Gay marriage

[inviere1644]

Ok, as a moderate gay man I'm always interested to see what people on the liberal and conservative spectrums have to say about this issue. So, is it right or wrong? why or why not?

[Autodidact]

No, the court did not create or change a law. It struck down a law that prohibited certain legislation.

I never said it did. Courts don't make laws.

That is why legally recognized of homosexual marrage ceremonies have been stopped pending appeal, or at least that is what I heardon the Rachel Maddow show. If anyone were to question whether that is true, it would no doubt have been her.

I'm not exactly sure of the details, the situation in California is so complex, but I think no one wants to take any affirmative actions because everyone agrees that will be appealed, and is likely to end up in the Supreme Court.

If you think recognizing same-sex marriage violates a legitimate governmental purpose, then it is incumbent on you to say what and why.

Until those purposes can be defined an analized properly, one can not make a determination on whether marrage is a governmental concern at all, let alone certain kinds of marrage.

Well don't let us stop you. Any time you like, go for it. After all, we're only on page 22.[/quote]

I have attempted that. However, all attempts to find working definitions have been rejected because they are semantics, even though that is the very defintion of the term.

Well, I have to dispute this. You asked me what I thought those purposes were and I told you. If you dispute those purposes, please let us know what you think they are.

I have even permitted you to establish the definitions. Yet, when I ask for clarification, I am dismissed as having gone off topic. If you do not wish your words to communicate anything other than your personal viewpoint without question, then your statements are simply dogma and of no more value than the social bias you appear to oppose. Mind you, I do not question your sincerity or integrity as an individual. I just find it difficult to find a basis for accepting your proposed overturning of precident without a willingness on your part to acknowledge the scope of behaviors that are effected by such a proposal.

I have no idea what you're talking about. I also don't think there's any precedent to overturn. At least, I can't think of any court ever ruling that such a statute is constitutional under any state constitution, although my memory may be faulty. I believe every court that has considered such statutes has overturned them.

There is nothing communist about it. If you're not talking about the right to marry, which is the subject at hand, then why bring the subject up? Equal protection is all about equality. You can tell because of that word equality in there.

Well, if I recall correctly, you said, "Our society has a strong interest in equality." I was merely pointing out that is not a constitutional principle, but a political tenent.

I disagree. The 14th amendment to the constitution requires the government to treat all person equally, unless there is a justification to distinguish between them.

Equal protection is all about equality, with regard to government protections. However, the converse is not true. Equality is about more than just the equal protection concept found in the 14th amendment.

That's true but irrelevant.

There are certain aspects of equality that are not supported by the constitution, therefore, one should not mistake equality as a strong interest of our society. In fact, many on the left propound diversity as a strong interest of our society. How can one hold both equality and diversity as strong interests without subjegating one to the other?

I guess you better ask them.

Yes, that is why every state court that has considered it has struck down these bans. However, the constitution is not sole concern of the courts. The legislatures and the people should also not pass laws that discriminate with regard to a fundamental right (marriage) without a compelling state interest. There is not such interest, therefore the legislature should not enact such laws.

Emphasis Mine

With regard to the federal courts, all laws must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates, otherwise we do not have constitutional government. As the 10th amendment points out, the various states are free to enact any legislation as they please, any way they please, as long it does not violate the federal constitution and federal laws enacted in accordance with that constitution.

Yup. Did you have any point relevant to our discussion or are we done?

You just said that the constitution "is not sole concern of the courts", but you also agree that any decisions made, ie regarding marrage, must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates. Even if something is considered a "fundamental right", the federal courts can not rightly act on it without a constitutional mandate.

The federal courts already have a constitutional mandate to rule on the constitutionality of any statute, state or federal. Marbury v Madison.

Therefore, to determine the extent of the recognition by the federal government of a "fundamental right" one must look to the constitution.

This is not correct. Marriage is not mentioned in the constitution. Yet the Surpeme Court has repeatedly held that it is fundamental right.

You have presented the equal protection clause as a justification for an expanded recognition of marrage. This begs the question, how broad should this recognition be? If we adopt your proposed parameters, incest and simultanious polygamy or polyandry would be included. Do you find this to be acceptable? If not would you care to amend those parameters and what would be your justfications for doing so?

