Atheist arguments for God

[Mithrae]

I'm bored and a little drunk, so I figured I'd give this a shot. I don't believe in a god, but I always find it quite stimulating to think of the pro and con arguments. Limited by belief in biblical infallibility, conservative Christians are easy prey for atheists. But weighing both sides of a position, I've been known to change my own mind on occasion, so if nothing else that might make it an interesting endeavour to see how convincingly I might argue for the existence of a god.

'God' is here defined as an infinite personal Creator of everything. I won't argue (and don't believe) that concepts like 'good' and 'evil' have any true meaning with or without such a being's existence; with a God, he calls the shots, and without they're meaningless. I won't argue for biblical infallibility or even that the monotheistic faiths are the only ones with experience of this god; though some arguments will come from Judaism/Christianity if I get 'round to it.

I'll try to be relatively brief in my initial post, but since the responses will probably be considerable, it may take time to cover all points. For the sake of convenience, I'll broadly number my arguments and hopefully those responding will follow suit.



1 - Berkeley's immaterialism
This is based essentially on the problem of epistemology (the theory of 'knowing'). All science and a great deal of other human knowledge is based, ultimately, on observation; yet 'observation' for any individual amounts ultimately to nothing more than perceptions in the mind. If you've seen The Matrix, it's obvious that anyone plugged in has no way of knowing that what they see, feel, hear etc. isn't real. The difference is that there's no real world with machines running the Matrix.

Berkeley agreed with the sciences of his day that what we observe is real, and also with the philosophers that what we observe occurs in the mind. Reality, therefore, is a thing of the mind, not of some ultimately unprovable material world. Thus either I am the only mind in existence, and everything and everyone I've perceived is a figment of my imagination, or there are indeed other minds whose generally shared perceptions must necessarily be part of a greater Mind. The problem of epistemology is a significant one regarding the reliability of the sciences - observations occur only in the mind - but a wholly immaterial universe can be both largely consistent and largely comprehensible. There's genuine evidence for the phenomenon of perception (and less certainly, for shared perception between minds), but there's no genuine evidence for a material world - so why postulate one?

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2 - Consciousness
Quite briefly, it's obvious that I possess a quality which I call consciousness, and it's equally obvious that a rock does not. There is no evidence for any theory suggesting that physical molecules grouping together in a complex enough fashion could give rise to this non-physical phenomenon known as consciousness. Related to and compatible with the above, but ultimately distinct, each person has genuine evidence for consciousness, but no genuine evidence regarding a physical basis for it. Pure immaterialism may or may not be the best explanation for this phenomenon, though an alternative is the existence of some non-material aspect of the universe somehow linked to the material.

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3 - First cause and contigency
Everyone's probably familiar with the 'first cause' cosmological argument. Logically, the universe must be attributed either to an infinite regress of prior universes or some precedences (which seems unlikely) or it is self-caused or uncaused (equally unlikely). The same applies to the concept of God, of course. But there's a distinction which non-theists often don't seem to grasp; since long before the birth of Christ, the monotheistic concept of God has consistently been that of a timeless, uncaused Creator. The concept of material reality by contrast has consistently been that of a contingent existent, each aspect relying on previous aspects for its existence and nature. Whether it's a combination of the cosmological and ontological arguments, or Aquinas' first three arguments (I'm not enough of a philosopher to make the point clearly), the outcome is the same. An ultimate self-causation, non-causality or infinite regress in a contingent universe seems absurd compared to the possibility that a non-contingent entity caused all else.

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4 - Evolution
Paleo-biology is an even weaker point for me than philosophy, but it's my understanding that there's virtually no evidence in the fossil record for transitional forms between major classes, let alone phyla. This contrasts severely with the expected findings of the phyletic gradualism theory of evolution initially envisaged by Darwin, giving rise eventually to the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution - suggesting, if memory serves, that significant major phases of evolution occured in restricted environments under greater selective pressure, before the resultant changes spread more widely and became visible in the fossil record. I don't know whether there's other theories around, nor how many scientists still adhere to the idea of phyletic gradualism.

