Atheist arguments for God

[Mithrae]

Inspired by the thread 'The Ten Best Apologetic Arguments,' I've recently remembered a thread I started in November last year. They're not really apologetic arguments, so with any luck I'm not violating any forum rules by starting a thread with a clean slate.

Across eleven days I had the pleasure of encountering some very intelligent discussion last year. However only three of my five arguments were debated, and on re-reading the thread I have to say that I don't think my arguments were defeated (or even particularly damaged) in any case. Maybe that's just arrogance talking But I think it's worth opening the floor again to challenge myself and other atheists to consider whether there might not be some genuinely good reasons for believing in a god after all.

Some italicized comments in [square brackets] will be comments/insights gleaned from the original debate or other more recent ideas, and I've added two new arguments to the original five. A few small changes have been made to my original wording also.

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I'm bored and a little drunk, so I figured I'd give this a shot. I don't believe in a god, but I always find it quite stimulating to think of the pro and con arguments. Limited by belief in biblical infallibility, conservative Christians are easy prey for atheists. But weighing both sides of a position, I've been known to change my own mind on occasion, so if nothing else that might make it an interesting endeavour to see how convincingly I might argue for the existence of a god.

'God' is here defined as an infinite personal Creator of everything. I won't argue (and don't believe) that concepts like 'good' and 'evil' have any true meaning with or without such a being's existence; with a God, he calls the shots, and without they're meaningless. I won't argue for biblical infallibility or even that the monotheistic faiths are the only ones with experience of this god; though some arguments will come from Judaism/Christianity if I get 'round to it.

I'll try to be relatively brief in my initial post, hoping to start debate rather than win it, but since the responses will probably be considerable it may take time to cover all points. For the sake of convenience, I'll broadly number my arguments and hopefully those responding will follow suit.



1 - Berkeley's immaterialism
This is based essentially on the problem of epistemology (the theory of 'knowing'). All science and a great deal of other human knowledge is based, ultimately, on observation; yet 'observation' for any individual amounts ultimately to nothing more than perceptions in the mind. If you've seen The Matrix, it's obvious that anyone plugged in has no way of knowing that what they see, feel, hear etc. isn't real. The difference in Berkeley's argument is that there's no real physical world with machines running the Matrix.

Berkeley agreed with the emerging sciences of his day that what we observe is real, and also with the philosophers that what we observe occurs in the mind. Reality, therefore, is a thing of the mind, not of some ultimately unprovable material world. Thus either I am the only mind in existence, and everything and everyone I've perceived is a figment of my imagination, or there are indeed other minds whose generally shared perceptions must necessarily be part of a greater Mind. The problem of epistemology is a significant one regarding the reliability of the sciences - observations occur only in the mind - but a wholly immaterial universe can be both largely consistent and largely comprehensible. There's genuine evidence for the phenomenon of perception (and less certainly, for shared perception between minds), but there's no genuine evidence for a material world - so why postulate one?


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2 - Consciousness
Quite briefly, it's obvious that I possess a quality which I call consciousness, and it's equally obvious that a rock does not. There is no evidence for any theory suggesting that physical molecules grouping together in a complex enough fashion could give rise to this non-physical phenomenon known as consciousness. Related to and compatible with the above, but ultimately distinct, each person has genuine evidence for consciousness, but no genuine evidence regarding a physical basis for it. Pure immaterialism may or may not be the best explanation for this phenomenon, though an alternative is the existence of some non-material aspect of the universe somehow linked to the material.

[In discussion with Bernee51 and AkiThePirate, I suggested a working definition for consciousness as:
"Awareness - the difference between someone in a coma and someone awake."
"I'm just theorising here of course, but probably the most basic indicators of awareness are reaction to pain and movement/exploration to acquire more sensory data. While it's true that different species have different means of acquiring sensory data, and different levels in their capacity to evaluate, remember and extrapolate from it, those would seem more like faculties in addition to 'consciousness,' not differing types or levels of consciousness itself."

