Is Theism Justified?

[LiamOS]

In the thread 'Can evidence lead to belief in god(s)?' EduChris wrote:

[...] theism is at least as justified (and probably more justified) than non-theism.

For Debate:
-Is Theism justified?
-If so, is it more justified than Non-Theism?

[Baz]

You: Thus, as a Non-Theist, I do not "believe in gods", BUT do not deny that they MAY exist.

Theist: Thus, as a theist, I do believe in gods, BUT do not deny that they MAY NOT exist.

Of course there are some theists who wont accept the "MAY NOT" but I am sure there are many theists who do accept that.

Those that add the May or the May Not are also agnostic (or in rarer cases ignostic). Those that refuse to add the May or May Not label are, imo, often using an argument from ignorance in their life view and thus being unreasonable.

So to be certain that there is a god or to be certain that there isnt a god is un reasonable?

Yes.

[EduChris]

...The theist also has a potential benefit in choosing flourishing. You have no way of saying which option the theist should choose - at all...

I am not saying which option the theist should choose. Instead, I am pointing out the one, solitary, unambiguous fact: there is at least the chance that theistic truth might be meaningful, there is at least some possibility for benefit in choosing truth over this-worldy flourishing. Thus there is a potential benefit available for the theist, while no no such potential benefit is available to the non-theist.

...justify believing in things based on whether or not they offer a potential benefit while ignoring potential drawbacks...

I am not ignoring potential drawbacks. Different theists might have different assessments of risks, but the point is that since it is impossible to rule out the potential for benefit, we cannot blame the theist who takes the risk for truth.

...The person in your thought experiment cannot make an informed choice when it comes to benefits/drawbacks in BOTH scenarios. They can only speculate blindly...

Not true. If you would only read my thought-experiment carefully enough, you would realize that the non-theist will have truth to the extent that truth will be of benefit to this-worldly human flourishing. This is why the non-theist has nothing of value to gain by choosing non-theistic truth over this-worldly human flourshing: if flourishing entails truth, then truth will be known.

...Going around in circles. You still haven't shown -at all- why a theist should choose option 1 rather than 2...

I agree that we're simply spinning our respective wheels at this point. You are very tenacious and frenetic with your claims, and so I have no doubt that you will grab the last word for yourself here. Have at it, but I will not respond to any more of your endless and repetitious arguments.

[EduChris]

...The concept of cause and effect does not lead us to the concept of a god. The concept of cause and effect leads us to look for a cause based on the effects we see, nothing more...

I am not saying that cause and effect leads us to accept the concept of God; instead, it leads us to consider the possibility of an Ultimate Cause. Therefore, we all eventually must consider God--and such is not the case with mere contingent "things" such as unicorns, leprechauns, etc.

...Only the ignorance of our past has lead people to look to a god for an answer to an unknown cause...

A very strong claim. But I think you are smart enough to realize that this is nothing more than an opinion.

...We need to examine both the cause and effects rather then lay cause at the feet of a non-existent deity...

Obviously this is a hurried statement. I wouldn't normally expect to see you assuming the consequent.

...The question of God is only unavoidable because the ignorance of our youth as a species has forced the issue to be unavoidable...

We all must consider the possibility of an Ultimate Cause. We may or may not come to the conclusion that there is such a Cause, or that we matter to such Cause.

...We need to shake off these superstitions to truly grow as intelligent lifeforms or we will continue to destroy ourselves...

Another opinion. But of course if there is no God we will all be destroyed sooner or later anyway, and nothing in the universe will be around to care.

...at least that is my opinion...

Ah, yes.

[Woland]

Hello EduChris,

...The theist also has a potential benefit in choosing flourishing. You have no way of saying which option the theist should choose - at all...

I am not saying which option the theist should choose.

Really?

->

Now, repeat this exercise except that this time your altered state of consciousness informs you that theistic belief is true. You again have the same two choices. In this case, given theism, which choice is more reasonable? If you operate strictly by reason, you would have to choose option 1.