Not really. All that has to be asked is whether the specific discrimination under consideration is justified, constitutionally (for the court), morally and practically (for the legislature.)

It may be that the reasons for permitting one kind of restriction are justified, and not for the other. Either the reasons are justified, and the restriction should be upheld, or not, and they should be struck down. But there is no reason to consider them together, when each case is separate.

Think back to Loving v. Virginia. It was not necessary to ask whether Kentucky's age of marriage was constitutional, only whether the ban on interracial marriages was.

[bluethread]

No, the court did not create or change a law. It struck down a law that prohibited certain legislation.

I never said it did. Courts don't make laws.

That is why legally recognized of homosexual marrage ceremonies have been stopped pending appeal, or at least that is what I heardon the Rachel Maddow show. If anyone were to question whether that is true, it would no doubt have been her.

I'm not exactly sure of the details, the situation in California is so complex, but I think no one wants to take any affirmative actions because everyone agrees that will be appealed, and is likely to end up in the Supreme Court.

If you are not sure of the details, how can you speak to the reasoning of the court. It appears that it was a narrow decision regarding an initiative overtuning current legislation, specifically legislation expanding legally recognized marrage to include homosexual marrages. It did not speak to cases where no such legislation already exists.

I have attempted that. However, all attempts to find working definitions have been rejected because they are semantics, even though that is the very defintion of the term.

Well, I have to dispute this. You asked me what I thought those purposes were and I told you. If you dispute those purposes, please let us know what you think they are.

I have even permitted you to establish the definitions. Yet, when I ask for clarification, I am dismissed as having gone off topic. If you do not wish your words to communicate anything other than your personal viewpoint without question, then your statements are simply dogma and of no more value than the social bias you appear to oppose. Mind you, I do not question your sincerity or integrity as an individual. I just find it difficult to find a basis for accepting your proposed overturning of precident without a willingness on your part to acknowledge the scope of behaviors that are effected by such a proposal.

I have no idea what you're talking about.

You say that you told me what the purposes of marrage are and now you say you do not know what I am talking about. Did I not enquire to whom marrage should be granted based on those purposes? Then was I not told that I was just engaging in semantics?

I also don't think there's any precedent to overturn.

The precident is the application of the marrage statutes exclusively to relationships between a man and a women. Until recently that has been the case in all states.

There is nothing communist about it. If you're not talking about the right to marry, which is the subject at hand, then why bring the subject up? Equal protection is all about equality. You can tell because of that word equality in there.

Well, if I recall correctly, you said, "Our society has a strong interest in equality." I was merely pointing out that is not a constitutional principle, but a political tenent.

I disagree. The 14th amendment to the constitution requires the government to treat all person equally, unless there is a justification to distinguish between them.

Equal protection is all about equality, with regard to government protections. However, the converse is not true. Equality is about more than just the equal protection concept found in the 14th amendment.

That's true but irrelevant.

It is not irrelevant, if it is allowed to stand and then later used as a justification. If you wish ti say that our society has a strong interest in equal protection under the law, then that is accwptable. However, I will not accept that "Our society has a strong interest in equality.", because equality in general is not a constitutional principle.

Yes, that is why every state court that has considered it has struck down these bans. However, the constitution is not sole concern of the courts. The legislatures and the people should also not pass laws that discriminate with regard to a fundamental right (marriage) without a compelling state interest. There is not such interest, therefore the legislature should not enact such laws.

Emphasis Mine

With regard to the federal courts, all laws must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates, otherwise we do not have constitutional government. As the 10th amendment points out, the various states are free to enact any legislation as they please, any way they please, as long it does not violate the federal constitution and federal laws enacted in accordance with that constitution.

Yup. Did you have any point relevant to our discussion or are we done?

You just said that the constitution "is not sole concern of the courts", but you also agree that any decisions made, ie regarding marrage, must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates. Even if something is considered a "fundamental right", the federal courts can not rightly act on it without a constitutional mandate.

