Can we at least agree on this?

[notachance]

There is no empirical evidence in support of any supernatural claim in the Bible.

The only evidence is hearsay anecdotal evidence.

That hearsay evidence in support of supernatural claims in the Bible is miniscule when stacked up against the overwhelming empirical evidence AGAINST any supernatural claims in the Bible.

For example, the only piece of evidence for Genesis is an old book written by anonymous authors who could not POSSIBLY have been alive at the time the event allegedly happened.

To the contrary there is overwhelming empirical evidence against genesis: Accurate, testable, empirical, measurable evidence that allows us to make accurate predictions, and the validity of which is supported by the fact that the same data-acquiring-method (the scientific method) is also responsible for getting us to the moon, performing heart transplants, creating computers, doubling life expectancy, inventing antibiotics and millions of others things which are measurably and irrefutably valid.

So, can we at least agree that the evidence against the veracity of supernatural Bible claims is more solid than the evidence in favor of it?

[LiamOS]

Aki, my friend, you are plain wrong.

Not a chance!
I really am a sucker for awful puns, but there you go.

Anyway... It's quite plausible that I'm wrong, but all you've shown in this post is a complete lack of understanding of my argument.

Fiction set in an imaginary location is just as fictional as fiction set in a real location.

Agreed.

"2+2=4, Bigfoot is real and 3+3=6"

"2+2=5, the Lockness monster is real, and 2+4=7".

Is the probability of bigfoot being real any higher than the probability of the Lockness monster being real, just because the statement about Bigfoot is surrounded by true statements?

You're only evaluating each statement on its own in this case. The point of my argument was that, when considered as a set of statements, the probability of the set's being correct as a whole is the product of the probabilities of each statement which is an element of the set being true.

The first set is more likely to be true(Unless you have reason to believe that the probability that Bigfoot exists is exactly equal to zero...) due to the fact that it has a non-zero probability and the second has a probability equal to zero(Since your numerical statements are false even under(I think) modular arithmetic).

Let's apply that to the spiderman scenario.

"New York exists and spiderman lives there"

"Krypton exists and superman lives there"

Is the probability of spiderman being real any higher than the probability of superman being real, just because the statement about spiderman is next to a true statement and the statement about superman is next to an untrue statement?

And here we have another example of you missing the point. The statement has a probability of being true independent of other statements. The collection of those statements' probability of being correct is proportional to the probability of each, so more true statements in a given set would make the set more likely to be true.

Fiction set in an imaginary location is just as fictional as fiction set in a real location.

Clipboard accident?

The notion that a claim is NOT fictional must be determined on the merits of the claim itself, not on the merits of unrelated claims it happens to be sitting next to.

Well, yeah, duh.

My hunch is that you presented your case more as a thought experiment than as something you're emotionally invested in

I try to make that the case in general.

so hopefully you'll have no difficulty retracting

Well, I'd like to be shown wrong before I do so.
I've not made a habit of retracting arguments because people are unable to understand them, and neither am I about to start.

The fault in your logic is that you've failed to adequately demonstrate the truth of the outlandish claim that if a false statement (spiderman exists) is sitting next to a true statement (NYC exists) then the truth of the second statement makes the false statement less false.

Never have I made such a claim. This fits perfectly the definition of a Straw Man, at this point.

Imagine there are two dice. One is rigged (analogy for a false statement), and the other is not rigged (analogy for a true statement).

If you throw the rigged and the non-rigged dice at the same time, the fact that the rigged dice is being thrown together with a non-rigged one, is in NO WAY going to reduce it's "rigged-ness".

Exactly, and that is clearly seen in my argument; namely where the probability of one element in the set is zero.



I'm going to try now to present a part of my argument in a general(ish) form, so please give it a good read and some thought.

Consider the sets of random premises:
1) {1+1=2, Bachelors are Single, Otseng will win the lottery within a year}
2) {Your next coin toss will be a heads, Your next dice roll will be a four}
3) {1+1=2, 9+2=11, 5+5-10, 1+1=1}
(Assume Otseng plays the lottery)

Now, if you haven't taken any classes on probability, the probability of two events both happening where each has probability P₁ and P₂ respectively is the product of those probabilities.