I couldn't think of anything outside the kingdom animalia which fit this working definition. We infer consciousness in other humans by constant observation and very strong analogy, and in dogs or the like by similar but weaker means; however without a degree in marine biology, I was unable to answer whether a jellyfish possesses consciousness. I argued that lack of complete certainty (or even a final, conclusive and unchangeable definition) about consciousness in all cases is not a weakness in the argument, any more than it is in the sciences; we work from observation, refining our hypotheses to reach the best conclusion.

Neither Bernee nor Aki was able to provide an example of component parts producing a whole or side-effect which was qualitatively different from those parts. Towards the end of the discussion Aki suggested that consciousness isn't non-physical, because everything that exists that isn't space or time is physical (matter or energy). I don't believe that he proved that contention, the particular counter-example we ended with being the fractals which he'd mentioned earlier in the discussion.]


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3 - First cause and contigency
Everyone's probably familiar with the 'first cause' cosmological argument. Logically, the universe must be attributed either to an infinite regress of prior universes or some precedences (which seems unlikely) or it is self-caused or uncaused (equally unlikely). The same applies to the concept of God, of course. But there's a distinction which non-theists often don't seem to grasp; since long before the birth of Christ, the monotheistic concept of God has consistently been that of a timeless, uncaused Creator. The concept of material reality by contrast has consistently been that of a contingent existent, each aspect relying on previous aspects for its existence and nature. Whether it's a combination of the cosmological and ontological arguments, or Aquinas' first three arguments (I'm not enough of a philosopher to make the point clearly), the outcome is the same. An ultimate self-causation, non-causality or infinite regress in a contingent universe seems absurd compared to the possibility that a non-contingent entity caused all else.

[Responses (from memory) mostly pointed out that this falls far short of proving the 'personal, infinite' God I set out to. However I believe that at the least, the argument might lay a good foundation for the theists' additional arguments. In fact, CalvinsBulldog has made some interesting points about a personal nature for the first cause in the Ten Best Apologetic Arguments thread.]


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4 - Evolution
Paleo-biology is an even weaker point for me than philosophy, but it's my understanding that there's virtually no evidence in the fossil record for transitional forms between major classes, let alone phyla. This contrasts severely with the expected findings of the phyletic gradualism theory of evolution initially envisaged by Darwin, giving rise eventually to the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution - suggesting, if memory serves, that significant major phases of evolution occured in restricted environments under greater selective pressure, before the resultant changes spread more widely and became visible in the fossil record. I don't know whether there's other theories around, nor how many scientists still adhere to the idea of phyletic gradualism.

However in the absense of any real evidence, the theory of punctuated equilibrium seems a tacit admission that the mere factors of genetic variation, random mutation and natural selection are not borne out by the available data as the sole cause of the earth's biodiversity. A confined ecosystem and greater selective pressure cannot, to my understanding, exessively increase the range nor rate of possible available genetic variants; so what we're left with is a theory which seems somewhat to rely on an inexplicable jump in mutations in those supposed confined spaces with high selective pressure.

If any biologists can correct me on any mistakes made above, it would be welcome. However from a layman's point of view, it seems that phyletic gradualism is grossly unevidenced in the fossil record, while punctuated equilibrium seems an intelligent but not particularly persuasive effort to explain the discrepancies. Is there any reason to go for an 'inexplicably increased rate in mutations and evolution'-of-the-gaps theory, rather than god-of-the-gaps?


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5 - Prophecy of Daniel
The biblical book of Daniel was written partly in Hebrew (ch 1 and 8-12) and partly in Aramaic (2-7). I contend that there's no compelling reason to believe that the Hebrew portion is not genuine 6th century BCE material. Based mostly on the 11th chapter, secular scholars argue that such knowledge of the long interactions between the 'king of the north' (Seleucid Greeks) and 'king of the south' (Ptolemaic Greeks) could only be the product of a later author and, based on 11:36ff suppose that it was written shortly before Antiochus IV Epiphanes failed to do those things.