However in the absense of any real evidence, the theory of punctuated equilibrium seems a tacit admission that the mere factors of genetic variation, random mutation and natural selection are not borne out by the available data as the sole cause of the earth's biodiversity. A confined ecosystem and greater selective pressure cannot, to my understanding, exessively increase the range nor rate of possible available genetic variants; so what we're left with is a theory which seems somewhat to rely on an inexplicable jump in mutations in those supposed confined spaces with high selective pressure.

If any biologists can correct me on any mistakes made above, it would be welcome. However from a layman's point of view, it seems that phyletic gradualism is grossly unevidenced in the fossil record, while punctuated equilibrium seems an intelligent but not particularly persuasive effort to explain the discrepancies. Is there any reason to go for an 'inexplicably increased rate in mutations and evolution'-of-the-gaps theory, rather than god-of-the-gaps?

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5 - Prophecy of Daniel
The biblical book of Daniel was written partly in Hebrew (ch 1 and 8-12) and partly in Aramaic (2-7). I contend that there's no compelling reason to believe that the Hebrew portion is not genuine 6th century BCE material. Based mostly on the 11th chapter, secular scholars argue that such knowledge of the long interactions between the 'king of the north' (Seleucid Greeks) and 'king of the south' (Ptolemaic Greeks) could only be the product of a later author and, based on 11:36ff suppose that it was written shortly before Antiochus IV Epiphanes failed to do those things.

Besides the presupposition that the chapter must be naturalistic in origin, there are two major flaws with this view. Firstly the idea that a king (Antiochus IV) who'd spent much effort attempting to Hellenize the Jews would suddenly "show no regard for the gods of his ancestors" (11:37) and instead exalt a foreign god (38-39). Such an idea would be virtually inconceivable to a Jewish author living under Antiochus' reign. Secondly, the fact that the 'abomination of desolation' from v. 31 was prophecied at a specific time - Daniel 9:25-27 says it will occur roughly 70 sevens after the command to restore and rebuild Jerusalem. Depending on the starting date, to a later Jew that could have meant anywhere from c53 BCE to c42 CE - either way, it's clear that Daniel 11:31 does not refer to anything which happened under the reign of Antiochus IV Ephiphanes (c167 BCE).

Above all, Daniel 8 refers to 'king' Belshazzar, a figure unknown to historians until a few cuneiform inscriptions were found in the last century. He was actually son to the last king of Babylon, Nabonidus, but ruled in his stead while Nabonidus resided elsewhere (memory fails me at this point, but pending confirmation I believe that one inscription mentions the name Belshazzar, while a different one clarifies his co-regency). Belshazzar is a name unknown in any Greek history - so while it would have been natural for a 6th century Jew to refer to 'king' Belshazzar, it's a mystery how a 2nd century BCE Jew would even know the name, let alone that he was crown prince and co-regent to Babylon's last king.

The balance of evidence suggests that Hebrew Daniel was written in the 6th century BCE, containing remarkable prophecy regarding the Greeks - and, even more intriguingly, arguably that it prophecies a messiah who would be 'cut off' sometime in the 30s CE (9:26).

[Cathar1950]

This is obvious in things like dogs and cats, but what of a jellyfish?

It's not obvious in cats and dogs, it requires observation and analogy. Your position is now inconsistent (accepting as 'obvious' what clearly is not) as well as fatuous (continued ignoring of my prior comments).

Not really. Your point that intelligence created them is inane unless intelligence didn't arise naturally.

Failure to understand basic logic principles - the conclusion (analogies of conciousness) can't be contained in the premises (things made by conscious beings).

That absurdity was on purpose.
I still don't fully comprehend what's entailed in your definition, as most of it seems implicit and subjective.

Failure to understand the further implications of your questioning: Everything is ultimately subjective.



Some of your further points are interesting, but in all honesty I don't see any point in continuing the discussion. Your position, while not internally consistent (see above) does indeed seem to prohibit any understanding of consciousness or god; along with purpose, love and satisfaction. I doubt those are the views you actually hold, so I won't say that I pity you. So congratulations on your victory It's ironic that consciousness is the only thing (besides perhaps the fundamental laws of logic) which is truly certain for an individual - but your questions about 'rocks,' 'slugs,' and talk of 'cars,' 'emergence' and so on have won the day for you through sheer attrition. I cannot argue against you

While we can grant everything is subjective or at least has a subjective element while it may have other on-subjective elements as well.
I end to think Whitehead had a point where he suspects everything that exists has a subjective element which would include subatomic particles and such.