In the case of set 1, we have two statements which are true by definition(Probability = 1) and one premise which has a reasonably low probability(~0.000001), which would make the probability of set one being true equal to whatever the probability of Otseng winning the lottery within a year is.
In the case of set 2, the first probability is 0.5 and the second is 0.166..., which makes the probability of set two being true equal to 0.0833...
In the third case, despite the first three probabilities being 1, the last is impossible(P = 0) and therefore the probability of set 3 being true is zero.

Now, returning to my original post:

1) Spiderman exists and inhabits New York City.
2) Spiderman exists and inhabits Atlantis.
Despite both being extremely improbable, the fact that the first location exists(Or is at least known to) makes the second statement more likely to be incorrect, if we associate a probability(Or lack thereof) with Atlantis' existence, due to the probability of NYC's existence being one(Or arbitrarily close to it).
If we consider evidence to be something which, when known, makes something more likely to be the case from one's perspective(William Lane Craig would agree here), it follows that, in the case of Spiderman, the existence of New York City constitutes evidence of Spiderman's existence.

We can see that the first set of statements is more probable than the second off the bat, and that's the point I'm making.


After this, all I do is argue that I think information which, from one's perspective, increases the likelihood of something being true constitutes evidence for that. You're more than welcome to disagree, but if you do so it'd be best for both of us if you were to outline what is the case and why this would be incorrect.

[Mithrae]

I don't know the specifics regarding carbon-dating of remains at Jericho, though it's worth noting that there's an error margin of at least a few decades from the result in the best of cases. To my knowledge the biblical chronology is fairly precise in many cases but contradictory, whereas the Egyptian chronology is somewhat sketchy (and also somewhat inconsistent, albeit reconciled by scholars, from what little I know). But if there's a best candidate for a major Semitic migration from Egypt into Canaan, I suspect the expulsion of the Hyksos in the mid-16th century BCE may fit the bill. As I've suggested, in decades past and future there'll probably be no end to the debates and theories about how well various historical scenarios fit various archaeological data. But from what I know there is some measure of justification for arguing that archaeological evidence at Jericho can be associated with the biblical story.

Actually it's news to me that there is as much debate about this as you are suggesting. I was under the impression that from an archaeological standpoint there exists little, if any evidence for the historicity of the Exodus and conquest of Canaan. ie:

The prevailing scholarly view is that Joshua is not a factual account of historical events. The apparent setting of Joshua is the 13th century; this was a time of widespread city-destruction, but with a few exceptions (Hazor, Lachish,) the destroyed cities are not the ones the Bible associates with Joshua, and the ones it does associate with him show little or no sign of even being occupied at the time.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conquest_o ... oricity.29

Historians today argue that Israelites were not external conquerors of the Levant, instead they gradually emerged from Canaanite culture:

Canaan in the Late Bronze Age was a shadow of what it had been centuries earlier: many cities were abandoned, others shrank in size, and the total settled population was probably not much more than a hundred thousand. Settlement was concentrated in cities along the coastal plain and along major communication routes; the central and northern hill country which would later become the biblical kingdom of Israel was only sparsely inhabited although letters from the Egyptian archives indicate that Jerusalem was already a Canaanite city-state recognising Egyptian overlordship. Politically and culturally it was dominated by Egypt, each city under its own ruler, constantly at odds with its neighbours, and appealing to the Egyptians to adjudicate their differences.

The Canaanite city-state system broke down at the end of the Late Bronze period, and Canaanite culture was then gradually absorbed into that of the Philistines, Phoenicians and Israelites. The process was gradual rather than swift: a strong Egyptian presence continued into the 12th century BC, and, while some Canaanite cities were destroyed, others continued to exist in Iron I.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of ... Bronze_Age

I agree that notachance's rhetoric is (as usual) imprecise and overbearing, I just wanted to point out that this particular piece of evidence isn't as special as you're making it out to be (not that you're making it out to be anything amazing, mind you). Personally I don't see a problem saying that there is some empirical evidence that may directly or indirectly support some supernatural claims of the bible. "There's no evidence!" and "there's a small amount of very weak evidence!" are functionally equivalent for the most part, but it is important to be as accurate as possible when discussing these things. So I see your point.

