"All possibilities are necessarily actualized"

[EduChris]

Consider the following hypothesis:

"Any and all possibilities are necessarily actualized in some or another universe(s) within an infinite omniverse"

Does this represent a parsimonious hypothesis, or a profligate one?

[ThatGirlAgain]

Let us first address a puzzling feature of this world: its specificity. Why should the world be exactly the way it is? The laws and other characteristics of the world could surely have been different. Theism explains this as a volitional act of creation by God. But is God truly capable of creating only one specific world? How would that world be chosen from all other alternatives? When we make a choice it is always based on something prior " reasoning, emotion, psychological factors, coercion, or whatever factors might influence a coin flip. What pre-existing factors influenced Gods decision? If something existed prior to God, then God is not the ultimate ground of existence after all. But if specific influences existed before God, we must explain why those specific influences?

One solution is to say that God created all possible worlds, incorporating every possible set of laws and contents. After all, God could have created different kinds of world, or else God is not omnipotent. (Note: We are ignoring logical contradictions. They do not count.) But if God is not omnipotent, then God possesses some power but not all power. The question then arises: Why those powers as opposed to any others? What pres-existing factors constrained God. And why those factors? Also, to be able to create some worlds but not to do so would imply unfulfilled potential, making God less than perfect.

If there is a God who created this world, then that God necessarily created all possible worlds. The idea of volition would seem to be inapplicable here. God had no choice.

We may then ask: Why is there a God? We can prove the existence of God from the existence of the world. God (or something) is necessary in the sense that an explanation for the existence of the world is needed. But is God inherently a necessary being independent of the existence of the world? Is existence of something inherently necessary?

If existence is indeed primal and if the idea of a volitional creator is problematic, as we have seen above, then why posit a creator God? Possibly the reason for the existence of things lies in logic itself. Logically possible things may exist simply because they can. That which can be, is. Why? Because it can, and therefore it does. The age old question of :Why is there something rather than nothing? may actually be :Why is there some specific thing instead of everything else that could be? The answer may simply be that everything is; that every possible universe exists because logic allows it.

Whole universes are needed for context. The proverbial universe consisting of nothing but an infinite number of talking donkeys has no meaning because there is no context for donkey or talking. These things are meaningful in our universe because they reside in the context of a universe that supports their possibility. And a whole lot of support is needed. As Carl Sagan once put it, if you want to make a birthday cake from scratch you have to first make the universe.

Logically incompatible alternatives are separated into different universes. There may be a universe where the Chicago Cubs won the World Series. There may be an infinite number of such universes each one embodying all the possible contexts that would allow such a statement to be true, including the starting pitcher having tentacles.

This alternative scenario avoids the problem of prior constraints. All possibilities are actualized so no choices are involved. It also avoids the question of where God came from. A separate God is not needed. Existence itself is natural.

[AquinasD]

If all possibilities are actualized, then we should have to say that, in reality, there are no true possibilities; there are only logical necessities.

A true possibility can be possibly not actual; thus if it must be actual, then it is not a possibility, but a necessity. So it doesn't make sense to state "All possibilities are necessarily actualized." It's self-contradictory.

Consider the two exclusive possibilities "This world exists" or "This world doesn't exist." If they both are possibilities, then they cannot both be actual. Thus, not all possibilities can be actualized, since there are mutually exclusive possibilities.

The only way to save ThatGirlAgain's underlying thesis is to simply take the Parmenidean route and say "There is only necessity." Otherwise, if there exists true possibilities, then you require a principle of differentiation for the possibilities, i.e. an actual, personal God.

[ThatGirlAgain]

If all possibilities are actualized, then we should have to say that, in reality, there are no true possibilities; there are only logical necessities.

A true possibility can be possibly not actual; thus if it must be actual, then it is not a possibility, but a necessity. So it doesn't make sense to state "All possibilities are necessarily actualized." It's self-contradictory.

Consider the two exclusive possibilities "This world exists" or "This world doesn't exist." If they both are possibilities, then they cannot both be actual. Thus, not all possibilities can be actualized, since there are mutually exclusive possibilities.