Do you recant your statement for which you've presented no evidence except pure speculation and wishful thinking? Can you show, for starters, that there is no God who would punish you for choosing option 1 and that there is no God that would only reward you for choosing option 2? Can you SHOW that these are less likely than the speculative benefit the theist blindly HOPES to reap?

Of course not.

Instead, I am pointing out the one, solitary, unambiguous fact: there is at least the chance that theistic truth might be meaningful, there is at least some possibility for benefit in choosing truth over this-worldy flourishing.

First of all, your use of "over", as has been pointed out to you a million times now, is fallacious. You do NOT know how truth and flourishing are correlated, and/or if one limits the other.

Secondly, there is also the possibility of a benefit for the theist if he chooses option 2.

Thirdly, what you're arguing for is the reasonableness of "believing in wishful thinking and speculation" - and you haven't shown that it's reasonable to believe things because you blindly hope to have a benefit if you will just believe without even knowing the risks you're taking.

Thus there is a potential benefit available for the theist, while no no such potential benefit is available to the non-theist.

I agree that you've rigged your experiment and fallaciously defined "benefit" to suit your argument. It doesn't show in the slightest that it's more reasonable to be a theist than a non-theist.

I am not ignoring potential drawbacks. Different theists might have different assessments of risks, but the point is that since it is impossible to rule out the potential for benefit, we cannot blame the theist who takes the risk for truth.

We cannot blame the theist who chooses the other option as well. So what? What does this show? Nothing.

We also cannot blame the non-theist who rejects your false dichotomy because no evidence has been presented to support it.

...The person in your thought experiment cannot make an informed choice when it comes to benefits/drawbacks in BOTH scenarios. They can only speculate blindly...

Not true. If you would only read my thought-experiment carefully enough, you would realize that the non-theist will have truth to the extent that truth will be of benefit to this-worldly human flourishing. This is why the non-theist has nothing of value to gain by choosing non-theistic truth over this-worldly human flourshing: if flourishing entails truth, then truth will be known.

I don't know if you realize it, but you've just demonstrated that your choices are fallacious.

...Going around in circles. You still haven't shown -at all- why a theist should choose option 1 rather than 2...

I agree that we're simply spinning our respective wheels at this point. You are very tenacious and frenetic with your claims, and so I have no doubt that you will grab the last word for yourself here. Have at it, but I will not respond to any more of your endless and repetitious arguments.

Perhaps if you actually addressed the arguments, we'd get somewhere faster.

Honestly, if you don't get it by now, I give up. If you believe you've shown that theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism after all this time, there's nothing that can be done to show you just how irrelevant your thought experiment is.

-Woland

[EduChris]

Hello EduChris,

...The theist also has a potential benefit in choosing flourishing. You have no way of saying which option the theist should choose - at all...

I am not saying which option the theist should choose.

Really?

->

Now, repeat this exercise except that this time your altered state of consciousness informs you that theistic belief is true. You again have the same two choices. In this case, given theism, which choice is more reasonable? If you operate strictly by reason, you would have to choose option 1.

Do you recant your statement for which you've presented no evidence except pure speculation and wishful thinking? Can you show, for starters, that there is no God who would punish you for choosing option 1 and that there is no God that would only reward you for choosing option 2? Can you SHOW that these are less likely than the speculative benefit the theist blindly HOPES to reap?...

Operating strictly according to reason, the theist would choose option 1. But I grant that my thought experiment has not eliminated all risk, since there is at least the theoretical possibility of a malevolent god whom one would not wish to know. My claim here is twofold:

1) Operating strictly according to reason, the possibility of a malevolent god is remote; therefore, option #1 stands as the most reasonable choice in the theistic scenario.

2) If for some reason one is convinced that a malevolent god is either a certainty or a near-certainty, then this particular theistic sub-scenario becomes indistinguishable from the non-theistic scenario. Option #2 is the only reasonable choice in either scenario.