I'm just assuming that debate over the historicity of the exodus will continue of course, but I reckon it's a pretty safe assumption that it will - and will even be on a somewhat more scholarly basis than the debate over whether the earth is 6000 years old

As you mentioned previously, one passage in the bible sets the date of the exodus in the mid 15th century BCE; from what I gather the 13th century date was originally based to no small extent on associating the Pharoah of the exodus with Rameses II (cf Exodus 1:11). If I read the bits you've quoted correctly, archaeological evidence for a 13th century transition between Canaanite and Israelite culture does not seem to be overwhelming. But I'm still partial to suspecting that a probable historical basis can be found in the Hyksos, re-writing their ignoble ousting as a ruling class into a glorious escape from slavery. I'm not at all sure whether that ties in at all with Canaanite archaeology of course. But there are a few interesting points of contact with the biblical story:

• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyksos#Who ... _Hyksos.3F
  
  In his Against Apion, the 1st-century CE historian Josephus Flavius debates the synchronism between the Biblical account of the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, and two Exodus-like events that the Egyptian historian Manetho apparently mentions. It is difficult to distinguish between what Manetho himself recounted, and how Josephus or Apion interpret him.
  
  Josephus identifies the Israelite Exodus with the first exodus mentioned by Manetho, when some 480,000 Hyksos "shepherd kings" (also referred to as just 'shepherds', as 'kings' and as 'captive shepherds' in his discussion of Manetho) left Egypt for Jerusalem.[24] The mention of "Hyksos" identifies this first exodus with the Hyksos period (16th century BC).
  
  Josephus records the earliest account of the false but understandable etymology that the Greek phrase Hyksos stood for the Egyptian phrase Hekw Shasu meaning the Bedouin-like Shepherd Kings, which scholars have only recently shown means "rulers of foreign lands."[25]
  
  Modern scholarship usually[who?] assumes that the Hyksos were likely Semites who came from the Levant. Kamose, the last king of the Theban 17th Dynasty, refers to Apophis as a "Chieftain of Retjenu (i.e., Canaan)" in a stela that implies a Canaanite background for this Hyksos king: this is the strongest evidence for a Canaanite background for the Hyksos. . . . .
  
  As to a Hyksos conquest, some archaeologists[who?] depict the Hyksos as northern hordes . . . sweeping through Palestine and Egypt in swift chariots. Yet, others refer to a creeping conquest, that is, a gradual infiltration of migrating nomads or seminomads who either slowly took over control of the country piecemeal or by a swift coup detat put themselves at the head of the existing government. In The World of the Past (1963, p. 444), archeologist Jacquetta Hawkes states: It is no longer thought that the Hyksos rulers... represent the invasion of a conquering horde of Asiatics... they were wandering groups of Semites who had long come to Egypt for trade and other peaceful purposes. However, this view still makes it difficult to explain how wandering groups could have gained control of Egypt, especially since the twelfth dynasty, prior to this period, is considered to have brought the country to a peak of power.

But all this is largely an aside, of course.

l evidence that NYC exists constitute evidence in support of the notion that spiderman exists? YES OR NO!!!???

No.

Ok, thank you!

So you agree that the empirical evidence for the existence of New York does NOT constitute evidence in support of Spiderman.

Next question:
Does empirical evidence for the occurrence of an earthquake constitute evidence in support of magical powers of nomadic barbarians? Yes or no.

Please don't make me go through a dozen posts of begging and pleading like last time. Please just answer the question.

lol You really don't see the problem with using flawed analogies and black/white reasoning as your primary mode of 'debate' yet, do you?

- Stories about a super-hero, viewed as fictional by the audience, with many different plots set against the background of a city - and that city can be shown to exist.

- Stories about a nation's origins, viewed as historical by the audience, one of which involves the destruction of a city - and that city might be shown to have existed and been destroyed in a manner consistent with the story.

You don't actually see the difference there, do you? Yes or no.