The federal courts already have a constitutional mandate to rule on the constitutionality of any statute, state or federal. Marbury v Madison.

Yes, but according to the tenth amendment, if there is not an issue that is addressed in the constitution, the state statute or lack of a statute stands. It is my understanding that is what the ninth circuit held. California had a statute and people who have acted in good faith can not be denighed the consideration of their union as marrage, since it was granted under an existing state statute. No opinion was bound in regard to states in the ninth circuit that do not have statutes that recognize homosexual unions as marrage.

Therefore, to determine the extent of the recognition by the federal government of a "fundamental right" one must look to the constitution.

This is not correct. Marriage is not mentioned in the constitution. Yet the Surpeme Court has repeatedly held that it is fundamental right.[/quote]

Yes, in accordance with the equal protection provision of the 14th amendment.

You have presented the equal protection clause as a justification for an expanded recognition of marrage. This begs the question, how broad should this recognition be? If we adopt your proposed parameters, incest and simultanious polygamy or polyandry would be included. Do you find this to be acceptable? If not would you care to amend those parameters and what would be your justfications for doing so?

Not really. All that has to be asked is whether the specific discrimination under consideration is justified, constitutionally (for the court), morally and practically (for the legislature.)

The precident in the federal courts has been that marrage is defined as a relationship between one man and one woman. This recident has recently been challenged by state laws expanding that definition to include homosexual unions. That percident has not yet been overturned by the federal courts, but left to the states. The ninth circuit let this latter stand, leaving the definition of marrage to the states.

It may be that the reasons for permitting one kind of restriction are justified, and not for the other. Either the reasons are justified, and the restriction should be upheld, or not, and they should be struck down. But there is no reason to consider them together, when each case is separate.

The reason that various arrangement should be considered together is because it is not the inclusion of homosexual unions that is being decided, but the definition of marrage and where the jurisdiction lies for defining whyat that is. I fully expect this broad examination of the issue should the parties press for national recognition of homosexual unions as marrage.

Think back to Loving v. Virginia. It was not necessary to ask whether Kentucky's age of marriage was constitutional, only whether the ban on interracial marriages was.

That is because there was no question of the common law definition of marrage, but whether marrage as previously defined could be denighed to certain individuals that met that definition. This left the common law definition of marrage unchallenged or only challenged with regard to race. However, sexual orientation speaks to a core premise of marrage, ie sexual relations. Therefore, as all races were considered in the prior case, all sexual relationships will no doubt be considered in this case.

[Autodidact]

You say that you told me what the purposes of marrage are and now you say you do not know what I am talking about. Did I not enquire to whom marrage should be granted based on those purposes? Then was I not told that I was just engaging in semantics?

This is tedious. If you have an argument to make, please make it.

I also don't think there's any precedent to overturn.

The precident is the application of the marrage statutes exclusively to relationships between a man and a women. Until recently that has been the case in all states.

Well, in the law, the word "precedent" usually refers specifically to a court ruling.

There is nothing communist about it. If you're not talking about the right to marry, which is the subject at hand, then why bring the subject up? Equal protection is all about equality. You can tell because of that word equality in there.

Well, if I recall correctly, you said, "Our society has a strong interest in equality." I was merely pointing out that is not a constitutional principle, but a political tenent.

I disagree. The 14th amendment to the constitution requires the government to treat all person equally, unless there is a justification to distinguish between them.

Equal protection is all about equality, with regard to government protections. However, the converse is not true. Equality is about more than just the equal protection concept found in the 14th amendment.

That's true but irrelevant.

It is not irrelevant, if it is allowed to stand and then later used as a justification. If you wish ti say that our society has a strong interest in equal protection under the law, then that is accwptable. However, I will not accept that "Our society has a strong interest in equality.", because equality in general is not a constitutional principle.

I can't stand to quibble to this level.

Yes, that is why every state court that has considered it has struck down these bans. However, the constitution is not sole concern of the courts. The legislatures and the people should also not pass laws that discriminate with regard to a fundamental right (marriage) without a compelling state interest. There is not such interest, therefore the legislature should not enact such laws.

