Volitional Non-contingent Reality?

[EduChris]

Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?

If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.

For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box. There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:

1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy

I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

[Bust Nak]

And similarly, we have no way of knowing whether chance/necessity exists.

So what's wrong with thinking all three are at work as that's what our senses are telling us?

The Matrix is akin to the "rocks and fields are illusions" scenario, because in that movie your own internal powers of observation seemingly remain intact even though the external world now presents a conundrum. On the other hand, if all of your observational tools were faulty, you would not be able to tell which was the real illusion. Are you actually a battery for machines, or is your perception that you are a battery the illusion? Without any trustworthy powers of observation, how would you ever learn which was the real illusion?

If someone tries to convince me that I am living in a matrix, but don't have the pills to prove his point, then obviously I would ignore him. But if I had taken the pills and found two realities, I would pick one and stick to it, trying to work out which reality is "realer" lies solipsism.

[EduChris]

And similarly, we have no way of knowing whether chance/necessity exists.

So what's wrong with thinking all three are at work as that's what our senses are telling us?

Nothing at all is wrong with that approach. But if all three are at work, then volition is at work, and rational people will seek an epistemically justified explanation for it. This thread proposes that if volition is present in our universe, then theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation for it.

...if I had taken the pills and found two realities, I would pick one and stick to it, trying to work out which reality is "realer"...

Herein lies the human condition. But in my view, the "problem of knowing" is more acute under non-theism than with theism.

[Bust Nak]

Nothing at all is wrong with that approach. But if all three are at work, then volition is at work, and rational people will seek an epistemically justified explanation for it. This thread proposes that if volition is present in our universe, then theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation for it.

Ok, and if I am reading you right, you are saying chance and necessity can be reduced to volition (i.e. that some rock in a field I talked about can well be placed there) but it isn't clear if volition could be reduced to chance and necessity; hence
theism is the best explanation. Is that what you are arguing for?

Herein lies the human condition. But in my view, the "problem of knowing" is more acute under non-theism than with theism.

Because theists already believe they are living in a matrix and are waiting for the "real" reality (re afterlife)?

[EduChris]

...if I am reading you right, you are saying chance and necessity can be reduced to volition (i.e. that some rock in a field I talked about can well be placed there) but it isn't clear if volition could be reduced to chance and necessity; hence theism is the best explanation. Is that what you are arguing for?...

When I point out that "chance" and "necessity" might--in actuality, and for all we know--be fully explained by volition, I am not claiming that this is in fact the case or even likely to be the case. Rather, I am countering the (rather common) non-theistic attempt to reduce volition down to some admixture of chance and necessity. My point is that the non-theist is not entitled to insist that chance & necessity represent the only two causal mechanisms which need no further explanation; indeed, to make such claim (without adequate evidence or argument) is to beg the question, to put the cart before the horse. We truly do not know that chance & necessity exist at all--although it is quite reasonable to operate on the initial assumption that they, along with volition, do exist.

That said, I also want to clarify what I mean by "chance." Sometimes when something happens--say, the movement of some sub-atomic particle--we explain it in terms of "chance" or "randomness." Strictly speaking, this is an admission that we lack a full explanation. If the movement of the particle in reality had been fully caused by necessity (or perhaps volition) then we are objectively wrong in attributing the movement to "chance." In other words, when we attribute anything to "chance," either we are objectively wrong (in which case "chance" is simply a euphemism for our ignorance of the true cause) or else there literally is no explanation at all (in which case it would be equally true to say, "Poof! It just happened!").

Similarly, we need to clarify what we mean by "necessity." Strictly speaking, attributing something to "necessity" means that it could not possibly have been otherwise. The rules of logic and mathematics seem to be "necessary"; that is, we cannot comprehend how (A) and (NOT A) could ever be true in the same way and in the same sense and at the same time. We also cannot comprehend how 1 + 1 can add up to anything other than 2. We might be wrong about this--perhaps there is some superset of logic and mathematics which is beyond the limit of our human intellectual capacity--but despite that qualification, we seem to have no other option than to think of logic and mathematics as "necessary." We also have definitional "necessity" wherein there cannot be "married bachelors" because bachelors are necessarily, by definition, unmarried. The remaining sort of "necessity" is reserved for observational regularities--the so-called "laws" of physics. Strictly speaking, these "laws" may not be objectively "necessary"; for all we know, the laws of physics could all change tomorrow. But again, we don't really seem to have the option of engaging in such speculation--we must assume at least some measure of regularity within our universe, just as we must assume that at least some of our memories are at least partially accurate and true.

Herein lies the human condition. But in my view, the "problem of knowing" is more acute under non-theism than with theism.

