Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence

[Goose]

The following mantra is often repeated in regards to the miracles of Jesus, in particular the resurrection of Jesus:

But, it is also true that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence [ECREE].

It seems to me, regarding events from ancient history, the proposition ECREE is meaningless without qualifying and quantifying what constitutes extraordinary evidence. I'm inclined to think it is a convenient way to put the goal posts on wheels.

First question: Is the proposition: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence true or false?

Second question: What constitutes extraordinary evidence for ancient history?

[Goat]

Now, extraordinary evidence means it can be verified repeatedly, by multiple methods.

What methods?

..For historical items, there is forensic evidence...

I would say for historical claims, there is archelogical evidence, and I think for some claims, we have to show that in principle it is feasible.

Can you clarify this. Are you saying forensic evidence is extraordinary and so is archelogical evidence?

You seem to do everything but present that evidence.

And you seem to do everything but stay on topic.

Those are the methods that can be used.. Evidence must be verifiable to be extrodinary?

What evidence do you have that is verifiable?

[McCulloch]

You are right. I should have said credible evidence. What scant evidence there is is biased.

I should have used 'credible' instead of extraordinary, which we see is somewhat undefinable.

The whole point of the matter is that the more unusual the claim, the greater the requirement for supporting evidence. Can we agree thus far?

Then following Hume, the evidence to support a miracle should be such that to deny that evidence would involve an even greater miracle than to accept it.

[TheOneAndOnly]

First question: Is the proposition: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence true or false?

True. See Humes Maxim:

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish...

I'm not sure how Hume's maxim makes the proposition true. Let's break Hume's maxim down and look at it logically. The falsehood of the testimony supporting a miracle claim will NEVER be more miraculous than the claim itself as the falsehood of the evidence that supports a miracle will by necessity not be or not appear miraculous. Hume has created an impossible standard that can't be met even in principle.

You are correct. Something is wrong here. I wonder what it might be?

Let me explain with an example:

Let P = A dead person returned to life.
Evidence for P is X: Person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X):It is not true that person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Let P = A bird with no wings flew.
Evidence for P is X: A bird with no wings was observed flying.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X): It is not true that a bird with no wings was observed flying.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Hume's standard, even in principle, can't show a miracle to be possible and is thus as meaningless as ECREE.

You are right and you are wrong. Yes, Humes standard cannot show a miracle to be possible. You have not, however, demostrated how his standard is wrong. You have simply stated that you disagree with it leaving out the possibility of miracles. Your response has not been proven to be a matter of fact. If anything, your response shows human bias, the exact thing science was designed to combat against. Please demonstrate how his standard is incorrect. Your equations above have only confirmed that they were correct so far.

The question I would ask Hume, and you, is why wouldn't you accept the BEST explanation whether it be natural or supernatural. If one rejects a supernatural explanation, even though it is the BEST explanation, on the basis it is a miracle then one rejects the explanation a priori because it is a miracle and is engaging in circular reasoning.

Again, you show human bias, not scientific method. The scientific method cares not for human biases.
Determining the Best Explanation is done through the scientific method, not human bias.

To say that Humes Maxim is wrong, you must demonstrate it. Please show a real event from this century alone that proves Humes Maxim wrong. It has to be an event that was investigated and documented, not possible folklore or a hypothetical.

[Goose]

Now, extraordinary evidence means it can be verified repeatedly, by multiple methods.

What methods?

..For historical items, there is forensic evidence...

I would say for historical claims, there is archelogical evidence, and I think for some claims, we have to show that in principle it is feasible.

Can you clarify this. Are you saying forensic evidence is extraordinary and so is archaeological evidence?

You seem to do everything but present that evidence.

And you seem to do everything but stay on topic.

Those are the methods that can be used.. Evidence must be verifiable to be extraordinary?

Can we clarify this a bit? I'm trying to understand here. Only evidence that can be verified by archaeological evidence is considered extraordinary. Is that right?

