Atheism, Evolution and Moral Nihilism

[Adamoriens]

It is often argued by atheist and theist alike that evolutionary explanations for morality refute the idea that there are any "spooky" moral facts, and that therefore atheists ought to think there are no moral facts. But nobody on this board (so far as I have observed) has actually made a good argument toward this end. Here is the best I can come up with:

The moral beliefs of humans have been created and conditioned by, apart from cultural factors, the impersonal demands of evolution. Thus we find that our moral beliefs tend to facilitate reproduction and the passing of healthy genetic material onto the next generation. The universal tendency to especially value one's own immediate family, offspring and friends, the protection of children and women (chivalry, perhaps), the (general) disgust for murder, rape and incestuous sex, etc. are all explained by evolution's blind selection for adaptive behaviours. Assuming this is true, we can conclude that our moral beliefs are not sensitive to "spooky" moral facts, but rather to the impersonal pressures demanded by survival. And since knowledge requires a causal connection between facts and beliefs, it follows that none of our moral beliefs are knowledge; they have never tracked facts, only evolutionary pressures.

There are two points I'd like to make here. The first is that this challenge to moral beliefs must be met by theists as well; the evolutionary explanations are impersonal, which means that their success in explaining moral beliefs entails that the idea God has endowed us with reliable moral faculties is less probable (probably false). The second is that both the theist and the atheist can conceivably get around the challenge by positing that evolution happened to select for moral beliefs that actually correlate with moral facts; theists might come out in better shape here.

Any thoughts?

[scourge99]

Evolutionary psychology makes no hefty assumptions about the nature of mind that neuroscience does not.

This is an evasive and vague reply. You've jumped from your original idea, to evolutionary psychology, and now to neuroscience. We are going to have to agree to disagree.

There are a few things to say here. You criticized me for making "some hefty assumptions about the nature of the mind," and then you failed to tell me what those assumptions were. I can't very well be faulted for shooting into the dark in return. Will you clarify what illegitimate assumptions evolutionary psychology makes?

I agree I could be a bit more direct. My criticism is that it should be made clear that the theory of evolution only accounts for changes in physical traits. Extending evolution beyond that to such things as beliefs has not been substantiated. Its only been speculated upon, assumed, or asserted. More on this in the rest of my response.

If no-one extended theories beyond their demonstrated scope, we'd have no progress.

This is both irrelevant to this discussion and a misunderstanding of what I've stated.
There is a difference between investigation/research and asserting certain ideas as true or likely. I am criticizing the notion that morality can be accounted for purely by evolution. I am not criticizing or condemning investigation/research into anything.

Indeed, my original postulate was that evolution can account for all significant moral intuitions. I took on that assumption just to see where it leads; I'm not actually arguing that evolutionary psychology can account for it all. However, I do find it plausible to think that certain important psychological traits in humans can be explained by their adaptiveness for survival, prosperity, and reproduction.

Well I think a lot of things could be argued plausible including many imaginary things.

If your actual position is that evolution cannot account for all significant moral intuitions then what moral beliefs exactly do you think it does account for beyond mere "plausibility"?

But as you can see from AquinasD's early response, whatever moral intuitions are not destroyed by evolutionary psychology are probably destroyed when one considers the sheer diversity of moral intuitions.

Without being more specific i don't know whether i agree or disagree. I can imagine that some moral intuitions are instinctual and perhaps some of those have evolved. What i question is (a) how that can be effectively evidenced, (b) how that can be explained from a physical basis without first solving the mind/body relationship, and/or (c) what mechanism facilitates the transfer of moral intuitions to offspring.

The inability to answer that question is devastating to any EP idea. It effectively kicks the legs out from under it. Without a mechanism then it is like arguing for evolution without natural selection.

Here's Edward H. Hagen on the subject:

In the three and a half centuries since William Harvey proved that the purpose of the heart is to pump blood, physiologists have revealed the functional organization of the body in blinding detail. Their discoveries demonstrate beyond question that the structure of the body serves survival and reproduction. Further, there is near unanimity among biologists that this functional structure is a product of natural selection. In our century, psychologists have developed powerful techniques that conclusively demonstrate that cognition, too, has structure. Evolutionary psychologists are betting that cognitive structure, like physiological structure, has been designed by natural selection to serve survival and reproduction.

What exactly do you think that quote is stating? Here is what i read:
1) the heart and brain are both products of evolution (i agree)
2) cognition has structure (i agree)
3) Evolutionary psychologists hope that their research into the brain will demonstrate that the cognitive structure of the brain is the product of evolution.

Based on your own quote we should agree that EPs have NOT demonstrated that the "cognitive structure" of the brain is the product of evolution. Thus there hasn't been anything to confirm this idea that morality, in any part, is the product of evolution.

1) Without an explanation about the precise mechanism that explains how genes and environmental pressures directly give rise to moral beliefs then this idea is untenable.

