The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[McCulloch]

I'll try to reduce it or simplify it:

Thank you for your patience. I get confused easily.

(1) If personhood is rooted in being, 3 persons = 3 beings.

OK, this is good. Let's start with something easily understood. I am a person and I am a being. From my perspective personhood and being are roughly synonymous.

(2) If 3 persons = 3 beings, then statement 3 persons = 1 being is illogical. This is the objection of many non-theists to the Trinity.

Great! You understand where we are.

(3) If personhood is rooted in being, the idea of the person adds nothing to the idea of the body or the social role. Thus, if personhood is rooted in being, personhood is a vacuous philosophical concept.

In philosophy, the term being, is typically understood as one's state of being, and hence its common meaning is in the context of personal experience, with aspects that involve expressions and manifestations coming from a being's innate being, or personal character. A person is most broadly defined as any individual self-conscious or rational being. I see these two terms as being rather closely linked. I don't see how the subtle distinction linking these two terms renders personhood to be a vacuous concept.

(4) Christian theology claims personhood is not rooted in being. (I cited Zizioulas interpreting the Cappadocian Fathers here). This focuses on the essence/existence divide in philosophy.

This is where we part company. I disagree with the Christian theological claim that personhood is not rooted in being. Can you explain why you conclude that personhood is not rooted in being?

(5) If personhood is not rooted in being, 3 persons need not equal three beings.
(6) If three persons need not equal three beings, 3 persons = 1 being is not illogical.
(7) If personhood is not rooted in being, personhood can have meaning above and beyond bodily being or social being.

Agreed. I'm still stuck on step 4.

I would not label thinkers such as Martin Buber as being vacuous, would you?

[theopoesis]

I'll try to reduce it or simplify it:

Thank you for your patience. I get confused easily.

And I confuse easily. Perhaps we aren't the best debate partners?

(1) If personhood is rooted in being, 3 persons = 3 beings.

OK, this is good. Let's start with something easily understood. I am a person and I am a being. From my perspective personhood and being are roughly synonymous.

My argument objects to the equality of personhood and being. The test will be to see whether I can maintain it.

(2) If 3 persons = 3 beings, then statement 3 persons = 1 being is illogical. This is the objection of many non-theists to the Trinity.

Great! You understand where we are.

Glad I'm not setting up a straw man.

(3) If personhood is rooted in being, the idea of the person adds nothing to the idea of the body or the social role. Thus, if personhood is rooted in being, personhood is a vacuous philosophical concept.

In philosophy, the term being, is typically understood as one's state of being, and hence its common meaning is in the context of personal experience, with aspects that involve expressions and manifestations coming from a being's innate being, or personal character. A person is most broadly defined as any individual self-conscious or rational being. I see these two terms as being rather closely linked. I don't see how the subtle distinction linking these two terms renders personhood to be a vacuous concept.

Being would seem to me to refer to what a thing is. It's essence (at least this is the sense in which the Orthodox use "being"). "State of being" as you use it would seem to be an appropriate term insofar as whatever is, in fact is so in a particular state.

To link the state of being, that is the particular condition of the "isness" of a thing, with experience would seem to fall into the trap of existentialism. What is, is in or through a state of experience. Well enough. The experience itself is all that is. Does nothing, then, have being apart from experience? Does the earth have being? The union of experience and being results in Hegel's claim that being is meaningless, because being is simply experience/existence, or in Heidegger's claim that we must destroy current philosophy and its history to uncover a meaning for being.

In short, it seems that if being is experience through personhood (which is grounded in being), then being itself loses meaning and everything becomes experience/personhood.

When you speak of persons as self-conscious beings, is it not linguistically admitting a divide between being and personhood? In other words, persons are such because of the property "self-consciousness", so then is this self-consciousness itself what personhood is? For self-consciousness and personhood not to be illusory, that is for a human being to both be a being and a human person, there would seem to need to be a divide between being/person or else one term or the other adds nothing conceptually and should therefore be eliminated. If self-consciousness is a property of being, is self-consciousness able to perceive being as other? More importantly, can self-consciousness perceive itself as other? If it cannot, then "personhood" reduces to being and either one or the other ceases to have meaning.