So theism is at least as justified as non-theism (given the unlikely "malevolent god" sub-scenario) or more justified than non-theism (given the more likely "non-malevolent God" sub-scenario). Now here the question becomes, how do we know that the possibility of a malevolent god is remote? We don't have proof either way, but we do have the following compelling reasons that tip the balance in favor of the non-malevolent God sub-scenario:

1) Every major theistic tradition in the world claims that to the extent that one desires truth, seeks truth, understands truth, and practices truth, all will be well in an ultimate sense (though this does not guarantee that things will necessarily be well for every individual truth-seeker in all aspects of this worldly life).

2) Evil has no reality in and of itself; it cannot exist without Good. In other words, evil is not a Godelian "positive" (i.e., non-arbitrary) property.

[Adamoriens]

For some reason this argument has remained entrenched in my subconscious since I left this discussion several weeks ago. I feel now I have some fresh criticism.

Suppose during your sleep a wrinkle in the fabric of space-time transports you into an altered state of consciousness in which you all of a sudden know with objective clarity that theistic belief is false. In this altered state of consciousness, you have amnesia so you don't know who you are or what your belief system was when you went to sleep, but you do have an otherwise normal view of the world and culture. Given perfect objective knowledge that theistic belief is false, you can choose one of the following belief systems which will become your belief system once you return from this altered state. Once you awake, you will not remember what has happened to you. You will hold your newly chosen belief system, but only with the same degree of subjectivity as is common to all humanity (that is, you will no longer have the objective certainty you had during your altered consciousness). Here are your choices:

1) You may choose to adopt whatever belief system which best provides for truth, and only secondarily for this-worldly human flourishing.

2) You may choose to adopt whatever belief system which best provides for this-worldly human flourishing, and only secondarily for truth

Given non-theism, which choice is more reasonable? Operating strictly according to reason, you would have to choose option 2--and this option, in terms of evolutionary advantage, could go either way for theism or non-theism (since neither can be shown to offer any definite adaptive advantage over the other).

Now, repeat this exercise except that this time your altered state of consciousness informs you that theistic belief is true. You again have the same two choices. In this case, given theism, which choice is more reasonable? If you operate strictly by reason, you would have to choose option 1.

To summarize, given objective (but temporary) certainty of non-theism, the reasonable choice is for this-worldy human adaptive advantage rather than for truth (and here theism is no less favored than non-theism). On the other hand, given objective (but temporary) certainty of theism, the only reasonable choice is for truth (which will be theism, since theism is true in this scenario).

Thus, theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism. This is not to say that theism is objectively proven true, but it is more reasonable since it is definitely favored under theistic assumptions, and no less favored under non-theistic assumptions. That theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism is the best explanation for the fact that most people are theists.

Note: here is my working definition of theism:

The belief that there is an ultimate, absolute, necessary and non-contingent Reality which affords the contingent reality of our lives and of the entire universe and to which we humans (individually or collectively) might actually matter in some way, whether by personal Divine response or by Divinely-established autonomic reaction.

Here is my paraphrase:

P1. Rational non-theism values this-worldly flourishing over truth.
P2. Rational theism values truth over this-worldly flourishing.
C1. Therefore theism is objectively more reasonable than non- theism.

C1 is ambiguous. What exactly is meant by reasonable? If by reasonable we mean, that which values truth above all else, then C1 is trivial, a restatement of P2.

C1a. Theism is more justified than non-theism.

If justified world-views are those which value truth above all else, then we have again simply rephrased P2.

C1b. Rational people ought to choose theism over non-theism.

This presupposes that truth is more valuable than this-worldly flourishing. Therefore it seems to me that, if P1 and P2 are granted as necessarily true, C1b begs the question. If you affirm that truth is more valuable than this-worldly flourishing, then the rational choice is theism. If you affirm that this-worldly flourishing is more valuable than truth, then the rational choice is non-theism.

The argument is either inconsequential if C1a is the conclusion, or fallacious if C1b is.