Because theists already believe they are living in a matrix and are waiting for the "real" reality (re afterlife)?

If there is some volition behind our universe and our selves, then there is at least a chance that our inner mental thought life actually means something. By contrast, in a non-theistic world, our inner mental thought life is just the froth on the waves of a reality that cares nothing about our thoughts and beliefs; in this situation, behavior--not thoughts--are the only criteria for anything.

[Bust Nak]

I am countering the (rather common) non-theistic attempt to reduce volition down to some admixture of chance and necessity. My point is that the non-theist is not entitled to insist that chance & necessity represent the only two causal mechanisms which need no further explanation;

Non-theist insist on that? I think we are just saying we think we can reduce volition to chance and necessity, and is currently in the process of showing that via studying the brain. If one day we do unlock the secret of the brain, would that change your position?

But for other phenomenon that scientist have succeed in providing the chance and necessity explaination for, then why put volition under that? I am thinking of theistic evolution here.

That said, I also want to clarify what I mean by "chance." Sometimes when something happens--say, the movement of some sub-atomic particle--we explain it in terms of "chance" or "randomness." Strictly speaking, this is an admission that we lack a full explanation.

I think the lastest consensus is that there is genuine randomness, re uncertainty principle.

If there is some volition behind our universe and our selves, then there is at least a chance that our inner mental thought life actually means something. By contrast, in a non-theistic world, our inner mental thought life is just the froth on the waves of a reality that cares nothing about our thoughts and beliefs; in this situation, behavior--not thoughts--are the only criteria for anything.

Objectively speaking, sure, but isn't this just meaningless life vs find your own purpose debate?

[EduChris]

I am countering the (rather common) non-theistic attempt to reduce volition down to some admixture of chance and necessity. My point is that the non-theist is not entitled to insist that chance & necessity represent the only two causal mechanisms which need no further explanation;

Non-theist insist on that?...

The point of this thread is that non-theism, to be coherent and rational, must either demonstrate that volition does not exist, or else provide some epistemically justified explanation as to how volition can be outside of the black box if it is not also inside the box. And of course if volition is inside the box, then theism is true.

...I think we are just saying we think we can reduce volition to chance and necessity, and is currently in the process of showing that via studying the brain. If one day we do unlock the secret of the brain, would that change your position?...

It is impossible, even in principle, to demonstrate that volition does not exist, given that we cannot prove that chance & necessity do exist. We certainly have prima facie reason to suppose that all three exist--but this fact is compatible with theism, and incompatible with non-theism (at least this is my claim on this thread).

Moreover, if volition does not exist, then we are objects only, rather than subjects. But only a subject can evaluate an argument and make a claim; thus, if the non-theist must act as a subject while in the very process of denying her own subjectivity, it would seem that her claim is untenable right out of the gate. Given all of these reasons, it seems absolutely impossible, even in principle, that volition can be proven false.

...But for other phenomenon that scientist have succeed in providing the chance and necessity explaination for, then why put volition under that? I am thinking of theistic evolution here....

There are problems with evolutionary theory, but that doesn't stop scientists from appealing to it due to the simple fact that there is at present no widely acknowledged competing scientific theory. But even if evolutionary theory were known to be correct, we would still need to explain why this universe was set up with the particular sort of physical properties and regularities ("laws") so as to allow for evolution to proceed. The specificity of this universe requires some epistemically justified explanation--and if volition is in fact part of this universe, then the explanation can only be theism (or so I claim, and obviously I'm expecting some challenges here).

...I think the lastest consensus is that there is genuine randomness, re uncertainty principle...

We assume it to be true, but I don't believe any scientist would argue that she knows this for an absolute fact. Any claim that genuine chance actually exists would involve the logical fallacy of "appeal to ignorance." We have prima facie reason to suppose that chance exists, but it can't serve as an epistemically justified explanation--any more than "Poof! It just happened!" can serve as an epistemically justified explanation.

...isn't this just meaningless life vs find your own purpose debate?

If we are the product of chance and necessity, then we have no good reason to suppose that the convictions of our own minds are any more valid or true than the convictions of a monkey's mind, or an ant's mind. On the other hand, if volition is involved, then the convictions of our minds might possibly mean something. Either way, we will carry on with our life as we see fit. But getting back to the main point of this thread, this "carrying on with our life as we see fit" seems to inevitably involve a measure of volition on our part. That being the case, theism seems to provide the best and only epistemically justified explanation for our universe and our selves.

