The nature of 'belief'

[Mithrae]

In Notachance's thread Can we at least agree on this? I've just mentioned a theory about the Egyptian plagues and Exodus, commented on the subjectivity inherent in our analysis and weighing of evidence, and made one of my frequent references to Hebrew Daniel (which age 17 was a turning point in my gradual dismissal of biblical inerrancy).

In thinking about Exodus, I was reminded of the time several years ago that I was reading the book and something went 'click' in my head; the contrast between four generations and four centuries mentioned in Genesis 15:12-16. Specifically (from Exodus 6), even if Levi's son Kohath was born just before the move to Egypt (cf Genesis 46), and Amram was born just before he died age 133, and Moses was born just before he died age 137, the Israelite's departure when Moses was 80 is still closer to 300 years in that absurd scenario than the 400 years mentioned in Genesis. Those four generations found in Exodus 6 (and Genesis 15 again) are far shorter than the 430 years of Exodus 12:40-41.

I'd read about the documentary hypothesis of the pentateuch's formation previously in Josh McDowall's apologetics, but it was the fact of personally noticing the two contrasting claims replicated in the two separate books which actually convinced me that there was something to the J and E sources, at least. (The traditions represented by the divided kingdom of Israel and Judah seems the simplest explanation, from what I know.)

Anyways, this reminded me of some other things I'd previously mused over regarding the process and nature of 'belief' which I think have considerable bearing on the various topics discussed in these forums, and regarding just how subjective our process of forming beliefs can be (relevant bits in purple, for those not interested in my ramblings ):

• Monday, 2 August 2004
  As seems so often to be the case in my life, I find myself sitting at a computer and writing in an attempt to straighten out my thoughts a bit. Writing in a coherent manner forces one to first put ones thoughts into a coherent order. Care must be put into consideration of format, content, intelligibility and, most importantly, plausibility. Moreover, the results are then preserved for future reference or, even if never looked back on, have been concreted in the mind by the process of deeper consideration and writing.
  
  However while my situation is in this respect familiar, in another sense it is quite different to any other Ive been in through my life. I write now to consider the strange matter of a world without Christianity; a world in which I no longer believe that which I formerly considered to be the very centrepiece of my worldview. To be fair, I had at times mused on whether it was this or my deeply rational attitude which I cherished more dearly; which, if it came to it, I would reject sooner. But ultimately Id always avoided that question on the grounds of what I considered to be its patent absurdity. How could Christianity, that model of sensibility, come into conflict with rational thought?
  
  Well, limited in scope though it may be, that conflict has come and I have found no reasonable, honest conclusion except that Christianity cannot be true. So now after nearly a month of what Ive called a transitional phase - doing whatevers pleased me at the time with only the occasional musing on what beliefs and principles I should now turn to - I must now begin to consider that question in earnest. Thus without further pre-cognitive ramblings, I should first ask myself what I consider to be appropriate grounds for any reasonable worldview.
  
  I once wrote that there were four grounds on which beliefs could be held; convenience of belief (such as following in the beliefs of ones parents), attractiveness of belief (choosing beliefs which hold a superficial appeal for whatever reason), reasonability of belief (believing that which has the strongest objective support) and spirituality of belief (following a path to belief which lies beyond the normal world). I reasoned that the transient circumstances dictating convenience and personal preferences determining attractiveness were no grounds on which to judge truths about reality. Of the latter two I could prove neither better than the other, save that spirituality is usually not subject to the same objective tests of reliability as the other.
  
  Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether or not these four categories are accurate or comprehensive enough, the simple fact is that for the moment I have no strong basis for any worldview from either of the last two areas. . . .

• Friday, 13 May 2011
  On Friday the 13th I'm watching, among other movies, The Cable Guy. I'm currently at the scene in Medieval Times where Chip fights Whatshisface, and even after half a dozen plus viewings it's still laugh-out-loud funny. Not from the scene itself, but thanks to my cousin - who, having watched the movie with my brother once or twice, was in the habit of staging just such a battle complete with Jim Carrey's sound effects.
  
  I'd also tonight watched Bad Eggs for what I believe is the second time - I bought it on DVD yesterday. Reflecting on it afterwards, there's a scene in it very similar in comedic effect to one in Galaxy Quest - but while on second viewing of Bad Eggs I again laughed for two or three minutes straight at the scene (upsetting the cat on my lap, I regret to add), since I've owned Galaxy Quest for much longer it's often now little more than a chuckle at a scene which originally was just as humorous.
  
