scourge99 wrote:You either have an epistemological model or theory that can be shown to accurately reflect reality (to some extent) or not. You are continually making excuses for NOT presenting your theory or avoiding the question by critiquing the “evidentiary epistemological model�. This does not go unnoticed.
scourge99 wrote: I don't claim that any epistemological model is perfect. What I do claim is the evidential model is superior in its conclusion when it comes to reality. Failing to present your own model to be contrasted, speaks for itself.
scourge99 wrote:If your model cannot be used to make reliable conclusion regarding objective reality then what model do you use in those regards? By what means or method do you confirm the veracity of this model for its application?
I see the pattern here, and will attempt to clarify my argument, as previous attempts have been interpreted as my evasiveness. I do not intend to evade, and will do my best to avoid doing so now.
I will begin with your definitions:
(1) Our objective: to find epistemological models that can be shown to accurately reflect reality.
scourge99 wrote:What other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality?
(2) Our definition of reality: something that exists independently of ideas concerning it
scourge99 wrote:reality - something that exists independently of ideas concerning it.
(3) Based on your definitions, our more precise objective is: "to find epistemological models that can be shown to accurately reflect something existing independently of ideas concerning it."
My contention is that the mind has two major levels of distinction within it: perception and cognition. Perception refers to the direct sensory input of our sensory organs (nerves, eyes, ears, tastebuds, etc.). Cognition takes sensory input and perception, labels it through language and interprets it through theoretical framework.
By definition, it seems that:
(4)Epistemological models describe cognition.
This analysis of the mind leads me to conclude:
(5)The objects of cognition are discrete ideas and incoming perceptions, not reality itself.
You seem to agree with the existence of this gap, if not my conclusions:
scourge99 wrote:The fact that there exists a “gap� between reality and what we perceive in our mind is no excuse to brashly dismiss everything as hopeless or speculative.
That there is a "gap" is granted by you as "fact." I will address your qualifications in my second argument. For now, I merely wish to point to the existence of the gap.
Taking your definitions, our objective, and your concession of the existence of a gap, I cannot help but conclude:
(6) Our objective to uncover the epistemological system which best represents existence apart from ideas concerning it is impossible to fulfill because all epistemology depends upon cognition which necessarily deals with ideas, not reality (as defined as existing independently of ideas).
Here I must again turn to your reasonable objection:
scourge99 wrote:I disagree. What indication is there that this "gap" between our thoughts and objective reality is distorted for our collective or individual perception? Are you suggesting that merely because you can imagine or recognize such a gap then it MUST be distorting our collective/individual perception of reality?.
The fact that there exists a “gap� between reality and what we perceive in our mind is no excuse to brashly dismiss everything as hopeless or speculative. The hypothesis that our perception, for the most part, accurately reflects objective reality is confirmed repeatedly and consistently. The only apparent support for disbelief is "naked" philosophizing, no different than that used by strict solipsists to deny the existence of other minds. It takes extraordinarily contrived explanations to "explain-away" the consistency and repeatability of our perceptions to a matching objective reality. Only by retreating into solipsism can one deny the predictive power of the methodology employed by science—confidence based upon and limited by repeatable, objective experiences.
To put it simply, theory that is based on limited but repeatable experimentation (E.G., the theory of gravitation) provides indisputable predictive power even if it somehow turns out to be imperfect (as relativity has demonstrated of the theory of gravitation).
I would respond with the following argument:
(1) The objects of cognition are discrete ideas and incoming perceptions, not reality itself.
We discussed this in the last argument, and it seems you grant this point, so I will not linger here.
(2) Ideas are influenced by language, society, theoretical structure, and individual psychology. These factors can be called "cognitive determinants."
Let's analyze the cognitive determinants one by one:
Language
Language determines ideation to some degree. This occurs on several levels. First, language itself offers a particular series of words that can be used to describe ideas and thereby limits comprehensible ideational structures. For example, Greek has three words for love to English's one. These vocabulary differences limit an English-speaker's ability to analyze love as a concept relative to the Greek-speaker. Second, the syntactical and grammatical structures of language can be seen to influence knowledge paradigms. For example, in Greek all adjectives can also be substantival adjectives, which function in essence like nouns. Therefore, through language, "good" can also be "the good." One can see the link between this syntactical coincidence and ancient Greek philosophical emphasis on typology, virtue ethics, and forms. Similarly, there is a tie between the strong subject/object syntax of German and English and the dialectics of Hegel, Marx, Buber, Levinas, and others. Other languages, where the ideas of subject and object are fused into a single word, have less of a need to speculate about such things. Third is the notion of intertextuality. If we look at language diachronically and not merely synchronically, we see that language (particularly written language) is shaped and intimately connected to its prior uses. In this way ideation is shaped by language and previous ideation. The determinance is cyclical and linked with sociological and paradigmatic determination, to which we now turn.
