Do You Apply Your Epistemology Consistently?

[bluegreenearth]

Whenever I evaluate apologetic arguments, I'm compelled to wonder if these apologists consistently apply their epistemology to other claims. Usually, the apologists I encounter dodge the challenge of applying their epistemology consistently. Instead, I'm offered appeals to special pleading for why they are justified in accepting a positive result of a particular epistemology when it has been applied to a desirable theistic claim but also justified in rejecting an equally positive result from that same epistemology when it has been applied to an unfavorable or competing claim.

For example, some Christians commonly refer to an epistemology which justifies the application of faith in Holy Scriptures and sensory experiences they interpret to be divine revelation from the Holy Spirit as a reliable mechanism for obtaining knowledge of Gods existence and his requirements for humanity. At the same time, the identical or nearly identical epistemology underlies theological claims from other competing religious traditions which are not only incompatible with Christianity but each other as well. This inconsistency is not necessarily a problem for theism in general, but most religious traditions are inherently dogmatic and unwilling to embrace external theological claims.

When confronted with this dilemma, many theists modify or transfer their epistemology grounded on faith to an epistemology grounded on something like emotional appeal or personal experience which may help distinguish their preferred theology from other less desirable theologies, but these epistemological approaches are equally unreliable. For instance, Christians will often say things like, I know Jesus Christ exists as my one true Lord and Savior because I have a personal relationship with him. or I know Christianity is true because Ive experienced positive changes since surrendering my life to the will of God. Meanwhile, nothing prohibits loyal followers of competing religious traditions from using the identical epistemology to distinguish and justify their own theological beliefs.

In more intellectual circles, many theists will modify their epistemology to resemble a scientific or historiographic methodology as a strategy for maintaining confidence in a religious belief. Nevertheless, those intellectually motivated epistemological modifications usually fail at permanently resolving the initial problem of producing positive results that also serve in supporting the interests of unfavorable or competing claims. At the same time none of those strategies successfully mitigate for confirmation bias and may actually depend upon it to achieve the theist's desired goal unlike an epistemology that is actually grounded in a scientific or historiographic methodology.

In all fairness, theists are not prohibited from utilizing a fluid epistemology in that way to justify their beliefs among themselves. If the goal is to reinforce a preferred belief, then adopting the most favorable epistemology or swapping back and forth between multiple epistemologies will serve to achieve that goal regardless of whether or not it corresponds with reality. Furthermore, when changing the epistemic rules at any convenient moment is acceptable or unnoticeable, it becomes relatively easy for apologists to justify theological claims to themselves and other people who already harbor a strong emotional attachment to their shared beliefs. However, it should be noted that every religious tradition retains the same ability to modify their epistemology at will in order to justify and reinforce a preferred theology. More importantly, there is no reason to expect a non-believer to operate under such an unstable and unreliable epistemological model which fails to mitigate for confirmation bias and produces a knowledge base that is inconsistent with or contradictory to the reality they experience.

Questions for consideration and debate:

What is the justification for failing to consistently apply an established epistemology?

How reliable is an epistemology that serves to support multiple competing or contradictory beliefs?

[William]

William: I don't claim to know if we do or do not live within a creation. I accept the logical possibility of either position.

So - now that this is stated, we can say we are "on the same page" and being from there?

Under the presumption that we are correctly understanding each other's perspective on this particular point, I'll agree to consider us as being on the same "agnostic" page. However, I always reserve the right to be smarter later if my presumption is subsequently falsified.

William: So, do we resume from where we left off in our discussion?

[bluegreenearth]

William: So, do we resume from where we left off in our discussion?

The most recent part of our discussion that was directly relevant to the topic of this thread was when I inquired about your epistemology and if you apply it consistently to all claims. It would help me if you would demonstrate how your epistemology can be applied to multiple claims by describing a couple of examples.

[William]

William: So, do we resume from where we left off in our discussion?

The most recent part of our discussion that was directly relevant to the topic of this thread was when I inquired about your epistemology and if you apply it consistently to all claims. It would help me if you would demonstrate how your epistemology can be applied to multiple claims by describing a couple of examples.

William: What is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

What multiple claims are you referring to?