  Bad Eggs initially spawned a few thoughts on the mechanics of comedy in the five or ten minutes before I put on the next movie; but Cable Guy has spawned some thoughts on the value of associating images with memories - in this case not even my own memory, but my brother's description of our cousin's antics. However, to this very day at times I'll hear a certain song or see a particular movie scene and be reminded of events, thoughts or feelings from way back in my childhood. By themselves, the songs or movies or whatever mean nothing; but as aspects of my personal history, they acquire additional meaning.
  
  Since I've been drinking, I'm not sure to what extent I originally expected to develop this line of thought - or whether I just intended to mention it and perhaps see if anything would spring from it, as is often the case. As it turns out, I want to get back to my movie, and the only thought of even marginal value which has occurred is this; the value of face-to-face, word of mouth communication. I can remember some online dialogues from years ago, but far more commonly and hopefully more clearly do I remember specific events and conversations in my immediate personal experience - indeed several I have mentioned in this very journal. Obviously, the priority of ideas encompasses also coherence and acceptability . . . . and it's just occurred to me that 'acceptability' could be judged by religious or social-worldview standards as easily as epistemological or 'evidence/logic' standards (which themselves vary from person to person).
  
  Perhaps then, approaching midnight on Friday the 13th of May in 2011, I'm approaching a better classification of belief than the one I recorded seven years ago (August 2nd), albeit conceived earlier. That classification, as recorded in the first entry of this journal, two days shy of a month after I'd lost my Christian faith, were as follows:
  • I once wrote that there were four grounds on which beliefs could be held; convenience of belief (such as following in the beliefs of ones parents), attractiveness of belief (choosing beliefs which hold a superficial appeal for whatever reason), reasonability of belief (believing that which has the strongest objective support) and spirituality of belief (following a path to belief which lies beyond the normal world).
  
  I'm not sure if or how well a corresponding (or perhaps alternative) 'priority of ideas' - based on acceptability, coherence and internalisation (for my current lack of a better word to describe the value of personal experience or event-memory in the preservation of thoughts) - might be worked into or over that frame-work. But it's a thought worth remembering for later.

In light of the discussions which occur on these forums - and assuming I'm not completely off the mark in my drunken ramblings above - I wonder how we might compare beliefs learned on our mother's knee with whatever scraps of cold hard evidence we might encounter and consider in later life. Or perhaps the more accurate comparison is between our upbringing as a worldview through which to interpret knowledge gained, compared with whatever philosophies and values we later gain and use to interpret knowledge.

Is there any such thing as objectively considering the 'evidence'?

I suspect that many folk will say that we can't be objective in our assessment (as indeed they have in the past). So more pertinently, I'd like to ask how we each consider the evidence, knowledge or factoids we encounter in our lives. And what are the similarities and differences from person to person?

I suspect it's a lot easier to acknowledge the impossibility of objectivity than to consider the areas (and perhaps depth) of subjectivity to which we're all prone.

[Goat]

It just so happens that there was a news article that was discussing the difference between believers and non believers that touched on the experience you had.

Belief in God boils down to a cut feeling

How people approach problems makes a big difference in their God belief.

[Furrowed Brow]

It just so happens that there was a news article that was discussing the difference between believers and non believers that touched on the experience you had.

Belief in God boils down to a cut feeling

How people approach problems makes a big difference in their God belief.

"A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?" Question posed by researcherss

It seems that those who get the question wrong are 1.5 times more likely to believe in God. The research puts things in terms of relying on intuition as opposed to reflecting on the question but I think the researcher posit a false distinction. To get the right answer requires a more careful attention to the question; sure those who reflect on the question will be more likely to spot what exactly is being asked and hence will be less likley to allow themselves to be misdirected. But we could equally say that in this case the wrong answer is the less attentive response that reads the question inaccurately and consequently does not answer the question. So for "intuition" read sloppy.

[Mithrae]

It just so happens that there was a news article that was discussing the difference between believers and non believers that touched on the experience you had.

Belief in God boils down to a cut feeling

How people approach problems makes a big difference in their God belief.

I'm not sure how that relates to the experiences I've described, but it's certainly an interesting article. 'Belief in God boils down to a gut feeling' is obviously an eye-catchingly inaccurate title. But taking the article on face value, it seems that on average only 40% or so of poorer mathematicians or hasty respondants believed in God.