How about we try a different late bronze/early iron age story about the destruction of a city as a slightly more sound analogy than the best one you were able to come up with? Archaeological finds at Troy provide empirical evidence supporting Homer's story of gods and men found in the Illiad. The comparison has limits of course; Homer's Troy didn't have its walls remarkably collapse with only a small section left intact, and we can't find archaeological evidence that Hera, Aphrodite and Athene asked Paris to judge a beauty contest for them But in the case of the biblical tale, the very detail which might be supported by archaeological evidence is the detail in the story which is often considered a supernatural event.

You personally may not consider it 'supernatural' of course, but since you still haven't answered my request for clarification of what you mean by the term around which your whole thread is based, that's hardly my problem. Your little yes/no questions are not an argument; they're feeble attempts to avoid discussion.

[notachance]

Hey Aki, I think I cracked it. I figured out the source of our disagreement. I could hash it out in three sentences, but let me go the long route so as to totally avoid misunderstanding. Bear with me if you would.

Ok, assume this for the purpose of argument:

1) The chance that New York exists is 1.

2) The chance that earthquake did actually take place in Canaan is the same as getting heads when flipping a coin (.5)

3) The chance of nomadic barbarians having magical powers to predict the exact timing, intensity and repercussions of a specific earthquake is the same as winning the lottery three times in a row (~0.000000000001)

4) The chance that the planet krypton exists is also ~0.000000000001

5) The chance that superman exists is also ~0.000000000001

6) The chance that spiderman exists is also ~0.000000000001

Now, let's build some sets with these probabilities.

set 1: {Chance of New York existing AND chance of spiderman existing} 1 x ~0.000000000001

set 2: {Chance of an earthquake happening in Canaan AND nomads having magical powers} 0.5 x ~0.000000000001 = ~0.0000000000005

set 3: {Chance of krypton existing and superman existing} ~0.000000000001 x ~0.000000000001 = ~0.00000000000000000000001


That's what you're saying, right?

I agree 100% that the probability of the ENTIRE SET increases by adding high-probability events to the set.

But here is the thing:

In my OP I am not talking about the combined probability of all events, natural and supernatural, in the probability set called "the Bible". I am specifically and discriminately asking for the probability of occurrence of SUPERNATURAL events, and making the claim that that probability is far lower than the probability of non-occurrence of supernatural events.

You were right in saying a set containing a high probability event and a low prob event has higher prob than a set containing two low prob events.

I was right in saying that the presence of a high prob event, while it might increase the prob of the set, when compared with a set with only low prob events, DOES NOT INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE LOW PROB EVENT ITSELF.

The probability that Spiderman exists, Superman exists, and nomadic barbarians had magical powers remains <0.00000000000000000000000001

So you were right, I was right, we were just unclear about the scope of each other's argument.

Agreed?


Also a point of interest that should be noted is that if you add high probability events to a set you are NOT increasing the probability that the set is true, you are just decreasing it to a lower degree than if you added a low prob event to the set.

Therefore, by saying "there was an earthquake and the barbarians had magical powers", as opposed to just saying "barbarians had magical powers" without mentioning an earthquake, the Bible DECREASES the credibility of the entire set, as compared to the credibility of the supernatural claim by itself. However low the probability of the barbarian's magical powers is, it's half as likely that they had them AND that an earthquake happened as described as well

Similarly, the probability that spiderman exists is higher than the probability that he exists AND lives in new york (but, yes it's higher than the prob that he exists and lives in atlantis)

[notachance]

- Stories about a super-hero, viewed as fictional by the audience, with many different plots set against the background of a city - and that city can be shown to exist.

- Stories about a nation's origins, viewed as historical by the audience, one of which involves the destruction of a city - and that city might be shown to have existed and been destroyed in a manner consistent with the story.

You don't actually see the difference there, do you? Yes or no.

No, I don't see the difference.

Are you saying that if a story about magical powers is viewed as "fictional" by the audience, then we should take the overwhelming evidence against its veracity into consideration, but if a story about magical powers is viewed as "historical" by the audience, then we should DISREGARD the overwhelming evidence against its veracity?

