Volitional Non-contingent Reality?

[EduChris]

Who and what are we as human beings? Specifically, do we possess any measure of genuine volition—some causal mechanism which is not strictly reducible to the causal mechanisms of chance and necessity—whereby we can, in certain cases and in some degree, take ownership and responsibility for our thoughts and behaviors by intentionally using our volition to alter some causal chain?

If we do have some measure of genuine volition, as rational beings we will attempt to find some epistemologically justified explanation for it. What is the best epistemically justified explanation for volition? I believe theism is the best and only epistemically justified explanation.

For this debate, I will define theism as the claim that the explanation for all contingencies (including our universe and our selves) ultimately derive from some non-contingent reality which involves at least some volition. Since we cannot subject this non-contingent reality to empirical testing, and since we cannot know precisely what it is, we will wrap this non-contingent reality up inside a tool of logic known as a black box. There could be anything inside this black box, but for simplicity’s sake we will start with the following minimal definition of the contents of the black box:

1) It undergirds all contingent existence
2) It is not arbitrarily limited by any physical or spatio-temporal dimensions
3) It is not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle or process information
4) It is not arbitrarily limited in causal efficacy

I believe the above definition is both simple and capable of producing any possible world. If I am correct, then there is no need (and no epistemological warrant) to postulate additional entities inside the black box.

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

[EduChris]

...Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

I'm not sure your terminology is helpful, but we can proceed along the lines you propose provided you similarly view "the act of necessity and the result of that act as two separate events" and "the act of chance and the result of that act as two separate events."

Again, in my view, "chance" and "necessity" are simply the asymptotic bookends of the full "causal force activation continuum."

[Jax Agnesson]

...Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

I'm not sure your terminology is helpful, but we can proceed along the lines you propose provided you similarly view "the act of necessity and the result of that act as two separate events" and "the act of chance and the result of that act as two separate events."

We have, I think, a broad agreement on what the phrase 'act of volition' is meant to represent for the purposes of this discussion. Approximately, it refers to the experience of willing something. This experience is a normal part of the day-to-day inner life of every conscious being, as far as we know.
'Acts of necessity' and 'acts of chance' are not things within our experience.
I can just about imagine an 'act of necessity' happening in the mind of a Being capable of committing 'acts of necessity', though you and I do not agree that any such Being exists.
As for an 'act of chance', I cannot imagine what that could be, or what sort of consciousness could experience it.

Therefore I think it reasonable to treat 'acts of volition' in a particular manner without any obligation to treat 'acts of necessity' or 'acts of chance' in the same way.

Given that you and I do not agree that 'volition' 'necessity' and 'chance' are three things of the same sort, can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

[EduChris]

...We have, I think, a broad agreement on what the phrase 'act of volition' is meant to represent for the purposes of this discussion. Approximately, it refers to the experience of willing something. This experience is a normal part of the day-to-day inner life of every conscious being, as far as we know...'Acts of necessity' and 'acts of chance' are not things within our experience...

We have the experience of weighing alternatives and assigning value to a particular (as yet unrealized) state of affairs. At a certain point, we release causal force which may or may not be sufficient to bring about our valued state of affairs. Depending on the relative intensity of value we assign, as well as the efficacy of resources at our disposal, the causal force we release may tend toward necessity (high value combined with high efficacy) or chance (minimal value and/or minimal efficacy) or something in between.

...Therefore I think it reasonable to treat 'acts of volition' in a particular manner without any obligation to treat 'acts of necessity' or 'acts of chance' in the same way...Given that you and I do not agree that 'volition' 'necessity' and 'chance' are three things of the same sort, can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

I see no reason why we should let this issue bog us down for now. Let's just note the disagreement as to whether we have a continuum of experiences which cover the spectrum of necessity, chance, and volition, and whether these experiences help us understand all three concepts well enough.

[Jax Agnesson]

I see no reason why we should let this issue bog us down for now. Let's just note the disagreement as to whether we have a continuum of experiences which cover the spectrum of necessity, chance, and volition, and whether these experiences help us understand all three concepts well enough.

The question you posed for debate was:

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?
You have suggested throughout this discussion that volition is one of exactly three members of the set of 'causal mechanisms'.

