The Semantical Argument

[AquinasD]

This is an argument for God's existence that is, as of now, highly speculative. I'm just hoping some of you can help to bring clarity to the validity and soundness of the premises.

1) Whatever is thinkable is possible

2) If something necessary* is possible, it is true

3) God is thinkable

4) God is necessary

5) God exists

*Necessary is taken here to be listing an essential property of the being; its shorter than saying If something were to be necessarily true were it true were possible, then it is true.

(3) is the controversial premise.

So tell me what you think.

[Moderate Guy]

So you suggest that the necessary being is only sort of necessary? It's necessary, but that doesn't imply any necessity of what it must be like?
Where do you find room for contingency within the necessary being?

That seems like a strange comment for a Christian to make. Doesn't God have relationships with human beings? If human beings are contingent, then the relationships are contingent, and a relationship involves change for both parties.

Isnt Jesus supposed to be God? Doesn't this incarnation imply a change to God? God's existence is considered necessary, but I'd be surprised if any Christian philosophers would think that God doesn't change.

More generally, irrespective of the existence of gods, existence is necessary, nevertheless there is contingency within it.

Whatever is logically possible is thinkable, for whatever we understand as logically possible is just a result of our ability to think it. And "to think" something is to hold an adequation of that instance of its-being-the-case as a proposition in the mind. Does this seem sufficient?

No, it's not sufficient. Your objections to my examples were all based on asserting that logical impossibility made them "unthinkable." I'll get into the specifics below. But as I've said, if it is logically impossible then further rationalization is superfluous. To be non-superfluous, you will need to provide a basis for identifying a proposition that is both logically possible and "unthinkable" (and therefore "impossible" by your definition). After all this time, you have still failed to provide objective criteria to support your contention that quantum indeterminacy is impossible because it is "unthinkable," despite the fact that it is indeed logically possible.
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The laws of physics are contingent, as is all the material beings and their existence. Natural laws describe reality, but they do not describe necessary, or metaphysical, reality. They describe a different part of it.

Are you suggesting that metaphysical reality is equivalent to being NECESSARY?! That makes no sense. There is no difference between metaphysical reality, and reality. If you believe I'm off base, then please provide a source that supports your view.

Reality includes contingencies. Some natural laws MAY describe reality and be metaphysical truths. Further, it is possible that there are necessary natural laws (laws that are true in all worlds; laws which must exist). I'll grant that we don't know that there are any, but we also don't know that there aren't.

Again with the quantum measurement example, what you find to be a contradiction is only the simultaneous truth of two alternate propositions, i.e. both "We can measure a quantum particle's velocity and location to an arbitrarily high degree" and "Heisenberg uncertainty is true."

You are missing, my point. Assuming the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is true, a person who is ignorant of this fact can imagine measuring both the velocity and location of a quantum particle to arbitrary levels of accuracy. How is that NOT being "thinkable?" Perhaps you are suggesting that thinkability entails something absolute and objective, that ignorance can mislead us into thinking something is thinkable. Is that it? The problem I see with this approach is that there's always the possibility we are ignorant of some pertinent fact. This makes thinkability a poor guide.

It is like a mind which, in understanding a circle, will also understand that it cannot go on to think "and this shape could be a square."

I agree that one can't think about a square circle or round square " these things have mutually exclusive definitions, and it is a simple logical contradiction - which is logically impossible. I already told you that logical impossibilities are impossible. The "thinkability" aspect is irrelevant.

The same sort of understanding presents itself even here with these contingent factors. There are certain ramifications attached to the truth of certain propositions about material reality that result in the falsity of other propositions such that we cannot think of certain pairs of propositions as both being true at the same time.

Yes, and that ramification is logical impossibility. Calling it "unthinkable" carries no additional information, it appears.

All of your examples are nothing but complex examples of thinking something like "I could think that a person is alive and dead." You understand that if a person truly understands what it means to be alive will understand that some being cannot be both alive and dead; the concepts are antipodal. One can and must be true of a being at any moment, but both cannot be true at the same time.

In fact, you are simply arguing that they are logically impossible. One nevertheless CAN think about logical impossibilities, in some sense. You can identify some things wrong with the thinking " and I don't take exception to that, but what you're finding wrong with it is the inherent logical impossibility. The net result is that you are trying to substitute the simple criteria of logical impossibility with a less straightforward notion of unthinkability.

It shows that your "unthinkability" characteristic is vague to the point of meaninglessness.