Emphasis Mine

With regard to the federal courts, all laws must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates, otherwise we do not have constitutional government. As the 10th amendment points out, the various states are free to enact any legislation as they please, any way they please, as long it does not violate the federal constitution and federal laws enacted in accordance with that constitution.

Yup. Did you have any point relevant to our discussion or are we done?

You just said that the constitution "is not sole concern of the courts", but you also agree that any decisions made, ie regarding marrage, must conform to the constitution and be enacted and enforced according to it's dictates. Even if something is considered a "fundamental right", the federal courts can not rightly act on it without a constitutional mandate.

The federal courts already have a constitutional mandate to rule on the constitutionality of any statute, state or federal. Marbury v Madison.

Yes, but according to the tenth amendment, if there is not an issue that is addressed in the constitution, the state statute or lack of a statute stands. It is my understanding that is what the ninth circuit held. California had a statute and people who have acted in good faith can not be denighed the consideration of their union as marrage, since it was granted under an existing state statute. No opinion was bound in regard to states in the ninth circuit that do not have statutes that recognize homosexual unions as marrage.

The court in this case only rules on the facts before it. Its ruling applies only to California. The court found that this proposition furthered no valid state interest. Interestingly, that is also what the courts in every other state that has considered the issue ruled as well.

Therefore, to determine the extent of the recognition by the federal government of a "fundamental right" one must look to the constitution.

This is not correct. Marriage is not mentioned in the constitution. Yet the Surpeme Court has repeatedly held that it is fundamental right.

Yes, in accordance with the equal protection provision of the 14th amendment.

Not quite. Because marriage is a fundamental right, it cannot be denied to a specific group without a compelling state interest, because the fourteenth amendment provides for equal protection of the laws. Please let me know if I have not explained this clearly enough. I used to teach it, and given enough time, can explain it well enough so anyone can understand it.

You have presented the equal protection clause as a justification for an expanded recognition of marrage. This begs the question, how broad should this recognition be? If we adopt your proposed parameters, incest and simultanious polygamy or polyandry would be included. Do you find this to be acceptable? If not would you care to amend those parameters and what would be your justfications for doing so?

Not really. All that has to be asked is whether the specific discrimination under consideration is justified, constitutionally (for the court), morally and practically (for the legislature.)

The precident in the federal courts has been that marrage is defined as a relationship between one man and one woman.

I don't think any federal court has ever ruled on this issue, to my knowledge. However, federal courts are bound by DOMA, if it constitutional.

This recident has recently been challenged by state laws expanding that definition to include homosexual unions. That percident has not yet been overturned by the federal courts, but left to the states. The ninth circuit let this latter stand, leaving the definition of marrage to the states.

Marriage is traditionally a state issue. That is one of the problems with DOMA.

It may be that the reasons for permitting one kind of restriction are justified, and not for the other. Either the reasons are justified, and the restriction should be upheld, or not, and they should be struck down. But there is no reason to consider them together, when each case is separate.

The reason that various arrangement should be considered together is because it is not the inclusion of homosexual unions that is being decided, but the definition of marrage and where the jurisdiction lies for defining whyat that is. I fully expect this broad examination of the issue should the parties press for national recognition of homosexual unions as marrage.

Sorry, you're mistaken. That is exactly what is under consideration, both in this thread and in the courts. Courts only rule on the cases before them, and usually try to tailor their rulings as narrowly as possible.

Think back to Loving v. Virginia. It was not necessary to ask whether Kentucky's age of marriage was constitutional, only whether the ban on interracial marriages was.

That is because there was no question of the common law definition of marrage, but whether marrage as previously defined could be denighed to certain individuals that met that definition. This left the common law definition of marrage unchallenged or only challenged with regard to race. However, sexual orientation speaks to a core premise of marrage, ie sexual relations. Therefore, as all races were considered in the prior case, all sexual relationships will no doubt be considered in this case.

No, the cases are almost identical. Neither changes the definition, scope or nature of marriage. Both deal only with what couples may enter into it. And in both cases, any court that considers the question will rule only on the question before it; that's how courts work.

btw, before trying to explain a ruling, it might help you to read it or at least the summary in wiki.