2) It is true that our minds are influenced by genetics and evolution had some role in that but genes do not account for everything. If they did then we would expect to see identical twins think, behave, and suffer from identical psychological disorders at very high rates. We don't. For example, if one twin is schizophrenic, autistic, or ADHD then the other only has about a 50% chance or less of having it. While this is substantially greater than the prevalence in the general population, it demonstrates that there is more than just genes at work. This is precisely where the OP goes wrong. It makes too much of genes and evolution while disregarding individual experiences and self reflective thoughts which directly mold the mind and higher cognitive functions.

I don't think that evolutionary psychology aims to offer unique evolutionary explanations for individual moral beliefs like, "you ought to have a single spouse for the duration of your lifetime." Rather, there is a selection for "empathetic" cognitive structures that must be explained by the sorts of adaptive moral beliefs it tends to cause. And this involves going beyond genetics and into the environment in which these empathetic cognitive structures act.

And the problem with this is that if you identify some "empathetic cognitive structure" then you need to explain exactly how that empathetic cognitive structure relates to physical structure or genes. And if you've ruled out genes then what is left?


It really comes down to this: evolution occurs because a mechanism known as natural selection works on genes.
1) if some moral beliefs arise from physical components that are subject to evolution then the body-mind problem must be solved. Otherwise there is giant hole that fails to link physical changes to cognition.
2) you can attempt to ignore the mind-body problem by presenting some type of mechanism which facilitates the transfer of moral beliefs to offspring (E.G., another member, Bernee, has postulated something known as the "noosphere".). If its not natural selection working on genes then labeling it "evolution" is misleading.

The rest of your criticism is probably best answered here (from The Origins of Morality by Dennis L. Krebs):

Evolutionary psychologists attribute an important role to the environment at all levels of the evolutionary process. At an ultimate level, the environment plays a key role in the natural selection of inherited traits. Indeed, the nature in natural selection refers to the environment. As explained by Edward Hagen and Donald Symons ( 2007 ), organisms evolved to reproduce in a particular environment; if nothing is known about that environment, almost nothing can be said about what it takes to reproduce in it (p. 43). Hagen and Symons argue that accounting for the evolution of traits is like deciphering the relation between keys (adaptations) and the locks they were designed to open (environmental problems). You cannot understand one without understanding the other. It follows that one of the most important challenges for understanding the evolution of morality is to identify the environmental problems that the mental mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments and behaviors evolved to solve, which as I have argued, were primarily social in nature. (p. 68)

We see the same fatal problem going unaddressed. Its asserted that moral judgments and behaviors evolved because of the environment. No attempt whatsoever is made explain WHAT mechanism facilitates the transfer of these moral judgments and behaviors to offspring or HOW exactly physical evolution can account for it.

And as for the whole lock-and-key analogy, its easy to find a lock and key that fit when you are the key maker.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_ ... psychology

Critics argue that many hypotheses put forward to explain the adaptive nature of human behavioural traits are "just-so stories"... They allege that evolutionary psychology can predict many, or even all, behaviours for a given situation, including contradictory ones. Therefore many human behaviours will always fit some hypotheses. Noam Chomsky argued:

"You find that people cooperate, you say, Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating. You find that they fight, you say, Sure, thats obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."

[Artie]

It appears that certain animals can pass pretty much any metric of cognition you can throw at them: memory, self-recognition, rational decision making, arithmetic reasoning, introspection etc.

Any way they manage to do so can be replicated by a computer.

So animals have no minds but are simply programmed computers, programmed in such a way that it appears that they have a mind? That the animal is angry or sad or lonely or cares about its young or cares about you is just a part of their programming?

[McCulloch]

It appears that certain animals can pass pretty much any metric of cognition you can throw at them: memory, self-recognition, rational decision making, arithmetic reasoning, introspection etc.

Any way they manage to do so can be replicated by a computer.

Firstly one error in fact. Computers cannot yet replicate the cognitive processes of all animals.

Humans are animals. We are not plants, and we are alive. We are different from the other animals only in degree, not in any fundamental way. If computers become complex and powerful enough to match the cognitive abilities of beavers, chimpanzees or eagles, then they could, in principle, match the cognitive abilities of humans.

[AquinasD]

So animals have no minds but are simply programmed computers, programmed in such a way that it appears that they have a mind? That the animal is angry or sad or lonely or cares about its young or cares about you is just a part of their programming?

The dog acts sad. It gets rewarded with food.

Evolutionary advantage to acting sad? Greater than nil.

Programmable? Absolutely.

So yes, emotions are just part of the programming. I don't see any reason to believe otherwise. Emotions aren't indicative of a mind.

[AquinasD]

Firstly one error in fact. Computers cannot yet replicate the cognitive processes of all animals.

Not all processes, not yet. But that doesn't mean they won't.

We are different from the other animals only in degree, not in any fundamental way.

So our ability to comprehend significance (viz. semantics) counts for nought?

