The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[theopoesis]

First of all before we can decide rather the Trinity doctrine or formation is rational is to have a rational definition of this god stuff and one for person without making them a special case or plea. One formula has the Father being the ground of all being or is the source of the Son and the Spirit making the god-stuff redundant.

I think we can escape this need if God is a Trinitarian God. You see, in your objection here you claim that we need to begin with being, that is, with a discussion of "this God stuff." God as the "ground of all being" would seem to give ontology precedent. In short, you assume a perspective that is contrary to Trinitarian thought. However, we must recognize that if God subsists in three Persons, it is perfectly appropriate to begin with God as a person and not as a substance.

I think one helpful element here is the role of experience and worship in theology. Quite often, theological debates are shaped within liturgical contexts. For example, Nestorianism was combatted largely as a result of liturgical experiences by Christians in expressing devotion to Christ born as God in Mary. The Trinity, to a larger degree, emerged not only out of philosophical and theological discussions of particular texts, but out of experiences of individual Christians. Jesus was experienced as a divine person through whom salvation was possible. The Father was experienced as a divine person whose sovereign guidance of the cosmos brought meaning out of the chaos. The Holy Spirit was experienced as the Personal presence of God in and through worship and the sacraments. More than that, Christians experienced God as Three Persons while feeling themselves to be persons.

This reality points to what Charles Taylor (a noted scholar of secularism) calls "social imaginaries." Particular narratives, experiences, practices, texts, ideas, etc develop into a collective means of orientation in the world which effects individuals prior to their rational analysis of the world as it is. Historically speaking, the Christian experience of God as Three Persons relating to individual Christians as persons was a new social imaginary from which the concept of Personhood and the Trinity emerged. To speak of personalism apart from the Trinity is, therefore, to undermine the experiences and language from which personalism emerged. Therefore, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is intricately linked to the very language and experience of personalism and, thus, to demand an a priori definition of person apart from Trinitarianism is to divorce the person from its historical sources of origination. (The Greek Paterfamilias was the previous conception of society... or one among many. These variants were not variants of personhood as such).

To the Trinitarian Christian, God as Three Persons is not the "special plea" that you make it out to be. Instead, it is the experience (grounded in philsophy, theology, reason, tradition, and holy texts) or relationality independent of being. The question of the persons of the Godhead is no special plea, but is critically linked with personalism/personhood.

I see the Trinitarian problem, besides the Greek Fathers, as a result of Jesus being claimed as divine, God or the Son of God outside a second temple Hebrew context.
I think there is a case to be made that once Yahweh was the son of El so it would make more mythological sense if Jesus was the son of either Yahweh or El and if he were the son of El then he could also be Yahweh.

To be sure, a strong argument can be made that Trinitarianism is against the dominant strain of second temple judaism. But I believe you go too far in claiming that the Trinitarian development is entirely outside of the second temple Hebrew context. In fact, there are many latent trends than can be considered entirely contiguous with Trinitarian thought. Consider: the emergence of Judaism as playing a powerful role in Alexandria (Philo, the LXX, etc) which began to incorporate an allegorical hermeneutic as well as Greek philosophical terms, the emergence of emphasis on metatron as a unique, unparalleled (and sometimes worshipped) angelic intermediator between God and human beings, the development of the synagogue and rabbis as a propositional variant of liturgical/sacrificial judaism, the presence of iconic varieties of judaism whose icons often mirrored Christian developments (i'm thinking specifically of several archaeological discoveries of the "pantocrator" in synagogues and churches alike), the emphasis in Judaism on a God who is transcendent, and yet who is experienced personally (think Moses, Jeremiah, Hanina ben Dosa). These developments in judaism (not to mention contentious OT interpretations) provide ample room for exploring how Trinitarian conceptions are both coherent with and divergent from second Temple judaism.

In point of fact, Trinitarian Christianity did emerge from the second Temple context, and not outside of it, so to fully claim a divorce is both historically myopic and reductionistic, insofar as it ignores actual historical trajectories and real historical variations.

Just to be honest about my bias, the only rational conception or idea is an Adoptionists view and only if it is mean metaphorically.

I appreciate being up front about biases. I believe all people have them, and they do shape discourse. I believe I was fairly obvious in the OP with my Trinitarian bias, but I will label it "bias" now.

.Father like Son is being used metaphorically and shouldnt represent God or any actualities.
I think models of God are ways we metaphorically related to God that are grounded in your own human experiences.. God as Father, God as Mother, God as Son, God as Friend, God as Lover, God as Judge, God as Savior, and so on are all on equally metaphorical footing, and as much so as any mask, person or however you want to define things so it makes sense to you, and rather then help understand God, it limits God to three rather arbitrary metaphors and leads to all kinds of wordy philosophical gymnastics and obscures meaning as definitions are shuffled.

I agree that much Biblical language is metaphor, but even if we concede that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are metaphors, it is safe to say that they are metaphors of a completely unique caliber. This is true on a Scriptural, experiential, and liturgical level.