However, one need not grant that P1 or P2 are true, and I think Ive explained already why I find EduChriss defence of P1 and P2 insufficient and even somewhat inconsistent. Just so I have the last word:

Evolutionary selection is either objectively valuable or subjectively valuable. There is no evidence that it has objective value, so the non-theist is free to subjectively value truth over this-worldly flourishing. This disconfirms P1.

EduChris allows the indomitable search for truth to be of primary value to theists, because the discovery of an ultimate Reality would accrue great benefit. If the benefit is the satisfaction of our indomitable search for truth and not this-worldly flourishing, then this satisfaction is of equal value under both theism and non-theism even if P1 is true. That is, unless it could be shown that our discovery of the Realitys existence would be somehow objectively more valuable (apart from this-worldly advantage) than its absence.

[EduChris]

...P1. Rational non-theism values this-worldly flourishing over truth...

Here is my version of P1: There is no such thing as objectively rational non-theism. Non-theists might subjectively prefer some chosen form of perceived "rationality," but in the end the only thing that counts for anything even approaching "objective" non-theistic value is the postponement of one's inevitable extinction (individually and collectively) for as long as possible. And on this basis there is no way to demonstrate that theism is more detrimental to survival than non-theism.

...P2. Rational theism values truth over this-worldly flourishing...

Here is my version of P2: For the theist, God is the ultimate objective reality. If God exists, God may very well be worth knowing. Given a theistic reality, non-theist presuppositions are objectively inferior. In other words, theism, if true, provides an objective rational basis for preferring theism over non-theism. But the converse is not true--that is, given a non-theistic reality, there is no rational objective basis for preferring anything over another.

...C1. Therefore theism is objectively more reasonable than non-theism...

And here is my C1: Since theism cannot be ruled out on objective grounds (given non-theistic reality) and since theism is objectively preferred on rational grounds (given theistic reality) we see that the presupposistion of theism enjoys better justification than the alternative presupposition of non-theism.

...Evolutionary selection is either objectively valuable or subjectively valuable. There is no evidence that it has objective value, so the non-theist is free to subjectively value truth over this-worldly flourishing. This disconfirms P1...

You have here disconfirmed your P1, but not my P1.

...EduChris allows the indomitable search for truth to be of primary value to theists, because the discovery of an ultimate Reality would accrue great benefit...

No, my claim is that theism (and only theism) provides the necessary basis for any objectivity at all.

[Woland]

1) Operating strictly according to reason, the possibility of a malevolent god is remote;

You keep making that claim, but it's more than evident that you cannot support it. Your appeal to the main world theisms is irrelevant as it cannot be shown that any human has any special knowledge of the supernatural.

therefore, option #1 stands as the most reasonable choice in the theistic scenario.

You have not shown this, but keep claiming it nonetheless.

2) If for some reason one is convinced that a malevolent god is either a certainty or a near-certainty, then this particular theistic sub-scenario becomes indistinguishable from the non-theistic scenario. Option #2 is the only reasonable choice in either scenario.

The point is that nobody seems to have knowledge of gods or the afterlife despite their endless and contradictory claims, which makes your argument utterly pointless.

So theism is at least as justified as non-theism (given the unlikely "malevolent god" sub-scenario) or more justified than non-theism (given the more likely "non-malevolent God" sub-scenario).

Truly, I have trouble believing that you really think that you've shown this.

Now here the question becomes, how do we know that the possibility of a malevolent god is remote? We don't have proof either way, but we do have the following compelling reasons that tip the balance in favor of the non-malevolent God sub-scenario:

None of the following are compelling reasons, to anyone with a critical mind, to accept your highly speculative hypothesis.

1) Every major theistic tradition in the world claims that to the extent that one desires truth, seeks truth, understands truth, and practices truth, all will be well in an ultimate sense (though this does not guarantee that things will necessarily be well for every individual truth-seeker in all aspects of this worldly life).

Yes, so they claim. Any reason to suppose that their claims are representative of reality?

Is it surprising that humans would want to believe in happy endings to the extent of accepting their own wishful thinking as being representative of reality?