Post 4.
A causal mechanism produces effects. People have become accustomed to speaking of three causal mechanisms: chance (it just happened); necessity (it happened according to some law of nature); and volition (she intended to do it). Strictly speaking, we cannot prove that any of these three causal mechanisms isn't reducible to one or both of the others. And "chance" is really a euphemism that we use when we lack a full explanation for the precise effect we observe. Still, to the extent that these three terms represent independent causal mechanisms, any one of them might indeed operate at cross purposes with one or both of the others.

Post b19

We cannot show that "genuine chance" exists; we cannot show that "genuine necessity" exists. We must assume they exist based on indirect, external, mediated observations. "Volition" similarly cannot be proven to exist, but we can do more than simply observe it; indeed, we have direct, unmediated, universally subjective experience of it within our inner mental conscious life--which in turn forms the basis for all of our observations of what appear to be "chance" and "necessity." Thus, "volition" seems to be more epistemically fundamental than mere "chance" and "necessity."


Post 34
Bust Nak wrote:
...if I am reading you right, you are saying chance and necessity can be reduced to volition (i.e. that some rock in a field I talked about can well be placed there) but it isn't clear if volition could be reduced to chance and necessity; hence theism is the best explanation. Is that what you are arguing for?...

When I point out that "chance" and "necessity" might--in actuality, and for all we know--be fully explained by volition, I am not claiming that this is in fact the case or even likely to be the case. Rather, I am countering the (rather common) non-theistic attempt to reduce volition down to some admixture of chance and necessity. My point is that the non-theist is not entitled to insist that chance & necessity represent the only two causal mechanisms which need no further explanation; indeed, to make such claim (without adequate evidence or argument) is to beg the question, to put the cart before the horse. We truly do not know that chance & necessity exist at all--although it is quite reasonable to operate on the initial assumption that they, along with volition, do exist.

That said, I also want to clarify what I mean by "chance." Sometimes when something happens--say, the movement of some sub-atomic particle--we explain it in terms of "chance" or "randomness." Strictly speaking, this is an admission that we lack a full explanation. If the movement of the particle in reality had been fully caused by necessity (or perhaps volition) then we are objectively wrong in attributing the movement to "chance." In other words, when we attribute anything to "chance," either we are objectively wrong (in which case "chance" is simply a euphemism for our ignorance of the true cause) or else there literally is no explanation at all (in which case it would be equally true to say, "Poof! It just happened!").

Similarly, we need to clarify what we mean by "necessity." Strictly speaking, attributing something to "necessity" means that it could not possibly have been otherwise. The rules of logic and mathematics seem to be "necessary"; that is, we cannot comprehend how (A) and (NOT A) could ever be true in the same way and in the same sense and at the same time. We also cannot comprehend how 1 + 1 can add up to anything other than 2. We might be wrong about this--perhaps there is some superset of logic and mathematics which is beyond the limit of our human intellectual capacity--but despite that qualification, we seem to have no other option than to think of logic and mathematics as "necessary." We also have definitional "necessity" wherein there cannot be "married bachelors" because bachelors are necessarily, by definition, unmarried. The remaining sort of "necessity" is reserved for observational regularities--the so-called "laws" of physics. Strictly speaking, these "laws" may not be objectively "necessary"; for all we know, the laws of physics could all change tomorrow. But again, we don't really seem to have the option of engaging in such speculation--we must assume at least some measure of regularity within our universe, just as we must assume that at least some of our memories are at least partially accurate and true.


Bust Nak wrote:

EduChris wrote:
Herein lies the human condition. But in my view, the "problem of knowing" is more acute under non-theism than with theism.

Because theists already believe they are living in a matrix and are waiting for the "real" reality (re afterlife)?

If there is some volition behind our universe and our selves, then there is at least a chance that our inner mental thought life actually means something. By contrast, in a non-theistic world, our inner mental thought life is just the froth on the waves of a reality that cares nothing about our thoughts and beliefs; in this situation, behavior--not thoughts--are the only criteria for anything.

Post 40

Beyond that, I would be interested in how someone might try to define volition so as to avoid the force of the argument (which, in its present form, leads directly and obviously to theism).

Post 42

We do not know of chance & necessity existing outside our own heads. Every question or thought we have had, or do have, or will have, traverses or resides (apparently) inside our mind. Only volition and consciousness comes to us in a direct, unmediated fashion; everything else is mediated through causal chains which can be quite tentative and long, relying as they do on multiple testimonies and multiple observations and multipe blips on a computer screen and multiple conflicting interpretations and complex mathematical formulas inaccessible to all but a few people with specialized training. If I have to start throwing out causal mechanisms, volition is the last one I would throw out--because without it, I have no means of taking ownership of any thoughts or questions or interpretations regarding anything (including chance and necessity).. .. .