Or else you're not even trying to understand the concept. "Thinkability" was clear enough to Wittgenstein and most other readers of the Tractatus. I think this is a problem in every discussion you and I have ever had; instead of trying to understand the logic of my position and see what consequences follow were something I said to be the case, you insist only on trying to find facetiously shallow holes. Work with me. I already said this is speculative, so I'd warrant that coming to have a better understanding of what "thinkability" means is a point of this discussion.

AquinasD- You are posting your thoughts for debate, and I give you credit for that. IMO there's no better way to refine one's thinking than to solicit feedback from people who disagree with you. Take it for what its worth. I think I've identified some mistakes of yours. For example, I pointed out that your position against randomness is equivalent to pure determinism. I provided you a logical proof of this based solely on statements you had made, and this was after you charged that I had been making some invalid assumptions about what your position was. In the end, I think your only objection was that you feel that human free will is an exception to determinism. I hope that exchange sharpened your personal view.

I haven't read Wittgenstein. If you want to utilize his concepts in debate, you'll need to explain them. BTW, I have been making a sincere effort to understand your points. I wouldn't continue responding to you and asking more questions otherwise. Of course, I also think you are making errors. At the same time, I don't think I'm infallible.

For any thing which is the case, we can understand it as p. After that, we can apply the logical negation, coming up with p. And this is all we are doing. We can think about p, even if p is necessary, but this doesn't imply we can think p. Take this example

But again, you are identifying a logical contradiction and saying this is unthinkable. So far, it appears that your label of "unthinkable" conveys no information beyond the fact that it is logically impossible. The challenge you have is to identify criteria for identifying a logically possible proposition (such as "quantum indeterminacy is true") as being unthinkable and therefore impossible. I stress "criteria" so that you realize you need more than just a subjective argument tailored to the proposition you disagree with.

I'd really like to hear your criteria for identifying a proposition as thinkable/unthinkable. You need to do this to correct the vagueness.

Whatever is logically possible is thinkable, for whatever we understand as logically possible is just a result of our ability to think it. And "to think" something is to hold an adequation of that instance of its-being-the-case as a proposition in the mind. Does this seem sufficient?

Nope. This does not support your notion that a logically possible proposition can be deemed impossible using objective criteria of "thinkability."

[AquinasD]

That seems like a strange comment for a Christian to make. Doesn't God have relationships with human beings? If human beings are contingent, then the relationships are contingent, and a relationship involves change for both parties.

Isnt Jesus supposed to be God? Doesn't this incarnation imply a change to God? God's existence is considered necessary, but I'd be surprised if any Christian philosophers would think that God doesn't change.

A lot of Christian philosophers think God doesn't change. I think God doesn't change. All these changes are external to God's own essential being. God has no accidental being.

Are you suggesting that metaphysical reality is equivalent to being NECESSARY?! That makes no sense. There is no difference between metaphysical reality, and reality. If you believe I'm off base, then please provide a source that supports your view.

Metaphysics is a different part of reality. You don't usually confuse the mathematical reality with the physical reality, do you? While these are all parts of reality, they're different parts of it, that operate by different principles and have different natures.

Mathematical reality is fixed and necessary, true "in all possible worlds" as you like to say. I'm only saying that metaphysical reality is also fixed and necessary. Nothing metaphysical is contingent.

Some natural laws MAY describe reality and be metaphysical truths. Further, it is possible that there are necessary natural laws (laws that are true in all worlds; laws which must exist). I'll grant that we don't know that there are any, but we also don't know that there aren't.

What do you think a metaphysical law is, and what do you think a natural law is? It seems your understanding of the two is different, such that you think they "might" overlap. But physical reality is contingent through and through, so how could something necessary (metaphysics) be contingent (physics)?

You are missing my point. Assuming the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is true, a person who is ignorant of this fact can imagine measuring both the velocity and location of a quantum particle to arbitrary levels of accuracy. How is that NOT being "thinkable?"

That is thinkable. I haven't denied that.

What I'm saying is that "Heisenberg uncertainty" and "Arbitrary degrees of precision are possible" are mutually exclusive. They are related in a way such that, if one is true, the other is false. They are of the logical form

If p, then q
If q, then p

In this instance, they are alternately thinkable. What is not thinkable is "Both 'Heisenberg uncertainty' and 'arbitrary degrees of precision are possible' is true," for we understand that the understanding of one to be true yields the understanding of the other to be false. In other words, if someone were to say "Heisenberg uncertainty is true, and arbitrary degrees of precision are possible" we would say they are conceptually confused about what both of those propositions mean.

This is why a person ignorant, or even cognizant, of Heisenberg uncertainty can think that arbitrary degrees of precision are possible, it is only that they would need to understand Heisenberg uncertainty as being false were the alternate possibility to be true.

