The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[EduChris]

...The idea of a "person" is a Christian invention...in antiquity prior to Christianity, there were no persons. The human being was just a product of deterministic fate. That is the result of ontological priority...

Since the question of sources came up, I wanted to quote a source regarding ontological priority:

This assertion of the substantiality of relations, that is, of their ontological independence and possible priority over against the related terms, is the main place at which the metaphysically revolutionary power of the gospel breaks out in Western theology. In the lead of the Greeks, our inherited ways of thinking suppose that there must first be things that in the second place may be variously related. But there is nothing intrinsically obvious about it; in fact, by biblical insight, it is the other way around (Speaking of God: Relational Theology, p. 29 [citing Robert Jensen's The Triune God, p. 147]).

[Slopeshoulder]

Well, someone owes you a reply to these questions. The briefness and lameness of mine simply reflect my lack of expertise in this area, but I offer these in good faith:

1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?

Assuming/positing/presupposing the IF, then no it does not appear illogical. Further, in a world of incomplete and somewhat arbitrary rationalities, it does not seem unreasonable to start with this IF in light of your explanantions.

(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?

Sorry, this is beyond me. But at this point there does seem to be a number of sources and posters who would say no, that it would be tautlogical (?) or vacuous. But that is also based on the presupposition in question 1.

(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

Only by referring to dictionary definitions, common usage and parasitic sourcing if your historical overview is correct. But the question seems open about the understanding of personhood in non-western contexts. No wait, they deny personhood.
But I suppose one could say that etymology is not destiny and that the word is used pragmatically. And that a societal shift based upon trinitarian understanding is not the same as establishing the reality of the trinity. So they are free to use the word.

Editorial: finding this stuff hard is not grounds to dismiss it. I suggest one put up or shut up, ask questions, engage to the limits of one's abilities, talk smack elsewhere or go play Wii. Whatever our POV, topics and attempted discussions like this raise the game and do a great service to this forum.

[theopoesis]

I am not participating in this thread, but as a fascinated reader hanging on every word, may I ask a clarifying question? Forgive me if I seem as thick as a column in a Soho loft:

Something jumped out at me. If I understand correctly, in the christian eastern orthodox view, ontology is not precedent and so one starts presuppositionally (as a chosen rationality) with personhood/will from which being/essence proceeds (as a logically possible/credible/consistent formula for our consideration).

I think that's what I am saying.

But if the formula is "one being, three persons" as you say (I've always heard it expressed as "one being with or in three persons"), is it in the terms outlined above more accurate/consistent to say "3 persons from whom one being (the Godhead) and later all being proceeds/follows/emerges" than to say "one being with three persons" because the latter makes God's own being prior to personhood? Does God, in this view, have no being per se, until God wills Godself into existence from God's personhood? is not, then, one being with three persons sloppy and inaccurate within this doctrinal line of reasoning?

I thought the formula was one being subsisting in three persons. The "in" in the phrase "one being in three persons" implies the "subsisting in." The question of being/personhood of God is more one of logical priority than temporal priority. There never was a time when God was not being, for God is eternal. But being is a consequence of personhood logically. I think that's the way to describe it.

And, if so, from what and how did pre-existing essential God/personhood/will emerge (not sure we can say "exist" if there is no being yet). Am I correct to assume that this is unaddressible and posited presuppositionally?

Thanks.

I think you could say it this way. God's essence is because God subsists in three persons. Rather than, God subsists in three persons because God's essence is.

I think the eternality of God eliminates questions of where God came from. The west would have the same perspective. Yes, this is assumed in the term "God" for (most?) Christians.

[Slopeshoulder]

I am not participating in this thread, but as a fascinated reader hanging on every word, may I ask a clarifying question? Forgive me if I seem as thick as a column in a Soho loft:

Something jumped out at me. If I understand correctly, in the christian eastern orthodox view, ontology is not precedent and so one starts presuppositionally (as a chosen rationality) with personhood/will from which being/essence proceeds (as a logically possible/credible/consistent formula for our consideration).

I think that's what I am saying.

But if the formula is "one being, three persons" as you say (I've always heard it expressed as "one being with or in three persons"), is it in the terms outlined above more accurate/consistent to say "3 persons from whom one being (the Godhead) and later all being proceeds/follows/emerges" than to say "one being with three persons" because the latter makes God's own being prior to personhood? Does God, in this view, have no being per se, until God wills Godself into existence from God's personhood? is not, then, one being with three persons sloppy and inaccurate within this doctrinal line of reasoning?

I thought the formula was one being subsisting in three persons. The "in" in the phrase "one being in three persons" implies the "subsisting in." The question of being/personhood of God is more one of logical priority than temporal priority. There never was a time when God was not being, for God is eternal. But being is a consequence of personhood logically. I think that's the way to describe it.

And, if so, from what and how did pre-existing essential God/personhood/will emerge (not sure we can say "exist" if there is no being yet). Am I correct to assume that this is unaddressible and posited presuppositionally?

Thanks.

I think you could say it this way. God's essence is because God subsists in three persons. Rather than, God subsists in three persons because God's essence is.

I think the eternality of God eliminates questions of where God came from. The west would have the same perspective. Yes, this is assumed in the term "God" for (most?) Christians.

Excellent. Thanks. The "subsisting in" is the key, and omitting it is the sloppiness. Subsisting is the opposite of comprising. And as such, personhood is logically prior. Also point taken re: eternality. Them "fathers" was sure thinkin'. It adds up, if one presupposes existence of God etc.

[Cathar1950]

In process...
:sleep:

[Slopeshoulder]

Cathar, could you go back and clean up your post? There are several typos, strange punctuation, and weird prepositions and articles so I find it and not theopoesis' thoughtful and precise posts to be convoluted and incomprehensible. I'd like to understand your point, but I can't. Thanks in advance.