[TheJackelantern]

Firstly one error in fact. Computers cannot yet replicate the cognitive processes of all animals.

This is due to limitations on electron based processing and binary code.. Put an ion based processing coupled with quantum computing in qbits to which can be both zero and one and you can then process in abstract, and in true probability. This in which has a lot to do with how our brains process information. However, the first basic computers will still be limited here, and it will require development of a complex network similar to a brain.. But that runs the risk of having a computer so smart you might have a challenge of what constitutes life.

And it's irrelevant if you think computers can't replicate every animal, they never tried to do that for one, and it's only important here that they can replicate animals. They have done it with fish robots that even develop into schools and behave just as you would expect a fish to.. It's also key to note that current computer ability to replicate deals a lot with how much sensory input they can get from the environment.. Hence they don't have a nervous system like an animal does. But brain cell robots are probably the most interesting so far as they seem to learn and even develop personality traits ect.

[Artie]

So our ability to comprehend significance (viz. semantics) counts for nought?

Could you provide a simple example of what humans do that animals don't?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 69:

That's kinda my point. The god concept is the container for all that which is unknown or unconfirmed.

You keep saying this, but I fail to see what you mean in the least.

I don't know whether Goldbach's conjecture is true or false. But I don't stuff Goldbach's conjecture into "the god concept."

So what do you mean by the god concept being "the container for all that which is unknown and unconfirmed?"

I'm doing some proposing here, based on a lifetime of amateur study, so anything I say I don't declare so much as "truth" as I declare to be my own conclusions...

I contend this is because this conjecture doesn't cause any intellectual "anguish" to the point where it would affect your day to day activities. I notice where "vexing" questions arise, such as "why do we exist" or "what is my/our purpose", the god concept is introduced by those who seem most disturbed by the question/s and possible implications.

I've provided an example that seems to discount what you mean, so unless you mean something specific and definite, then my suspicion is that your postulate about what "the god concept" serves as is your own little deus ex machina that does whatever work you want it to do. A kind of Sonic Screwdriver, as it were. You pull it out in any situation where you don't have some other ready answer.

A fair charge, one I hope the observer considers when they come across anything I have to say.

I would contend that the use of the god concept is exactly as you see my use of my concept of the god concept...

"You pull it out in any situation where you don't have some other ready answer."

That is exactly what I observe in those who use the god concept.


>I snip further commentary on the god concept as I hope I answered above<

That said, my perception is that many a theist will reject confirmable data that goes against their particular god notions.

Do you have an example? Specifically, something which is in fact plainly confirmable and not an example of question-begging?

Christian Scientists come to mind, where they often refuse medical treatment. Jehovah's Witnesses are another, refusing blood transfusions even in the face of death. (Wiki links for saving me some time, I can offer other substantiation on request)

I also think of folks who refuse medical treatment for their children based on their religious beliefs - to the point where the child dies, often an agonizing and needless death. (Examples available on request)

[AquinasD]

I contend this is because this conjecture doesn't cause any intellectual "anguish" to the point where it would affect your day to day activities. I notice where "vexing" questions arise, such as "why do we exist" or "what is my/our purpose", the god concept is introduced by those who seem most disturbed by the question/s and possible implications.

Are you declaring that, in principle, answers that quiet one's mental anguish are prima facie wrong and for some reason necessarily "unconfirmable" (whatever you mean by that and however you would demonstrate that this is the cause)?

"You pull it out in any situation where you don't have some other ready answer."

That is exactly what I observe in those who use the god concept.

If you're right that theists are wrong, wouldn't you be implicating your own wrongness?

Further, I don't see that this is the case. If were I to ask "Is Goldbach's conjecture true," and I don't have an answer, and I don't think God provides an answer (well, maybe I can ask Him in Heaven, but that's not the kind of reference to God you're speaking of), would this be a counterexample? Or do you mean only in those situations in which some other theists are prone to whipping out God as an answer for why toast always comes out of the toaster (you can't explain that!?!?)?

Does this mean I can also start lumping all atheists together for all the stupid things they've ever said?

Christian Scientists come to mind, where they often refuse medical treatment. Jehovah's Witnesses are another, refusing blood transfusions even in the face of death. (Wiki links for saving me some time, I can offer other substantiation on request)

I also think of folks who refuse medical treatment for their children based on their religious beliefs - to the point where the child dies, often an agonizing and needless death. (Examples available on request)

Okay.

So some atheists have also done some stupid things.

Does this mean that these stupid things are essential to atheism?

Does your whole complaint here amount to the suggestion that "Some theists are stupid, therefore all theism is stupid in essence?"

It's not a very compelling claim. You're going to have to explain what about your critique is so devastating to theism in principle.

[AquinasD]

Could you provide a simple example of what humans do that animals don't?

That was my example. Humans can perceive and understand semantics, or meaning. Animals cannot. This is not a difference of degree, but of quality.