Scripturally, the formula "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" emerge in a sort of proto-Trinitarian formula in degrees that other names do not. We do not see a formulaic connection between judge, friend, and lover. Similarly, we see the Son, the Father, and the Holy Spirit filling functional roles that other names do not do. The doctrine of the Trinity developed in conjunction with the doctrine of Soteriology (that is, the understanding of salvation works). This is known as the economic Trinity (as opposed to the imminent Trinity which focuses on metaphysics). Specific questions from the Scriptures guided the development of the Trinity. For example: how could God both be the one receiving and dispensing judgment?; How could God maintain transcendence and yet relate personally to the Christian? How can God be present with us while Jesus has ascended? These questions related to the Father, Son, and Spirit in critical ways according to critical texts that metaphors like "lover" and "friend" do not.

Experientially, and I have already discussed this, the Father, Son, and Spirit were experienced as persons. Other metaphors, such as lover, friend, and judge, are roles and not personal titles, so as personhood developed experientially (in the "social imagination") the personal titles were emphasized over other titles.

Liturgically, the Biblical formula from Matthew 28 - "baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit" - was incorporated into Christian rituals of baptism, eucharist, and marriage. In short, the entire liturgical experience of the Christian community was shaped, using Biblical language according to Biblical mandates, in ways that each individual Christian could not experience Christianity apart from the particularity of the Father, Son, and Spirit.

Can you really claim that other names ("metaphors") played a comparable role in Scripture, experience, and liturgy? Did they play as substantial of a role in tradition and reason? Arguably (and a strong argument at that), no.

It might be better to look at it as what could happen if you take a Hebrew god, God and turn Him into a Greek God so they could make Jesus divine and still claim to be monotheists.

This seems to be a simplification of history.

One problem I see with Biblical faith or Biblical foundations for argument is that they treat passages or concepts in the Bible as facts and facts to be explained and incorporated even before concretion of reality, experience and existence treating what is contained as data or fact that is primary.

This is true in some cases, but I do not think it is true in mine. I have argued extensively across the forum (I have directed you to one place where this is the case) that "facts" cannot exist apart from particular instantiations of particular rationalities. In short, "facts" cannot exist apart from experience, faith, and existence. Above, I explained how the Trinity developed in conjunction with "Reality." More importantly, the OP suggests that being/reality is itself subordinate to personhood, which itself indicates that particular persons whose wills are shaped in particular ways shape being itself. Thus, the "facts" cannot help but be shaped by experiences.

That being said, the Christian assumes that the Bible is shaped by the Persons of the Trinity through and through (the NT is written by humans inspired by the Holy Spirit, under the Sovereign plan of God, concerning the personal acts fo the Son of God in Jesus of Nazareth). Thus, facts in Biblical terms are already embedded in personal existence.

The author of John says Jesus said He and the Father are one without taking into account the ideas of Father and Son are metaphors not the grounds of all being or literal facts about God or the universe.
Not only is there the fact Jesus might not have said such a thing there is also the fact that the author or Jesus could have been wrong. I find it an odd way to approach claims about the world where you first make a claim and then try to make everything fit as you ignore the elements that dont fit or redefine them so they do.

I have challenged the metaphor critique above.

I also have argued extensively that the faith commitment is pre-rational, or a-rational, and shapes all further reason. All rationalities have a priori assumptions which in turn shape conclusions. A clear example is above (and below) in your discussion of the "stuff" of God, where you continue to manifest a materialist perspective through demanding the primacy of being. The question of being must be answered first, prior to the question of persons. The problem is that such a claim is rooted in non-deductive methods, in the pre-rational or non-rational.

I do not deny that first principles shape all subsequent claims. But in calling such an admission odd, it seems that you do. In my opinion, this simply makes me more aware of my biases than you are of yours (assuming, that is, that I can correctly identify my first principles).

I have argued these things more thoroughly with scourge99 elsewhere, and can direct you there if you are interested.

It isnt enough that he has to be at one with the Father and in agreement now he has to be made of the same undefined god-stuff. It seems if God or the ground of all being already is included with everything as it is the ground of all being or existence. Not only would Jesus be made of the same god-stuff but so would everything else.

The patristic theologians were well aware of what issues you address here. If you read Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, or Maximus the Confessor, you will get a clear sense of this.

What's more, the patristic thinkers developed clear answers to these questions. Being proceeds from persons, that is, from God. But being is also critically linked with "goodness." This is partly Biblical (insofar as God created everything good), and partly philosophical, insofar as evil is defined as a deficiency of being. In patristic thought, human beings were created with a level of goodness which could be maintained or destroyed through the use of the will. It was a personal understanding of goodness and being. The further one drifts from goodness, the less being one has.