No. Scammers and swindlers of all types understand that very well.

2) Evil has no reality in and of itself; it cannot exist without Good. In other words, evil is not a Godelian "positive" (i.e., non-arbitrary) property.

I don't see how that's relevant to anything at all.

Your evasive and cherrypicking tactics do not reflect well on your position.

-Woland

[Zzyzx]

.

1) Operating strictly according to reason, the possibility of a malevolent god is remote;

You keep making that claim, but it's more than evident that you cannot support it.

I agree.

Perhaps related: propaganda often includes repeating claims (or falsehoods) ad nausea in hopes that they will become accepted by the masses. Challenges need not be answered, but simply ignored while the claim (or falsehood) is repeated over and over.

Your appeal to the main world theisms is irrelevant as it cannot be shown that any human has any special knowledge of the supernatural.

This is the critical fault in Theism / Supernaturalism. No one knows anything beyond he says so, this book says so, I think so, they think so, just believe on faith.

therefore, option #1 stands as the most reasonable choice in the theistic scenario.

You have not shown this, but keep claiming it nonetheless.

Repeat the claim ad nausea without substantiation.

Theism is the most reasonable choice FOR THEISTS who presuppose god.

However, basing decisions on belief in an invisible, undetectable rabbit (or god) about whom no information or knowledge is available (aside from conjecture and hearsay masquerading as knowledge) is decidedly NOT the most reasonable choice to those who think analytically or critically.

2) If for some reason one is convinced that a malevolent god is either a certainty or a near-certainty, then this particular theistic sub-scenario becomes indistinguishable from the non-theistic scenario. Option #2 is the only reasonable choice in either scenario.

The point is that nobody seems to have knowledge of gods or the afterlife despite their endless and contradictory claims, which makes your argument utterly pointless.

Agreed

So theism is at least as justified as non-theism (given the unlikely "malevolent god" sub-scenario) or more justified than non-theism (given the more likely "non-malevolent God" sub-scenario).

Truly, I have trouble believing that you really think that you've shown this.

Repeat the claim . . .

Now here the question becomes, how do we know that the possibility of a malevolent god is remote? We don't have proof either way, but we do have the following compelling reasons that tip the balance in favor of the non-malevolent God sub-scenario:

None of the following are compelling reasons, to anyone with a critical mind, to accept your highly speculative hypothesis.

Biblicism is evidently not intended to be accepted by those who have a critical or analytical mind.

1) Every major theistic tradition in the world claims that to the extent that one desires truth, seeks truth, understands truth, and practices truth, all will be well in an ultimate sense (though this does not guarantee that things will necessarily be well for every individual truth-seeker in all aspects of this worldly life).

Yes, so they claim. Any reason to suppose that their claims are representative of reality?

No, there is no reason to accept such claims as representative of anything but imagination.

Is it surprising that humans would want to believe in happy endings to the extent of accepting their own wishful thinking as being representative of reality?

No, it is not surprising.

Scammers and swindlers of all types understand that very well.

Agreed " to include religious scammers.

2) Evil has no reality in and of itself; it cannot exist without Good. In other words, evil is not a Godelian "positive" (i.e., non-arbitrary) property.

I don't see how that's relevant to anything at all.

Your evasive and cherrypicking tactics do not reflect well on your position.

I agree.

Additionally, the need to employ such tactics in ones argument should convey to readers that the position being defended lacks verifiable support and valid claim to truth.

[Woland]

Hello EduChris,

So theism is at least as justified as non-theism (given the unlikely "malevolent god" sub-scenario) or more justified than non-theism (given the more likely "non-malevolent God" sub-scenario).

Could you please support your repeated use of the words "likely/unlikely" with relevant arguments, or admit that your argument falls flat on its face because you cannot defend it without using fallacies (i.e. appeal to authority or popularity)?

Could you also explain what knowledge you have of the relationship between truth and "flourishing"? You do understand that without this knowledge your thought experiment and the limited choices contained therein are fallacious and irrelevant, don't you?

-Woland