This is really only like the square and circle example. "Being a square" and "being a circle" are mutually exclusive, yet someone can imagine a shape where either is the case; what they cannot think is that both are the case. And the same with Heisenberg uncertainty.

Yes, and that ramification is logical impossibility. Calling it "unthinkable" carries no additional information, it appears.

And why do you think so? We're providing some clarification on the nature and limits of thought. That seems relevant. A whole part of philosophy is dedicated to pursuing an answer to these questions.

In fact, you are simply arguing that they are logically impossible. One nevertheless CAN think about logical impossibilities, in some sense.

True. And I have already provided an explanation of such apparent phenomena.

BTW, I have been making a sincere effort to understand your points. I wouldn't continue responding to you and asking more questions otherwise. Of course, I also think you are making errors. At the same time, I don't think I'm infallible.

I appreciate that. It only feels that sometimes you are overtly hostile. This dialogue is constructive, otherwise.

But again, you are identifying a logical contradiction and saying this is unthinkable. So far, it appears that your label of "unthinkable" conveys no information beyond the fact that it is logically impossible. The challenge you have is to identify criteria for identifying a logically possible proposition (such as "quantum indeterminacy is true") as being unthinkable and therefore impossible. I stress "criteria" so that you realize you need more than just a subjective argument tailored to the proposition you disagree with.

It just so happens to be the case that "logically possible" and "thinkable" are at a perfect parity. That is, I reckon, an interesting result.

Nope. This does not support your notion that a logically possible proposition can be deemed impossible using objective criteria of "thinkability."

But you first have to be able to reckon some particular proposition as "logically possible." So "thinkability" is always present even before we get around to the logic. And it just so happens that I think there the propositions you think of as "logically possible" are actually not, at least not in the sense you think.

[JohnPaul]

AquinasD wrote:

A lot of Christian philosophers think God doesn't change. I think God doesn't change. All these changes are external to God's own essential being. God has no accidental being

What about the Christian claim that the coming of Jesus (God) ended all the horrors of God in the Old Testament? If God doesn't change, how can his approval of slavery and command to stone homosexuals to death in the Old Testament, for example, have changed without God changing his internal opinion? This seems to be a fundamental internal change from a cruel vindictive God to an allegedly "loving" God.

John

[AquinasD]

What about the Christian claim that the coming of Jesus (God) ended all the horrors of God in the Old Testament? If God doesn't change, how can his approval of slavery and command to stone homosexuals to death in the Old Testament, for example, have changed without God changing his internal opinion? This seems to be a fundamental internal change from a cruel vindictive God to an allegedly "loving" God.

As I said, any changes we associate with God are external to His being.

[Moderate Guy]

What about the Christian claim that the coming of Jesus (God) ended all the horrors of God in the Old Testament? If God doesn't change, how can his approval of slavery and command to stone homosexuals to death in the Old Testament, for example, have changed without God changing his internal opinion? This seems to be a fundamental internal change from a cruel vindictive God to an allegedly "loving" God.

As I said, any changes we associate with God are external to His being.

It seems you've landed on the answer to your question:

Necessity implies only a degree of immutability; it means some fundamental essence of the necessary thing must continue. This would not, however, imply that the necessary thing can never undergo any change whatsoever.

So you suggest that the necessary being is only sort of necessary? It's necessary, but that doesn't imply any necessity of what it must be like?

Where do you find room for contingency within the necessary being?

You're indicating there is a fundamental, necessary component of God but that doesn't preclude him having contingent aspects as well. The same is true of any entity that is necessary. Existence as a whole is necessary, yet existence includes contingent aspects.

As far as God is concerned, the only aspect that you can assume is necessary is the "prime mover" portion. It is necessary that there exist a prime mover. It is not necessary that this prime mover have any specific characteristics.

Let's review your argument:

1) Whatever is thinkable is possible You now agree that "thinkable" is equivalent to "logically possible." So this statement can be changed to "whatever is logically possible is possible." This makes it a tautology that is devoid of signficance.

2) If something necessary* is possible, it is true

3) God is thinkable can be replaced with "God is logically possible" But this isn't really needed for your conclusion.

4) God is necessary In post#19, you defined God to be that which is necessary, so this statement is a tautology.

5) God exists i.e. that which is necessary actually exists. This statement stands on its own as true, given your definition of God as the necessary being. It doesn't need to be deduced.

But don't now blur the definition of God. There's quite a gap between some unspecified necessary thing, and Yahweh.

[Adamoriens]

This is an argument for God's existence that is, as of now, highly speculative. I'm just hoping some of you can help to bring clarity to the validity and soundness of the premises.