The only way to save ThatGirlAgain's underlying thesis is to simply take the Parmenidean route and say "There is only necessity." Otherwise, if there exists true possibilities, then you require a principle of differentiation for the possibilities, i.e. an actual, personal God.

Word play. Something is either possible or not possible. If you say that necessities are not possibilities then by your reasoning necessities are impossible. Your definitions are not consistent.

It is possible for Christmas ornaments to come in more than one color. Each ornament is a particular color. Other ornaments express different possibilities. Different worlds express different possibilities for worlds. In my proposal, it is the existence of multiple universes that fulfill all possibilities but keep the contradictions separated. To say "this world does not exist" is not a possibility. In this scenario, all worlds exist.

[EduChris]

If all possibilities are actualized, then we should have to say that, in reality, there are no true possibilities; there are only logical necessities...The only way to save ThatGirlAgain's underlying thesis is to simply take the Parmenidean route and say "There is only necessity."...

Agreed. If all possibilities are necessarily actualized, then we have removed both volition and chance from the original mix of our three causal mechanisms (chance, necessity, and volition).

Unfortunately, in such case, what we end up with is a tautology: our original phrase, "all possibilities are necessarily actualized," becomes "all necessities are necessarily actualized." I'm not sure that tautologies constitute explanations at all (though if I'm wrong, I'd certainly like to know how a tautology might possibly constitute and explanation).

Beyond that, there seems to be an almost infinite set of possibilities, and for each true belief any intelligent being can hold, there are a nearly infinite set of false beliefs such being could possibily hold, and so for any and all beliefs we might hold, it becomes almost infinitely more likely that our beliefs are wrong than that they are right.

Epistemology goes out the window if all necessities are necessarily actualized. We wouldn't be able to trust the reasoning that caused us to believe the tautology in the first place. After all, why should we suppose that we just happen to exist within that one universe, out of an infinity of universes, where our beliefs on any given proposition are actually correct?

So it seems that the "necessity alone" option is inadequate. We must retain at least chance and/or volition, along with our logically necessary "black box" of Ultimate Reality. Which one (or both) should we retain?

[ThatGirlAgain]

If all possibilities are actualized, then we should have to say that, in reality, there are no true possibilities; there are only logical necessities...The only way to save ThatGirlAgain's underlying thesis is to simply take the Parmenidean route and say "There is only necessity."...

Agreed. If all possibilities are necessarily actualized, then we have removed both volition and chance from the original mix of our three causal mechanisms (chance, necessity, and volition).

Unfortunately, in such case, what we end up with is a tautology: our original phrase, "all possibilities are necessarily actualized," becomes "all necessities are necessarily actualized." I'm not sure that tautologies constitute explanations at all (though if I'm wrong, I'd certainly like to know how a tautology might possibly constitute and explanation).

Beyond that, there seems to be an almost infinite set of possibilities, and for each true belief any intelligent being can hold, there are a nearly infinite set of false beliefs such being could possibly hold, and so for any and all beliefs we might hold, it becomes almost infinitely more likely that our beliefs are wrong than that they are right.

Epistemology goes out the window if all necessities are necessarily actualized. We wouldn't be able to trust the reasoning that caused us to believe the tautology in the first place. After all, why should we suppose that we just happen to exist within that one universe, out of an infinity of universes, where our beliefs on any given proposition are actually correct?

So it seems that the "necessity alone" option is inadequate. We must retain at least chance and/or volition, along with our logically necessary "black box" of Ultimate Reality. Which one (or both) should we retain?

More word play. A possibility is a complete, coherent and self-consistent system. As I discussed in another thread, this implies a universe. As Carl Sagan put it, to make a birthday cake from scratch you have to first create the universe. The proverbial universe consisting entirely of an infinite number of talking donkeys does not work. There is no context for talking and donkey. These are ideas existing in another universe and have no explanation in the example universe. A possibility in the sense I am using it IS a universe. Each universe contains its own truths about itself. These need not be true of any other universe. Our beliefs about propositions concerning the physical reality we experience apply to the universe we happen to be living in. Those beliefs are either right or wrong and have testable consequences. But there is no problem with working out the logical ramifications of a universe with different ground rules. I am afraid the epistemology argument is yet more word play.