(4) Christian theology claims personhood is not rooted in being. (I cited Zizioulas interpreting the Cappadocian Fathers here). This focuses on the essence/existence divide in philosophy.

This is where we part company. I disagree with the Christian theological claim that personhood is not rooted in being. Can you explain why you conclude that personhood is not rooted in being?

I believe the two options are (1) personhood is an empty word, or (2) Personhood is distinct from being. I got into this a bit above, but here's more...

(1) Personhood is an empty word

(a) Suppose we explain being biologically (or materialistically): I am a being in that I am composed of matter or a body. Typically, we also say that I am a person, yet my being, that is my body, actually does not exist continually throughout my life. All the cells in my body at age 3 will be dead at age 45. How can we appropriately explain the persistence of the phenomenon of the "person" if we reduce the person to being? Nothing is at the beginning of my life that also is at the end of my life. Can the person then be said to exist?

(b) Furthermore, if we root personhood in being (materialistically or biologically understood) can we divorce the idea of "person" from "being" sufficiently enough to provide a meaning to the word "person"? If the "person" does not exist from a materialistic perspective prior to conception, and does not exist from a materialistic perspective after death, and if, in this way, the duration of the being is identical to the duration of the person, is the person anything other than the being?

Admittedly, there might be another way to define being/person than the above. However, I raised some questions about your definition, and responded to the "Scientific" definition, so I don't feel the need to set up tons of straw men to respond to them one by one.

(2) Personhood is Distinct from being

To the secularist, being is not a product of will, it is a product of necessity (or perhaps probability). Being, therefore, is the ultimate category out of which other principles arise, or within which other principles operate. Being comes first, and things cannot adequately be said to exist independent of being because being itself is the ultimate answer. Think Sagan: "The Cosmos is all that is, or was, or ever will be."

To the Christian, being is a product of will. The will of the Father creates the being of the cosmos, and God Himself has being in and through divine will. The complete being of God is three Persons, but two of these Persons (the Son and Spirit) are themselves a product of the will of the Father, whereby the principle of God's being is secondary to the principle of God's will.

Let's apply this concept to the cosmos. The cosmos is not necessary, but is created ex nihilo (in Christian theology). The Triune, Personal God creates a universe, but the original principle is personhood/will not substance/being. Persons exist autonomously of being, and therefore can interact with one another as persons through being, in being, despite being, and above being. To the Christian, the human person persists as soul beyond death, such that being itself can change independently of persons. Thus, the principle of the person is distinct from the being. The person subsists/exists through will, but being is a product of will external to or independent of will.

Can we grant the converse if priority is given to being? If personhood is a property of being, persons themselves are beings and the term "personhood" seems to add little to the concept of being itself insofar as all that is is being. Conversely, if Persons exist independently of being as will, then being is a distinct concept from person. Essence is distinct from existence. ousia from hypostasis.

(5) If personhood is not rooted in being, 3 persons need not equal three beings.
(6) If three persons need not equal three beings, 3 persons = 1 being is not illogical.
(7) If personhood is not rooted in being, personhood can have meaning above and beyond bodily being or social being.

Agreed. I'm still stuck on step 4.

I would not label thinkers such as Martin Buber as being vacuous, would you?

I'm not familiar with Buber's thoughts on personhood in relation to being. Insofar as Buber points to the need for an I/Thou relationship, he is in fact understanding the primacy of personhood in theology, but if Buber reduces personhood to being, it seems that the person cannot philosophically be differentiated from being. Determinism, nihilism, or materialistic scientism would seem to be the outcomes available to him.

I'm sorry, I'm afraid I've done a terribly confusing job trying to explain a complex principle. I suppose I could just paste broad excerpts of Zizioulas and others. I hope something makes sense out of what I have typed.

theopoesis

[EduChris]

..If personhood is a property of being, persons themselves are beings and the term "personhood" seems to add little to the concept of being...

In ordinary speech, is "person" just another way of saying, "sentient, intelligent being"?