[Goose]

First question: Is the proposition: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence true or false?

True. See Humes Maxim:

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish...

I'm not sure how Hume's maxim makes the proposition true. Let's break Hume's maxim down and look at it logically. The falsehood of the testimony supporting a miracle claim will NEVER be more miraculous than the claim itself as the falsehood of the evidence that supports a miracle will by necessity not be or not appear miraculous. Hume has created an impossible standard that can't be met even in principle.

You are correct. Something is wrong here. I wonder what it might be?

What's wrong is that Hume's maxim is fallacious.

Further, Hume's maxim is nothing more than his personal standard for miracles. It does not show that it is true extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. You have yet to prove this proposition true, which is something you have asserted to be true.

Let me explain with an example:

Let P = A dead person returned to life.
Evidence for P is X: Person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X):It is not true that person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Let P = A bird with no wings flew.
Evidence for P is X: A bird with no wings was observed flying.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X): It is not true that a bird with no wings was observed flying.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Hume has created an impossible standard that can't be met even in principle. It is a standard that if applied will NEVER allow a miracle and thus demonstrates his bias. He has began under the assumption that miracles are improbable then constructed a standard to ensure that a miracle can never be proven. Don't you see the fallacious reasoning here?

Let me ask this. Are miracles at least possible? If they are possible why would Hume construct a personal standard to ensure they can never be proven?

Hume's standard, even in principle, can't show a miracle to be possible and is thus as meaningless as ECREE.

You are right and you are wrong.

I can not be both right and wrong at the same time in the same sense.

Yes, Humes standard cannot show a miracle to be possible.

Thank you. Thus it is fallacious as it shows a bias against the supernatural and is circular.

You have simply stated that you disagree with it leaving out the possibility of miracles.

I've done much more than that.

If anything, your response shows human bias, the exact thing science was designed to combat against.

That's ironic considering Hume's standard is hardly scientific.

The question I would ask Hume, and you, is why wouldn't you accept the BEST explanation whether it be natural or supernatural. If one rejects a supernatural explanation, even though it is the BEST explanation, on the basis it is a miracle then one rejects the explanation a priori because it is a miracle and is engaging in circular reasoning.

Again, you show human bias, not scientific method. The scientific method cares not for human biases.
Determining the Best Explanation is done through the scientific method, not human bias.

You haven't answered the question.

To say that Humes Maxim is wrong, you must demonstrate it. Please show a real event from this century alone that proves Humes Maxim wrong. It has to be an event that was investigated and documented, not possible folklore or a hypothetical.

Actually, you need to show how Hume's maxim could at least in principle be met. Without this it is useless unless one is looking for an impossible standard to hide behind to ensure that a miracle can never reach a burden of proof. Is that what you are looking for?


BTW, still waiting for you to qualify what constitutes extraordinary evidence.

[TheOneAndOnly]

First question: Is the proposition: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence true or false?

True. See Humes Maxim:

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish...

I'm not sure how Hume's maxim makes the proposition true. Let's break Hume's maxim down and look at it logically. The falsehood of the testimony supporting a miracle claim will NEVER be more miraculous than the claim itself as the falsehood of the evidence that supports a miracle will by necessity not be or not appear miraculous. Hume has created an impossible standard that can't be met even in principle.

You are correct. Something is wrong here. I wonder what it might be?

What's wrong is that Hume's maxim is fallacious.

"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation....

The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish....' When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence."

-David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

There is nothing fallacious about his argument. IMO, his argument does not eliminate the possibility of miracles or the supernatural, but makes it increasingly difficult to fraudulently claim such an occurance.

It is easy to fake a miracle, while it is very difficult to prove one. With Humes standard, it makes both similarly difficult, and evens things out. Either way, the latter would be difficult nevertheless. Hume does not eliminate miracles, he helps eliminate fraudulent claims of miracles.