My thesis is that all possibilities (see above definition) are actualities, with contradictions (Who won the World Series? What is the value of the Fine Structure Constant?) isolated in different universes. These are necessities because there is nothing to select which are to be realized and which not. And obviously something is realized. We are living in it. Inventing a volitional God to explain the specificity of the universe is profligate, not parsimonious. There is no explanation of why such a God should create this particular one without loading up the baggage cart with assumptions.

Parmenides hypothesized an all at once unchanging universe. Heraclitus hypothesized a universe whose essence was change. Plato attempted to reconcile these with his Theory of Forms. (See his Theaetetus for Platos analysis of those two world views, laying the groundwork for his own theory.) But the Platonic realm of Ideas contains many contradictions. Is algebra, analysis, geometry or topology the correct description of space? In Platonic Realism they are all real. My thesis at least separates contradictions.

[EduChris]

Let us first address a puzzling feature of this world....

This post from ThatGirlAgain is pretty much a repeat of our discussion on another thread, and so I will simply provide a link to my response on that thread. I don't want to conflate both threads and keep repeating the same material on two separate threads.

Anyway, on this thread we have shown that "necessity alone" creates a tautology which refutes itself by hopelessly undermining epistemology. So although necessity must be one of the three causal mechanisms (that is, we have a logically necessary "Ultimate Reality"), necessity must be complemented by one or both of the remaining causal mechanisms (chance and/or volition). Which of the two (or both) can we retain?

[EduChris]

...More word play. A possibility is a complete, coherent and self-consistent system...

But is it possible for any complete, coherent, and self-consistent universe NOT to exist, per your theory? If it is not possible that such a universe not exist, then all such universes exist necessarily. And as we have seen, this entails a tautology which defeats epistemology. On the other hand, if it is possible for such a universe not to exist, then you have supplemented your original "necessity alone" hypothesis with the addition of some other causal mechanism(s).

Tautologies are not explanations, and tautologies which refute themselves are doubly nonsensical. I don't see how any better refutation could be given for any explanation. Your "necessity alone" hypotheis seems to create a "perfect storm" of failure.

[EduChris]

...Our beliefs about propositions concerning the physical reality we experience apply to the universe we happen to be living in. Those beliefs are either right or wrong and have testable consequences...

You seem to be arguing that each and every one of your infinite number of necessarily existing universes will be such as to preserve epistemology. Why should this be so? Even in our own universe we see that for any true belief, there are an infinite number of false beliefs which can be believed. If false beliefs are possible, and if false beliefs outnumber true beliefs by a factor of infinity, why should we believe that true beliefs will predominate in an infinite number of independent, necessarily existing universes?

[ThatGirlAgain]

...Our beliefs about propositions concerning the physical reality we experience apply to the universe we happen to be living in. Those beliefs are either right or wrong and have testable consequences...

You seem to be arguing that each and every one of your infinite number of necessarily existing universes will be such as to preserve epistemology. Why should this be so? Even in our own universe we see that for any true belief, there are an infinite number of false beliefs which can be believed. If false beliefs are possible, and if false beliefs outnumber true beliefs by a factor of infinity, why should we believe that true beliefs will predominate in an infinite number of independent, necessarily existing universes?

Epistemology has nothing to do with it. It is not about human knowledge of true/false propositions. Analytic propositions are self-contained and have nothing to do with any actual state of affairs since they refer only to themselves. Synthetic propositions are true or false depending on the state of affairs in the universe to which they relate. Within a universe, things are or they are not regardless of belief. If a false belief is 'believable' a mistake is being made. Belief is unreliable and irrelevant.

"John went to the movies today." (True statement)

"No he didn't, I saw him at the beach all day" (True statement)

"Different John" (Explanation of how both can be true)

If the "John" referent had been more precise, specifically identifying which John in which universe, there would be no issue. But human knowledge is rarely very precise relative to the big scheme of things.

Epistemology is irrelevant here.