How is this related? For starters, we are all united to God in our being, in our goodness, because God is the source of all being and goodness. However, we are differentiated in terms of being through our various degrees of goodness. Distinct persons exist beyond (or despite) levels of being, but in terms of being, unity was recognized. The three Persons of the Trinity were understood to have maximal goodness, and therefore maximal being, and therefore maximal ontological equivalence. The human is gradually purified through Christ toward maximal goodness, but this process is an eternal progression, a traversing of the infinite, which is called (variously) "divinitation" or "theosis" or "theopoiesis" or "epectesy." Salvation is a gradual increase in the participation of the relational Trinity, whereby our being emanating from our will grows ever more similar to the being of God.

I find it amusing the pains that are suffered to make the irrational rational when a better approach is to do away with the flawed doctrine altogether by not taking metaphors literally and be forced to redefine God.

I do not yet see any substantiated claims of irrationality.

Another problem is that the God that is the ground of all being is not the same as the God of the Bible, namely El, Yahweh, Elohim or Jesus and what we see is attempt to make the concepts conform.
The God that is outside of time and space is no the God of the Bible where even God is not a theistic god.

I find it amusing that you require in your first statement that we begin with ontology, or the "stuff" of God, and then you define this "stuff" as "the ground of all being" and then you claim that God as "the ground of all being" is not the Biblical picture of God. This is precisely my point in the OP. The Biblical God is a personal God: El, Yahweh, or Jesus being known personally through actions in this world or realm of being. Trinitarian thought focuses on personalism. Your alternate proposal is shot down here by your own words.

I cant help but see that it looks like abstractions are being mistaken for concrete reality and then the blurring of distinctions

Which distinctions are blurred? I have maintained that a proper being/personhood, essence/existence dichotomy is only possible given the Christian understanding of the person. I have claimed that to miss this fact is to blur the lines. Have you proposed an alternative analysis?

What is the substance or God stuff that makes up God and the godhead?
Anachronistic and less developed but still the Trinitarian doctrine.
I tend to think it is irrational in its claim that Jesus and God are of the same undefined god stuff. This essence they want to call being which can easily be confused with person or individual.

I am not sure where the confusion comes in. Can you explain where you are confused?

My claim has been that persons are identical to being if there is a priority of ontology. The divergence of the two is possible given the priority of persons. You assert the contrary here without any elaboration. Can you respond to any of my arguments (other than tangentially about the nature of metaphor)?

Developed, redefined, reformulated, It sees to me that will and relationality are a part of the essence or being and they dont transience as much as the are grounded and emerge. It sounds like you are getting substance, being and person all mixed up trying to make sense out of the senseless.

If will and relationality are part of essence or being, can you illustrate how will actually is differentiated from being? If will is an emergent property of being, can we say that will operates independently of being, or does will result deterministically from being? By what means does will escape being's non-willed (i.e. deterministic) causality?

You accuse me of confusion, but make no specific claim and offer no specific alternative. Your arguments are tangential (metaphor, Greek vs. Jewish origination) or are simply assertions of the inverse of my argument (we must start with the "stuff" of God) followed by rejections of your own inverse.

I have no problem understanding the fideism inherent in the Trinitarian doctrine and it is when it is moved from the abstract to making claims about the concrete and anything outside out the fidelistic system we need to have better explanations and grounds.

It is impossible to ground any system completely free from fideistic (i.e. pre-rational, or non-rational) elements. Once the assumptions are made fideistically, then rationality arises from whence we can judge the presuppositions in terms of coherence. I have argued that the notion of personhood is only conceptually defensible within particular fideistic assumptions about being/personhood interpreted in light of the Trinity. You reject fideism, but you do not address the result of the rationality which emerges from Christian Trinitarian axioms (i.e. doctrine) apart from critiquing the axioms and accusing a lack of "explanations and grounds."

Which explanations and what grounds are invalid?

The problem with transcendence is once you remove the grounds from which it transcends it disappears or no longer exists except as an ideal or abstraction.
I see many approaches starting with transcendence trying to work its way down and in the process creating unexplained dualisms.

The problem with your objection is you assume the conclusion. Christians begin with personhood/will and move to being/existence. In defining the transcended as "grounded in being" you assume the very primacy of ontology that Christian theism rejects. Christians assume the Primacy of persons, whereby being originates from will. The OP questions whether such an assumption/definition removes any challenge to the logic of the Trinity, and then argues that apart from such an assumption, the notion of being and personhood cannot be maintained as autonomous conceptions. You accuse "unexplained dualisms" but I accuse you of "unavoidable monism."

Do you have a response, or just the ability to assert what you assume?

theopoesis wrote:

Furthermore, your depictions of the Trinity seems a bit off (though I grant it does sound a bit Augustinian and I wouldn't be surprised to find it in On the Trinity I do believe Augustine and the West has fallen short of the East here, as said clearly in the OP). If the Father is the knower, the Son the known, and the Holy Spirit the act of knowing, it seems the Trinity would be three aspects of one being, and not three persons subsisting in one being. This is not the orthodox position.

Off, I dont see any we have agreed were on as of yet. We are under no obligation to neither be orthodox nor reject others because they are not orthodox. This might be were fideism might pose a problem. All we see are a bunch of ifs.
That it isnt the orthodox position is irrelevant to it being off or on, correct or rational.