[Mithrae]

It's obvious to anybody who grew up with such animals that they are conscious in a manner similar to humans.

Yes, after two pages' worth of sophistry it's now 'obvious.' That's why the discussion is no longer fun.

Every physical aspect of the world can, in theory at least, be observed either directly or indirectly by any number of people. By contrast we can't observe any other person's consciousness either directly or indirectly, and can't even know except by analogy and taking their word for it that they experience the same phenomenon we do. But to avoid confusion, how would you define physical?

Also, in the most basic sense I would define physical as E/c².

Then consciousness is indeed non-physical.

I can't see why it's not clearly obvious, but my point is that it gets very vague. What you don't seem to get is that I just won't accept any definition that isn't concise to the utmost degree because to do otherwise is useless in terms of philosophy.

When a property is 'obvious' in some entities other than ourselves, an endless string of inane questions about the degree of certainty with which our knowledge permits us to recognise the defined characteristics in the most obscure cases is nothing more than sophistry.

Can you give me a set of properties or criteria which must be met for something to be conscious?
This set of properties must be applicable to any item or set of items in the universe and must render either consciousness or lack thereof to have any use.

Already done at least twice. "The most basic indicators of awareness are reaction to pain and movement/exploration to acquire more sensory data." Applied to everything in the universe, only animals possess consciousness; it's 'obvious' that mammals fit the criteria and, lacking a university degree in marine biology, uncertain whether jellyfish do.



So we've established that consciousness is a non-physical phenomenon, known for certain to the individual and in other animals with varying degrees of probability based on observation and analogy. I have no interest in further sophistry. If you want to proceed with your arguments from emergence, finding examples in which the whole of a thing possesses characteristics qualitatively different from the sum of its parts, that would be interesting. Otherwise, consciousness (and no doubt many other mental phenomena) would be a unique example of the physical producing the non-physical, and not a bad case for inferring the contributory involvement of some other agency.

I'll probably respond to further intelligent comments, though truth be told with the next WoW expansion coming out soon it probably won't be long before I disappear from the forum again for another few months

[LiamOS]

Then consciousness is indeed non-physical.

Please show your work.

When a property is 'obvious' in some entities other than ourselves, an endless string of inane questions about the degree of certainty with which our knowledge permits us to recognise the defined characteristics in the most obscure cases is nothing more than sophistry.

Which is necessary if you're going to use consciousness to debate.
Using 'the obvious' where it is not obvious is like applying Maxwell's Equations to an electron.

Already done at least twice. "The most basic indicators of awareness are reaction to pain and movement/exploration to acquire more sensory data." Applied to everything in the universe, only animals possess consciousness; it's 'obvious' that mammals fit the criteria and, lacking a university degree in marine biology, uncertain whether jellyfish do.

You don't need a degree to determine it, you merely need to go and kill a few jellyfish.

Even with your definition, you must still actually define what qualifies as reaction and pain, and determine a way to determine whether actions are undertaken for a reason.

So we've established that consciousness is a non-physical phenomenon

Apparently you have, but I still fail to see how it is non physical let alone meaningful in the first place.

Otherwise, consciousness (and no doubt many other mental phenomena) would be a unique example of the physical producing the non-physical, and not a bad case for inferring the contributory involvement of some other agency.

If you can show that consciousness is indeed non-physical, I suppose this is correct.

[Mithrae]

When a property is 'obvious' in some entities other than ourselves, an endless string of inane questions about the degree of certainty with which our knowledge permits us to recognise the defined characteristics in the most obscure cases is nothing more than sophistry.

Which is necessary if you're going to use consciousness to debate.
Using 'the obvious' where it is not obvious is like applying Maxwell's Equations to an electron.

You were the one who claimed it was obvious, and reaffirmed it when questioned: "It's obvious to anybody who grew up with such animals that they are conscious in a manner similar to humans."

But to avoid confusion, how would you define physical?

Also, in the most basic sense I would define physical as E/c².