Besides the presupposition that the chapter must be naturalistic in origin, there are two major flaws with this view. Firstly the idea that a king (Antiochus IV) who'd spent much effort attempting to Hellenize the Jews would suddenly "show no regard for the gods of his ancestors" (11:37) and instead exalt a foreign god (38-39). Such an idea would be virtually inconceivable to a Jewish author living under Antiochus' reign. Secondly, the fact that the 'abomination of desolation' from v. 31 was prophecied at a specific time - Daniel 9:25-27 says it will occur roughly 70 sevens after the command to restore and rebuild Jerusalem. Depending on the starting date, to a later Jew that could have meant anywhere from c53 BCE to c42 CE - either way, it's clear that Daniel 11:31 does not refer to anything which happened under the reign of Antiochus IV Ephiphanes (c167 BCE).

Above all, Daniel 8 refers to 'king' Belshazzar, a figure unknown to historians until a few cuneiform inscriptions were found in the last century. He was actually son to the last king of Babylon, Nabonidus, but ruled in his stead while Nabonidus resided elsewhere (memory fails me at this point, but pending confirmation I believe that one inscription mentions the name Belshazzar, while a different one clarifies his co-regency). Belshazzar is a name unknown in any Greek history - so while it would have been natural for a 6th century Jew to refer to 'king' Belshazzar, it's a mystery how a 2nd century BCE Jew would even know the name, let alone that he was crown prince and co-regent to Babylon's last king.

The balance of evidence suggests that Hebrew Daniel was written in the 6th century BCE, containing remarkable prophecy regarding the Greeks - and, even more intriguingly, arguably that it prophecies a messiah who would be 'cut off' sometime in the 30s CE (9:26).

[I should note that I use the term 'prophet' and 'prophecy' for Daniel. But by biblical standards he wasn't a prophet; he recorded visions of the future, but he didn't pass on the 'word of the Lord' as the other prophets did (cf Deuteronomy 18:14ff). The arguments about Daniel are a little more specialist and harder to summarize than for consciousness, but I invite interested folk to browse the discussion I had with Goat on the topic.]


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6 - Jeremiah's Gematria
The concept and implied validity of this argument was actually shown to me by another atheist (Goat). I'm assuming my research last November was accurate, though that may be worth double-checking. However.

In Daniel 1:1 'Nebuchadnezzar' is written in Hebrew with a particular variation in spelling, one of several different spellings found throughout the standard Masoretic text of the Tanakh. The earliest biblical use of this particular spelling is found in the work of the prophet Jeremiah; in 27:6, from around 593 BCE, while Ezekiel 26 uses the same spelling around 7 years later. Jeremiah was a source of inspiration for Daniel, with his 70 years of Babylonian domination being the spring-board from which Daniel predicted his 70 'sevens' (Daniel 9). Whereas a major theme of Daniel's visions was the ravaging and persecution of the Jews by the Seleucid king Antiochus IV Epiphanes, a major theme in Jeremiah's prophecy is the ravaging and persecution of the Jews by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar. In chapter 27, Jeremiah speaks not just to Judah but to all the surrounding nations, declaring God's supreme power and warning them to submit to the rule of his servant Nebuchadnezzar.

That said, one can't help but consider it extremely intriguing that the precise manner in which Jeremiah spelled 'Nebuchadnezzar' while telling all nations of God's supreme power just happens to be a perfect match in Hebrew gematria for Antiochus Epiphanes! Goat, citing Wikipedia, initially advanced this as an argument that the author of Daniel must have been writing in the 2nd century. But having advanced it as a meaningful point, the fact that undisputed 6th century works use the same spelling means that on the contrary, not only does it suggest Daniel as a 6th century work but it's a remarkable indication of the hidden foreknowledge which even God's prophets may not have recognised themselves!