Does the opinion of the audience override empirical evidence in favor and against a claim?

Look man, the situation is simple:

Evidence in favor of nomadic barbarians having supernatural powers: Anecdotal hearsay from an unreliable and unknown source

Evidence AGAIN nomadic barbarians having supernatural powers: Overwhelming empirical evidence.

It doesn't matter that this absurd fairy tale is set to the stage of historical events that may have actually happened. So is the cartoon "Mickey Mouse goes to war". So what!

You can group up your story about barbarians with magical powers in the middle of the Encyclopedia Britannica, surrounded by millions of true and demonstrated facts, it's NOT GOING TO CHANGE A THING.

Fiction is fiction is fiction.

[Mithrae]

I notice you're still talking about 'magical powers' and still failing to define your key term 'supernatural.' So it probably wouldn't be very useful to ask for your supposed "overwhelming empirical evidence" on the subject. Thanks for the discussion so far, but until you learn the basics of debate I suspect this won't really end up going anywhere. So I'll leave it at that for now.

[notachance]

I notice you're still talking about 'magical powers' and still failing to define your key term 'supernatural.' So it probably wouldn't be very useful to ask for your supposed "overwhelming empirical evidence" on the subject.

I will hereby define "supernatural" as that which, with a preponderance of evidence, has been proven to be certifiably impossible to explain by natural means.

In other words, a supernatural event is not one for which we don't have an explanation yet, but one for which, by rigorous and pragmatic research, we have concluded positively and with a preponderance of evidence that there can be no explanation ever within the confines of natural existence.

So, if you wish to make the claim that a supernatural event happened, first you have to demonstrate with a preponderance of evidence that the event happened, and then you have to demonstrate with a preponderance of evidence that it's impossible that the event happened in accordance with the laws of nature.

Do you disagree with this definition?

[Mithrae]

Thankyou. I do disagree with the definition, since virtually anything is possible to explain by natural means. But if that's the definition you use then your OP is correct, since you're essentially defining the 'supernatural' out of existence. If you're interested, I posted some comments on that subject to Furrowed Brow in the thread How unlikely is the supernatural?

• Actually I'd say that if, in the absense of any better natural explanation, we were resorting to invoking billionaire conspiracies to account for a hypothesised 'supernatural' event, we've already burned the bridge of testability in a worse way than traditional religious claims. A Christian apologist might claim as evidence that "four independent gospels, two of which were written by eyewitnesses, all confirm that Jesus walked on water." This is falsifiable to the extent that we can show that at least three of those gospels do share a dependency on each other and at least one of the eyewitness claims is false, and further falsifiable in showing that eyewitness testimony is often unreliable. With relevant information, few but the most determined conservative apologists will claim that there is strong evidence for Jesus walking on water. Our hypothetical billionaire conspiracy theory likewise has no good evidence, and worse is simply an ad-libbed response; it's proposed precisely because there's no evidence on the matter.
  
  As far as supernatural claims/events requiring the suspension of established scientific laws, that's only the case if you're including theories about how an event happened alongside your question of whether it happened. It would be akin to disbelieving someone's claim that a feather fell as fast as a lead ball on the basis of our certainty that lead balls fall faster. Once we know the how - that rates of fall are affected by air resistance, and the feather and ball were in a vacuum - we might be more inclined to believe what someone claims they saw. If someone did that little magic trick a few centuries ago, it seems to me that your position would have us believing that it was a lead feather or that our friend was deluded. My position is that if we have reasonable evidence for something - in this case, if our friend is an observant, level-headed and honest person - we should consider it possible (perhaps even probable, depending on the strength of evidence) that the something did happen, even if we don't know how.
  
  If some of the heat from a layer of water just beneath Lake Galilee's surface were transferred deeper in the lake (maintaining the law of conservation of energy) a sheet of ice would form on which Jesus could walk (or more likely slide ). How could the heat transfer be effected without violating established scientific laws? Not a clue off the top of my head, but I imagine there could be quite a few ways (an alien ship in orbit being one random example), just as there are other ways we could speculate how Jesus might have walked on water.
  