While I agree that how people approach problems can make a significant difference in their God belief, I'm not sure in what way (or to what extent) that article proves the point. Could you clarify?
--

"A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?" - Question posed by researchers

It seems that those who get the question wrong are 1.5 times more likely to believe in God. The research puts things in terms of relying on intuition as opposed to reflecting on the question but I think the researcher posit a false distinction. To get the right answer requires a more careful attention to the question; sure those who reflect on the question will be more likely to spot what exactly is being asked and hence will be less likley to allow themselves to be misdirected. But we could equally say that in this case the wrong answer is the less attentive response that reads the question inaccurately and consequently does not answer the question. So for "intuition" read sloppy.

I agree that the intuition/reflection distinction may not be wholly valid, though I'm not sure how much that's a fault in the research compared with its presentation in that article. But at the very least, the fact that it seems to have been a relatively formal experiment or test means that at best a correlation between greater precision in answers and lack of theistic belief suggests that non-theists are more likely to be the type who treat life itself as a 'test,' so to speak.

I disagree that 'intuition' should be equated with 'sloppy' - certainly I for one had 10c in mind as an answer for the first few seconds after reading the question. You seem to acknowledge reflectiveness as the other option though; 'sloppy' vs reflective. Curious

[Adurumus]

Very eye catching title, though a little unfulfilling. The second experiment seems more credible than the first, which seems to be a thinly disguised potshot at theists. Low sample size, as well. (987 is low, in my opinion.) Well, an article is an article at least. Heap it on the "mass evidence" rather than "convincingly bullet proof argument."

[fredonly]

Is there any such thing as objectively considering the 'evidence'?

Yes, there is (to a degree*). It requires establishing common ground, a set of "agreed truths," and evaluating the evidence in those terms. For example, I think it should be theoretically possible for a Christian and an Atheist to examine the historicity of the Gospels, based on a common ground. Common ground = the intersection of the respective sets of beliefs.

The problem we get into so frequently when atheists debate Christians is that they talk past one another, because they each are using different assumptions.

* I said "to a degree" because there's no true absolute objectivity because objective truth is out of our reach.

[Mithrae]

Is there any such thing as objectively considering the 'evidence'?

Yes, there is (to a degree*). It requires establishing common ground, a set of "agreed truths," and evaluating the evidence in those terms. For example, I think it should be theoretically possible for a Christian and an Atheist to examine the historicity of the Gospels, based on a common ground. Common ground = the intersection of the respective sets of beliefs.

The problem we get into so frequently when atheists debate Christians is that they talk past one another, because they each are using different assumptions.

* I said "to a degree" because there's no true absolute objectivity because objective truth is out of our reach.

Agreed - though it's actually difficulties in discussing the gospels in past forums which really got me thinking about another facet to this question. I'll just C&P from the thread Textual Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels:

Because it does not have to be a widespread concerted effort, it just takes a systemiser like Iranaeus and material to begin to be divided into four distinct gospels around the middle end of the 2nd century and that tradition followed thereafter. Let me put this the other way around. What evidence is there that there were four distinct gospels prior to 180CE? There does not seem to be very much if any at all.

I think I've suggested what happened between Polycarp and Irenaeus, and also that there were indeed four distinct accepted gospels in the preceding decades (albeit less formally acknowledged).

More broadly though may I say that these are worthy questions which anyone genuinely interested in Christian origins should consider at some point (even if only to see what others have to say on the topic ). They're questions which have actually provided the groundwork for some of my key intellectual philosophies, because ultimately these questions boil down to where we each draw our personal lines regarding what constitutes 'persuasive' evidence.

One can take a minimalist position that if there's no positive manuscript or literary evidence for distinct gospels (or their full/exact content) prior to a certain date, we needn't accept them as factual. Indeed some folk might adopt an extreme minimalist position (Notachance again) that "Nobody who ever met anybody who ever met anybody who met Jesus EVER mentioned miracles. People started writing about miracles ELEVEN generations after Jesus was dead. That is to say that the first person to certifiably write on paper that Jesus could do miracles was the great, great, great, great, great, great, great, great, great, grandson of somebody who would have been alive when Jesus died." As I mentioned in your thread on Mark, a while back I learned a lot by researching my responses in a forum dominated by folk who believed Jesus never existed (and at least one who argued that Paul was also a mythic character).