[theopoesis]

...After repeated accusations of the illogical nature of the Trinity, I felt the need to start this thread...

Is the following example from McCulloch an example of the sort of claim you wish to address here? If so, could you please show how your proposal avoids McCulloch's charge of Trinitarian abandonment of logic:

"X is not Y" and "X is Y" cannot both be true at the same sense at the same time

Can "X is Z", "Y is Z" and "X is not Y" all be true in the same sense at the same time, where Z is a single entity not a set?

For example, substitute "1" for X, "2" for Y and "an integer" for Z.

• 1 is an integer, 2 is an integer, 1 is not 2.

This is a true and valid statement because integer refers to a set, not an individual item.
Second example, substitute "Barak Obama" for Z, "The President of the United States" for X and "the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces" for Y.

• The President of the United States is Barak Obama.
  The commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces is Barak Obama.
  The President of the United States is not the commander-in-chief of the United States armed forces.

This is a false and invalid statement, because Barak Obama is a single entity.
Third example, substitute "God" for Z, "Jesus" for X and "the Holy Spirit" for Y.

• Jesus is God.
  The Holy Spirit is God.
  Jesus is not the the Holy Spirit.

This is a false and invalid statement, because God is a single entity, God is one. Unless Trinitarians accept polytheism, or that God is a set, they must abandon logic.

This is quite a strong argument by McCulloch, and much more sophisticated than Murad's 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 argument. Murad's argument was the context of McCulloch's and my initial discussion out of which this thread emerged.

That being said, it would seem that my OP might offer a means of beginning to address this question, but more might be required. I am beginning with step 1: Showing that a person is not identical to a being. If this can be substantiated, then 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 objections to Trinitarian logic fail. Murad's challenge is a fallacy of identity, whereas McCulloch here seems to be addressing reflexivity or transitivity or something (I'm not too good with technical math jargon). Therefore, additional argument might be required.

Mathematically, a brief answer might go as follows: God is represented neither as a single entity, nor as a set, but as a field (such as the real number plane). It would then be possible to say that the Holy Spirit was a square with infinite length and width, the Father a circle with an infinite circumference, and the Son a triangle with an infinite hpoteneuse and infinite legs.

Thereby, we can say that a square is not a circle is not a triangle, but all three fully occupy the field "God."

Of course, this all presupposes that God can be described through mathematical analogy. The Father is not a circle. So perhaps we'd do better to just ignore the critique altogether. I'm just too proud to back down. Plus, silence is not very helpful for solid discourse, and McCulloch generally seems to be an intelligent and good guy who deserves some dialogue partners.

In truth, though, the OP gets to the deeper question of the ousia and hypostasis dichotomy. Being/person is distinct. Being and subsisting/existing are distinct philosophical principles. All the geometry analogy suggests is that whatever God is, in an ontological sense, is mysterious to us but is certainly distinct from the three persons themselves. The question of how the three persons (in the analogy shapes) can coincide in the same field/space is the one thing my OP doesn't answer. Theologically, this refers to perichoresis, a principle which my OP completely ignores.

Hopefully, I offer a brief word on what the OP offers, a tentative answer, and a word on what steps we must take forward to develop a more satisfactory answer. Does that help?

[theopoesis]

..If personhood is a property of being, persons themselves are beings and the term "personhood" seems to add little to the concept of being...

In ordinary speech, is "person" just another way of saying, "sentient, intelligent being"?

Perhaps so. The specific usage of a language and the philosophical validation of the principles behind the language is two different questions. I am proposing that "person" philosophically must be divorced (or perhaps simply prior to) being in order for personhood to have and philosophical realness.

[bernee51]

I find it informative, albeit mildly amusing, when attempts are made to shoehorn later mythic beliefs in to ancient philosophies. The idea of the trinity predates the earliest codified religions.

The ancients cognized the nature of being:
The knower " god the father (cf. Brahman " the creator)
The known " god the son (cf. Vishnu " the sustainer)
The act of knowing " the holy spirit (cf. Shiva " the destroyer)

I'm not sure what you are suggesting. Are you suggesting that Brahman, Vishnu, and Shiva were described as three persons but one being? If so, please cite a source.