[Jax Agnesson]

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

Reading through this thread, I see that, despite your valiant repeated efforts, no-one has yet agreed to address this question. Let me have a go at it.
The straight answer is 'yes of course', since the answer is designed into the question, given your definitions of volition and theism.
(quote) . . .genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity.
(quote) theism—volitional non-contingent reality.
Asking whether theism as defined here is the best epistemic explanation for the existence of volition as defined here amounts to asking 'Could a kind of volition not strictly reducible to chance and necessity exist in a Universe in which everything is strictly reducible to chance and necessity?'
Well, duh?

[EduChris]

...Asking whether theism as defined here is the best epistemic explanation for the existence of volition as defined here amounts to asking 'Could a kind of volition not strictly reducible to chance and necessity exist in a Universe in which everything is strictly reducible to chance and necessity?' ... Well, duh?

The sort of theism which I propose (and define) corresponds to the non-contingent theistic understanding of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and even most modern forms of scholarly Hinduism. My definition does not pertain to any contingent theistic understanding such as might be found in, say, Greek or Norse mythologies.

I freely grant that the standard non-theistic arguments have relegated all forms of contingent theism obsolete, and that is why my definition makes no attempt to incorporate contingent theism.

So, ultimately the question of God--as "God" is understood by today's major world theisms--boils down to who and what we are as persons. You have correctly grasped the logic of my argument--if everything boils down to chance and necessity, then volition cannot be a causal mechanism in its own right; on the other hand, if volition is a causal mechanism in its own right, then there is no epistemologically justified reason for excluding it from the black box of non-contingent reality.

Beyond that simple claim, however, I am attempting to flesh out why I accept Theopoesis' summary of the problems with secular (non-theistic) worldviews:

(1) A belief in a self-created, self-actualized individual through self-will; a belief in scientific causal determinism and behaviorism that eliminate the free will which makes self-actualization possible.

(2) A belief in progress and the advancement of human kind; the elimination of objective standards of truth and morality with which to measure progress.

(3) A belief in the inalienable rights of the political individual; the relegation of political truths to popular conventions, thereby guaranteeing that rights are always subject to alienation.

(4) A belief in the sufficiency of human reason to master its environment apart from supernatural revelation; the historicizing of knowledge systems as a product of culture, generation, language, gender, and race, thereby making human reason a captive of its environment instead of master over it.

(5) A belief in the individual autonomously shape his or her own identity; the elimination of a transcendent anchor for identity which relegates identity to temporal relationships, dialectics, or social networks whereby identity is completely determined by the other, and ever fragmented.

(6) A belief in the liberation of sexuality from the constraints of previous moral systems to allow the best sex lives possible; the sexualization of everything through a virtual "plague of fantasies" (to use Zizek's term), whereby our own minds grow bored with the real sex we can actually get.

The list could grow. The point is, postmodernism seems, in many ways, to be modernism undermining its own project of eliminating theology and the transcendent. Christian theism can overcome all of these antinomies (and more), but I have yet to see evidence of atheism's ability to do so, and as such as a logical system and a way of life, it leads to contradiction and individual fragmentation.

The first point (in boldface) corresponds nicely to Haven's avatar: "(Question) What is the meaning of life? (Answer) Whatever you want it to be." Such a sentiment sounds nice, but given the non-theistic framework of "scientific causal determinism and behaviorism," it is difficult to find any coherence in such a claim.

Theists refuse to abandon their conviction that persons are, in at least some degree, autonomous and self-actualizing individuals. Non-theists seemingly adopt this same "working hypothesis" in their daily life, even though they refuse to endorse the only metaphysical framework which could possibly bring about such personhood.

[Jax Agnesson]

I note you haven't denied my observation that the answer is designed into your 'Question for Debate'. Given there is only one possible answer to the question, what sort of debate were you proposing?

[EduChris]

I note you haven't denied my observation that the answer is designed into your 'Question for Debate'. Given there is only one possible answer to the question, what sort of debate were you proposing?

There seems to be a pervasive notion on this forum that non-theism is the so-called "default postion" in any debate. Most non-theists here presuppose that their position is the only rational starting point; therefore, if the theist cannot overcome some unspecified "burden of proof," non-theism automatically "wins" any debate by default, even if the non-theist presents no argument at all in defense of non-theism. This thread (and several others similar ones that I have advanced previously) is designed to even the odds. To me, there is no "default" position,* and consequently arguments need to be advanced on both sides, so that there can be a true comparison and contrast of the alternatives.

Beyond that, I would be interested in how someone might try to define volition so as to avoid the force of the argument (which, in its present form, leads directly and obviously to theism).


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* Actually, to me theism is the default position for a variety of reasons; but since the notion of a "default position" seems to foster laziness, I would rather that each side be required to advance actual arguments as opposed to "winning" the debate simply sitting on their presumed laurels.