1) Whatever is thinkable is possible

2) If something necessary* is possible, it is true

3) God is thinkable

4) God is necessary

5) God exists

*Necessary is taken here to be listing an essential property of the being; its shorter than saying If something were to be necessarily true were it true were possible, then it is true.

(3) is the controversial premise.

So tell me what you think.

Do you read Prosblogion? This looks a lot like Emanuel Rutten's argument from Cartesian knowledge. I can't tell the difference between this argument and Plantinga's modal ontological argument. If you don't find the latter compelling, I doubt this "Semantical argument" will gain any more traction.

[AquinasD]

You're indicating there is a fundamental, necessary component of God but that doesn't preclude him having contingent aspects as well. The same is true of any entity that is necessary. Existence as a whole is necessary, yet existence includes contingent aspects.

No, you have completely skirted over a fundamental distinction. I said that the change is external to God's being; implying that God's being is not changing. What remains the case, then, is that God's being is necessary, while anything that changes we will be speaking about something else. Hence unmoved mover. What is moved is not the unmoved mover, but something else.

Acts of revelation, like John Paul referenced, are part of this something else, which God, the unmoved mover, is specifically responsible for. But then, this is just the same as everything else in motion, which God is also responsible for, at least in the sense of creating/sustaining their existence.

Everything you would like to describe as a "change of God" is really a change of something else, and not properly a change of God's being. And if God's being isn't changing, then God isn't changing.

Now you should respond to the relevant material about thinkability and logical possibility. I think it is the case that thinkability and logical possibility are not identical, but only that thinkability implies logical possibility.

[Goat]

You're indicating there is a fundamental, necessary component of God but that doesn't preclude him having contingent aspects as well. The same is true of any entity that is necessary. Existence as a whole is necessary, yet existence includes contingent aspects.

No, you have completely skirted over a fundamental distinction. I said that the change is external to God's being; implying that God's being is not changing. What remains the case, then, is that God's being is necessary, while anything that changes we will be speaking about something else. Hence unmoved mover. What is moved is not the unmoved mover, but something else.

Acts of revelation, like John Paul referenced, are part of this something else, which God, the unmoved mover, is specifically responsible for. But then, this is just the same as everything else in motion, which God is also responsible for, at least in the sense of creating/sustaining their existence.

Everything you would like to describe as a "change of God" is really a change of something else, and not properly a change of God's being. And if God's being isn't changing, then God isn't changing.

Now you should respond to the relevant material about thinkability and logical possibility. I think it is the case that thinkability and logical possibility are not identical, but only that thinkability implies logical possibility.

Well, if there is no change to 'God's being', God has no actions. If God can not have an action, god does not exist. Thank you very much.

[Moderate Guy]

You're indicating there is a fundamental, necessary component of God but that doesn't preclude him having contingent aspects as well. The same is true of any entity that is necessary. Existence as a whole is necessary, yet existence includes contingent aspects.

No, you have completely skirted over a fundamental distinction. I said that the change is external to God's being; implying that God's being is not changing. What remains the case, then, is that God's being is necessary, while anything that changes we will be speaking about something else. Hence unmoved mover. What is moved is not the unmoved mover, but something else.

Doesn't "being" equate to "existence?" i.e. God's existence is necessary. The necessity of existence does not preclude changing; existence continues despite change. Couldn't God enter time if he wanted to? DIDN'T he enter time when he was incarnated as Jesus? None of this changes the fact of his existence, his being.

Now you should respond to the relevant material about thinkability and logical possibility. I think it is the case that thinkability and logical possibility are not identical, but only that thinkability implies logical possibility.

Your prior comment on the topic was, "It just so happens to be the case that "logically possible" and "thinkable" are at a perfect parity. " This sounded like we agreed. Did you change your mind, or is that not what you meant? If you now mean that something can be logically possible but not thinkable, then need to do two things: 1)you need to provide objective criteria for identifying whether something is, or is not, thinkable. 2) you'll have to make a case for the impossibility of things that are shown to be (through your criteria) unthinkable.

[FinalEnigma]

This is an argument for God's existence that is, as of now, highly speculative. I'm just hoping some of you can help to bring clarity to the validity and soundness of the premises.

1) Whatever is thinkable is possible

2) If something necessary* is possible, it is true

3) God is thinkable

4) God is necessary

5) God exists

*Necessary is taken here to be listing an essential property of the being; its shorter than saying If something were to be necessarily true were it true were possible, then it is true.

(3) is the controversial premise.

So tell me what you think.

Can you show why 4) is true? I don't follow.

also, you don't seem to have ever answered as to the definition of thinkable. could you define it clearly for me?

and isn't 2) a tautology? or is it a definition of necessary?