Society
Here I'll simply offer a brief recap of Peter Berger's
The Social Construction of Reality. One generation arbitrarily makes a decision about how to do something in society. This generation trains its children to do the same. Within a few generations, most of "reality" as understood by a society is simply a past arbitrary choice that has slowly added layers of legitimization and support to explain why what is actually is best, is truth, is necessary, and must be perpetuated. This, of course, links with individual and group psychology, to which we will soon turn.
Theoretical Structure
In terms of science, the two thinkers who have most influenced my thought in this regard are Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn, though there are numerous individuals who can be added to their ranks. Polanyi's
Knowing and Being suggests that there are three objectives to all scientific research: (1) "a sufficient degree of plausibility", (2) "scientific value" rooted in "its accuracy, its systematic importance, and the intrinsic interest of the subject matter," and (3) "originality." (source: Michael Polanyi,
Knowing and Being Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 53-54) In other words, science must be original and accurate to test results, but it must also be plausible within given theoretical structures, it must have value to those structures rooted in its relation to the system, and it must be interesting. These criteria limit and direct scientific discovery and resulting outcomes based on their relationship to the democratic desires and interests of the scientific community as well as based on their relationship to the dominant paradigm. Here, I am referring to Thomas Kuhn's ideas, which I have discussed in previous posts. All discoveries, according to Kuhn, are either conformed to the dominant paradigm or are dismissed as faulty until a point of crisis is reached. Therefore, all research is, to a degree, determined by theoretical structure.
Individual Psychology
The principles here are too numerous to describe. To put it briefly, individuals tend to converge with viewpoints around them (majority and minority influence, groupthink, social norming), defend these viewpoints regardless of the best evidence (escalation of commitment, legitimization, confirmation bias) and then ignore evidence to the contrary (confirmation bias, selectivity, radical polarization). Cognitive psychology challenges substantially the independence of ideation.
Given the existence of these factors, I'll simply lump them together as "cognitive determinants." My next point:
(3) Either cognitive determinants have temporal priority, or ideas have temporal priority.
By this I mean, which came first, the chicken or the egg? I suppose cognitive determinants and ideation might have arisen simultaneously, but I think I can prove the contrary.
(4) Cognitive determinants have temporal priority.
Try to think apart from language. If you can't, language comes first. Try to discover the theory of relativity without reading any science books or any books at all, without any education. If you can't, theoretical structure comes first. Are people born without existing in a society? If not, societal determination comes first. You see the point. It seems that, in the scheme of things, cognitive determinants influence ideation, but they also are encountered before ideation is fully developed. Thus, it seems that ideation and reason are in fact unable to fully escape the determinants which come before them. To think is to think as a linguistic being, socially determined, within a particular paradigm. Thus, I conclude:
(5) If ideas are influenced by cognitive determinants, and these cognitive determinants came first, then the non-rational (i.e. non-ideational) cognitive determinants are chosen or coincidental.
If reason does not exist before or outside cognitive determinants, how do particular cognitive determinants come to apply? Certainly we do not reason ourselves to them for reason is itself already shaped by them. Instead, it seems they are the coincidental result of birthplace, education, society, and peer influence. Or, perhaps, they are the result of choice. In such instances where a paradigm breaks down or a society or peer group is left, a new paradigm emerges or one joins a new society or peer group. This choice, however, exists
against reason before a new reason system is constructed to support it. One might call this faith. Therefore, I conclude my entire argument with the belief that:
(6) Reason is thus determined by non-rational choice or coincidence.
It is with this in mind that I consider myself a fideist. But there is still some clarifying to do, so let's consider your other points:
theopoesis wrote:Verification is a requirement of evidentiary epistemology. My claim (along with the claims of a significant majority of postmodern thinkers) is that we have no cognitive access to “reality� as you define it, that is as an outside and independent entity.
scourge99 wrote:If you concede that you have no access to reality then this makes it impossible to distinguish false, true, imaginary, or real theories from one another. This is exactly the problem with fideism, it offers no means by which to adjudicate between conflicting faith claims. It’s either making a claim, in which case the claim must be defended, or it is NOT making a claim in which case it disqualifies itself.
I am making a claim, but within my own system of arbitrary rationality (more on this below). There is no way to adjudicate between faith claims because reasoning used to adjudicate is itself simply a performative outpouring of the initial choice or coincidence, which is itself on a level with faith.