As I understand Hindu metaphysics these three are aspects of the divine " they are not persons as such.

Furthermore, your depictions of the Trinity seems a bit off (though I grant it does sound a bit Augustinian and I wouldn't be surprised to find it in On the Trinity I do believe Augustine and the West has fallen short of the East here, as said clearly in the OP). If the Father is the knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the act of knowing, it seems the Trinity would be three aspects of one being, and not three persons subsisting in one being. This is not the orthodox position.

I am not an orthodox person.

There is not one being there is only being. Being is made up of the three aspects of the knowing, the known and the act of knowing.

In terms of relating god the father to the knower and so forth I was merely suggesting the origin of the trinity doctrine in ancient thought. The splitting the aspects of being into three persons is a result of maya.

Also, granting a precedent for the Trinity in terms of the threeness of being is no problem for me. My question is regarding personhood, and it is there that the Trinity as a doctrine succeeds or fails.

Personhood is an illusion...and the trinity doctrine along with it.

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

So being is indeed all three.

Individual self - personhood, however, is an illusion derived in the apparent separateness of the aspects of being.

I don't understand your first statement. Can you elaborate?

I think I was referring to the three actually being one...the three being an illusion.

I also appreciate your second statement. I agree that, apart from Trinitarian presuppositions, personhood is an illusion. However, if we attempt to build a concept of personhood ecclessially and theologically we must have the Trinity, and this Trinity is not illogical. You've made some assertions with little to back it up, but your conclusion ultimately affirms my position. No Trinity, no personhood.

What assertions have I made that need backing up?

Actually it is no personhood therefore no trinity.

Adi Shankara noted: Brahman (being) is the only truth, the spatio-temporal world is an illusion, and there is ultimately no difference between Brahman and individual self.

[theopoesis]

I find it informative, albeit mildly amusing, when attempts are made to shoehorn later mythic beliefs in to ancient philosophies. The idea of the trinity predates the earliest codified religions.

The ancients cognized the nature of being:
The knower " god the father (cf. Brahman " the creator)
The known " god the son (cf. Vishnu " the sustainer)
The act of knowing " the holy spirit (cf. Shiva " the destroyer)

I'm not sure what you are suggesting. Are you suggesting that Brahman, Vishnu, and Shiva were described as three persons but one being? If so, please cite a source.

As I understand Hindu metaphysics these three are aspects of the divine " they are not persons as such.

Ok, I was just checking due to the juxtaposition of the Christian persons with the Hindu names. Thanks for the clarification.

Furthermore, your depictions of the Trinity seems a bit off (though I grant it does sound a bit Augustinian and I wouldn't be surprised to find it in On the Trinity I do believe Augustine and the West has fallen short of the East here, as said clearly in the OP). If the Father is the knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the act of knowing, it seems the Trinity would be three aspects of one being, and not three persons subsisting in one being. This is not the orthodox position.

I am not an orthodox person.

There is not one being there is only being. Being is made up of the three aspects of the knowing, the known and the act of knowing.

In terms of relating god the father to the knower and so forth I was merely suggesting the origin of the trinity doctrine in ancient thought. The splitting the aspects of being into three persons is a result of maya.

I didn't presume that you were orthodox. Your user groups suggest otherwise. You just seemed to set up a 1:1 correlation between Hindu and Christian metaphysics, and I intended to show that there was a difference.

Also, granting a precedent for the Trinity in terms of the threeness of being is no problem for me. My question is regarding personhood, and it is there that the Trinity as a doctrine succeeds or fails.

Personhood is an illusion...and the trinity doctrine along with it.

You are welcome to believe this. I consider the options to be Christian personalism or non-personalism. You have chosen the latter, and I accept that. The OP was intended to show that the very idea of persons ensures the logical consistency of the Trinity.

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

So being is indeed all three.

Individual self - personhood, however, is an illusion derived in the apparent separateness of the aspects of being.