  This example obviously has very weak evidence that the event did occur at all. But my point is that while I can somewhat understand Notachance's initial position of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt,' your position of trillionth of a trillionth of a trillionth etc. and preference even for far-fetched conspiracy theories seems fundamentally flawed. As far as I'm concerned the first question is what happened. If on further consideration the 'what' seems beyond or contrary to our best current knowledge, we should rightly expect higher standards of evidence before accepting it as plausible (and much higher still before considering it fact). How it might have happened is almost always the subject of speculation, then theories and often still isn't agreed-upon as fact even in scientific enquiries.

If a potential natural explanation would have us classifying something like Jesus walking on water as not a 'supernatural' event, I'm not sure what merit the thread actually has. Certainly nothing relating to the consideration of evidence for biblical claims.

[notachance]

Thankyou. I do disagree with the definition, since virtually anything is possible to explain by natural means.

Ok, let's get this straight: I am saying that if something can be explained by natural means, then it's natural, and that if it cannot be explained by natural means, then it's supernatural.

And you disagree with that????

Are you saying that if something can be explained by natural means... then it's supernatural?

Are you saying that if something CANNOT be explained by natural means... then it's natural?

Are you saying that whether something is natural or supernatural, has nothing to do with whether it's natural or supernatural?

What are you saying?

What part of "natural = within nature; supernatural = beyond nature" do you disagree with?

The fact that virtually anything can be explained by natural means is true. But it's NOT a good reason for disagreeing with my definition, it's only a "good reason" for arbitrarily rejecting my definition because it invalidates your personal faith.

Kinda like "I reject the notion that God doesn't exist, because if He didn't my life would be meaningless" or "I simply cannot live in a world without a God".

You don't falsify a logical argument by expressing that you don't enjoy the prospect of its conclusion being true, you falsify an argument by pointing out flaws in its formulation.

Go ahead and do that.

And then go ahead and demonstrate that the fact that earthquakes sometimes happen are evidence for bronze age barbarians having supernatural powers.

[LiamOS]

Hey Aki, I think I cracked it. I figured out the source of our disagreement.

Good job. By any chance, did it turn out to be your misunderstanding of my position and posts on the subject?(Rhetorical question)
I'm just putting this out there after your previous assertion that I was wrong and your request that I retract my statement, it is hilariously rude and hypocritical for you to not to either retract such portions of your posts or at least concede that you were wrong and apologise.
I honestly don't actually care if you do or not, but I'm just pointing it out that not doing so both here and elsewhere would(If it has not already) leave you with zero credibility as a debater.

Ok, assume this for the purpose of argument:

1) The chance that New York exists is 1.

2) The chance that earthquake did actually take place in Canaan is the same as getting heads when flipping a coin (.5)

3) The chance of nomadic barbarians having magical powers to predict the exact timing, intensity and repercussions of a specific earthquake is the same as winning the lottery three times in a row (~0.000000000001)

4) The chance that the planet krypton exists is also ~0.000000000001

5) The chance that superman exists is also ~0.000000000001

6) The chance that spiderman exists is also ~0.000000000001

Now, let's build some sets with these probabilities.

set 1: {Chance of New York existing AND chance of spiderman existing} 1 x ~0.000000000001

set 2: {Chance of an earthquake happening in Canaan AND nomads having magical powers} 0.5 x ~0.000000000001 = ~0.0000000000005

set 3: {Chance of krypton existing and superman existing} ~0.000000000001 x ~0.000000000001 = ~0.00000000000000000000001


That's what you're saying, right?

That's merely assumed in my argument as being the case. I was rather hoping to not have to go into any detail on the matter originally, but there you go...

But here is the thing:

In my OP I am not talking about the combined probability of all events, natural and supernatural, in the probability set called "the Bible". I am specifically and discriminately asking for the probability of occurrence of SUPERNATURAL events, and making the claim that that probability is far lower than the probability of non-occurrence of supernatural events.

Yes, but in case you didn't notice, I was not replying directly to the OP. I replied to a specific post addressed primarily to Mithrae in an attempt to outline why you were not actually correct in what you were saying specifically in that instance.