The main question for me, then as now, is whether one can consistently hold to such a position. As we've already noted in this thread, the works of Plato are far more dubious than any New Testament book. So are the histories written by Herodotus, Ctesias, Thucydides, Xenophon, Josephus, Tacitus, Hegesippus, Eusebius etc. etc. Many facts of ancient history can be gleaned from archaeological remains, but if one consistently applies a minimalist approach to textual evidence a huge amount of what we know is essentially lost, and a lot of what's left makes far less sense. And not necessarily just ancient history; how many autographs by great scientists of the renaissance do we possess, or autographs by those who knew them? It may not change the scientific facts, but it's still a point worth considering for anyone interested in the grand story of human development or assigning credit where it's due. As I discovered when I suggested the comparison on that forum I mentioned, there are folk who genuinely believe that Shakespeare did not exist.

If it's applied consistently, I really can't see a good argument against any particular threshold of 'persuasive' evidence that an individual chooses; in this field or in any other. Personally, while I retain doubt and scepticism about all my views, the threshold at which I consider views worthy of entertaining and perhaps accepting is probably somewhat lower than most other sceptics (perhaps because I'm more sceptical about the 'big picture'). What tends to concern me is not so much the particular threshold an individual might choose, as whether it's not simply an inconsistent/biased approach to religion (or some other subject).

Just thinking about it now I'd guess that there are at least three broad aspects to how and why we hold 'beliefs':

Tenacity - We internalise beliefs from our upbringing, from our culture and from the kind of influences or patterns of thought we expose ourselves to (eg. debate forums). We also internalise beliefs or ideas in particular when they relate to our personal memories or to lessons which we have personally discovered or acquired. We're resistant to change in our established beliefs, and the more 'internalised' our beliefs or thought patterns are, the more resistant they'll be to change.

Analysis - When we encounter new information we consider it in light of our existing values or thought processes. The information acquired from the performance of a Hindu 'miracle-worker,' for example, will almost certainly be interpreted in very different ways by a child, by an adult Buddhist and by a professional magician. We tend to subject information which fits poorly into our existing worldviews to greater scrutiny or interpretation than information which fits well. Different people also apply different criteria in assessing information; for example some people show a preference for anecdotal evidence from those they know in forming their view of the world, whereas others seek broader and less personal grounds for a worldview through which they filter their perception of individual experience. (I'll need to think about this one a lot more, I suspect.)

Evaluation - As above, different people hold different thresholds at which they'll consider views or thoughts worthy of entertaining or ultimately accepting. These are not necessarily always consistently applied. Some people will happily entertain theories of UFOs, ghosts and Atlantis, while others remain dubious about a link between smoking and cancer or carbon emissions and climate change. This is related to 'tenacity,' in that our thresholds for considering evidence persuasive will obviously be higher when it potentially conflicts with our existing views.



Anyone disagree with the above?
How do we each analyse new information?

[fredonly]

Tenacity - We internalise beliefs from our upbringing, from our culture and from the kind of influences or patterns of thought we expose ourselves to (eg. debate forums). We also internalise beliefs or ideas in particular when they relate to our personal memories or to lessons which we have personally discovered or acquired. We're resistant to change in our established beliefs, and the more 'internalised' our beliefs or thought patterns are, the more resistant they'll be to change.

I agree this is the way it works, but I'll add that there are good reasons for this. Internalized beliefs become part of one's world-view, and a world-view is necessary in order to make sense of the world.

Analysis - When we encounter new information we consider it in light of our existing values or thought processes. The information acquired from the performance of a Hindu 'miracle-worker,' for example, will almost certainly be interpreted in very different ways by a child, by an adult Buddhist and by a professional magician. We tend to subject information which fits poorly into our existing worldviews to greater scrutiny or interpretation than information which fits well. Different people also apply different criteria in assessing information; for example some people show a preference for anecdotal evidence from those they know in forming their view of the world, whereas others seek broader and less personal grounds for a worldview through which they filter their perception of individual experience. (I'll need to think about this one a lot more, I suspect.)

I agree. You're describing the elements of subjectivity, and these are the obstacles to objectivity. If we at least understand this, then we can strive to overcome them.

Evaluation - As above, different people hold different thresholds at which they'll consider views or thoughts worthy of entertaining or ultimately accepting. These are not necessarily always consistently applied. Some people will happily entertain theories of UFOs, ghosts and Atlantis, while others remain dubious about a link between smoking and cancer or carbon emissions and climate change. This is related to 'tenacity,' in that our thresholds for considering evidence persuasive will obviously be higher when it potentially conflicts with our existing views.