In Hebrew, as in many other ancient languages, names and words often have numerical value (see Gematria). Nebuchadnezzar's name in cuneiform is Nabû-kudurri-uṣur which should be transliterated into Hebrew as נבוכדנ�צר or Nebuwkadne'tstsar (as it is in Jer. 46:2, 39:11). It is unlikely to be a coincidence that when the numbers represented by "Nebuwkadne'tstsar" are added up, they come exactly the same figure (423) as the numbers of the name "Antiochus Epiphanes".
~ Wikipedia

Wikipedia and Goat may not be authoritative sources on the subject of 'unlikely to be coincidence' or the like. Nevertheless, on face value it seems that any but the most intractable sceptic must admit that it's a rather remarkable phenomenon. See here for my detailed and impeccably expert analysis of the Hebrew language in the relevant passages


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7 - Origin of life
Since it's related to argument #4, I figured I'd throw this in here too. But it deserves its own point because if my rather uneducated guess is correct that evolutionary theory still has major gaps to fill before being truly plausible as a naturalistic explanation, that is even more obviously and certainly the case regarding the origin of life itself.

• Since life exists, if it wasn't created then it must have arisen spontaneously. However that has never been observed by humans, all experimental efforts to recreate the right conditions in which it could occur have so far failed and there's not even any accepted model as to how it occurred (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abiogenesis). Since it is essentially unprovable, as you've noted it's quite rare to see atheists making that claim in a debate context despite being a logical consequence of atheism.

I won't add more on this point for now (partly 'cos I don't have much more to add), but I think it's definitely worth considering. Particularly when considering arguments like the above in gestalt, rather than taken separately: Is it strange that we find it so hard to explain the origins of life, evolution between kingdoms, phyla and classes, and the phenomenon of consciousness? Or does the presence of 'consciousness' only in living things, and only in one kingdom (and perhaps only some phyla) suggest that all of these questions may be linked within the over-arching mystery of divinity? To simply overlook arguments like #4 and #7 with a trite 'god-of-the-gaps' dismissal - particularly without having truly grappled with other powerful arguments - is perhaps an example of the overweening pride which many of the most revered teachers through history have warned as one of the greatest causes of mankind's spiritual void.



*sigh* I was trying to wax poetical for a dramatic conclusion there, but I think I failed. Anyways, that's about all I've got for now - enjoy

[Kronos]

I still have an open mind as to whether there is a meta being of some form or other. I have problems with the deterministic view of the cosmos because it would seem to deny the notion of causality, an action leads to a consequence making the future uncertain. This is tempered by the notion that if everything is just down to chance then why is there such beauty in the universe? For example the extraordinarily beautiful pictures of the outer planets in our solar system? Can you have beauty without design? Can you have form without context?

[WinePusher]

Is there a question for debate? Or is the OP just (and admittedly) a drunken, bored rant?

Did you post this up without actually reading the topic? There are questions found in the topic but you just missed them, gain the motivation to actually read topics you want to comment on if you hope to be taken seriously. Also, the word 'rant' is defined as: 'speak in loud exaggerated manner: to speak or say something in a very loud, aggressive, or bombastic way, usually at length and repetitively.' Why do you perceive this topic to be a 'rant?" Is it projection? Is it because you generally write posts that are defined as 'rants' and thus you perceive everything you read to be a 'rant' as well?

Is this topic more appropriate for Holy Huddle or TD&D?

Do you know what the 'report' option is? If you feel it's in the wrong subforum, you should report as the rules state, and refrain from publicly commenting on it, as the rules state. Perhaps you are not familiar with the rules? Many of the topics you create are put within in the wrong subforum, and I report them as mandated by the rules and the moderators correct your mistakes by moving them to the appropriate subforum.

[McCulloch]

I disagree that it's redundant, even granting all of the above. The argument is that there's no evidence or plausible mechanism by which physical molecules grouping together in a complex enough fashion could give rise to this non-physical phenomenon known as consciousness.

Why do you single out consciousness? Why not use joy, sadness, beauty, awe, intelligence, insight, fairness, bonhomie, the ability to parse grammar ...
All of these are functions of the physical organ we call the brain. Proof? Stop the brain and see if any of these attributes are still evident. How does the brain produce these, and many other allegedly non-physical phenomena? We don't know. Yet.

