Volitional Non-contingent Reality?

[EduChris]

Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?

If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.

For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box. There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:

1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy

I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

[EduChris]

...the mind is the result of the brain...

I think there are credible reasons to believe that "emergence" can pertain, such that the total is greater than the sum of the individual parts. The real question is, does the mind "go meta," so that the non-material can exert influence on the physical?

...I don't see why V can't just an illusion and is reducable to the others.

For me, I could more easily be convinced that my own mind is real, and that everything other than my mind is an illusion.

[Jax Agnesson]

As I see it there are some things that are impervious to known volitional activity--we can't will ourselves to be unmarried bachelors; we can't will that a random event will play itself out in some specified non-random fashion; we cannot will that A ≠ A.

ok. Total agreement!

If some state of affairs X always entails some other state of affairs Y, and if this relation is impervious to all known forms of volitional activity, then we speak of "necessity."

Similarly, if some state of affairs X sometimes leads to Y1, and sometimes to Y2, ..., and sometimes to Yn, and if there is no established correlation between the outcome and any known volitional activity, then we speak of "chance" or "probability."

We appear to be on the same page here with regard to chance and necessity; they are words we use to describe our understanding of relationships between states or events. But, except in some very special circumstances, the words used to describe something do not themselves have any effect on the thing they are describing.
And then your speak of Volition as something quite different in kind; ISTM you regard volition as an objectively existing force that may or may not intervene between events.

But there are also some states of affairs X where a relationship exists between volitional activity and the result.

Here you seem to include both the act of volition and its outcome in a single state of affairs X, and you speak of a relationship between them, clearly referring to the act of volition and its result as two separate elements within this single 'state of affairs'.

I recognise that it is perfectly legitimate to regard any number of events, or any number of states, having some thematic connection, as elements in a single 'event', or in a single 'state', simply by adopting a wide frame of reference..
And I believe the reverse is also true.
Throughout this thread, I have been referring to the act of volition as state (or event) X, and the outcome as state (or event) Y, and thus far you appear to have accepted this distinction between act and outcome.. (At least, you have not queried it.)
I propose to continue considering the act of volition and its outcome as two separate states, or events unless you can show some reason why this is not legitimate.

[Bust Nak]

The real question is, does the mind "go meta," so that the non-material can exert influence on the physical?

I guess such a question cannot be answered. Even if we understand the workings of the brain to download ones mind to an artifical brain, that still doesn't mean there isn't a disembodied soul that works with a mind.

For me, I could more easily be convinced that my own mind is real, and that everything other than my mind is an illusion.

Even if free will is an illusion, I wouldn't think my mind is any less real. I think therefore I am, even if the process of thinking is purely mechanical. Put it another way, if we can make strong AI, I would treat these artifical construct as I would a person.

[EduChris]

...I propose to continue considering the act of volition and its outcome as two separate states, or events unless you can show some reason why this is not legitimate.

I propose that "causal action" or "causal force" is what causes events. This causal action may be triggered in various ways.

1) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered automatically to produce state of affairs Y every time, without fail. Here we have "necessity."

2) Given some state of affairs X, casual action may be triggered automatically to produce either Y1, Y2, ..., or Yn. If there is no detectable correlation between the initial state and the resulting state, we speak of "chance."

3) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered in a controlled or discretionary fashion, such that variously strong or weak correlations can be drawn between the initial and the resulting state. Here we have "volition."

In other words, we need speak of only one causal force, and we can discern three different ways in which this causal force may be triggered. "Necessity" constitues one end of the continuum, "chance" constitutes the other end of the spectrum, and "volition" pertains to everything in between the two poles.

Getting back to my original specifications regarding the black box, in which there is no arbitrary limitation in causal efficacy, we may assume initially that the black box can trigger causal force according to any of the three methods listed above.

[EduChris]

...if we can make strong AI, I would treat these artifical construct as I would a person.

Perhaps, but then the question becomes, "Would we still treat people the same way, if we knew we were all competely equivalent to artificial constructs?"

[Jax Agnesson]

...I propose to continue considering the act of volition and its outcome as two separate states, or events unless you can show some reason why this is not legitimate.

I propose that "causal action" or "causal force" is what causes events. This causal action may be triggered in various ways.

1) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered automatically to produce state of affairs Y every time, without fail. Here we have "necessity."

2) Given some state of affairs X, casual action may be triggered automatically to produce either Y1, Y2, ..., or Yn. If there is no detectable correlation between the initial state and the resulting state, we speak of "chance."

3) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered in a controlled or discretionary fashion, such that variously strong or weak correlations can be drawn between the initial and the resulting state. Here we have "volition."

In other words, we need speak of only one causal force, and we can discern three different ways in which this causal force may be triggered. "Necessity" constitues one end of the continuum, "chance" constitutes the other end of the spectrum, and "volition" pertains to everything in between the two poles.

Getting back to my original specifications regarding the black box, in which there is no arbitrary limitation in causal efficacy, we may assume initially that the black box can trigger causal force according to any of the three methods listed above.

Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

[EduChris]

...Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

Whether you're talking about chance, necessity, or volition, the "trigger" which releases the causal force can be thought of as logically distinct from the causal force itself.

[EduChris]

...Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

Just to clarify:

1) The "necessity trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct, though perfectly correlated.

2) The "chance trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct and completely uncorrelated.

3) The "volition trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct and more-or-less correlated.

Because the causal efficacy within the black box is not arbitrarily limited, it is therefore epistemically most privative.

[Jax Agnesson]

...Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

[Bust Nak]

Perhaps, but then the question becomes, "Would we still treat people the same way, if we knew we were all competely equivalent to artificial constructs?"

Sure, I would, since I already believe the mind is reducible to the brain.