[bluethread]

The ninth circuit let this latter stand, leaving the definition of marrage to the states.

Marriage is traditionally a state issue. That is one of the problems with DOMA.

Finally, you recognize my point. This is the same as with polygamy. There is no federal law against polygamy, though at present it is against the law in all fifty states. Since, these two situations have followed similar courses state by state. One moving from nonrecognition to illegality and the other charting a course, since the Kennedy decision in Reynolds regarding the legality of homosexual acts, from nonrecogition toward legal recognition at in the various states.

Think back to Loving v. Virginia. It was not necessary to ask whether Kentucky's age of marriage was constitutional, only whether the ban on interracial marriages was.

That is because there was no question of the common law definition of marrage, but whether marrage as previously defined could be denighed to certain individuals that met that definition. This left the common law definition of marrage unchallenged or only challenged with regard to race. However, sexual orientation speaks to a core premise of marrage, ie sexual relations. Therefore, as all races were considered in the prior case, all sexual relationships will no doubt be considered in this case.

No, the cases are almost identical. Neither changes the definition, scope or nature of marriage. Both deal only with what couples may enter into it. And in both cases, any court that considers the question will rule only on the question before it; that's how courts work.

btw, before trying to explain a ruling, it might help you to read it or at least the summary in wiki.

I did read summaries of the rulings as well as those regarding the Reynolds ruling, and those regarding polygamy. Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

[Autodidact]

The ninth circuit let this latter stand, leaving the definition of marrage to the states.

Marriage is traditionally a state issue. That is one of the problems with DOMA.

Finally, you recognize my point.

Well, if your point is that marriage is traditionally a state issue, it would have taken you only six words to say so. Of course, this speaks against DOMA, which makes it a federal issue.

This is the same as with polygamy. There is no federal law against polygamy, though at present it is against the law in all fifty states. Since, these two situations have followed similar courses state by state. One moving from nonrecognition to illegality and the other charting a course, since the Kennedy decision in Reynolds regarding the legality of homosexual acts, from nonrecogition toward legal recognition at in the various states.

Or rather, they have followed opposite tracks.

Think back to Loving v. Virginia. It was not necessary to ask whether Kentucky's age of marriage was constitutional, only whether the ban on interracial marriages was.

That is because there was no question of the common law definition of marrage, but whether marrage as previously defined could be denighed to certain individuals that met that definition. This left the common law definition of marrage unchallenged or only challenged with regard to race. However, sexual orientation speaks to a core premise of marrage, ie sexual relations. Therefore, as all races were considered in the prior case, all sexual relationships will no doubt be considered in this case.

No, the cases are almost identical. Neither changes the definition, scope or nature of marriage. Both deal only with what couples may enter into it. And in both cases, any court that considers the question will rule only on the question before it; that's how courts work.

btw, before trying to explain a ruling, it might help you to read it or at least the summary in wiki.

I did read summaries of the rulings as well as those regarding the Reynolds ruling, and those regarding polygamy.

Your posts do not reflect that reading.

Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

Marriage is an agreement to enter into a status of kinship, or family, including the legal recognition of that status. This is consistent across all cultures that recognize the institution. The Loving allowed black people and white people to join into one family, a notion that was seen as abhorrent at the time.

[Autodidact]

Let's look at what some courts who have considered the question have to say on the issues you raise, bluethread.

First, with respect to the purposes of marriage:

The Iowa court in Varnum v. Brien found that, in order to determine whether the parties are similarly situated, it was necessary to determine the purpose of the marriage laws.

The court found that these laws “are rooted in the
necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental
relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.�... is “ ‘a partnership to which both partners bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts’ . These laws also serve to recognize the status of the parties’ committed relationship. “ ‘the marriage state is not one entered into for the purpose of labor and support alone,’ � but also includes “ ‘the comfort and happiness of the parties to the marriage contract’ � ......marriage
changes the parties’ “legal and social status�).

Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage
laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to
heterosexual persons. Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships,
many raising families, just like heterosexual couples. Moreover, official
recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for
heterosexual couples. Society benefits, for example, from providing samesex
couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the
power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it
does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.

