Is God held to a different moral standard?

[Angel]

The Bible mentions several acts of God that if a human did would be considered wrong. Some examples would be when the Bible mentions God killing babies and ordering others to do so. I wonder if God is obligated to follow the same morals as us. One common response I get from some Christians is that God is God so he can do what he wants. If we try to do some of the objectionable things on our own that he's done then we're guilty of playing God. For example, if a human kills an innocent baby, the human would be guilty of murder, but if God does it, some Christians defend it as being right since it's God. Christians with that position see no wrong in it just as long as the child goes to a better afterlife but they don't factor in the means of the baby's death which is by 'murder' as far as I could tell. Why the double standard?


Debate Question:
1) Does God have a different set of morals to follow or does he follow the same ones that he expects humans to follow?

2) If God does not follow the rules he expects us to follow, is that fair to his followers? Why or why not?

[EduChris]

...The problem of evil only demonstrates that VUR is probably not morally perfect and perhaps not even very good...

Your claim would hold true if: 1) some people, on balance, experience more evil than good in this life; and 2) those unfortunates are not adequately compensated in some afterlife. Can you demonstrate that both of these conditions are met?

On the other hand, if God has complete knowledge of facts and possibilities, and if God is supremely rational, then it necessarily follows that God is morally good. And moral goodness implies that God will ensure--either in this life or in another--that each person will experience more good than evil.

[EduChris]

...I see many assertions but no explanation...

You are attacking Christian theology, and I have given a fairly standard Christian explanation. You don't like that explanation? Well, fine for you. I'm not particularly impressed with your argument from emotion, so there is no need for us to continue going round in circles.

...This is poisoning the well in lieu of debate. You aren't required to respond but this sort of thing is uncalled for.

You always have the option of reporting any post to the moderators.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

...I see many assertions but no explanation...

You are attacking Christian theology, and I have given a fairly standard Christian explanation. You don't like that explanation? Well, fine for you. I'm not particularly impressed with your argument from emotion, so there is no need for us to continue going round in circles.

I do not think that pointing out that genocide is bad, and that an entity who chooses to solve his problems with genocide rather than peaceful methods is behaving badly is an "argument from emotion." Just basic ethics, really.

It isn't that I don't like the explanation. It's that the explanation is wholly inadequate. It's simply assertions based on circular reasoning and "god works in mysterious ways." Saying Yahweh had to order violent actions because otherwise we could not learn from our actions is not an explanation, it is a statement of faith that doesn't make any logical sense as far as I can see.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

...I see many assertions but no explanation...

You are attacking Christian theology, and I have given a fairly standard Christian explanation. You don't like that explanation? Well, fine for you. I'm not particularly impressed with your argument from emotion, so there is no need for us to continue going round in circles.

I do not think that pointing out that genocide is bad, and that an entity who chooses to solve his problems with genocide rather than peaceful methods is behaving badly is an "argument from emotion." Just basic ethics, really.

It isn't that I don't like the explanation. It's that the explanation is wholly inadequate. It's simply assertions based on circular reasoning and "god works in mysterious ways." Saying Yahweh had to order violent actions because otherwise we could not learn from our actions is not an explanation, it is a statement of faith that doesn't make any logical sense as far as I can see.

[EduChris]

...Saying Yahweh had to order violent actions because otherwise we could not learn from our actions is not an explanation, it is a statement of faith that doesn't make any logical sense as far as I can see.

You are saying that God has no right to judge a culture and a toxic religious system. You are saying that the God who gives life is thereby obligated to grant some particular length of life (how long is long enough?). You are saying that God doesn't have access to the big picture, and that God can't determine whether one particular action will result in a greater balance of good over evil. You are saying that the God who gave humans the choice between an "ignorance is bliss" scenario and a scenario of "knowledge of both good and evil" is somehow obligated to ensure that we don't experience evil. You are saying that God must use a spoon and a toothbrush to dig a tunnel through solid rock, rather than using a carefully placed stick of dynamite. You are saying that ancient texts using ancient idioms (exaggerated rhetorical "annihilation bravado") must be interpreted literally and without regard to the way those texts would have been interepreted by people of their own era. And you are saying that God has no capacity to compensate individuals, when necessary, in the next life.

Forgive me if I see little logic and lots of emotion in all your assumptions.

[Adamoriens]

AquinasD, your view seems to entail that there are as many worlds as there are physical/mental variations, and that there is a unique set of persons for each variation. But my modal intuitions tell me that it's sensible to think of a person spanning several mutually exclusive variations. Does that indicate your view is probably false?

...The problem of evil only demonstrates that VUR is probably not morally perfect and perhaps not even very good...

Your claim would hold true if: 1) some people, on balance, experience more evil than good in this life; and 2) those unfortunates are not adequately compensated in some afterlife. Can you demonstrate that both of these conditions are met?

On the other hand, if God has complete knowledge of facts and possibilities, and if God is supremely rational, then it necessarily follows that God is morally good. And moral goodness implies that God will ensure--either in this life or in another--that each person will experience more good than evil.