You take my response out of the context of the post I was replying to, my original post, or my subsequent response to bernee. I understood bernee as attempting to equate Hindu metaphysics with Christian Trinitarian metaphysics. To establish such an identity, orthodox presentations of the Trinity would need to be presented. Bernee has clarified, and I have retracted.

theopoesis wrote:

Also, granting a precedent for the Trinity in terms of the threeness of being is no problem for me. My question is regarding personhood, and it is there that the Trinity as a doctrine succeeds or fails.

It sounds like you are trying to hang the whole argument on personhood as if you were successful then you solved the Trinity problem. It doesnt work that way but good luck anyway. It doesnt all hang on person-hood as t is connected to the god-stuff and the two need to cohere. And yet it can all still fail.

The whole argument does hang on personhood. The formula is "one being, three persons." If personhood is either undifferentiable from being, or a vacuous terms, the formula automatically fails. If not, the formula is logically possible. It may not be definitively the best option, but it is an acceptable faith option. The question of "metaphor" is peripheral.

theopoesis wrote:

I also appreciate your second statement. I agree that, apart from Trinitarian presuppositions, personhood is an illusion. However, if we attempt to build a concept of personhood ecclessially and theologically we must have the Trinity, and this Trinity is not illogical. You've made some assertions with little to back it up, but your conclusion ultimately affirms my position. No Trinity, no personhood.

There is no apart from. There is no inherent reason why we must have the Trinity and person-hood and ecclesiastics are not dependent upon the Trinity and the Trinity can be as illogical as you want to make it. The only think that has been affirmed is you ability to further obscure the doctrine where now you can even define what it is to be a person.

You call the Trinity "illogical" but I do not see where there are any specific claims of faulty logic. Can you present anything concrete?

Furthermore, you say I obscure doctrine, but I am presenting the original doctrine the vast majority of which has been prevalent in the East since the 4th century. I do not obscure. Either it began as obscure, or it continues unobscure.

Also...

Person: a will independent of being subsisting in relation to other persons, both human and divine.

Being: that which emanates from will/Persons within which persons relate and whose properties/nature defines the nature and properties of the relationship between the Persons therein.

Alternately, can you define personhood and being, keeping them categorically distinct while maintaining a critique against the Trinity as being "illogical"? That was the OP question. Still no answers.

[theopoesis]

it was said that the message of christ is a simple one,yet it takes millions of words by many many men to explain the trinity. the only "evidence" for a trinity are verses by someone other than jesus that are ambigous at best jesus never made a claim that he was God.

It is often said that the Trinity is intrinsically illogical, yet the common responses to its logical presentation are trite one-liners full of pat arguments that completely ignore the OP.

[theopoesis]

One further possible definition of person and being:

Person: an entity operating in a realm of freedom

Being: a realm of necessity emerging from free action of persons.


If being operates under necessity, can freedom emerge from necessity?

If persons operate freely, can necessity emerge from freedom?

These are the two questions we must address, and which have (predominantly, with McCulloch as perhaps an exception) been sidestepped.

[Jester]

Moderator Comment

Funny, you invent a concept("personhood")that requires belief in your version of a god(Trinitarianism), then insult all who don't buy it as "intellectually bankrupt". I find that offensive.

Regardless of the rudeness of others, this is outside the rules. Please report incivility, rather than responding in kind.

[Jester]

Moderator Comment

That's rich coming from one who argues that imagining something means that something exists.

Same as above. This neither assists your point nor earns you respect from those who happen by.

[Goat]

First of all before we can decide rather the Trinity doctrine or formation is rational is to have a rational definition of this god stuff and one for person without making them a special case or plea. One formula has the Father being the ground of all being or is the source of the Son and the Spirit making the god-stuff redundant.

I think we can escape this need if God is a Trinitarian God. You see, in your objection here you claim that we need to begin with being, that is, with a discussion of "this God stuff." God as the "ground of all being" would seem to give ontology precedent. In short, you assume a perspective that is contrary to Trinitarian thought. However, we must recognize that if God subsists in three Persons, it is perfectly appropriate to begin with God as a person and not as a substance.

That sounds like a lot of 'wordiness' to justify thing. Another way would just to say that Jesus was not God, and accept the concept that the term 'Son of God' mean a very righteous person.

It seems to me that calling God 'The ground of all being' is doublespeak. It sounds impressive, but semantically, it is undefined, except by uses terms that have high emotional content, and low semantic value.

I think one helpful element here is the role of experience and worship in theology. Quite often, theological debates are shaped within liturgical contexts. For example, Nestorianism was combatted largely as a result of liturgical experiences by Christians in expressing devotion to Christ born as God in Mary. The Trinity, to a larger degree, emerged not only out of philosophical and theological discussions of particular texts, but out of experiences of individual Christians.

Can you show that the 'liturgical context' is something more than high emotional content with low semantic value? I would like to see how you can show that the trinity concept came out of the experiences of individual Christians. That claim seems to have high emotional appeal, but can you show it to be true?

