The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[fewwillfindit]

In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being -God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand.

I don't see this distinction as trivial in the slightest. I, too, think it is critical. To say that the Son finds His being in and through the Father, Who is the source of the Son and the unifying principle of the Godhead, introduces the possibility of the Son having a beginning point for His being, which is a slippery slope that could lead to cultist beliefs that the Son was created and had a beginning. It is also the starting point for the error of Modalism.

To me, when I think of personhood, it isn't as nuanced as it is to some. A person is simply a distinct sentient being, not limited to "social roles" or "biologically determined bodies." This definition of "person" allows for an understanding of the Trinity to be something like this: "Three distinct sentient beings of the same nature, this nature being eternally limited to only three." I don't think that we have to jump through hoops to satisfy the critics who cry foul against monotheism. We tend to perform apologetic gymnastics in an effort to appease accusations of polytheism, when in fact, we don't need to do this. God reveals Himself exactly as He wishes is His Word, and if we simply use His words to describe His nature without attempting to further define that which He hasn't revealed, we reduce the risk of falling into error.

[EduChris]

...In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit...Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature...the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion...

I'm not sure what we gain by saying that the Father is the eternal "source" of the Son and the Spirit. Can you help me out here? Why not just say the three are eternally differentiated, eternally related, eternally existing, eternally communing and communicating? I think I understand why the distinctions between the persons are necessary, since without some eternal movement within relationship God would simply be the "unmoved mover," eternally contemplating himself and never opening up to new possibilities and new creations. But what does this "source" do for us, other than perhaps providing us a human (parent-child) metaphor for understanding how a single common nature can be expressed or exhibited in distinctly different persons?

[theopoesis]

I don't see this distinction as trivial in the slightest. I, too, think it is critical. To say that the Son finds his being in and through the Father, Who is the source of the Son and the unifying principle of the Godhead, introduces the possibility of the Son having a beginning point for His being, which is a slippery slope that could lead to cultist beliefs that the Son was created and had a beginning. It is also the starting point for the error of Modalism.

To me, when I think of personhood, it isn't as nuanced as it is to some. A person is simply a distinct sentient being, not limited to "social roles" or "biologically determined bodies." This definition of "person" allows for an understanding of the Trinity to be something like this: "Three distinct sentient beings of the same nature, this nature being eternally limited to only three." I don't think that we have to jump through hoops to satisfy the critics who cry foul against monotheism. We tend to perform apologetic gymnastics in an effort to appease accusations of polytheism, when in fact, we don't need to do this. God reveals Himself exactly as He wishes is His Word, and if we simply use His words to describe His nature without attempting to further define that which He hasn't revealed, we reduce the risk of falling into error.

Thanks for the feedback, fewwillfindit.

I think, however, in defining a person as a "sentient being" and therefore suggesting that the Trinity is "three distinct sentient beings of the same nature, this nature being eternally limited to only three" you avoid modalism but fall into tri-theism. The creedal formula is one being and three persons, not three beings and one nature. The Western tradition of grounding the Trinity in Being leads to this conundrum, where three persons-as-beings are one being (God). This confusion leads to the many objections to the Trinity by non-Christians. Zizioulas was no apologist - his work focuses on the Eastern conception of the Trinity in relation to Ecclesiology and Eucharist. However, I consider it the best English translation of Eastern thought on the Trinity, and I think Eastern thought renders the typical objections here moot. This is not theology in the service of apologetics, but theology recognized by apologists as resolving a dilemma.

I agree that the Eastern definition does risk modalism, but I think it avoids it in its insistence that being and existence/subsistence are distinct categories, so that one Being (God) subsists in three distinct persons (Father, Son, Spirit). Modalism as I understand it suggests that one being (God) subsists/exists as one person (God) manifest as the same person but perceived in different aspects (Father/Son/Spirit) by the human observer. Modalism reduces God to a unitary being with unitary existence, but the Cappadocian formula and its Eastern interpretation presents God as a unitary being with compound, tripartite existence.

As for your worry about the Son having a beginning for his being, you are quite right. I misspoke in my presentation of Zizioulas' thought. The Father is not the source of the Son and the Spirit's beings because the Son and Spirit have no distinct being from the Father. Rather, the subsistence of the Son and Spirit eternally emanates from the Father.

In short, I retract the following statement:

The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle.

Instead, I correct it to: "The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity subsist in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle and from whom they eternally emanate."

Thanks for the correction to my theology.

[theopoesis]

...In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit...Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature...the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion...