I completely agree, but again these are elements of subjectivity. The more of these we can identify, the more we can strive to overcome so that we can strive toward the grand goal of objectivity.

[Flail]

In Notachance's thread Can we at least agree on this? I've just mentioned a theory about the Egyptian plagues and Exodus, commented on the subjectivity inherent in our analysis and weighing of evidence, and made one of my frequent references to Hebrew Daniel (which age 17 was a turning point in my gradual dismissal of biblical inerrancy).

In thinking about Exodus, I was reminded of the time several years ago that I was reading the book and something went 'click' in my head; the contrast between four generations and four centuries mentioned in Genesis 15:12-16. Specifically (from Exodus 6), even if Levi's son Kohath was born just before the move to Egypt (cf Genesis 46), and Amram was born just before he died age 133, and Moses was born just before he died age 137, the Israelite's departure when Moses was 80 is still closer to 300 years in that absurd scenario than the 400 years mentioned in Genesis. Those four generations found in Exodus 6 (and Genesis 15 again) are far shorter than the 430 years of Exodus 12:40-41.

I'd read about the documentary hypothesis of the pentateuch's formation previously in Josh McDowall's apologetics, but it was the fact of personally noticing the two contrasting claims replicated in the two separate books which actually convinced me that there was something to the J and E sources, at least. (The traditions represented by the divided kingdom of Israel and Judah seems the simplest explanation, from what I know.)

Anyways, this reminded me of some other things I'd previously mused over regarding the process and nature of 'belief' which I think have considerable bearing on the various topics discussed in these forums, and regarding just how subjective our process of forming beliefs can be (relevant bits in purple, for those not interested in my ramblings ):

• Monday, 2 August 2004
  As seems so often to be the case in my life, I find myself sitting at a computer and writing in an attempt to straighten out my thoughts a bit. Writing in a coherent manner forces one to first put ones thoughts into a coherent order. Care must be put into consideration of format, content, intelligibility and, most importantly, plausibility. Moreover, the results are then preserved for future reference or, even if never looked back on, have been concreted in the mind by the process of deeper consideration and writing.
  
  However while my situation is in this respect familiar, in another sense it is quite different to any other Ive been in through my life. I write now to consider the strange matter of a world without Christianity; a world in which I no longer believe that which I formerly considered to be the very centrepiece of my worldview. To be fair, I had at times mused on whether it was this or my deeply rational attitude which I cherished more dearly; which, if it came to it, I would reject sooner. But ultimately Id always avoided that question on the grounds of what I considered to be its patent absurdity. How could Christianity, that model of sensibility, come into conflict with rational thought?
  
  Well, limited in scope though it may be, that conflict has come and I have found no reasonable, honest conclusion except that Christianity cannot be true. So now after nearly a month of what Ive called a transitional phase - doing whatevers pleased me at the time with only the occasional musing on what beliefs and principles I should now turn to - I must now begin to consider that question in earnest. Thus without further pre-cognitive ramblings, I should first ask myself what I consider to be appropriate grounds for any reasonable worldview.
  
  I once wrote that there were four grounds on which beliefs could be held; convenience of belief (such as following in the beliefs of ones parents), attractiveness of belief (choosing beliefs which hold a superficial appeal for whatever reason), reasonability of belief (believing that which has the strongest objective support) and spirituality of belief (following a path to belief which lies beyond the normal world). I reasoned that the transient circumstances dictating convenience and personal preferences determining attractiveness were no grounds on which to judge truths about reality. Of the latter two I could prove neither better than the other, save that spirituality is usually not subject to the same objective tests of reliability as the other.
  
  Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether or not these four categories are accurate or comprehensive enough, the simple fact is that for the moment I have no strong basis for any worldview from either of the last two areas. . . .

• Friday, 13 May 2011
  On Friday the 13th I'm watching, among other movies, The Cable Guy. I'm currently at the scene in Medieval Times where Chip fights Whatshisface, and even after half a dozen plus viewings it's still laugh-out-loud funny. Not from the scene itself, but thanks to my cousin - who, having watched the movie with my brother once or twice, was in the habit of staging just such a battle complete with Jim Carrey's sound effects.
  
