymore than I know all the people who died, but they all go back to the presence of sin in the world.

My point is, your argument rests on the assumption that unnecessary evil exists. I maintain that it doesn't.

The Happy Humanist wrote:

I could lead an exemplary life, I could feed more hungry than Mother Teresa, I could resist all temptation to do evil.

You haven't and you couldn't. That's what you need to be concerned about.

Neither could Adam and Eve. That's what I'm concerned about.

They could, they didn't.

God creates imperfect beings, then punishes them for their imperfections.

This has been repeated ad nauseam, and it's as false now as it was the first time.

Not quite the same. If my beliefs were to take hold, none of those people would be deprived of their chance at salvation. All would be allowed to worship as they choose (as long as they don't interfere with others' right not to worship). The lack of state-sponsored prayer in school, or allowing gay marriage, for example, would not affect your relationship with Christ one whit. Oh, did you think I wanted the government to become actively atheistic and officially outlaw religion or something?

No, just that you would legalize sin, which would in time bring the wrath of a holy God on this nation. And religion could be outlawed practically without it ever being official.

I won't push you on the slavery issue, I can understand where you might be reticent to discuss it, especially if your answers don't accord with popular opinion...but you can't decline the invitation and then claim victory anyway.

I'm not claiming victory, I'm refusing to surrender. You're trying to get me to admit that humanity has come to perceive a moral truth God was blind to, by bringing up slavery. It's not going to work.

At least, you hope he can...after all, if your conscience is flawed, your perception of God as the Good Guy may be flawed as well...

I don't use my conscience to determine truth.

The default position is not non-existence - God's existence can be observed in nature if you have the eyes to see it.

Unfortunately he appears to have withheld this special vision from certain of us.

No, He hasn't. The only thing keeping you from seeing is your own unwillingness.

...which, of course, you have determined by looking directly into my heart and my experience, like only God's supposed to be able to do, right? You have no clue how willing and open I am, or have been in the past.

Well, I know that "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." Since I can't believe you and God, I'll chose God.

Hannah Joy