God, Satan and Job

[Tim the Skeptic]

The book of Job starts out with the "divine beings", including Satan, getting together with God. (OK, this is bizarre considering what I understand of God/Satan relationship, but not my point here.) And then this conversation, as I interpret it, occurs:

God (to Satan): Isn't Job a great guy, he is a blameless and upright man.

Satan: Look at the way he's been blessed by you. Of course, he's a great guy.

God: OK, you can do to his life whatever you want but don't hurt him.

Satan destroys Job's wealth and kills his children. But he did so with God's permission, so, who's responsible? Is God the source of this evil that happens to Job?

[trencacloscas]

It is also true that evil can be irreversible. Take Job, as the topic goes. God erased his whole family; even if he gives him another one, it will never be the same. So evil remains evil, no compensation is possible unless he gives Job his original family back. But he didn't "raise the dead" for Job. So, the God of the Book of Job is clearly evil, and in Epicurus vision, probably not God at all.

[bernee51]

There are limits to omnipotence.

Then it is, by definition, not omnipotence.

ergo - not the omnipotent god of the bible.

The argument holds.

[bernee51]

He died in an earthquake. How is he going to comfort others?

In the resurrection afterlife.

ppppfffftttt.

I know of no such place of time. Nor do his wife and kids.

I know he doesn't. That's my belief.

And your belief does not a fact make - other than perhaps for yourself.

If you guys are claiming that the existence of evil is logically impossible to reconcile with a loving God then you have to deal stuff that God normally does, like raise the dead.

I know of no example of the dead being raised. Thre is nothing to be dealt with.

[Bugmaster]

That's what it purports, but there's a big hole in the argument. Prove to me that suffering can not be beneficial. Unless you prove that, then statement #2 fails.

A truly omni-everything god would be able to figure out a way to achieve the benefit without the suffering. If he can't, then he's either not omniscient, not omnipotent, or just a mean kind of guy.

[harvey1]

Anyway, Spetey, you, and I already covered this ground. The problem of evil comes down to whether the atheist is claiming that it is impossible for an all-powerful, all-good God to allow evil (therefore an all-powerful, all-good God necessarily cannot exist), or whether the atheist is claiming that an all-powerful, all-good God probably would not allow evil (therefore an all-powerful, all-good God probably doesn't exist). In both Spetey's case and your case, you later admitted that the former argument was mistaken.

If you could point out where I conceded that, I'd be obliged. Not denying it...yet....it may have been a moment of weakness, I just don't remember.

Here is your admission:

Now, since we mere mortals cannot distinguish the difference between evil that God can prevent and that which he can't, we are forced to concede that all evil we see might be unpreventable, and thus an all-good God can exist... Have we not given God an out by defining "omnipotence" as the ability to do all possible things? And have we not agreed that it is not possible to actualize a deterministic paradox, even one so simple as the rock so heavy he can't lift it?

This is an admission of two sorts. One, that the claim that God necessarily cannot exist is invalid since "an all-good God can exist," and that the claim that God probably doesn't exist is invalid since "since we mere mortals cannot distinguish the difference between evil that God can prevent and that which he can't." In other words, we mere mortals don't have enough knowledge to determine probablistically what must be the case.

I told you, in ten years you'll be an atheist. Patience!!

Well, I guess that means you have to put up with arguments you cannot reply to for over 9.5 years.

As to my position, I continue to think that an all-powerful, all-benevolent God is out of the question (overriding any previous concessions I may or may not have made). The key to our argument here is the qualifier "all." It may be next to impossible to define "God," or "heaven," or even time and space....but the word "all" as used here has a very definite, precise, easy-to-understand meaning. It means 100%, no exceptions. If I can show that God had an opportunity to lessen human suffering, and that the means to do it would not interfere with accomplishing his ultimate goal, and yet chose not to take that opportunity, then I will have nullified omni-benevolence. I say that that opportunity came at the point at which God decided to create the universe. He would of course have been able to foresee the wickedness of mankind, along with the suffering caused by nature. If he still thought it was a good idea to create man, he could have done so, but placed him in heaven already in a state of grace, sinless but free willed. The travails of the human saga would have thus been avoided, all of humanity would be in heaven, no wailing or gnashing of teeth in hell, God gets to hear himself praised and Hosannahed till the cows come home. Mission accomplished. But that didn't happen. Here we are. That the universe exists is cosmic testimony to the non-benevolent nature of God, and/or his nonexistence.

Not necessarily. God can have multiple criteria that the divine will is trying to satisfy which requires that a great deal of pain & suffering exist in the world. For example, my conception of God requires that we see God as an omniscient interpreter who decides what is true in the world. This position is by default all-powerful, all-good, however it requires that God interpret the world according to a method that optimizes truth. In such a conjectured world, we would see the Christian God existing with much pain and suffering taking place. Since this kind of cosmology is easily constructed from first principles (much easier than your brute fact cosmology), therefore by Occam's razor we are led to believe that we live in a world best described by a Christian metaphysical account versus an atheist metaphysical account.

[palmera]

For example, my conception of God requires that we see God as an omniscient interpreter who decides what is true in the world. This position is by default all-powerful, all-good, however it requires that God interpret the world according to a method that optimizes truth. In such a conjectured world, we would see the Christian God existing with much pain and suffering taking place. Since this kind of cosmology is easily constructed from first principles (much easier than your brute fact cosmology), therefore by Occam's razor we are led to believe that we live in a world best described by a Christian metaphysical account versus an atheist metaphysical account.

I just don't know about this. Wouldn't the simplest scenario for suffering in the world simply be that there is suffering, and that we don't know why? Such a statement like, "shit happens" does not presuppose a deity or anything else for that matter. It is simply an observation without regards as to determining why. Once you endeavor to determine why, things get murky and Occam's Razor holds less and less value the further from simple observation you venture. Outside of "shit happens," the simplest observation, dealing with why, would be to say that there is no discernable why; again, an answer which doesn't presume divine presence and the complexity that goes along with it.