I also think you're inserting into your argument the presumption that consciousness is an analog scale. If we graduate the spectrum finely enough we may find that consciousness is apparent here but not here, though of course this would require specialized study.

To say the least. It would also require a definition of the term rigorous enough to support a test. How does one test whether a fish or a fly has consciousness?

[Strider324]

......Thus either I am the only mind in existence, and everything and everyone I've perceived is a figment of my imagination, or there are indeed other minds whose generally shared perceptions must necessarily be part of a greater Mind.....

This argument seems to fail right here. Nothing about the fact that there must be other minds in any why implies that there must be some 'greater mind', unless your meaning is that there is a 'collective of minds' possessed by the billions of humans on the planet.

[Ragna]

1 - Berkeley's immaterialism [...] The difference in Berkeley's argument is that there's no real physical world with machines running the Matrix.

Then what's the point in calling it non-physical? If in the Matrix all there is is the Matrix, then that's all the meaning physical has. Non-physical opposes to physical, but if there's no physical, then that point is moot. Things can't get any more real than they are (and the thought becomes absurd).

[...] The problem of epistemology is a significant one regarding the reliability of the sciences - observations occur only in the mind - but a wholly immaterial universe can be both largely consistent and largely comprehensible. There's genuine evidence for the phenomenon of perception (and less certainly, for shared perception between minds), but there's no genuine evidence for a material world - so why postulate one?

An immaterial universe may be internally consistent, but certainly the simplest explanation that accounts for reality is a material, physical one (for example, take into account things which have happened much before conscious creatures supposedly arose). This arguments gives a false impression that the immaterial scenario is more plausible and/or more explanatory.

3 - First cause and contigency
Everyone's probably familiar with the 'first cause' cosmological argument. Logically, the universe must be attributed either to an infinite regress of prior universes or some precedences (which seems unlikely) or it is self-caused or uncaused (equally unlikely).

That something is uncaused is called here 'unlikely', though in the end that's what theists defend. I'll here make a parallel to the theist who wrote this and say that while non-theists attack the concept of God ignoring his timelessness etc, the universe need not be all physical reality, there could be a multiverse, a bigger cosmos. And that cosmos may not need to be finite in duration, though I don't see any inherent contradiction in temporal finitude.

The same applies to the concept of God, of course. But there's a distinction which non-theists often don't seem to grasp; since long before the birth of Christ, the monotheistic concept of God has consistently been that of a timeless, uncaused Creator. The concept of material reality by contrast has consistently been that of a contingent existent, each aspect relying on previous aspects for its existence and nature. Whether it's a combination of the cosmological and ontological arguments, or Aquinas' first three arguments (I'm not enough of a philosopher to make the point clearly), the outcome is the same. An ultimate self-causation, non-causality or infinite regress in a contingent universe seems absurd compared to the possibility that a non-contingent entity caused all else.

Certainly a personal creator for the whole cosmos is absurd, in a sense that a universe without a creator cannot be, so it's the opposite to what is written here. The problem is not so much about the contingency of God's existence, but about the contingency of the universe, as theists know. What they don't know so often is that God solves nothing. All contingencies in the physical universe that need to be explained, will go to God. When we ask why God created these contingencies, we can find two different answers. One is necessity. A higher truth than God makes God create the universe in the only way it can be. What's God doing here, then? Nothing. The second answer is that God created the contingencies of the universe capriciously. Well, then God solves nothing either! What we have now is divine randomness, but it's still randomness, so what's with a creator that cannot account for the order he sought to explain?

About the first cause directly: the totality of existence, by definition, has to account for itself (be necessary), because nothing can exist outside of it. A simple reductio can demonstrate this, by definition. So existence just is, and unless we go for infinite regress, postulating a creator solves nothing that wasn't solved (if the creator had to be necessary, then the cosmos can also have this property with the same logical validity). What's more, calling the creator timeless rises more paradoxes than problems it solves, because time cannot be created.