[bluegreenearth]

William: What is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

What multiple claims are you referring to?

You can find a summary of my epistemology here: Epistemology
It is the same epistemology I use to evaluate all claims. Whether a claim is mundane or extraordinary, I only have one epistemology to help me determine if the claim is true, false, or unknowable.

[William]

William: What is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

What multiple claims are you referring to?

You can find a summary of my epistemology here: Epistemology
It is the same epistemology I use to evaluate all claims. Whether a claim is mundane or extraordinary, I only have one epistemology to help me determine if the claim is true, false, or unknowable.

William: Just assume that I do not understand that long post. Are you able to succinctly explain what is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

When you use your epistemology, does the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation show you - with any clarity - that it is a true subject, a false subject, or unknowable subject?

Why have you chosen to make a category of "unknowable" rather than "unknown"?

Do you consider the idea of we existing in a Reality Simulation to be a 'claim'?

[bluegreenearth]

William: Just assume that I do not understand that long post. Are you able to succinctly explain what is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

When you use your epistemology, does the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation show you - with any clarity - that it is a true subject, a false subject, or unknowable subject?

Why have you chosen to make a category of "unknowable" rather than "unknown"?

Do you consider the idea of we existing in a Reality Simulation to be a 'claim'?

I'll respond to the question about the category of "unknowable" first because that explanation is needed before I can respond to your other inquiries. There is a category of "unknown" we can attribute to claims that are not currently known as being true or false. However, for a subset of those claims, the kind of evidence required for us to know if they are true or false is not potentially or reasonably obtainable. I would categorize those claims as "unknowable," at least within the context of the current reality we are experiencing. The reason the category of "unknown" was excluded from my previous post is because the category of "unknowable" seemed more appropriate for that discussion.

To answer your last question, the "idea" of existing within a Reality Simulation is just an idea until the moment I apply my epistemology to it. At that point, it becomes a claim I'm evaluating in order to determine if it is true, false, unknown, or unknowable.

When my epistemology is applied to the Reality Simulation claim, I discover that the kind of evidence needed to determine if it is true or false is logically impossible to obtain from within the currently reality I am experiencing. As such, I categorize the claim as being unknowable.

[William]

William: Just assume that I do not understand that long post. Are you able to succinctly explain what is your epistemology on the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation?

When you use your epistemology, does the subject of we existing in a Reality Simulation show you - with any clarity - that it is a true subject, a false subject, or unknowable subject?

Why have you chosen to make a category of "unknowable" rather than "unknown"?

Do you consider the idea of we existing in a Reality Simulation to be a 'claim'?

I'll respond to the question about the category of "unknowable" first because that explanation is needed before I can respond to your other inquiries. There is a category of "unknown" we can attribute to claims that are not currently known as being true or false. However, for a subset of those claims, the kind of evidence required for us to know if they are true or false is not potentially or reasonably obtainable. I would categorize those claims as "unknowable," at least within the context of the current reality we are experiencing. The reason the category of "unknown" was excluded from my previous post is because the category of "unknowable" seemed more appropriate for that discussion.

To answer your last question, the "idea" of existing within a Reality Simulation is just an idea until the moment I apply my epistemology to it. At that point, it becomes a claim I'm evaluating in order to determine if it is true, false, unknown, or unknowable.

When my epistemology is applied to the Reality Simulation claim, I discover that the kind of evidence needed to determine if it is true or false is logically impossible to obtain from within the currently reality I am experiencing. As such, I categorize the claim as being unknowable.

William: Does your system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

Is there any evidence for us NOT existing within a Reality Simulation that you can point to?

If not, then how do you decide - using your current epistemology - on the best way to look at your existence, being that you do not have access to alternate experience and that one day your body will die?

Do you study things to do with claims of alternate experiences (OOBEs etc) or simply put these in the "unknowable" category and not investigate at all?

[bluegreenearth]

William: Does your system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

I don't understand your question. Please elaborate.

Is there any evidence for us NOT existing within a Reality Simulation that you can point to?

The expectation that I should have to answer such a question seems a lot like an attempt to shift the burden of proof. However, I'll play along in the interest of discovering if my suspicion is correct. I am unaware of any evidence that would be sufficient to demonstrate that we are NOT existing within a Reality Simulation.