Jesus was experienced as a divine person through whom salvation was possible. The Father was experienced as a divine person whose sovereign guidance of the cosmos brought meaning out of the chaos. The Holy Spirit was experienced as the Personal presence of God in and through worship and the sacraments. More than that, Christians experienced God as Three Persons while feeling themselves to be persons.

And was not this experience shaped by words with high emotional appeal? How does this appeal to 'experience' relate to 'trinity or person hood'. Could it be he was experienced as 'divine person through whom salvation was possible because they were told that is what they were going to experience?>

This reality points to what Charles Taylor (a noted scholar of secularism) calls "social imaginaries." Particular narratives, experiences, practices, texts, ideas, etc develop into a collective means of orientation in the world which effects individuals prior to their rational analysis of the world as it is. Historically speaking, the Christian experience of God as Three Persons relating to individual Christians as persons was a new social imaginary from which the concept of Personhood and the Trinity emerged. To speak of personalism apart from the Trinity is, therefore, to undermine the experiences and language from which personalism emerged. Therefore, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is intricately linked to the very language and experience of personalism and, thus, to demand an a priori definition of person apart from Trinitarianism is to divorce the person from its historical sources of origination. (The Greek Paterfamilias was the previous conception of society... or one among many. These variants were not variants of personhood as such).

Well, Taylor would say the experiences were imaginary. .. so what he said is not relevant. It sounds like the experiences are what people were told to expect, and then got interpreted through the filter of social conditioning. When it comes to what you mean by 'person hood' in that context is not clear to me. It seems to be overly complicated word play.

To the Trinitarian Christian, God as Three Persons is not the "special plea" that you make it out to be. Instead, it is the experience (grounded in philsophy, theology, reason, tradition, and holy texts) or relationality independent of being. The question of the persons of the Godhead is no special plea, but is critically linked with personalism/personhood.

For something that is to be for the masses, the explanation seems to be overly complicated, contorted and not well explained. That is probably why it is called a 'Mystery', cause it just plain does not make sense. It seems that the words are very much mystification, rather than a coherent concept.

I see lots of lots of words, yet, the meaning of those words are not obvious.

[Cathar1950]

(1) If personhood is rooted in being, 3 persons = 3 beings.

OK, this is good. Let's start with something easily understood. I am a person and I am a being. From my perspective personhood and being are roughly synonymous.

(2) If 3 persons = 3 beings, then statement 3 persons = 1 being is illogical. This is the objection of many non-theists to the Trinity.

Great! You understand where we are.

(3) If personhood is rooted in being, the idea of the person adds nothing to the idea of the body or the social role. Thus, if personhood is rooted in being, personhood is a vacuous philosophical concept.

In philosophy, the term being, is typically understood as one's state of being, and hence its common meaning is in the context of personal experience, with aspects that involve expressions and manifestations coming from a being's innate being, or personal character. A person is most broadly defined as any individual self-conscious or rational being. I see these two terms as being rather closely linked. I don't see how the subtle distinction linking these two terms renders personhood to be a vacuous concept.

(4) Christian theology claims personhood is not rooted in being. (I cited Zizioulas interpreting the Cappadocian Fathers here). This focuses on the essence/existence divide in philosophy.

This is where we part company. I disagree with the Christian theological claim that personhood is not rooted in being. Can you explain why you conclude that personhood is not rooted in being?

(5) If personhood is not rooted in being, 3 persons need not equal three beings.
(6) If three persons need not equal three beings, 3 persons = 1 being is not illogical.
(7) If personhood is not rooted in being, personhood can have meaning above and beyond bodily being or social being.

Agreed. I'm still stuck on step 4.

I would not label thinkers such as Martin Buber as being vacuous, would you?

heopoesis wrote:

(1) If personhood is rooted in being, 3 persons = 3 beings.

There sure seems to be lot of ifs but little in definitions; or at least consistent and coherent definitions.
What if it means being? Then 3 beings equal 1 being.
God-stuff is not God and by confusing the two you try and avoid the charge that you are not monotheists. I on the other hand dont think monotheism is the default and it assumes non-monotheisms.

The ground of all being might be something like the stuff everything comes from like getting down to the bottom of things and seeing what everything is really made form. Of course it seems like the Universe is interrelated and all comes down to one unifying way of looking at the whole, at least in theory. Maybe it isnt just one unifying principle, maybe it is two? They seem to want to make it just three because someone wrote it in a collection of writings and the formula or ritual becomes the definition of God.


