Goat wrote:Mithrae wrote:Goat wrote:My position is.. Until something that is claimed to have existence has actual evidence, it is reasonable to not believe in that thing. I do not believe in the Yeti, I do not believe in big foot, I do not believe in little green men from alpha centauri , and I don't believe in any supernatural deity that created the universe.
I don't believe that something can be proven by adding adjectives to another word, and playing word games.
But you've played a word game of your own just there: The whole concept of the super-natural implies a conception of natural reality by which to contrast it. I think this is part of the fundamental issue Chris is getting at - that non-theism is not an absense of belief in distinction from, for example, agnostic theism. It's essentially belief that the fundamental character of the universe is non-volitional and 'natural' - until proven otherwise, of course.
No, not at all. I don't believe that the concept of the 'supernatural' is a valid concept. Either something can happen, or it can't... under any circumstances. If it can happen, by what ever means, then it is natural.
My definition of 'natural' is 'if it can happen, it is natural'. Often though, the tricky part is trying to find out if something can happen.
That is not word games, that is a straight definition. Word games happen when you make vague statements that can not be shown to be proven, to support other statements that can not be shown to be proven. Either that, or when asked to support your thesis, you provide definitions, but can not back up your claims with examples.
Then it seems that a crucial question, as far as you're concerned at least, is what constitutes 'proof' in any given context - when it comes to physics or biology, for example, or when it comes to history or sociology. But as we've seen often enough, what one intelligent person might consider blatantly obvious another may well believe to be very unclear, or indeed exactly the opposite of the first view! You gave examples of Yeti, Bigfoot, green aliens and a 'supernatural deity,' the latter of which you now say was a fundamentally invalid concept, and the other three of which are not even remotely comparable to EduChris' initial comments.
Would you say that a fundamental character of the universe (the logically necessary 'Ultimate Reality' as Chris calls it) as being non-volitional (or purely random and/or deterministic) is something which can be shown to be proven? Or, being otherwise merely a presumption, would that be one of the 'word games' you're talking about?
Goat wrote:Mithrae wrote:I was interested in this thread because it touches somewhat on issues which I myself raised in the past, with considerably less interest shown

Our minds are not a 'blank slate' and I suggest that it's rather self-deceptive to pretend that this is the case:
- In The nature of 'belief' Mithrae wrote:
There's a lot of merit in avoiding fundamental truths and indoctrination, but I wonder whether we can't take the 'grand goal' of objectivity too far?
There are many things that are not objective. That's perfectly fine. However, some people use as 'proof' the claim that their preconceptions are 'objective'. There are many people who make claims that have an 'independent existence' for things that exist only in the realm of concepts.
Suppose we take it as axiomatic that it's best to accept a new concept only on the basis of sufficient reason/evidence. Does that mean that we should pretend our minds are a blank slate, or does that mean that a theist should require sufficient reason/evidence before accepting the concept that their religion is wrong? I'd suggest that we can't all start out from Descartes' first meditations - and if we did we like Descartes would probably start having trouble after "I am."
That might (or might not) be fine, depending on the concept. That does not mean that that concept of 'objective', or can be used to prove anything. It might provide some useful personal inspiration, but unless it can be independently confirmed, it can not be shown to be 'objective reality'.
To what extent is it acceptable to use our childhood knowledge and the prevailing views around us as a starting point, requiring their falsification before rejecting them rather than their demonstration before acceptance?
Childhood knowledge?? You mean, like the belief in Santa Claus? Fairies?? And monsters under the bed?
If you are making a statement about 'what objectively exists'.. then things should have independent verification.
Of course, there is nothing wrong with examining anything else too.
It's not precisely the same as EduChris' initial point, but what I'm saying essentially is that our minds are
not blank slates from which every belief or viewpoint we hold can (or should) be built up from scratch. That is impossible.
Yet that is precisely the presumption on which this notion - that theism requires justification while non-theism can be simply an absense of belief and requires no justification - is built. In the developed Western world we generally grow up with a great deal in the way of core values and attitudes, such as high regard for democracy, liberty, justice, essentially consumer-based economic views, morals, love and so on. These are personal and social viewpoints which can be accepted or rejected, but we do not consider non-democratism or a-morality to be 'default' positions from which we should always or necessarily require or demand the justification of said beliefs.
Why is it that when it comes to beliefs about the fundamental nature of the universe - as an expression solely of mechanistic behaviour, or as an expression of volitional behaviour - anyone should consider it a matter of course to require justification of the latter? EduChris is asking this question in broad, philosophical terms of the folk who frequent this forum. My comments above recognise the fact that for the majority of people, who in one way or another grow up believing the latter to be true, this question is particularly pertinent because such presumption of a 'default' stance would require first their
rejection of existing beliefs!
The mind is not a blank slate, and I think Chris makes a valid point that an approach to debate which implies such a presumption is at best very dubious in the big picture. If the purpose of debate is to 'win,' then simply demanding proof of others' claims certainly makes a perceived victory much easier; but if we're interested in the exchange of ideas and the pursuit of greater knowledge, the predominance of such an approach merely invites intellectual stagnation.