2 - Consciousness
4 - Evolution
7 - Origin of life

All these three are interrelated, and to me they resemble a god-of-the-gaps type of argument. Evolution is well-explained naturally, and abiogenesis models are improving a lot. Also, the very concept of abiogenesis already renders terms like "first cell" meaningless, and thus God-of-the-gaps arguments don't work there either.

Consciousness, with dualism, is a different topic but still related. If consciousness arose naturally, then what's so special about it? Whatever it is, it's not something in favor of theism. Awareness is in the end matter interpreting itself. I don't see any obvious reason why this needs extra dimensions. I will ask you, when you look in a mirror, isn't that eye you see also the object through which you see? It's certainly very possible. I submit that recreating an atom-per-atom exact copy of a human brain would also recreate an exact copy of the brain states held at that moment. It would "be all there".

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This argument seems to fail right here. Nothing about the fact that there must be other minds in any why implies that there must be some 'greater mind', unless your meaning is that there is a 'collective of minds' possessed by the billions of humans on the planet.

That argument only works within the framework. If it is true that only an immaterial reality exists, then the only way independent minds can share the same perception is that that perception exists idependent of them. In that case, the only possible place for it to reside is a greater mind (i.e., God's mind). However, given that matter doesn't exist, it'd be much more plausible that a single mind exists (and none of the idealistic scenarios seem satisfactory or grant a plausible explanation for our perceptions, from my point of view).

I'd also like to point out that saying there is no evidence for physical reality is a fallacy. The word evidence already presupposes certain metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality (for example, that we can trust our senses).

[fredonly]

[The ability to test historical hypotheses is entirely opportunistic and rare, only occurring when new data (like the archeaological data you mention) arises.. The broad sweeps of ancient history are based on very limited data, with little hope of aquiring additional data for testing.

It is not as rare as all that. There is also looking at multiple accounts and convergence of evidence. We can also test the plausibility of accounts. For example, I doubt that any serious historian takes Suetonius' account of Vespasian healing the blind and the lame with a touch of his hands seriously.
We can test if claims about things are plausible, and look at multiple accounts to see if the match up.

You’re confusing the development of historical hypotheses with hypothesis testing. With history, particularly ancient history, the data we have is limited; we can’t create new data for testing the hypothesis. We can examine the data with fresh perspectives, or in different combinations, just as we can with the empirical data of science, but we can’t run experiments or gather new data sets as we can with science. History is about identifying patterns. The patterns that historians see may or may not be accurate representations of past reality. They are unavoidably subjective. Historians are undaunted by the sparseness of data. They’ll develop a historical hypotheses despite this, and then build historical narratives from premises that are themselves hypotheses. (the less data there is, the easier it is to construct a consistent scenario, but this also means the scenario will be more speculative and therefore more tenuous). Historiographies can be built up from layers of hypotheses, with the deepest layer being the interpretations of the raw data – so even the basic premises of the historiography can be tentative – very similar to the philosophical arguments we’re discussing. Historians may disagree with the validity of another historians premises (i.e. their historical evidence) just as you disagree that a ID proponent’s “evidence� is valid. It’s in the eye of the beholder.

When it comes to the fine tuning argument, the same logical fallacy of personal incredulity applies, as well as the ability (or not) to test it. So far, no one has been able to come up with a way to figure out if a natural object is 'designed', or merely complexity occurring because of the interaction of a number of simple rules over time.

Personal incredulity is certainly part of the argument (I wish I had a dollar for every time William Lane Craig uses the word, “astonishing�), but that’s not the entire argument. Analogous to historians, they perceive patterns and it is these perceived patterns that they treat as their evidence and as premises of their argument. (I sometimes point out that astrologers also see patterns, so the mere identification of patterns does not imply the pattern is genuine and meaningful. Random dots can be connected to form a picture). It may very well be a house of cards, just like ancient history, but one can’t invalidate their process without invalidating history. My point is simply that evidence is not always raw observation; it usually requires interpretation. This can still result in useful knowledge, tentative though it may be. Of course, ALL knowledge is tentative.