You were right in saying a set containing a high probability event and a low prob event has higher prob than a set containing two low prob events.

I was right in saying that the presence of a high prob event, while it might increase the prob of the set, when compared with a set with only low prob events, DOES NOT INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE LOW PROB EVENT ITSELF.

Let's not pat ourselves on the back for having a basic understanding of probability, and I'm still not sure whether you know that I never claimed even implicitly that the latter was untrue.

The probability that Spiderman exists, Superman exists, and nomadic barbarians had magical powers remains <0.00000000000000000000000001

Yes.

So you were right, I was right, we were just unclear about the scope of each other's argument.

Agreed?

No.
You've still managed to remain oblivious to the actual point of my post.

Also a point of interest that should be noted is that if you add high probability events to a set you are NOT increasing the probability that the set is true, you are just decreasing it to a lower degree than if you added a low prob event to the set.

Well, yes, but that's an implicit assumption when dealing with probabilities which interact multiplicatively.

Therefore, by saying "there was an earthquake and the barbarians had magical powers", as opposed to just saying "barbarians had magical powers" without mentioning an earthquake, the Bible DECREASES the credibility of the entire set, as compared to the credibility of the supernatural claim by itself. However low the probability of the barbarian's magical powers is, it's half as likely that they had them AND that an earthquake happened as described as well

But you assume that and account for that.
If I give you a set S with elements a₁ through to a_n and tell you that such a set has a probability P of containing only true elements, without any knowledge of the individual probabilities, you would say that the average probability for any a is P^1/5.
But that's not important, since I was (Albeit implicitly) assuming that we would consider only sets of the same number of elements to negate the need for this sort of discussion.



My point was that ultimately, the knowledge that at least one part of a given part of a hypothesis is true(Regardless of how frivolous) makes it more likely than it initially was. In the case presented - Spiderman, for whom NYC is a home - the existence of NYC does so. I believe this, in the sense I've previously explained, constitutes evidence for Spiderman's existence.

[notachance]

My point was that ultimately, the knowledge that at least one part of a given part of a hypothesis is true(Regardless of how frivolous) makes it more likely than it initially was. In the case presented - Spiderman, for whom NYC is a home - the existence of NYC does so. I believe this, in the sense I've previously explained, constitutes evidence for Spiderman's existence.[/b]

Here is the thing Aki, NOBODY CARES about the likelihood of the entire "new york exists and spiderman lives in it" hypothesis.

We are trying to determine the likelihood that spiderman exists. Period.

You are saying that if you combine the probability of something very unlikely with something somewhat likely, then the probability of the set is lower than the probability of the original unlikely thing, but to a lesser degree than it would be lowered if you combined the probability of that unlikely thing with something that is less likely than the original somewhat likely thing you had initially combined the unlikely thing with. And that constitutes evidence that Spiderman is real.

At no time in the history of the universe did anybody ask you to compare the probability of a set containing the existence of spiderman and a likely thing, with a set containing the existence of spiderman and a random less likely thing. You know why nobody asked you that? Because it would be a colossally stupid thing to ask of you!

First off, the addition of likely things to an unlikely thing does NOT change the likelihood of the unlikely thing itself. Sure, it lowers the likelihood of the set to a lesser degree than the arbitrary addition of less likely things, but nobody cares about that, because it's the most irrelevant thing in the universe.

Sure, something unlikely is less unlikely than something even more unlikely.

So what!

Something being less unlikely than something which is more unlikely does not constitute evidence for the veracity of anything.

The fact that you can think of something (spiderman living in atlantis) that is even more unlikely than the thing in question (spiderman living in New York) doesn't constitute evidence of the thing in question being true.

To say that the probability of spiderman existing is increased by the fact that the probability of {NYC exists; spiderman is real} is lower than the probability of spiderman existing, but not quite as low as the probability of {atlantis exists; spiderman is real}, is absurd.

It's like a defense lawyer saying that his client accused of murdering ten people is rendered less guilty by the fact that if you add the number of people he killed with the number of people OJ Simpson killed, it adds up to a lower number than if you add the number of people he killed with the number of people Stalin killed.