I don't understand your first statement. Can you elaborate?

I think I was referring to the three actually being one...the three being an illusion.

I understand now, thanks. Again, I think you have landed on one of two possible consistent positions.

I also appreciate your second statement. I agree that, apart from Trinitarian presuppositions, personhood is an illusion. However, if we attempt to build a concept of personhood ecclessially and theologically we must have the Trinity, and this Trinity is not illogical. You've made some assertions with little to back it up, but your conclusion ultimately affirms my position. No Trinity, no personhood.

What assertions have I made that need backing up?

Actually it is no personhood therefore no trinity.

Adi Shankara noted: Brahman (being) is the only truth, the spatio-temporal world is an illusion, and there is ultimately no difference between Brahman and individual self.

The assertion was in fact a misunderstanding. I thought you implied an equality between Hindu and Christian metaphysics, but it seems you did not intend to suggest an identity between the two. I understood you as trying to say Christians stole the idea from Hinduism and other Eastern Religious systems. I retract this claim.

[bernee51]

The assertion was in fact a misunderstanding. I thought you implied an equality between Hindu and Christian metaphysics, but it seems you did not intend to suggest an identity between the two. I understood you as trying to say Christians stole the idea from Hinduism and other Eastern Religious systems. I retract this claim.

No i don't believe christian theologians so much stole the idea - just that there is a cetain syncretism that occurs in the emergence of systems of belief. The parallels between the Adam/Eve and Tree story and the Vedic story of the Tree of Jiva and Atman are obvious. The Emporer Asoka sent Buddhist missionaries as far west as Greece three hundred years BCE...could this have been the source of the compassionate streak within Judaism that emerged as christianity?

Likewise the idea of trinity metaphysics...it explains a lot about the 'nature of being'...ie God.

[Cathar1950]

First of all before we can decide rather the Trinity doctrine or formation is rational is to have a rational definition of this god stuff and one for person without making them a special case or plea. One formula has the Father being the ground of all being or is the source of the Son and the Spirit making the god-stuff redundant.
I see the Trinitarian problem, besides the Greek Fathers, as a result of Jesus being claimed as divine, God or the Son of God outside a second temple Hebrew context.
I think there is a case to be made that once Yahweh was the son of El so it would make more mythological sense if Jesus was the son of either Yahweh or El and if he were the son of El then he could also be Yahweh.
Just to be honest about my bias, the only rational conception or idea is an Adoptionists view and only if it is mean metaphorically.

.Father like Son is being used metaphorically and shouldnt represent God or any actualities.
I think models of God are ways we metaphorically related to God that are grounded in your own human experiences.. God as Father, God as Mother, God as Son, God as Friend, God as Lover, God as Judge, God as Savior, and so on are all on equally metaphorical footing, and as much so as any mask, person or however you want to define things so it makes sense to you, and rather then help understand God, it limits God to three rather arbitrary metaphors and leads to all kinds of wordy philosophical gymnastics and obscures meaning as definitions are shuffled.

It might be better to look at it as what could happen if you take a Hebrew god, God and turn Him into a Greek God so they could make Jesus divine and still claim to be monotheists.

One problem I see with Biblical faith or Biblical foundations for argument is that they treat passages or concepts in the Bible as facts and facts to be explained and incorporated even before concretion of reality, experience and existence treating what is contained as data or fact that is primary.
The author of John says Jesus said He and the Father are one without taking into account the ideas of Father and Son are metaphors not the grounds of all being or literal facts about God or the universe.
Not only is there the fact Jesus might not have said such a thing there is also the fact that the author or Jesus could have been wrong. I find it an odd way to approach claims about the world where you first make a claim and then try to make everything fit as you ignore the elements that dont fit or redefine them so they do.
It isnt enough that he has to be at one with the Father and in agreement now he has to be made of the same undefined god-stuff. It seems if God or the ground of all being already is included with everything as it is the ground of all being or existence. Not only would Jesus be made of the same god-stuff but so would everything else.
I find it amusing the pains that are suffered to make the irrational rational when a better approach is to do away with the flawed doctrine altogether by not taking metaphors literally and be forced to redefine God.
Another problem is that the God that is the ground of all being is not the same as the God of the Bible, namely El, Yahweh, Elohim or Jesus and what we see is attempt to make the concepts conform.
The God that is outside of time and space is no the God of the Bible where even God is not a theistic god.
I cant help but see that it looks like abstractions are being mistaken for concrete reality and then the blurring of distinctions