Then consciousness is indeed non-physical.

Please show your work.

From my limited understanding of physics, that appears to be a definition of 'physical' to which consciousness doesn't conform. But if you'd like to explain it further, and how it applies to consciousness, I've still got a week to kill before the WoW expansion

[LiamOS]

You were the one who claimed it was obvious, and reaffirmed it when questioned: "It's obvious to anybody who grew up with such animals that they are conscious in a manner similar to humans."

It's also obvious that Maxwell's Equations are quite accurate.

For every instance that it is obvious though, there are infinitely many where it isn't, necessitating a good definition of the property if you're going to attempt to apply it.

From my limited understanding of physics, that appears to be a definition of 'physical' to which consciousness doesn't conform. But if you'd like to explain it further, and how it applies to consciousness, I've still got a week to kill before the WoW expansion

I don't know whether it applies to consciousness, but I'm almost certain that it does.
By my definition, anything that exists in the universe that isn't space or time is physical. To claim it is not physical is to claim that it does not function as energy or matter, and that is an extraordinary claim.

In fact, it is necessarily, as it could not interact with us otherwise.

[Mithrae]

You were the one who claimed it was obvious, and reaffirmed it when questioned: "It's obvious to anybody who grew up with such animals that they are conscious in a manner similar to humans."

It's also obvious that Maxwell's Equations are quite accurate.

For every instance that it is obvious though, there are infinitely many where it isn't, necessitating a good definition of the property if you're going to attempt to apply it.

As I understand it the definition of gravity in the 19th century was somewhat lacking, but that didn't mean it wasn't useful. What will physicists centuries from now think of our primitive definitions of quantum phenomena? You'd know better than me what advances have been made in the last century.

As you've recently conceded, each of us recognises a difference between our periods of waking and sleep which we call consciousness. It's observed by virtually every person on the planet in their day-to-day life. By observation and analogy, it's obvious that its not a purely human phenomenon either; cats and dogs also are at times conscious and at times unconscious.

But unless I'm very much mistaking your meaning, your argument seems to be something along the lines that without first knowing exactly how far down the animal chain this phenomenon goes, what it is and how it originates, we can't talk meaningfully about it. Were that true, scientists could never have talked meaningfully about anything, since even now I'd guess that there's few subjects on which our knowledge is so exhaustive. Definitions are based on observations and can be subject to change, but pending something better we work with what we've got. No doubt the definition I've given for consciousness could be improved upon; but merely commenting on my (and humanity's) lack of exhaustive knowledge about the phenomenon doesn't make our observations go away.

From my limited understanding of physics, that appears to be a definition of 'physical' to which consciousness doesn't conform. But if you'd like to explain it further, and how it applies to consciousness, I've still got a week to kill before the WoW expansion

I don't know whether it applies to consciousness, but I'm almost certain that it does.
By my definition, anything that exists in the universe that isn't space or time is physical. To claim it is not physical is to claim that it does not function as energy or matter, and that is an extraordinary claim.

In fact, it is necessarily, as it could not interact with us otherwise.

Not everything that exists can be weighed on scales. You earlier mentioned fractals which, unless I miss my guess, also do not fit your definition for physical, are not matter or energy, nor space or time (though, like everything else we know, they are in space and time). There are those who conceive of the mind as some thing distinct from the body and brain, and as you note the question of how such a thing would interact with the body is a tricky one. But I haven't advanced that theory, I've merely been talking about the phenomenon of consciousness.

To be honest I'd quite like to be proven wrong in this discussion, because while I'm not a theist, it is a question which genuinely puzzles me. Most (if not all) other phenomena in regular human experience can be understood and reduced down to the molecular level and beyond to explain them. The behaviour of water or computers or our own bodies all result inevitably from the interactions of the molecules which make them up. Their fluidity or hardness, electrical conduction or breakdown of ATP to provide energy... it's all quite complex and well beyond me, but all reducible down to that level. But when it comes to the brain, for all that we've learned about its molecular makeup, the chemicals which go in and the signals which come out, the structure and function of neurons and the various areas of the brain mapped, there's still no way to reduce a phenomenon such as consciousness down in terms of any more basic level.