Further, Hume's maxim is nothing more than his personal standard for miracles. It does not show that it is true extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. You have yet to prove this proposition true, which is something you have asserted to be true.

Your opinion is noted. Whether there is any personal bias by Hume, his standard has, AFAIK, stood unchallenged for over 200 years.
I brought Humes Maxim into this, because it is alleged that it was the precursor to the ECREE quote.

A miracle is the suspension or contradiction of the laws of nature. To prove such has occurred, evidence must not only account for how the abhorent event occurred, but must also explain how it suspended or contradicted the laws of nature. That is extraordinary evidence.
Anything less is substandard, and open to human interpretation and bias.

A perpetual motion machine would negate the laws of nature, and would require extraordinary evidence to explain its behavior, and how it operates. ECREE is not only meant for any miracle or supernatural event, but for anything that is unknown to us. It not only lowers the possibility of false claims, but also helps get to the truth of the unknown. It not only helps weed out human error and bias, but helps keep one on focus when trying to investigate real occurances.

Let me explain with an example:

Let P = A dead person returned to life.
Evidence for P is X: Person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X):It is not true that person B was pronounced dead by medical professionals and subsequently returned to life.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Let P = A bird with no wings flew.
Evidence for P is X: A bird with no wings was observed flying.
For P to be established by Hume's reasoning we must show the falsehood of X to be more miraculous than P.
~(X): It is not true that a bird with no wings was observed flying.

And what is wrong with this answer?

Hume has created an impossible standard that can't be met even in principle. It is a standard that if applied will NEVER allow a miracle and thus demonstrates his bias. He has began under the assumption that miracles are improbable then constructed a standard to ensure that a miracle can never be proven. Don't you see the fallacious reasoning here?[/quote]

Let me ask this. Are miracles at least possible? If they are possible why would Hume construct a personal standard to ensure they can never be proven?

Hume's standard, even in principle, can't show a miracle to be possible and is thus as meaningless as ECREE.

You are right and you are wrong.

I can not be both right and wrong at the same time in the same sense.

Yes, Humes standard cannot show a miracle to be possible.

Thank you. Thus it is fallacious as it shows a bias against the supernatural and is circular.

You have simply stated that you disagree with it leaving out the possibility of miracles.

I've done much more than that.

If anything, your response shows human bias, the exact thing science was designed to combat against.

That's ironic considering Hume's standard is hardly scientific.

The question I would ask Hume, and you, is why wouldn't you accept the BEST explanation whether it be natural or supernatural. If one rejects a supernatural explanation, even though it is the BEST explanation, on the basis it is a miracle then one rejects the explanation a priori because it is a miracle and is engaging in circular reasoning.

Again, you show human bias, not scientific method. The scientific method cares not for human biases.
Determining the Best Explanation is done through the scientific method, not human bias.

You haven't answered the question.

To say that Humes Maxim is wrong, you must demonstrate it. Please show a real event from this century alone that proves Humes Maxim wrong. It has to be an event that was investigated and documented, not possible folklore or a hypothetical.

Actually, you need to show how Hume's maxim could at least in principle be met. Without this it is useless unless one is looking for an impossible standard to hide behind to ensure that a miracle can never reach a burden of proof. Is that what you are looking for?


BTW, still waiting for you to qualify what constitutes extraordinary evidence.[/quote]

I feel that if we can sort out the first question, that the answer for the second question may present itself more easily. If not, then we can get to that later. Talking about both simply confuses the issue.

Keep yer britches on

[williamryan]

The slogan extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is misleading and, given a potential use of the phrase, it is false. Any claim, regardless of how improbable it is, requires adequate evidence. For any highly improbable event, all it takes to establish the event is sufficient evidence. The question, then, is simply determining what amounts to sufficient evidence.