I tend to think the focus on personalism is a step backwards for an understanding of God, Jesus, the Holy Spirit and an ancient understanding of the Hebrew writings and consequent Christian writings, before More Greek influences and the Greek Fathers where a more relative and social focus would be more productive.
Jacob is not so much of a person as he is a metaphor for a people as Abraham is not so much of a person as he represents fathers and the father of nations. He once represented the Elohim(meaning the gods and the worship of ancestors before becoming personalized as God and equated with El and Yahweh, the writing comes after the coalescence) as exalted father or even El as their fatherly god and is later used to represent a nation, family and dynasty and its justifications.
I guess if we are going to look at rational the Mormons and Unitarians are a more rational approach or solution to the problem which the Christian formation creates.
It sure would be nice if you guys would give the source of your claims, interpretation or formation so we didnt have to think you were just jumping around sticking in anything you think sounds good enough to you, plus it might help us know what you mean when you use your words and phrases that give you such emotional and doctrinal satisfaction and keep getting reworked with every objection until we can hardly remember where we started; the Christians problematic creation because of doctrine and a selective reading and interpretation of passages where metaphors have been taken literally.
Give the context and content of you responses I can only imagine that Educhris and theopoesis should be just talking to each other until they figure it out and agree then they can work it out with all the Christians that still dont agree. Or let mysteries remain mysteries and stop claiming they are rational and factual and except to the Trinitarian Christians and the number of variations formations, are vacuous.

It would be closer to history if you looked at Christian person-hood or personalism as a response or even Christian invention because of the failure of the Trinity to make sense.
It is an attempted solution to a problem of their making.

Person hood or what ever they want to mean by person is not dependent upon the Trinitarian formation and in fact person-hood is already assumed. I am not sure what kind of word game they are playing to make person-hood disappear and dependent upon the Trinity but it sure sounds sophist.

Person is only a vacuous or redundant term because the Trinitarian formation has made it so rather then Mask being an anachronistic meaning ("mask) or less developed it is clearer and more basic.
They take a metaphor like Father and Son and turn it into a literal definition of God

[theopoesis]

First of all before we can decide rather the Trinity doctrine or formation is rational is to have a rational definition of this god stuff and one for person without making them a special case or plea. One formula has the Father being the ground of all being or is the source of the Son and the Spirit making the god-stuff redundant.

I think we can escape this need if God is a Trinitarian God. You see, in your objection here you claim that we need to begin with being, that is, with a discussion of "this God stuff." God as the "ground of all being" would seem to give ontology precedent. In short, you assume a perspective that is contrary to Trinitarian thought. However, we must recognize that if God subsists in three Persons, it is perfectly appropriate to begin with God as a person and not as a substance.

That sounds like a lot of 'wordiness' to justify thing. Another way would just to say that Jesus was not God, and accept the concept that the term 'Son of God' mean a very righteous person.

It seems to me that calling God 'The ground of all being' is doublespeak. It sounds impressive, but semantically, it is undefined, except by uses terms that have high emotional content, and low semantic value.

I explicitly reject ontologically oriented definitions of God, i.e. "the ground of all being."

You opinion as to Jesus not being God is acceptable. The OP clearly offered the non-personal non-Trinitarian option as one viable option. But Cathar is trying to present an ontological personalism that is not tenable.

"Wordiness" neither validates nor invalidates a position.

I think one helpful element here is the role of experience and worship in theology. Quite often, theological debates are shaped within liturgical contexts. For example, Nestorianism was combatted largely as a result of liturgical experiences by Christians in expressing devotion to Christ born as God in Mary. The Trinity, to a larger degree, emerged not only out of philosophical and theological discussions of particular texts, but out of experiences of individual Christians.

Can you show that the 'liturgical context' is something more than high emotional content with low semantic value? I would like to see how you can show that the trinity concept came out of the experiences of individual Christians. That claim seems to have high emotional appeal, but can you show it to be true?

The experiential argument was to indicate that Trinitarian thought on personhood was not a "special plea." Not to substantiate my position on being and ontology. Further, the comments were in light of Cathar's larger emphasis on grounding "facts" in experience and existence.

As for the Trinity's experiential aspects among Christians, there are widespread examples ranging from the ascetic movements like the cenoebites and anchorites, to the official liturgical practices (through which individual experiences were mediated) as evident in the writings of Hippolytus (most notably) and others.

Jesus was experienced as a divine person through whom salvation was possible. The Father was experienced as a divine person whose sovereign guidance of the cosmos brought meaning out of the chaos. The Holy Spirit was experienced as the Personal presence of God in and through worship and the sacraments. More than that, Christians experienced God as Three Persons while feeling themselves to be persons.

And was not this experience shaped by words with high emotional appeal? How does this appeal to 'experience' relate to 'trinity or person hood'. Could it be he was experienced as 'divine person through whom salvation was possible because they were told that is what they were going to experience

Contextually, the argument is in terms of the "special plea" charge. The experience simply shows that you cannot divorce a theoretical idea (the Trinity/personhood) from its historical context, which includes the development of Christian worship.

In some cases, the experience could certainly have been through the power of suggestion. I was linking experience with theory, but conversely theory intersects with experience. It is nearly impossible to fully divorce the aspects from one another.