I would be required to meet both conditions if hedonism were true. But hedonism is false. QED I do not.

This paper also discusses why hedonism defeats the problem of evil.

[EduChris]

...I would be required to meet both conditions if hedonism were true. But hedonism is false. QED I do not...

I'll read the article you provided, but for now I will simply quote from it:

We dont know Gods reasons for having chosen to create a world with so much suffering; we cant even imagine all of the reasons why God might have chosen to create a world such as ours. In light of this, I think that it would be very unreasonable for someone who accepts DPTV3 to claim that the argument from evil shows that an omniscient, omnipotent, and loving God does not exist. Our inability to divine why such a God would allow there to be so much suffering doesnt show that there cant be reasons that are compatible with Gods being omniscient, omnipotent, and loving. Still, one might press the evidential argument from evil and claim that, since we cant imagine any reason why a loving, omniscient, and omnipotent God would allow so much evil to exist, it is unlikely or improbable that such a God exists. I cant begin to do justice to this argument in the present paper, but permit me a brief conjecture. Probabilistic arguments involve inductive inferences, but such inferences and reasoning are, in principle, illegitimate in the present case. We dont have any inductive basis for determining what sorts of universes omniscient, omnipotent, and loving deities are likely to create and what sorts of universes are likely to exist if such deities dont exist. We are familiar with only one universe and, for the purposes of the present debate, we cant make assumptions about what kind of God (if any) created the universe (emphasis added).

[Adamoriens]

I'll read the article you provided, but for now I will simply quote from it...

We've discussed this at some length before, and my thoughts on the matter haven't changed significantly. He's quite right that he [didn't] do the topic justice in that short space.

[AquinasD]

AquinasD, your view seems to entail that there are as many worlds as there are physical/mental variations, and that there is a unique set of persons for each variation. But my modal intuitions tell me that it's sensible to think of a person spanning several mutually exclusive variations. Does that indicate your view is probably false?

No, once again this just reveals conceptual confusion. You can only think of a person inasmuch as you think of them as they actually are. If you are not thinking of them as they actually are, then you are not actually thinking of them. If you believe you are thinking that a person could be other than they are, then you simply aren't thinking about them.

But what of the future, you might ask? "I can perfectly conceive of an individual having several possible but mutually exclusive futures."

If you are thinking of an individual as they might be in the future, then you are not thinking of them as they actually are, because we are always present beings. "A person in the future" is a person we can never know, because they are defined as being not in the present.

Can there be true statements about the future? I do think so, but they will be in a sense tautologous. I could say "At the present moment, Christmas Day 2011 is in the future." It is true, and will always be true, because the meaning of the statement is tied to the moment of its utterance. If I were to repeat the statement, and mean it for the present moment (rather than speaking of it as I meant it the first time) it could still be true.

So when we make statements about the future, they can be true inasmuch as they aren't stipulating about the present. "I could go to school tomorrow, or not" is true right now, but then it is only tautologous. "I will go to school tomorrow" I'm not too sure of, since it seems statements like this cannot be qualified except by the future being the present, which is a contradiction...

At worst, I could say that you are thinking of a person who is like the person you are thinking of as their counterpart exists in a different world, i.e. you are thinking of a real possibility but only as much as you are not meaning "and this person is a particular individual I know right now," which couldn't be the case since you can't know them in the future and right now (or the present). Present and future individuals are distinct, and as much as they are distinct, you can't think of a person being both present and future; inasmuch as you are thinking of a person in the future, you are not thinking of a particular individual in the present, and vice versa.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

You are saying that God has no right to judge a culture and a toxic religious system.

No, I am not. I am noting that his handling of the situation is unjust by contemporary ethical standards.

I also do not think it necessary to refer to other people's religions as "toxic."

You are saying that the God who gives life is thereby obligated to grant some particular length of life (how long is long enough?).

No, I am not. I am saying that ordering people to kill children when it is unnecessary to do so is a bad thing.

You are saying that God doesn't have access to the big picture, and that God can't determine whether one particular action will result in a greater balance of good over evil.

No, I am not. Perhaps you are troubled because I am not assuming this religious belief to be true in my interpretation of the text? I am simply avoiding circular reasoning.

You are saying that the God who gave humans the choice between an "ignorance is bliss" scenario and a scenario of "knowledge of both good and evil" is somehow obligated to ensure that we don't experience evil.

No, I am not. I'm saying that a god who orders people to do unnecessarily horrible things to each other is behaving badly.

You are saying that God must use a spoon and a toothbrush to dig a tunnel through solid rock, rather than using a carefully placed stick of dynamite.

I am saying that we would expect a loving god to solve his problems in a loving way rather than a needlessly violent way.

You are saying that ancient texts using ancient idioms (exaggerated rhetorical "annihilation bravado") must be interpreted literally and without regard to the way those texts would have been interepreted by people of their own era.

Perhaps if you presented evidence for this claim we could debate it?

And you are saying that God has no capacity to compensate individuals, when necessary, in the next life.

The ends justify the means?