The fine tuning argument is not about material objects, per se, it is about the philosophical question of why things are as they are (particularly: why is the universe configured to allow some life to develop?), and it relies an the argument from analogy - a type of argument used in historical analysis. (e.g. obviously a watch is designed; is there evidence of a similar type of complexity in nature?) This type of complexity is vague and seems to be evaluated based on personal prejudice. I think it's a worthy philosophical question, but most assuredly not a worthy scientific question.

And, the issue that I see for it from a philosophical question is that it looks at things backwards, and makes the assumption that we are a GOAL of the universe, rather than just one of very many results. I mean, if the universe is fine tuned for anything, it would be for the production of black holes.

They are, of course, motivated by the desire to rationalize their pre-conceived beliefs. But even science is driven in this way. We do not arrive at scientific breakthroughs entirely through deduction from premises. The starting point tends to be intuition and insight (I vaguely recall Kuhn discussing this in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions), which then leads to examining data to verify/refine the insights.

if the universe is fine tuned for anything, it would be for the production of black holes

I’ve seen this criticism before, but I think it misses the point. Although it is hypothetically true that the universe could have been more amenable to the development of intelligent life than it is, it remains the case that our universe is clearly amenable enough for the development of at least one form of intelligent life: us. The fine-tuning question is: how probable is it that a random, spontaneous appearance of the universe would have had conditions that would have allowed at least one intelligent species to develop? The pro-fine-tuning crowd insists the probability is infinitesimally low, because there’s no intrinsic reason (that we know of) why the sudden appearance of space-time and matter-energy would have randomly appeared with the set of conditions and fundamental parameters that would permit one or more species of life to develop. This is the pivotal issue.

According to Craig:
“[Roger] Penrose calculates that the odds of our universe’s low entropy condition obtaining by chance alone are on the order of 1:10^(10^123).� --http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=6123
“… in the absence of fine-tuning not even chemistry, not even matter would exist, much less planets where life might evolve and flourish. “
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=8853
More generally, Craig mentions that the probability is low that a spontaneous (unplanned) appearance of the universe would randomly result in an amenable cosmological constant, an amenable ratio of strong to weak force, etc. Craig charges that it is as a response to this “highly� improbable set of values that has driven cosmologists to suggest a many worlds hypothesis, so that our improbable universe becomes probable if there are a sufficiently large number of universes with varying values for the various parameters. Put in these terms, this suggests only two reasonable alternatives: 1) design; 2) a multiverse landscape with an enormous number of universes. I do believe there is a flaw in this reasoning, but it is subtle – and therefore should not be cavalierly dismissed.
My issue with it is not that any of us should necessarily accept the reasoning. As several have said, they consider this issue “dismissed.� This sounds like a personal dismissal, “I can tell it’s not true,� but unless one can articulate clear flaws, it’s no more generally dismissed than any of the other arguments Mithrae listed.

[Janx]

Mithrae,
Great read. I really wish you turned this into seven posts though because I don't know where to start. I think that all of these point to gaps in our understanding of the world and using God as filler for any of those gap will be no more or less effects than using the noun, "mystery".

Maybe the difference is that Christians have good feelings about God and no feelings about mystery. While I have no feelings about God and good feelings about mystery. Perhaps that's the key.

That's a worthy point applied to arguments about consciousness, evolution or the origin of life perhaps, but I'm not sure how well it works with the others. Suppose it's true that Daniel was written in the 6th century and contains genuine prophecy, for example; when Daniel himself explained the source of his knowledge as angels from God, I think it'd be a bit dismissive to then talk about 'mystery' and how our feelings shape our conclusions. Similarly the first and third arguments aren't so much about what we don't know, as what we might validly infer from logical principles and the fundamental nature and ubiquitous elements of the individual's experience.