If a highly improbable event requires extraordinary evidence in order to be justifiably believed, theres all sorts of beliefs we (generally take to) justifiably hold that would be unjustified when held to the extraordinary-evidence requirement. For example, take the belief that John Smith won the lottery last night. While its very likely that someone will win the lottery, it is extraordinarily improbable that this specific person, John Smith, will win the lottery. Thus, on the slogan quoted above, when we see on the evening news that John Smith won the lottery, we cant justifiably believe that claim. Wed need some piece of evidence far greater than the news story to justifiably (i.e. rationally) believe the claim. And yet, we generally think that were rational to believe that John Smith did, in fact, win the lottery. So what gives here? Were justified in believe that John Smith won the lottery because there was sufficient evidence to show that. We didnt need extraordinary evidence for this extraordinary event. The evidence of the news story is generally sufficient.

Therefore, what the lottery story shows is that the slogan is false depending on what the speaker means by the slogan. If the speaker means, All extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, then the lottery example falsifies the claim. If, however, the speaker means Some extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, then, if the claim is to be unambiguous, the speaker needs to explain: (i) what counts as an extraordinary claim; (ii) and what distinguishes a non-extraordinary claim from an extraordinary claim; and (iii) whether any evidence, in principle, can ever establish the plausibility of an extraordinary claim so defined.

[Furrowed Brow]

The slogan extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is misleading and, given a potential use of the phrase, it is false. Any claim, regardless of how improbable it is, requires adequate evidence. For any highly improbable event, all it takes to establish the event is sufficient evidence. The question, then, is simply determining what amounts to sufficient evidence.

This bit was spot on.....then you go all wobbly.

If the speaker means, All extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, then the lottery example falsifies the claim.

Dare I suggest you are purveying a muddle. News reports lottery win because it is new worthy. However that someone won the lottery (accepting rollovers) is just about certain. To accept John Smith won the lottery is to accept the new broadcaster have got their facts right. If we believe John Smith is the winner it is not founded on the improbability of John Smith being the winner. We know (given our background assumptions regarding the lottery) that there will be a winner and we can be pretty certain about this.so we have to decide whether the news have told us the truth. It is not so extraordinary to think that they might. But if we are of a mind to think the news have lied then we might as well as reject the idea that the lottery is a real event. It really depends how your opinions of news, government, society etc. stack up. But it really has nothing to with gambling odds.

[williamryan]

Furrowed Brow wrote:

Dare I suggest you are purveying a muddle. News reports lottery win because it is new worthy. However that someone won the lottery (accepting rollovers) is just about certain. To accept John Smith won the lottery is to accept the new broadcaster have got their facts right. If we believe John Smith is the winner it is not founded on the improbability of John Smith being the winner. We know (given our background assumptions regarding the lottery) that there will be a winner and we can be pretty certain about this.so we have to decide whether the news have told us the truth. It is not so extraordinary to think that they might. But if we are of a mind to think the news have lied then we might as well as reject the idea that the lottery is a real event. It really depends how your opinions of news, government, society etc. stack up. But it really has nothing to with gambling odds.

Thank you for your response. Before responding to your post, I should note the nature of your objection to my argument. I argued that we only need adequate evidence to establish the probability of the occurrence of some highly improbable event. To illustrate that, I gave an example of a specific person, John Smith, winning the lottery. Your post doesnt object to my conclusion, which was that we only need adequate evidence for highly improbable events. Instead, you argue that my example doesnt amount to a highly improbable event. In short, your post doesnt show my conclusion is false. Instead, it tries to undermine the justification for the conclusion.

Turning to your post, then, what exactly is your objection to my illustration? Ill go line-by-line in your response to see whether your argument is.

News reports lottery win because it is new worthy.

This goes to why the news ran the story, and thus, to the broadcasting organizations motivations. Im not interested in this, and the broadcasting organizations motivations arent relevant to the example.

However that someone won the lottery (accepting rollovers) is just about certain.

I agree. In fact, I specifically said this in my post. My example isnt based on the mere fact that someone won. Its based on the fact that this specific person won.

To accept John Smith won the lottery is to accept the new broadcaster have got their facts right.