What is the substance or God stuff that makes up God and the godhead?
Anachronistic and less developed but still the Trinitarian doctrine.
I tend to think it is irrational in its claim that Jesus and God are of the same undefined god stuff. This essence they want to call being which can easily be confused with person or individual.

Developed, redefined, reformulated, It sees to me that will and relationality are a part of the essence or being and they dont transience as much as the are grounded and emerge. It sounds like you are getting substance, being and person all mixed up trying to make sense out of the senseless.
I have no problem understanding the fideism inherent in the Trinitarian doctrine and it is when it is moved from the abstract to making claims about the concrete and anything outside out the fidelistic system we need to have better explanations and grounds.

The problem with transcendence is once you remove the grounds from which it transcends it disappears or no longer exists except as an ideal or abstraction.
I see many approaches starting with transcendence trying to work its way down and in the process creating unexplained dualisms.

theopoesis wrote:

Furthermore, your depictions of the Trinity seems a bit off (though I grant it does sound a bit Augustinian and I wouldn't be surprised to find it in On the Trinity I do believe Augustine and the West has fallen short of the East here, as said clearly in the OP). If the Father is the knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the act of knowing, it seems the Trinity would be three aspects of one being, and not three persons subsisting in one being. This is not the orthodox position.

Off, I dont see any we have agreed were on as of yet. We are under no obligation to neither be orthodox nor reject others because they are not orthodox. This might be were fideism might pose a problem. All we see are a bunch of ifs.
That it isnt the orthodox position is irrelevant to it being off or on, correct or rational.

theopoesis wrote:

Also, granting a precedent for the Trinity in terms of the threeness of being is no problem for me. My question is regarding personhood, and it is there that the Trinity as a doctrine succeeds or fails.

It sounds like you are trying to hang the whole argument on personhood as if you were successful then you solved the Trinity problem. It doesnt work that way but good luck anyway. It doesnt all hang on person-hood as t is connected to the god-stuff and the two need to cohere. And yet it can all still fail.

heopoesis wrote:

I also appreciate your second statement. I agree that, apart from Trinitarian presuppositions, personhood is an illusion. However, if we attempt to build a concept of personhood ecclessially and theologically we must have the Trinity, and this Trinity is not illogical. You've made some assertions with little to back it up, but your conclusion ultimately affirms my position. No Trinity, no personhood.

There is no apart from. There is no inherent reason why we must have the Trinity and person-hood and ecclesiastics are not dependent upon the Trinity and the Trinity can be as illogical as you want to make it. The only think that has been affirmed is you ability to further obscure the doctrine where now you can even define what it is to be a person.

[Cathar1950]

The assertion was in fact a misunderstanding. I thought you implied an equality between Hindu and Christian metaphysics, but it seems you did not intend to suggest an identity between the two. I understood you as trying to say Christians stole the idea from Hinduism and other Eastern Religious systems. I retract this claim.

No i don't believe christian theologians so much stole the idea - just that there is a cetain syncretism that occurs in the emergence of systems of belief. The parallels between the Adam/Eve and Tree story and the Vedic story of the Tree of Jiva and Atman are obvious. The Emporer Asoka sent Buddhist missionaries as far west as Greece three hundred years BCE...could this have been the source of the compassionate streak within Judaism that emerged as christianity?

Likewise the idea of trinity metaphysics...it explains a lot about the 'nature of being'...ie God.

The problem with taking metaphors seriously.
I like one of the early Trinities Father, Mother and child.
Or the Father and two battling sons.

God the Father, His wife Wisdom the Spirit and the Son.
Then those that want Mary can equate her with Wisdom or the Logos which is also the son.