If not, then how do you decide - using your current epistemology - on the best way to look at your existence, being that you do not have access to alternate experience and that one day your body will die?

I'm not sure I completely understand what you are asking but will try my best to supply an answer. I don't have to decide on the best way to look at my existence because there appears to be only one option.

Primarily, there is firsthand experience of the self. I can know that I am a sentient being who experiences a continuous flow of information from what appears to be an external world. I cant be absolutely certain that the world my mind perceives as an external reality is or is not a Reality Simulation. However, I can know it is true that Im experiencing sensory input regardless of its source. This type of knowledge is called personal knowledge.

Procedural knowledge refers to an understanding of how to perform a task. I can declare that the proposition, I know how to ride a bike, is true even if I dont know the external world in which I experience myself riding a bike is a Reality Simulation or not. This is because the knowledge claim is about my ability to consistently accomplish a specified action within the boundaries of my sensory experiences. Conversely, the proposition would not be true if the objective consequence of taking the action of riding a bike resulted in a sensory experience of me falling off the contraption on every attempt. Most claims about procedural knowledge made by theists are usually demonstrably true. For example, knowing how to pray is an example of procedural knowledge that is easily demonstrated by simply performing the action for which the term pray describes. On the other hand, claiming to know how to cure cancer using only prayer would refer to a procedure that has never provided consistently demonstrable results within the reality we experience. In that case, the claim does not meet the criteria for being labeled as procedural knowledge and would be disputable.

Propositional knowledge refers to consistent descriptive claims about my understanding of the realty I experience. It is merely practical that I label those types of statements as "knowledge." Otherwise, I could never propose to understand anything outside the reality of my own concept of self. Consider the synthetic proposition, Trees are growing in the park. I can say I know trees exist and a park exists within the reality I experience even if I cant be absolutely certain that I do or don't exist within a Reality Simulation. This is because the sensory input Ive labeled as park always corresponds with the sensory input Ive labeled as trees." If Im located somewhere other than the park when claiming to know trees exist there, someone might argue that I couldnt know if this claim is absolutely true because it is possible for all the trees in the park to have been destroyed or removed since my previous visit. The objection argues that I cannot be absolutely certain if the trees continue to exist in the park after Im no longer there to observe them. Nevertheless, there is a mechanism by which I can determine the truth of the proposition. If the proposition is true, then the predicted objective consequence of taking the action to visit the park will manifest as the observation of trees upon my arrival. If I arrive at the park to discover all the trees had been destroyed or removed, then the proposition will be reclassified as false.

Meanwhile, I am prohibited from claiming to know undetectable elves live in the parks trees because they would be, by definition, undetectable. In other words, the claim would be unjustified even if undetectable elves do live in the park's trees. Having no means by which to demonstrate the existence of undetectable elves, they could not be reasonably included in my understanding of trees or the park. Another way to understand this problem is to recognize where undetectable elves are indistinguishable from nonexistent elves. As such, I could not claim to know undetectable elves live in the parks trees.

Do you study things to do with claims of alternate experiences (OOBEs etc) or simply put these in the "unknowable" category and not investigate at all?

I would have to apply my epistemology to a claim in order to determine if is unknowable. So, yes, I have investigated and continue to investigate many of those claims.

[William]

William: Does your system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

I don't understand your question. Please elaborate.

William: If you don't claim to know if we do or do not live within a creation and accept the logical possibility of either position, then does your epistemology system allow for evidence which can be taken either way as being therefore "unknowable" equally?

[William]

Is there any evidence for us NOT existing within a Reality Simulation that you can point to?

The expectation that I should have to answer such a question seems a lot like an attempt to shift the burden of proof. However, I'll play along in the interest of discovering if my suspicion is correct. I am unaware of any evidence that would be sufficient to demonstrate that we are NOT existing within a Reality Simulation.

William: Be aware I am still trying to understand whether your particular Epistemology is consistent. My question and your answer help.

Your answer is as it should be given you have declared that you don't claim to know if we do or do not live within a creation and accept the logical possibility of either position.

If there was evidence for us NOT existing within a Reality Simulation, you would have answered differently.