Baker v. State of Vermont

to the extent that the State's purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to legitimize children and provide for their
security, the statutes plainly exclude many same-sex couples who are no different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives. If anything, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that theState argues the marriage laws are designed to secure against. In short, the marital exclusion treats persons who are similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently...Considered in light of the extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes of the law -- protecting children and "furthering the link between procreation and child rearing" -- the exclusion falls substantially short of this standard.

Goodrich v Department of Public Health
"Marriage is a vital social institution," wrote Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall for the majority of the Justices. "The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and mutual support; it brings stability to our society...
"it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of marriage."

In every highest court that has considered the question, the purposes of marriage have found to be furthered by permitting same-sex couples to participate in it.

[bluethread]

This is the same as with polygamy. There is no federal law against polygamy, though at present it is against the law in all fifty states. Since, these two situations have followed similar courses state by state. One moving from nonrecognition to illegality and the other charting a course, since the Kennedy decision in Reynolds regarding the legality of homosexual acts, from nonrecogition toward legal recognition at in the various states.

Or rather, they have followed opposite tracks.

Opposite effect, but same methodology, ie gradually changing state laws rather than creating a federal percident or mandate.

Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

Marriage is an agreement to enter into a status of kinship, or family, including the legal recognition of that status. This is consistent across all cultures that recognize the institution.

That is not how it is stated in the findings of fact, but close enough. However, regarding your statement that this is a consistant definition, though that is generally true, it has also been consistant across all cultures, that I am aware of, that this does not apply to homosexual relationships. In fact, it appears that prior to the late 1800's governments were not in the habit of recognizing marrage at all except as it was an act of the state, ie royalty. It was simply a civil/religous matter between two individuals.

The Loving allowed black people and white people to join into one family, a notion that was seen as abhorrent at the time.

The Loving case differs from the Perry case in that the former involves the defense against a criminal charge in one state based on the recogniton of a marrage in another jurisdiction, ie DC. This speaks not just of race but of multijuridictional conflict. The Perry case involves plantiffs suing for redress upon the reversal of a state statute on which the plantiffs had previously received recognition. If, as you say, decisions only speak to the issues of the particular case, then the Loving decision, due to it's multijurisdictional nature, created a federal precident, while Perry deals only with a conflict within a specific jurisdiction. This is one of the reasons why those who prefer to literally make a federal issue out of this, did not want this to be the test case. Therefore, the two cases are not identical either in inception or in the effect on the scope of the ruling. Regarding the equating of race to sexual orientation, this is highly contested among civil rights activists and the reason why other sexually related issues have been thrown into the mix and may be examined on appeal, as in the Reynolds case.

[Autodidact]

Opposite effect, but same methodology, ie gradually changing state laws rather than creating a federal percident or mandate.

Yes, did you have any sort of a point here?

Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

Marriage is an agreement to enter into a status of kinship, or family, including the legal recognition of that status. This is consistent across all cultures that recognize the institution.

That is not how it is stated in the findings of fact,

What findings of fact?

but close enough. However, regarding your statement that this is a consistant definition, though that is generally true, it has also been consistant across all cultures, that I am aware of, that this does not apply to homosexual relationships.

First, you didn't ask who was allowed to participate, but the definition of marriage. Second, no, this is not the case. For example, Roman law outlawed such marriages in 342 C.E., indicating that such unions must have been recognized in pre-Christian Rome.

In fact, it appears that prior to the late 1800's governments were not in the habit of recognizing marrage at all except as it was an act of the state, ie royalty. It was simply a civil/religous matter between two individuals.

Again, a point?

The Loving allowed black people and white people to join into one family, a notion that was seen as abhorrent at the time.

The Loving case differs from the Perry case in that the former involves the defense against a criminal charge in one state based on the recogniton of a marrage in another jurisdiction, ie DC. This speaks not just of race but of multijuridictional conflict. The Perry case involves plantiffs suing for redress upon the reversal of a state statute on which the plantiffs had previously received recognition. If, as you say, decisions only speak to the issues of the particular case, then the Loving decision, due to it's multijurisdictional nature, created a federal precident, while Perry deals only with a conflict within a specific jurisdiction. This is one of the reasons why those who prefer to literally make a federal issue out of this, did not want this to be the test case. Therefore, the two cases are not identical either in inception or in the effect on the scope of the ruling. Regarding the equating of race to sexual orientation, this is highly contested among civil rights activists and the reason why other sexually related issues have been thrown into the mix and may be examined on appeal, as in the Reynolds case.