Perhaps you are not aware of the idea of performativity. I first encountered it in the field of economics through a wonderful book titled,
Do Economists Make Markets?. One paper in this book described a model used for pricing stock options. Two well respected economists developed a model that roughly predicted options pricing, and they published and distributed their work. What later economists discovered is that, after the options pricing model had circulated and was taught in firms and universities, the market (which was once predicted about 65% of the time by the model) suddenly conformed 100% to the models predictions. What happened? Arguably, investors listened to the model and bought when they were supposed to make a profit according to the model, then sold when they were not. It was not so much that the model was correct based on the evidence as the fact that the model through its influence as part of theoretical framework (a cognitive determinant) made the world in its own image. This is a much smaller and more clear cut example of performativity, but I see similar principles at work in much larger ways.
If faith, choice, and coincidence have temporal primacy and occur before reason is possible, than the Christian should not be critiqued for having faith in God and then adopting a rationality accordingly. The faith in God is no less arbitrary than any other set of circumstances, coincidence, or choice. And this is why I say that fideism, once recognized, is the Christian's alternative to evidentiary epistemologies. But more must be said and responded to:
scourge99 wrote:I do not claim absolute truth but I claim a framework that, to my knowledge, best conforms to reality, shared experiences, etc, WITHOUT having to slip into solipsism or throw my hands up in the air and make the unwarranted claim that “all frameworks are valid�.
I believe my arguments challenge this assertion. Reality as independent of ideation is inaccessible through ideation by definition. Your framework conforms to the shared experiences which are declared valid, immediately dismissing miraculous experiences in a Humean fashion.
theopoesis wrote:I will not attempt to defend fideism rationally, because to do so is to abandon fideism.
scourge99 wrote: I agree. Fideists can make NO claims to truth as it is a position based not in knowledge but only intuitive belief.
Fideists MUST accept the law of non-contradiction in asserting their position but by doing such they contradict the fideistic premise of rejecting rationalism. It is an antithesis to reason and as such it cannot be contemplated. It is psychological state, not a coherent position.
It offers no test for truth. It offers no means to adjudicate between conflicting faith claims.
I had to think heavily about this point, and came up with the following division. I suppose there are two kinds of fideists. The first might be called
nihilistic fideists and are a group that completely discourage reason altogether. The second type might be labelled
relativistic fideists and are somewhat different. The relativistic fideist recognizes the necessity of language and reason, but simply believes that one rationality is often as good as the next insofar as reality goes. This does not mean that reason and language play no role. Take Ludwig Wittgenstein, for example. Wittgenstein rejects many "rational" claims made through language as non-propositional and non-substantive, but he retains their significance in terms of language through the concept of a "language game." Words do something and are part of larger semiotic "games" whose rules shape life, cognition, and society even if the words themselves cannot be shown to correlate to anything "real." Language is important, but perhaps not wholly reasonable as the evidentiary epistemological model might suppose.
Taking this to heart, I consider my acceptance of the law of non-contradiction not to be a concession to the primacy of reason nor to the ability of reason to accurately reflect ideation-independent reality. In truth, my rationality is as performative from the standpoint of Christian thought and the post-modern paradigm as the evidentiary epistemologist's rationality is performative of secularism and modernity. The law of non-contradiction functions for me as a necessary component of the language game. In fact, given language's priority over cognition, it seems that this is necessary for any conception of non-contradiction. Take the example of gender. The statement, "that is a male female" has no propositional content because the semiotic field for "male" and "female" must be mutually exclusive for "male" or "female" to have meaning. Therefore, non-contradiction says something cannot be male and female. Biologically, we can perceive roughly seven gender combinations, so the male/female dichotomy cannot be seen as intrinsic to "reality" or "perceptions" or even reason as much as it is intrinsic to language. Despite new rational paradigms, despite various perceptions, our linguistic range continues to drive most thought to concern male/female duality according to the law of non-contradiction. The relativistic fideist can point to such examples to suggest that rational systems might be arbitrary, yet language as a cognitive determinant (inducing the claims of arbitrariness) compels the fideist to accept non-contradiction as a linguistic necessity for communication, not as an endorsement of evidentialism.
theopoesis wrote:The question for a fideist is not so much whether my system is the most rational one, but whether my rationality creates a better world than the rationality of my evidentiary opponent. Then I can move on with philosophy and the sciences with the recognition that it is all just a game.
scourge99 wrote:So proposing unicorns and leprechauns to "create a better world" becomes equally valid as all manner of self-invented gods, creatures, ideas or forces. The sky is the limit.
The problem is that such inventing for a "better world" is that it requires complex and extravagant explanations to account for the evidence. Fideists only utilize rationality when it suits their claims. Such special pleading does not go unnoticed. You can’t have your cake and eat it too.