  I'd also tonight watched Bad Eggs for what I believe is the second time - I bought it on DVD yesterday. Reflecting on it afterwards, there's a scene in it very similar in comedic effect to one in Galaxy Quest - but while on second viewing of Bad Eggs I again laughed for two or three minutes straight at the scene (upsetting the cat on my lap, I regret to add), since I've owned Galaxy Quest for much longer it's often now little more than a chuckle at a scene which originally was just as humorous.
  
  Bad Eggs initially spawned a few thoughts on the mechanics of comedy in the five or ten minutes before I put on the next movie; but Cable Guy has spawned some thoughts on the value of associating images with memories - in this case not even my own memory, but my brother's description of our cousin's antics. However, to this very day at times I'll hear a certain song or see a particular movie scene and be reminded of events, thoughts or feelings from way back in my childhood. By themselves, the songs or movies or whatever mean nothing; but as aspects of my personal history, they acquire additional meaning.
  
  Since I've been drinking, I'm not sure to what extent I originally expected to develop this line of thought - or whether I just intended to mention it and perhaps see if anything would spring from it, as is often the case. As it turns out, I want to get back to my movie, and the only thought of even marginal value which has occurred is this; the value of face-to-face, word of mouth communication. I can remember some online dialogues from years ago, but far more commonly and hopefully more clearly do I remember specific events and conversations in my immediate personal experience - indeed several I have mentioned in this very journal. Obviously, the priority of ideas encompasses also coherence and acceptability . . . . and it's just occurred to me that 'acceptability' could be judged by religious or social-worldview standards as easily as epistemological or 'evidence/logic' standards (which themselves vary from person to person).
  
  Perhaps then, approaching midnight on Friday the 13th of May in 2011, I'm approaching a better classification of belief than the one I recorded seven years ago (August 2nd), albeit conceived earlier. That classification, as recorded in the first entry of this journal, two days shy of a month after I'd lost my Christian faith, were as follows:
  • I once wrote that there were four grounds on which beliefs could be held; convenience of belief (such as following in the beliefs of ones parents), attractiveness of belief (choosing beliefs which hold a superficial appeal for whatever reason), reasonability of belief (believing that which has the strongest objective support) and spirituality of belief (following a path to belief which lies beyond the normal world).
  
  I'm not sure if or how well a corresponding (or perhaps alternative) 'priority of ideas' - based on acceptability, coherence and internalisation (for my current lack of a better word to describe the value of personal experience or event-memory in the preservation of thoughts) - might be worked into or over that frame-work. But it's a thought worth remembering for later.

In light of the discussions which occur on these forums - and assuming I'm not completely off the mark in my drunken ramblings above - I wonder how we might compare beliefs learned on our mother's knee with whatever scraps of cold hard evidence we might encounter and consider in later life. Or perhaps the more accurate comparison is between our upbringing as a worldview through which to interpret knowledge gained, compared with whatever philosophies and values we later gain and use to interpret knowledge.

Is there any such thing as objectively considering the 'evidence'?

I suspect that many folk will say that we can't be objective in our assessment (as indeed they have in the past). So more pertinently, I'd like to ask how we each consider the evidence, knowledge or factoids we encounter in our lives. And what are the similarities and differences from person to person?

I suspect it's a lot easier to acknowledge the impossibility of objectivity than to consider the areas (and perhaps depth) of subjectivity to which we're all prone.

Subjective: based upon or influenced by personal feelings, tastes and opinions; dependent on the mind and individual perception.

Objective: not influenced by personal opinion; not dependent on the mind and feelings when examining and considering things purported as fact; actual.

By definition then, as human beings every single contemplation we have emanates from the subjective. All things objective are merely goals for a collective understanding that requires a constant conversation and a willingness to go along without the necessity of insisting on a truth, testing and retesting everything as we evolve. All of which makes fundamental theistic 'truths' into the ridiculous inventions of indoctrination. To my mind, if there exists an ultimate, omnipotent, omniscient 'God', such a being would expect more from us than the invention of superstitions based upon unfounded imaginings and then insisting they are truths.

[Mithrae]

Tenacity - We internalise beliefs from our upbringing, from our culture and from the kind of influences or patterns of thought we expose ourselves to (eg. debate forums). We also internalise beliefs or ideas in particular when they relate to our personal memories or to lessons which we have personally discovered or acquired. We're resistant to change in our established beliefs, and the more 'internalised' our beliefs or thought patterns are, the more resistant they'll be to change.

I agree this is the way it works, but I'll add that there are good reasons for this. Internalized beliefs become part of one's world-view, and a world-view is necessary in order to make sense of the world.