[harvey1]

I just don't know about this. Wouldn't the simplest scenario for suffering in the world simply be that there is suffering, and that we don't know why?

Often we do know why. Somebody hurt somebody else. An earthquake happened that made a tsunami that hit the coasts where people were playing in the water, etc.. What we don't know is why God would allow a tsunami (etc.) considering that God has the knowledge, power, and concern to prevent it. However, this is a major issue, and it affects our decision on whether God is a believable concept or not. So, I don't think we can just fluff off this question. For any religious belief of God, it is the most important question we must seek to know.

In my view, it is better to start from first principles. Go back all the way to the beginning of the world and try and determine what conditions might have existed which may or may not explain a God, existence of evil, etc..

[The Happy Humanist]

Here is your admission:

Now, since we mere mortals cannot distinguish the difference between evil that God can prevent and that which he can't, we are forced to concede that all evil we see might be unpreventable, and thus an all-good God can exist... Have we not given God an out by defining "omnipotence" as the ability to do all possible things? And have we not agreed that it is not possible to actualize a deterministic paradox, even one so simple as the rock so heavy he can't lift it?

You are correct, I did say that. That was before I introduced my "Malak Anti-Cosmological Argument." I hereby retract the above.

Not necessarily. God can have multiple criteria that the divine will is trying to satisfy which requires that a great deal of pain & suffering exist in the world.

Then his criteria is flawed. God is omnipotent in the sense of being able to do anything that is possible and consistent with his nature. Again, I give you a free pass on the paradox thing; but I insist that he is limited by his omni-benevolence to only do good, or even - I'll concede this for the moment - NET good. He CANNOT limit himself with criteria that would lead to unnecessary suffering. Given a choice that maximizes good to a greater extent than his so-called "criteria," he must make that choice. He may want to try out his criteria, but knowing in advance (omniscience) that it will lead to greater suffering than simply creating us in heaven, he cannot actualize his criteria.

Which is a better (=less suffering) outcome: All humans in heaven, or the majority in hell for eternity? That choice is obvious. So what "good" is his "multiple criteria"?

For example, my conception of God requires that we see God as an omniscient interpreter who decides what is true in the world. This position is by default all-powerful, all-good, however it requires that God interpret the world according to a method that optimizes truth.

You have some kind of metaphysical definition for truth that I don't understand.

Since this kind of cosmology is easily constructed from first principles

I can think of many cosmologies that can be easily constructed from first principles. "Easily constructed" != "parsimonious."

[harvey1]

You are correct, I did say that. That was before I introduced my "Malak Anti-Cosmological Argument." I hereby retract the above.

Why not instead just retract your atheism? Now, there's a novel idea.

Okay, what exactly are you retracting? Do you want to say that it is necessary that an all-good, all-powerful God cannot exist? Or, do you want to say that it is only probable that an all-good, all-powerful God does not exist?

Then his criteria is flawed. God is omnipotent in the sense of being able to do anything that is possible and consistent with his nature.

Yes, I emphasized that last clause...

...I insist that he is limited by his omni-benevolence to only do good, or even - I'll concede this for the moment - NET good. He CANNOT limit himself with criteria that would lead to unnecessary suffering. Given a choice that maximizes good to a greater extent than his so-called "criteria," he must make that choice. He may want to try out his criteria, but knowing in advance (omniscience) that it will lead to greater suffering than simply creating us in heaven, he cannot actualize his criteria.

During the Rwanda crisis in April, 1994, the United States could have put a quick end to the genocide. All they had to do was send the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier to the region, and launch a few cruise missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, and send those babies right into Hutu extremist regions, and faster than you can say "mushroom cloud," the genocide of Tutsis would have been over. Is that what you mean when you say God must make that choice? I hope not. The U.S. "allowed" this evil to persist despite the weaponary to stop it, however it was a good decision not to nuke Hutus despite the tremendous amount of evil that occurred. Similarly, it is a good decision that God allow evil despite the tremendous pain & suffering that results from allowing evil to exist.

Which is a better (=less suffering) outcome: All humans in heaven, or the majority in hell for eternity? That choice is obvious. So what "good" is his "multiple criteria"?

You are putting forth choices that we have no idea are available for a consistent reality. It might be a matter of fact that the laws of physics for our universe must be allowed in order for reality to be consistent. It would seem that the laws must be allowed to work as they do given their mathematical nature. If so, then the universe has evil because that's what the laws of physics bring about by their nature. God might allow that nature because the end result is a better world if naturalism is allowed to function, er... naturally.

You have some kind of metaphysical definition for truth that I don't understand.

Truth is a state of affairs that conforms to a statement describing those conditions. If the statement is true, then the state of affairs described by that statement obtain. An omniscient interpreter is that aspect of truth which confirms that indeed the statement is true by the fact that its described state of affairs has obtained. This 'first principles' approach leads naturally to the Christian view of the world.

I can think of many cosmologies that can be easily constructed from first principles. "Easily constructed" != "parsimonious."

You might be able to easily visualize them, but they are all insufficient explanations from all the atheist ones I have ever considered. The only consistent explanation are ones that are more consistent with theism.

[bobfisher]

It is also true that evil can be irreversible. Take Job, as the topic goes. God erased his whole family; even if he gives him another one, it will never be the same. So evil remains evil, no compensation is possible unless he gives Job his original family back. But he didn't "raise the dead" for Job. So, the God of the Book of Job is clearly evil, and in Epicurus vision, probably not God at all.

God will raise Job's dead family. Not back into this life, but in a new heavens & earth.