This reality points to what Charles Taylor (a noted scholar of secularism) calls "social imaginaries." Particular narratives, experiences, practices, texts, ideas, etc develop into a collective means of orientation in the world which effects individuals prior to their rational analysis of the world as it is. Historically speaking, the Christian experience of God as Three Persons relating to individual Christians as persons was a new social imaginary from which the concept of Personhood and the Trinity emerged. To speak of personalism apart from the Trinity is, therefore, to undermine the experiences and language from which personalism emerged. Therefore, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is intricately linked to the very language and experience of personalism and, thus, to demand an a priori definition of person apart from Trinitarianism is to divorce the person from its historical sources of origination. (The Greek Paterfamilias was the previous conception of society... or one among many. These variants were not variants of personhood as such).

Well, Taylor would say the experiences were imaginary. .. so what he said is not relevant. It sounds like the experiences are what people were told to expect, and then got interpreted through the filter of social conditioning. When it comes to what you mean by 'person hood' in that context is not clear to me. It seems to be overly complicated word play.

Equivocation with regard to Taylor, and a superficial reading both of my post and of philosophy. So what you said is not relevant.

Also, if this argument seems less clear, I wonder why it was the only one you chose to respond to, ignoring the OP and all other previous posts I've made as well as any subsequent posts, and any subsequent arguments within that post. Cherry picking, perhaps?

To the Trinitarian Christian, God as Three Persons is not the "special plea" that you make it out to be. Instead, it is the experience (grounded in philsophy, theology, reason, tradition, and holy texts) or relationality independent of being. The question of the persons of the Godhead is no special plea, but is critically linked with personalism/personhood.

For something that is to be for the masses, the explanation seems to be overly complicated, contorted and not well explained. That is probably why it is called a 'Mystery', cause it just plain does not make sense. It seems that the words are very much mystification, rather than a coherent concept.

I see lots of lots of words, yet, the meaning of those words are not obvious.

I do wonder what brings you to this thread. You ignore any arguments central to my perspective, ignore the OP questions, ignore the issues of personhood and ontology, and dissect a particular argument concerning "special pleas", ultimately dismissing Charles Taylor, who is the lynchpin of the entire argument, without a single comment. The argument is that the Trinity is a conceptual manifestation of a societal change in terms of ideas concerning what it means to be an individual and in terms of ideas concerning what God is. This shift is grounded in experience and thought. Therefore, the Trinity was not a special plea, but a fundamental societal shift.

Then, having failed to address any central argument, answer any central question, or raise your own theory, you call the argument (which you have failed to even comprehend) "complicated, contorted, and not well explained."

Perhaps I did not explain it well, but perhaps if you do not understand an argument, you can observe until you do or ask questions for clarification before you raise ephemeral objections?

[theopoesis]

theopoesis wrote:

(1) If personhood is rooted in being, 3 persons = 3 beings.

There sure seems to be lot of ifs but little in definitions; or at least consistent and coherent definitions.
What if it means being? Then 3 beings equal 1 being.

This is precisely the point of the OP. If personhood means being, personhood essentially has no philosophical content that being does not add and should be dropped. The non-theist's objection, then, should be to the use of a term: "person". This term is vacuous. However, the non-theist then must abandon anything even bordering on personalism. They are left with determinism.

On the other hand, if the Christian assumes that persons exist, and thereby have the right understanding of ontology, then the Trinity is not inherently illogical.

The argument is conditional, so I begin with "if." "If" signifies conditions, and you (and everyone on the entire thread) has failed to address the conditions to which I refer. The three questions of the OP are:

(1) IF persons exist, can we say the Trinity is illogical by the three does not equal one fallacy?
(2) Can persons exist apart from Trinitarian conceptions?
(3) Can the non-theist explain personhood?

You have not addressed these questions. Instead, you point to me using "if" in a conditional argument and ignore the argument itself.

Furthermore, I have now offered definitions.

I guess if we are going to look at rational the Mormons and Unitarians are a more rational approach or solution to the problem which the Christian formation creates.

You keep saying that Trinitarianism is not rational, but you have not argued it. Are you incapable of doing so? Lots of opinions, zero attention to the problem of ontology and personalism.

It sure would be nice if you guys would give the source of your claims, interpretation or formation so we didnt have to think you were just jumping around sticking in anything you think sounds good enough to you, plus it might help us know what you mean when you use your words and phrases that give you such emotional and doctrinal satisfaction and keep getting reworked with every objection until we can hardly remember where we started;

I gave a source in my OP: John Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I have repeatedly cited philosophers (Heidegger, Hegel), theologians (Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nazianzus, Origen). What sources do you want? I don't understand how I can do better. Further, what philosopher have you cited?

the Christians problematic creation because of doctrine and a selective reading and interpretation of passages where metaphors have been taken literally.

Give the context and content of you responses I can only imagine that Educhris and theopoesis should be just talking to each other until they figure it out and agree then they can work it out with all the Christians that still dont agree

consider the following statement:

The atheists on this forum seem unwilling to address common philosophical problems of ontology and existence. When you raise the questions, they seem to sidestep any substantive philosophy. Perhaps that is the problematic creation of a soundbite age? We have twitter, so atheists want a twenty-three word summary. Einstein didn't write twenty-three words, Ehrman didn't write twenty-three words, Dawkins didn't write twenty-three words, but the contemporary forum atheist is unfamiliar even with his or her own best thinkers. Instead, they reduce all things to unfounded claims of irrationalism, and the same trite responses.