As an atheist I can live with knowing no further than that it 'just is' because of how complex the brain is. But it's easy to see how it could make an interesting argument from a theistic viewpoint.

[LiamOS]

As I understand it the definition of gravity in the 19th century was somewhat lacking, but that didn't mean it wasn't useful.

Arguably it's still lacking today. It's very useful for making predictions, but only those predictions within its scope are any way useful.

What will physicists centuries from now think of our primitive definitions of quantum phenomena? You'd know better than me what advances have been made in the last century.

Arguably we don't have definitions for them. Currently we're just trying to make sense of everything that's going on using models.

As you've recently conceded, each of us recognises a difference between our periods of waking and sleep which we call consciousness. It's observed by virtually every person on the planet in their day-to-day life. By observation and analogy, it's obvious that its not a purely human phenomenon either; cats and dogs also are at times conscious and at times unconscious.

But unless I'm very much mistaking your meaning, your argument seems to be something along the lines that without first knowing exactly how far down the animal chain this phenomenon goes, what it is and how it originates, we can't talk meaningfully about it. Were that true, scientists could never have talked meaningfully about anything, since even now I'd guess that there's few subjects on which our knowledge is so exhaustive. Definitions are based on observations and can be subject to change, but pending something better we work with what we've got. No doubt the definition I've given for consciousness could be improved upon; but merely commenting on my (and humanity's) lack of exhaustive knowledge about the phenomenon doesn't make our observations go away.

Insofar as scientists had definitions from which to work, they could talk meaningfully about certain things.
Newton's Laws allowed people to speak meaningfully of planetary motion and such, but not of nuclear physics as the definition was not applicable there.

Not everything that exists can be weighed on scales. You earlier mentioned fractals which, unless I miss my guess, also do not fit your definition for physical, are not matter or energy, nor space or time (though, like everything else we know, they are in space and time).

They are composed of energy, so they are.

There are those who conceive of the mind as some thing distinct from the body and brain, and as you note the question of how such a thing would interact with the body is a tricky one. But I haven't advanced that theory, I've merely been talking about the phenomenon of consciousness.

And such a theory is inane until there is some evidence for it and theory for how it's possible.

To be honest I'd quite like to be proven wrong in this discussion, because while I'm not a theist, it is a question which genuinely puzzles me. Most (if not all) other phenomena in regular human experience can be understood and reduced down to the molecular level and beyond to explain them. The behaviour of water or computers or our own bodies all result inevitably from the interactions of the molecules which make them up. Their fluidity or hardness, electrical conduction or breakdown of ATP to provide energy... it's all quite complex and well beyond me, but all reducible down to that level. But when it comes to the brain, for all that we've learned about its molecular makeup, the chemicals which go in and the signals which come out, the structure and function of neurons and the various areas of the brain mapped, there's still no way to reduce a phenomenon such as consciousness down in terms of any more basic level.

This is largely due to the fact that we'd first have to determine what consciousness is.
This is a very tough question and is receiving a lot of attention, so we may be on the way to having some sort of answer.

[Mithrae]

Not everything that exists can be weighed on scales. You earlier mentioned fractals which, unless I miss my guess, also do not fit your definition for physical, are not matter or energy, nor space or time (though, like everything else we know, they are in space and time).

They are composed of energy, so they are.

The Mandelbrot set is composed of energy? (Just spent the last hour reading up on it, incidentally; fascinating stuff and I'm quite glad you mentioned them.)

But when it comes to the brain, for all that we've learned about its molecular makeup, the chemicals which go in and the signals which come out, the structure and function of neurons and the various areas of the brain mapped, there's still no way to reduce a phenomenon such as consciousness down in terms of any more basic level.

This is largely due to the fact that we'd first have to determine what consciousness is.
This is a very tough question and is receiving a lot of attention, so we may be on the way to having some sort of answer.

We can certainly hope so, though personally I'd be inclined to suspect that it'll be an accomplishment along the same sci-fi order of magnitude as jumping through time or space. Even if we could somehow accurately mimick all the billions of neurons, synapses, impulses and so on... well, like I say, when you get right down to it I find it hard to get past the fact that they're just chemicals.

Regardless, it's certainly been an interesting discussion and I appreciate your insights