Hey Mithrae,

I don't know much about the Prophecy of Daniel. Certainly it's often invoked but from what I understand there are plenty of historical errors. Is it worth looking it at?

[Clownboat]

Is there a question for debate? Or is the OP just (and admittedly) a drunken, bored rant?

Did you post this up without actually reading the topic? There are questions found in the topic but you just missed them, gain the motivation to actually read topics you want to comment on if you hope to be taken seriously. Also, the word 'rant' is defined as: 'speak in loud exaggerated manner: to speak or say something in a very loud, aggressive, or bombastic way, usually at length and repetitively.' Why do you perceive this topic to be a 'rant?" Is it projection? Is it because you generally write posts that are defined as 'rants' and thus you perceive everything you read to be a 'rant' as well?

Is this topic more appropriate for Holy Huddle or TD&D?

Do you know what the 'report' option is? If you feel it's in the wrong subforum, you should report as the rules state, and refrain from publicly commenting on it, as the rules state. Perhaps you are not familiar with the rules? Many of the topics you create are put within in the wrong subforum, and I report them as mandated by the rules and the moderators correct your mistakes by moving them to the appropriate subforum.

So much irony it hurts...

[Goat]

Mithrae,
Great read. I really wish you turned this into seven posts though because I don't know where to start. I think that all of these point to gaps in our understanding of the world and using God as filler for any of those gap will be no more or less effects than using the noun, "mystery".

Maybe the difference is that Christians have good feelings about God and no feelings about mystery. While I have no feelings about God and good feelings about mystery. Perhaps that's the key.

That's a worthy point applied to arguments about consciousness, evolution or the origin of life perhaps, but I'm not sure how well it works with the others. Suppose it's true that Daniel was written in the 6th century and contains genuine prophecy, for example; when Daniel himself explained the source of his knowledge as angels from God, I think it'd be a bit dismissive to then talk about 'mystery' and how our feelings shape our conclusions. Similarly the first and third arguments aren't so much about what we don't know, as what we might validly infer from logical principles and the fundamental nature and ubiquitous elements of the individual's experience.

Hey Mithrae,

I don't know much about the Prophecy of Daniel. Certainly it's often invoked but from what I understand there are plenty of historical errors. Is it worth looking it at?

Most biblical scholars have concluded that the Book of Daniel was specifically talking about the rule of Antioch ,and was written in 164 to 162 bce.

[arian]

I disagree that it's redundant, even granting all of the above. The argument is that there's no evidence or plausible mechanism by which physical molecules grouping together in a complex enough fashion could give rise to this non-physical phenomenon known as consciousness.

Why do you single out consciousness? Why not use joy, sadness, beauty, awe, intelligence, insight, fairness, bonhomie, the ability to parse grammar ...
All of these are functions of the physical organ we call the brain. Proof? Stop the brain and see if any of these attributes are still evident. How does the brain produce these, and many other allegedly non-physical phenomena? We don't know. Yet.

There are many physical phenomena that defy logic, or rational reasoning, like what we define as 'miracles' (see the Bible, or some of my posts where I claim my life full of miracles.)

Oh yes, everything is fair and up for discussion 'except' miracles. Even though there were witnesses, they are somehow discarded?

Come now, let's talk of the Spiritual realm, where in the OP does it address that issue besides Daniels questionable writings? Where is Jesus in all this?

"Stop the brain and see if any of these attributes are still evident."

It is, just raise the dead.

Is joy, sadness, beauty, awe, intelligence, insight, fairness, bonhomie, the ability to parse grammar dead and gone when the brain dies? Is beauty gone too? How about reasoning and logic? Billions of brains have died, and yet all this continues.

I also think you're inserting into your argument the presumption that consciousness is an analog scale. If we graduate the spectrum finely enough we may find that consciousness is apparent here but not here, though of course this would require specialized study.

To say the least. It would also require a definition of the term rigorous enough to support a test. How does one test whether a fish or a fly has consciousness?

Probably the same way as they are testing for 'dark-matter' which is described as invisible, goes through mass at the speed of light!?!