I am glad you have noticed. I have noticed similar maneuvers among evidential epistemologies.
scourge99 wrote: You have a fundamental misunderstanding of the scientific community and process. You inject the notion of conspiracy and widespread bias which fuels the extreme accusations you present. I cannot begin to correct the mistakes with such an incorrigible bias.
Perhaps I cannot understand scientific rationality from a non-scientific paradigm in much the same way that scientists cannot understand a non-scientific paradigm from within their own. I will clarify that I make no accusation of conspiracy. There is no mastermind directing the scientific community. What I am attempting to do is qualify the objectivity of any collective group of subjective humans.
scourge99 wrote:The only thing I do agree with is that some scientists do accept the theories of others without reinventing them themselves and may develop theories dependent on previous, perhaps even wrong theories. However, once a theory becomes discredited or revised, any theories dependent on them come tumbling down with them. Science has a built in self-correcting mechanism.
"Piltdown man was a hoax, which was exposed by science. This is significant not only because it demonstrates the self-correcting methods of science but because the evidence which exposed the hoax supports evolutionary theory. The bulk of evidence regarding ancient hominids formed a clear evolutionary pattern and Piltdown man remained an anomaly - it didn't fit the pattern.
A single hoax does not disprove a theory and, in this case, exposing the hoax actually demonstrates the veracity of the theory. Piltdown man, once exposed as a hoax, was no longer used as evidence for evolutionary theory, yet continues to be referenced by creationists as evidence against evolution."
So the fact that the Piltdown man was once evidence for science, but once uncovered as a hoax was also evidence for science makes science seem
less like an epistemological system that will take all evidence and use it to support its views regardless?
As a footnote, I never claimed to be a creationist. I think the assumption tends to be and in most debates along these lines I must be a creationist.
theopoesis wrote:Can we really expect these theories to “accurately reflect reality�?
scourge99 wrote:Science doesn't "expect theories to accurately reflect reality� at all. Science verifiably, repeatedly, and openly DEMONSTRATES them. This is significantly different then the naked philosophizing so often espoused by philosophers.
Scientific theories are ALWAYS tentative. Valid search for knowledge begins with a question, NOT a conclusion. Observations and measurements are made of the item being studied, then hypotheses are formed and tested. Tentative conclusions are drawn from the study, and the entire issue with its references and methods is opened to inspection, criticism, refutation or verification by independent researchers.
I'm not sure if this is equivocation or you conceding my point. Your initial post asked, and I quote: "What other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality?" I responded that this was an unfair criteria because no epistemological model, including science, accurately reflects reality. If you are granting that fact, then it seems the debate is over. If your use of "DEMONSTRATE" is somehow in support of your OP, please clarify the distinction so I can understand. I am well aware of the process of the Scientific Method, which is why I challenged your OP.
scourge99 wrote:You appear adamant in condemning all of science as hopelessly biased.
Peer-review is utilized to combat such bias. Are you familiar or aware of the peer-review process?
http://science.howstuffworks.com/innova ... review.htm
What self-correcting and validation process do you propose?
I predict you will write it all off as biased as well. Anything to justify rejection.
Well done with your predictions. Not all "peers" are created equal. Studies have shown that some scientists with big names or "important" ideas publish papers that are read, cited, and reviewed exponentially more often than most scientists'. I understand peer review, and see the numbers, and read philosophy of science, and conclude that peer review does not combat bias, it reinforces it by directing the majority of scientists to the same few ideas, authors, and theories which then democratically shape the paradigm. I'm not ignorant, but I do understand how my rationality is alien to yours.
theopoesis wrote: You overlook WHY they would come to different conclusions. And that is because scientists in different eras have access ONLY to the cumulative scientific data of their time. Its no surprise hawking would develop different and BETTER conclusions when he has access to magnitudes greater of data points and works than newton and even Einstein. The increase at which scientific data is accumulated is NOT linear!!
Ok, so we agree on one thing.
Scientist’s social location limits their conclusions, which are shaped by available theoretical framework and data.
scourge99 wrote:No, I don't agree to that. The scientific community is limited by the amount of data and knowledge available at the time. I mentioned nothing about "social location".
So if data and knowledge does not vary according to the "social location", but a person's access to data and knowledge is determined by the time and society in which they live, how else would you prefer to label this phenomenon?
I hope the time I spent trying to systematically present my arguments helps, but I suspect that we are simply in different worlds in terms of reason. You consider me to be uninformed and ignorant at times, and I consider you to be uninformed and naively optimistic. Perhaps for either of us to understand the other, we must first accept the basic paradigm of the other. Even if understanding and acceptance is impossible, I must thank you for the excellent dialogue and for challenging me to think deeply about my perspective. You are quite a strong dialogue partner, and I am enjoying this (even if I think it is futile).