The cases are similar, with differences. The interstate issue is not a significant difference between them. It is not necessary to equate race and sexual orientation. The most significant similarity is that both cases deal with the right to marry, which is a fundamental right. For that reason, both cases will be subject to strict scrutiny, which is almost impossible to overcome.

Again, I note that every state supreme court that has considered the issue has struck down an anti-same-sex marriage provision.

Now, do you have either a position on the subject of the thread, or an argument related to it?

[bluethread]

Opposite effect, but same methodology, ie gradually changing state laws rather than creating a federal percident or mandate.

Yes, did you have any sort of a point here?

Just showing how a previously accepted, in fact ignored in the case of polygamy, marital status can expand or contract based on the political whim of the various states. That is the issue on point. Will this continue to be a state issue, ie. what the state giveth the state can taketh away? Or, like with Loving, will a multijuristictional conflict result in a federal judgement binding all states? I guess we shall see.

Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

Marriage is an agreement to enter into a status of kinship, or family, including the legal recognition of that status. This is consistent across all cultures that recognize the institution.

That is not how it is stated in the findings of fact,

What findings of fact?

The findings of fact in the Perry case. No big deal, just saying.

but close enough. However, regarding your statement that this is a consistant definition, though that is generally true, it has also been consistant across all cultures, that I am aware of, that this does not apply to homosexual relationships.

First, you didn't ask who was allowed to participate, but the definition of marriage. Second, no, this is not the case. For example, Roman law outlawed such marriages in 342 C.E., indicating that such unions must have been recognized in pre-Christian Rome.

Not necessarily, the state could have been indifferent prior to that point.

In fact, it appears that prior to the late 1800's governments were not in the habit of recognizing marrage at all except as it was an act of the state, ie royalty. It was simply a civil/religous matter between two individuals.

Again, a point?

Well, it again goes to governmental indifference to marrage, historically.

The Loving case differs from the Perry case in that the former involves the defense against a criminal charge in one state based on the recogniton of a marrage in another jurisdiction, ie DC. This speaks not just of race but of multijuridictional conflict. The Perry case involves plantiffs suing for redress upon the reversal of a state statute on which the plantiffs had previously received recognition. If, as you say, decisions only speak to the issues of the particular case, then the Loving decision, due to it's multijurisdictional nature, created a federal precident, while Perry deals only with a conflict within a specific jurisdiction. This is one of the reasons why those who prefer to literally make a federal issue out of this, did not want this to be the test case. Therefore, the two cases are not identical either in inception or in the effect on the scope of the ruling. Regarding the equating of race to sexual orientation, this is highly contested among civil rights activists and the reason why other sexually related issues have been thrown into the mix and may be examined on appeal, as in the Reynolds case.

The cases are similar, with differences. The interstate issue is not a significant difference between them. It is not necessary to equate race and sexual orientation. The most significant similarity is that both cases deal with the right to marry, which is a fundamental right. For that reason, both cases will be subject to strict scrutiny, which is almost impossible to overcome.

Well, I guess we will see what is or is not significant when arguments are made and opinions are published at the US Supreme Court.

Again, I note that every state supreme court that has considered the issue has struck down an anti-same-sex marriage provision.

Have they also struck down the marrage laws in the states where there is no recogniton of homosexual marrage?

Now, do you have either a position on the subject of the thread, or an argument related to it?

Must one have a definitive position on the subject of this thread? I believe I have presented certain arguments, primarily with regard to the value of thouroughly examining the subject of this thread. It is peculiar how you appear to take anything short of full agreement with your views as somehow hostile and lines of inquiry you do not wish to follow as somehow not on topic. Personally, I am not in the habit dismissing the views of others. That is why I have responded to each line of reasoning you have presented, even though I would have prefered to examine the underlying issues. Regardless, your approach has forced me to do more research to understand more fully the positions on both sides of the issue. For that, I am grateful.