Analysis - When we encounter new information we consider it in light of our existing values or thought processes. The information acquired from the performance of a Hindu 'miracle-worker,' for example, will almost certainly be interpreted in very different ways by a child, by an adult Buddhist and by a professional magician. We tend to subject information which fits poorly into our existing worldviews to greater scrutiny or interpretation than information which fits well. Different people also apply different criteria in assessing information; for example some people show a preference for anecdotal evidence from those they know in forming their view of the world, whereas others seek broader and less personal grounds for a worldview through which they filter their perception of individual experience. (I'll need to think about this one a lot more, I suspect.)

I agree. You're describing the elements of subjectivity, and these are the obstacles to objectivity. If we at least understand this, then we can strive to overcome them.

I'm not sure how important it is to overcome subjectivity. And I'd say these are elements of objectivity too. What's particularly interesting to me is which bits are the 'nuts and bolts' of our thought processes, so to speak. Would it be fair to say that we accept thoughts which offer the best fit between our core values, our reason and our feelings? (Or might that be expanded even further along Myers-Briggs lines?)

If so, what does this 'reason' entail and how do we apply it to new information?

Evaluation - As above, different people hold different thresholds at which they'll consider views or thoughts worthy of entertaining or ultimately accepting. These are not necessarily always consistently applied. Some people will happily entertain theories of UFOs, ghosts and Atlantis, while others remain dubious about a link between smoking and cancer or carbon emissions and climate change. This is related to 'tenacity,' in that our thresholds for considering evidence persuasive will obviously be higher when it potentially conflicts with our existing views.

I completely agree, but again these are elements of subjectivity. The more of these we can identify, the more we can strive to overcome so that we can strive toward the grand goal of objectivity.

I'm not sure it's possible (or desirable) to try to apply objectivity here - an agreed-on 'threshold' of evidence or reasonability at which we should entertain or accept new ideas. It's probably often the people who are willing to accept and push ideas before they're reasonable which bring about changes (good and bad) or advances in society. And on the flip side of the coin, we need people who are resistant to accepting new ideas no less. It's the requirements for a certain 'standard of evidence' presented in the name of reason which concern me when applied inconsistently. I think this is more an area to examine one's subjectivity, but ultimately to accept it.

---

In light of the discussions which occur on these forums - and assuming I'm not completely off the mark in my drunken ramblings above - I wonder how we might compare beliefs learned on our mother's knee with whatever scraps of cold hard evidence we might encounter and consider in later life. Or perhaps the more accurate comparison is between our upbringing as a worldview through which to interpret knowledge gained, compared with whatever philosophies and values we later gain and use to interpret knowledge.

Is there any such thing as objectively considering the 'evidence'?

I suspect that many folk will say that we can't be objective in our assessment (as indeed they have in the past). So more pertinently, I'd like to ask how we each consider the evidence, knowledge or factoids we encounter in our lives. And what are the similarities and differences from person to person?

I suspect it's a lot easier to acknowledge the impossibility of objectivity than to consider the areas (and perhaps depth) of subjectivity to which we're all prone.

Subjective: based upon or influenced by personal feelings, tastes and opinions; dependent on the mind and individual perception.

Objective: not influenced by personal opinion; not dependent on the mind and feelings when examining and considering things purported as fact; actual.

By definition then, as human beings every single contemplation we have emanates from the subjective. All things objective are merely goals for a collective understanding that requires a constant conversation and a willingness to go along without the necessity of insisting on a truth, testing and retesting everything as we evolve. All of which makes fundamental theistic 'truths' into the ridiculous inventions of indoctrination. To my mind, if there exists an ultimate, omnipotent, omniscient 'God', such a being would expect more from us than the invention of superstitions based upon unfounded imaginings and then insisting they are truths.

There's a lot of merit in avoiding fundamental truths and indoctrination, but I wonder whether we can't take the "grand goal of objectivity" too far?

Suppose we take it as axiomatic that it's best to accept a new concept only on the basis of sufficient reason/evidence. Does that mean that we should pretend our minds are a blank slate, or does that mean that a theist should require sufficient reason/evidence before accepting the concept that their religion is wrong? I'd suggest that we can't all start out from Descartes' first meditations - and if we did we like Descartes would probably start having trouble after "I am."

To what extent is it acceptable to use our childhood knowledge and the prevailing views around us as a starting point, requiring their falsification before rejecting them rather than their demonstration before acceptance?