I agree, with a slight qualification. To accept the news report as providing sufficient evidence for the proposition that John Smith won the lottery is to believe that the news report makes the proposition more probable than its negation. We dont need 100% certainty here.

If we believe John Smith is the winner it is not founded on the improbability of John Smith being the winner.

Taken by itself, Im not sure what you mean by this sentence. The rational justification for a given proposition is never founded on the improbability of the proposition itself. Instead, the justification is founded on whether the new evidence (i.e. the news report) when combined with what we know about the world (i.e. our background knowledge) makes the proposition probable. This is basic confirmation theory, which is one of the two basic inductive methods of science.

We know (given our background assumptions regarding the lottery) that there will be a winner and we can be pretty certain about this.so we have to decide whether the news have told us the truth. It is not so extraordinary to think that they might. But if we are of a mind to think the news have lied then we might as well as reject the idea that the lottery is a real event. It really depends how your opinions of news, government, society etc. stack up. But it really has nothing to with gambling odds.

[/quote]

I think this final quote is the kernal of your argument and it shows that were not on the same page. In my example, I assumed that most of us are rational to accept the news report as sufficient evidence to justify our new believe that John Smith won the lottery. Your response is that if we think the news report may have lied, then we will probably reject the idea that the lottery is a real event. Theres three problems with this argument as is it stands. First, its tautological. Youre counter-argument is that if we inclined (for whatever reason) to think the news organization didnt tell the truth, then were inclined to think that the news report is not truthful. Well, of course thats true. If we think that, then of course, the news report isnt a reliable source, and the support it lends to the hypothesis is reduced or eliminated. But that wasnt the example I used. My example assumed a generally reliable source. Second, its conclusion isnt supported. Youre assumption (i.e. that we might think the news organization lied about John Smith winning) doesnt led to the conclusion that we reject idea that the lottery is a real event. Logically, wed only reject the idea that John Smith is the winner, or that there was a winner. I cant see how wed reject that a lottery even took place.

In summary, your response doesnt show my conclusion is false. Instead, it attempts to undercut the example I used to illustrate my conclusion. But the arguments you used to undercut the illustration are either tautological, invalid, or both. Therefore, both the truth of the conclusion and the applicability of the illustration remain. Further, nothing rests on the applicability of this specific illustration. Its simply an aid to my conclusion. Heres three more examples. First, take a card game. Any set of cards youve been dealt is highly improbable. Or zoom out, and take second example, it is even more highly improbable that youd have been dealt this set of cards immediately after the previous set of cards. But surely youre rationale in believing that you really do have the current set of cards, and further, that the previous set of cards consisted of such-and-such. In each a case, its based on either your own sense perception (i.e. you see the cards in your hand in the case of the present, or memory in the case of the previous hand) or the testimony of others (i.e. you ask your friends what hand you previously had etc). Are these two instances extraordinary evidence? No, they are sufficient evidence of a common type (i.e. sense perception and testimony).

For a third example, assume theres a large tumbler full of 1,000 ping-pong balls. 99 are black, but 1 is white. A host will withdraw a single ball. There are three different probabilities here: (1) the probability that any ball at all will be retrieved is near certain (b/c the host will retrieve it); (2) the probability that a specific ball will be retrieved is both (i) even [1 in 1,000] and (ii) more less probable that (1) (i.e. its more extraordinary); and (3) the probability that the ball retrieved will be white is far more improbable than (2). Suppose (2), that is to say, suppose the host pulls a certain ball x. What evidence will suffice to allow one to justifiably believe that the host actually pulled x? Once we agree on that evidence, isnt that set of evidence the exact same evidence that will suffice to show that the white ball was pulled, which event is far more statistically improbable? If we answer yes to the latter question, then the same set of evidence was sufficient to establish the truth (or at least justify a person in believing) two hypotheses of very different probability. This is another example to illustrate the conclusion of my argument that extraordinarily improbable events dont require extraordinary evidence.