I'm not sure what we gain by saying that the Father is the eternal "source" of the Son and the Spirit. Can you help me out here? Why not just say the three are eternally differentiated, eternally related, eternally existing, eternally communing and communicating? I think I understand why the distinctions between the persons are necessary, since without some eternal movement within relationship God would simply be the "unmoved mover," eternally contemplating himself and never opening up to new possibilities and new creations. But what does this "source" do for us, other than perhaps providing us a human (parent-child) metaphor for understanding how a single common nature can be expressed or exhibited in distinctly different persons?

I think the importance is in recognizing the divide between person and being. The Son is, scripturally, the only begotten Son of the Father. This suggests the Father is some sort of source. Often, being and personhood are collapsed into a unitary principle, which leads to a being (the Father) eternally begetting a distinct being (the Son), yet existing with the Son and Spirit as a single being. This doesn't make sense logically. Or, the tendency is to suggest the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct manifestations of the one Being (God) which tends to modalism, as fewwillfindit caught me on above.

If, however, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and Spirit, but persons exists independently of and yet through nature/being, then the Father can eternally beget the Son and the Spirit can eternally proceed from the Father without differentiating the being of that Father because the three persons do not emanate from Being, but from a Person who exists.

I think I'm explaining that right. The eternal differentiation is of persons, the eternal communion is through unitary being.

The important observation here is that, though we have nuanced theological disputes, separating personhood from being eliminates non-theistic objections and validates the idea of personhood itself

I'm waiting for Zzyzx or McCulloch to find this thread...

[horiturk]

the word begotten was a concoction,so it cannot be used to defend anything. and jesus never claimed to be the only begotten son of God,that was someone else speaking about him.....i think jesus would definitely have addressed that if it was the case.

[fewwillfindit]

In light of your amended definition:

In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity subsist in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle and from whom they eternally emanate.

Paired with this synopsis:

The important observation here is that, though we have nuanced theological disputes, separating personhood from being eliminates non-theistic objections and validates the idea of personhood itself.

I must admit that you've given me something to ponder, study and pray about. It most certainly would be gratifying, when affirming the Hebrew Shema, "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One," to mean it quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Bear with me as I attempt to wrap my head around the distinction between "being" and "person."

[McCulloch]

I think the importance is in recognizing the divide between person and being. The Son is, scripturally, the only begotten Son of the Father. This suggests the Father is some sort of source. Often, being and personhood are collapsed into a unitary principle, which leads to a being (the Father) eternally begetting a distinct being (the Son), yet existing with the Son and Spirit as a single being. This doesn't make sense logically. Or, the tendency is to suggest the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct manifestations of the one Being (God) which tends to modalism, as fewwillfindit caught me on above.

If, however, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and Spirit, but persons exists independently of and yet through nature/being, then the Father can eternally beget the Son and the Spirit can eternally proceed from the Father without differentiating the being of that Father because the three persons do not emanate from Being, but from a Person who exists.

I think I'm explaining that right. The eternal differentiation is of persons, the eternal communion is through unitary being.

The important observation here is that, though we have nuanced theological disputes, separating personhood from being eliminates non-theistic objections and validates the idea of personhood itself

I'm waiting for Zzyzx or McCulloch to find this thread...

OK, now my ears are burning.

I have read what you have said twice. It is still a word salad to me. There are a whole lot of words and I know what each of them mean. And they are arranged really nicely into properly constructed phrases and sentences. But I really don't have any idea what you are saying. I did find one statement that I fully agree with. Highlighted in red.

Begotten is the past participle of beget. To beget (an archaic word not frequently used) means to procreate. I have absolutely no idea what you could possibly mean by eternally begetting.

[theopoesis]

the word begotten was a concoction,so it cannot be used to defend anything. and jesus never claimed to be the only begotten son of God,that was someone else speaking about him.....i think jesus would definitely have addressed that if it was the case.

Several things here:

(1) The OP is about the logic of the Trinity and whether one being and three persons is logical. Your comment does not address this question.

(2) The word begotten is from John 3:16, which a Christian must address as part of the canon of Scriptures. I was speaking to a Christian as a Christian. If you'd like a debate, attend to the questions in the OP.

(3) Greek used no punctuation, so while most translators believe 3:16 is the author's commentary, it is possible that it is a continuation of 3:15, where Jesus is speaking. We just don't know beyond a shadow of a doubt.

(4) The ideas behind the only begotten son are compatible with Jesus' words as depicted in the Scriptures. It is impossible to prove what Jesus said one way or another historically. Canonically, it is much more clear.

Beyond these brief points, a further discussion of Jesus as the only begotten Son should be reserved for another thread. This thread challenges the non-theist to critique the inner logic of the Trinity and challenges the non-Christian to explain a conception of "personhood" that has any meaning above or beyond the body and social role. Can you respond do these critiques, or can you only offer brief criticisms of peripheral topics? Id be interested in dialogue on this idea.

[horiturk]

the word was interpolation,that's why it was taken out of newer more accurate translations