[Autodidact]

[/quote] Yes, did you have any sort of a point here?[/quote]

Just showing how a previously accepted, in fact ignored in the case of polygamy, marital status can expand or contract based on the political whim of the various states.

Yes, as long as it doesn't violate the constitution, it's up to the states.

That is the issue on point. Will this continue to be a state issue, ie. what the state giveth the state can taketh away? Or, like with Loving, will a multijuristictional conflict result in a federal judgement binding all states? I guess we shall see.

No, it doesn't require a conflict between jurisidictions. Every state that has decided the matter has come to the same conclusion, but it will probably go to the Supreme Court anyway.

Can you tell me, what the consistant definition, scope or nature of marriage has been through all of these cases given these cases do not change that?

Marriage is an agreement to enter into a status of kinship, or family, including the legal recognition of that status. This is consistent across all cultures that recognize the institution.

That is not how it is stated in the findings of fact,

What findings of fact? [/quote]

The findings of fact in the Perry case. No big deal, just saying.

but close enough. However, regarding your statement that this is a consistant definition, though that is generally true, it has also been consistant across all cultures, that I am aware of, that this does not apply to homosexual relationships.

First, you didn't ask who was allowed to participate, but the definition of marriage. Second, no, this is not the case. For example, Roman law outlawed such marriages in 342 C.E., indicating that such unions must have been recognized in pre-Christian Rome.

Not necessarily, the state could have been indifferent prior to that point.

The statute specifically prescribes penalties for those married under the old law.

In fact, it appears that prior to the late 1800's governments were not in the habit of recognizing marrage at all except as it was an act of the state, ie royalty. It was simply a civil/religous matter between two individuals.

Again, a point?[/quote]

Well, it again goes to governmental indifference to marrage, historically.

And?

The Loving case differs from the Perry case in that the former involves the defense against a criminal charge in one state based on the recogniton of a marrage in another jurisdiction, ie DC. This speaks not just of race but of multijuridictional conflict. The Perry case involves plantiffs suing for redress upon the reversal of a state statute on which the plantiffs had previously received recognition. If, as you say, decisions only speak to the issues of the particular case, then the Loving decision, due to it's multijurisdictional nature, created a federal precident, while Perry deals only with a conflict within a specific jurisdiction. This is one of the reasons why those who prefer to literally make a federal issue out of this, did not want this to be the test case. Therefore, the two cases are not identical either in inception or in the effect on the scope of the ruling. Regarding the equating of race to sexual orientation, this is highly contested among civil rights activists and the reason why other sexually related issues have been thrown into the mix and may be examined on appeal, as in the Reynolds case.

The cases are similar, with differences. The interstate issue is not a significant difference between them. It is not necessary to equate race and sexual orientation. The most significant similarity is that both cases deal with the right to marry, which is a fundamental right. For that reason, both cases will be subject to strict scrutiny, which is almost impossible to overcome.[/quote]

Well, I guess we will see what is or is not significant when arguments are made and opinions are published at the US Supreme Court.

Again, I note that every state supreme court that has considered the issue has struck down an anti-same-sex marriage provision.

Have they also struck down the marrage laws in the states where there is no recogniton of homosexual marrage?

Yes, when such challenges have come before them. Iowa, Hawaii, Vermont, Connecticutt.

Now, do you have either a position on the subject of the thread, or an argument related to it?

Must one have a definitive position on the subject of this thread? I believe I have presented certain arguments, primarily with regard to the value of thouroughly examining the subject of this thread. It is peculiar how you appear to take anything short of full agreement with your views as somehow hostile and lines of inquiry you do not wish to follow as somehow not on topic. Personally, I am not in the habit dismissing the views of others. That is why I have responded to each line of reasoning you have presented, even though I would have prefered to examine the underlying issues. Regardless, your approach has forced me to do more research to understand more fully the positions on both sides of the issue. For that, I am grateful.

Kind of hard to have an argument without a position. Just saying.