Is that a productive statement? I say no. Because it is unproductive, I try to avoid such statement. But every other post is a blanket dismissal of theists, spoken as if it was behind our backs but actually presented on a screen right in front of us for all to see. Why make such statements? If you don't want to address arguments but just want to talk smack, why not go to the atheists room?

Is it true? That's another question. You atheists, agnostics, and ignostics repeatedly call the Trinity illogical. Then, when the Trinity is presented in philosophical terms, you sidestep the basic question of the OP and accuse us of "sophistry" or "obfuscation" or "wordiness" without a single response, not one single independent response, to the substance of the argument or to the three questions in the OP. (McCulloch seems to be the only possible exception, and for that I am forever his fan).

Look, if you don't understand, be like McCulloch and ask for clarification. I'm only 26 so I'm sure I have a lot to learn in terms of expressing myself clearly. If you can't understand, then don't go around denouncing the Trinity just because you aren't able to engage in a basic philosophical discussion on ontology and will. If you won't understand, then why are we here? I'd be better of playing wii.

Given the content of our dialogue, maybe I would be better off going to talk with EduChris alone. I have to say, it's extremely frustrating to spend hours on a thread, when no single person bothers to even address the questions of the OP apart from one liner dismissals. It's extremely frustrating when no one actually responds to my arguments, to my responses, or to my ideas directly, but rather picks a small aspect of a larger argument to address, typicaly taken out of context, or sidesteps quoting me altogether and just pastes a few paragraphs of non-sequiturs and non-related critiques.

It would be closer to history if you looked at Christian person-hood or personalism as a response or even Christian invention because of the failure of the Trinity to make sense.
It is an attempted solution to a problem of their making.

This is precisely my point! The idea of a "person" is a Christian invention. The secularist often maintains ideas of the person, but in antiquity prior to Christianity, there were no persons. The human being was just a product of deterministic fate. That is the result of ontological priority. There is no will, choice, or freedom. A person with will, freedom, choice, or any equivalent does not exist apart from Christian thought.

The OP, if anyone cares to ever address it, states this. The question then becomes, can a non-theist affirm the existence of a person, or are we all just trapped in determinism and necessity? If personhood is affirmed, can there possibly be grounds for rejecting the Trinity as illogical?

You restate my argument to condemn me! How clearly I've been understood.

Person hood or what ever they want to mean by person is not dependent upon the Trinitarian formation and in fact person-hood is already assumed. I am not sure what kind of word game they are playing to make person-hood disappear and dependent upon the Trinity but it sure sounds sophist.

You just said personhood was an invention of the Christian because of the dilemma that created the Trinity, and now you say that the Trinity isn't required to explain personhood. Which is it? You, again, shoot down your own argument in the same post. Doesn't leave much for me to do.

If it is sophist, then it is smoke and mirrors. Clear the smoke and mirrors away, address the arguments, and see if they are sophistry or legitimate. Keep sidestepping and you'll get nowhere.

Person is only a vacuous or redundant term because the Trinitarian formation has made it so rather then Mask being an anachronistic meaning ("mask) or less developed it is clearer and more basic.
They take a metaphor like Father and Son and turn it into a literal definition of God

I've addressed the metaphor question above. You ignored the response.

Furthermore, how is "mask" a better explanation of what you are, Cathar? Are you nothing more than a mask? A product of nature masquerading as something free of necessity?

[Slopeshoulder]

theopoesis wrote:

The whole argument does hang on personhood. The formula is "one being, three persons." Person: a will independent of being subsisting in relation to other persons, both human and divine.

*

Being: that which emanates from will/Persons within which persons relate and whose properties/nature defines the nature and properties of the relationship between the Persons therein.

I am not participating in this thread, but as a fascinated reader hanging on every word, may I ask a clarifying question? Forgive me if I seem as thick as a column in a Soho loft:

Something jumped out at me. If I understand correctly, in the christian eastern orthodox view, ontology is not precedent and so one starts presuppositionally (as a chosen rationality) with personhood/will from which being/essence proceeds (as a logically possible/credible/consistent formula for our consideration).

But if the formula is "one being, three persons" as you say (I've always heard it expressed as "one being with or in three persons"), is it in the terms outlined above more accurate/consistent to say "3 persons from whom one being (the Godhead) and later all being proceeds/follows/emerges" than to say "one being with three persons" because the latter makes God's own being prior to personhood? Does God, in this view, have no being per se, until God wills Godself into existence from God's personhood? is not, then, one being with three persons sloppy and inaccurate within this doctrinal line of reasoning?

And, if so, from what and how did pre-existing essential God/personhood/will emerge (not sure we can say "exist" if there is no being yet). Am I correct to assume that this is unaddressible and posited presuppositionally?

Thanks.