.. . .
If we are to ask such questions, we will certainly want to end up with an epistemically justified explanation for volition. If the causal chain which leads to our experience of volition contains even a single element of chance, then we either have an incorrect explanation (i.e., there really is some cause, but this cause is unknown to us and thereby incorrectly labeled as "chance") or else we have the "Poof! It just happened!" scenario, which circumvents the normal cause-and-effect requirements of scientific method. Either way, whenever we try to explain volition in terms of some admixture of chance & necessity, we always end up without any epistemically justified explanation for volition.. . ..

.. . .
It seems to me that there cannot, even in principle, ever be any epistemically justified explanation for volition (per the reasons given in paragraph #5, above). It appears to me that only volition can provide an epistemically justified explanation for itself--which means that it is fundamental, irreducible, and independent of chance & necessity.

Post 45

By way of preface, I will argue that volition and chance are similar in some ways, but different in other ways. Neither volition nor chance is the same as "necessity." And "chance," if it exists at all, is the objective lack of explanation, whereas "volition" is explained by value-based selectivity. . . . .

. . . .
Ontologically, I don't know whether causal mechanisms are "things" or "ideas" or "descriptions" or "relations." Whatever they are, they evidently cause particular states of affairs (and note that if causal mechanisms are non-physical ideas, then we have an example of the "non-physical" exerting causal influence on the "physical").

Epistemology seems to require the principle of cause-and-effect, and as long as cause-and-effect pertain, there must be some relationship(s) between causes and effects. By convention we refer to these relationships as "causal mechanisms."

At any rate, whatever causal mechanisms may be, we can refer to them as follows:

1) necessity (unable to have been otherwise)
2) chance (the objective lack of any explanation whatsoever)
3) volition (selectivity based on value)

We agree that chance and volition differ from necessity, which does not allow for options or selectivity. We differ in that you, in essence, seek to equate chance with volition. To reject such claim, all I have to do is show how volition and chance are different--and this is easy to do.

Let's suppose that "chance" operating on X results in state-of-affairs Y1. Let's also suppose that "volition" operating on the same X results in state-of-affairs Y2. It is impossible for Y1 to be completely equivalent to Y2, since a state of affairs with an explanation is not identical to a state of affairs without any explanation.

Therefore, volition cannot be reducible to some admixture of chance & necessity, and this holds true whether volition is a "thing" or a "relationship" or a "description" or an "idea."

Thus, all three of our causal mechanisms are conceptually independent. We have no way of knowing whether necessity or chance actually exist, or whether they actually describe any relationships at all. But we cannot deny our daily experience of value-based selectivity. And if volition is a genuine, independent causal mechanism within our universe, then we may justifiably conclude that volition also inheres within the black box of non-contingent reality.

Post 49

As I see it there are some things that are impervious to known volitional activity--we can't will ourselves to be unmarried bachelors; we can't will that a random event will play itself out in some specified non-random fashion; we cannot will that A ≠ A. If some state of affairs X always entails some other state of affairs Y, and if this relation is impervious to all known forms of volitional activity, then we speak of "necessity."

Similarly, if some state of affairs X sometimes leads to Y1, and sometimes to Y2, ..., and sometimes to Yn, and if there is no established correlation between the outcome and any known volitional activity, then we speak of "chance" or "probability."

But there are also some states of affairs X where a relationship exists between volitional activity and the result. This correlation might be strong or weak--a continuum rather than a simple binary function. A strong volitional relation tends toward necessity; a weak volitional relation tends toward chance. In such cases, we see that volition entails a physical effect which is neither necessary nor random. Here we have something entirely new: here we have an agent marshalling resources in pursuit of value; here we can speak of volition.

Post 53

I propose that "causal action" or "causal force" is what causes events. This causal action may be triggered in various ways.

1) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered automatically to produce state of affairs Y every time, without fail. Here we have "necessity."

2) Given some state of affairs X, casual action may be triggered automatically to produce either Y1, Y2, ..., or Yn. If there is no detectable correlation between the initial state and the resulting state, we speak of "chance."

3) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered in a controlled or discretionary fashion, such that variously strong or weak correlations can be drawn between the initial and the resulting state. Here we have "volition."

In other words, we need speak of only one causal force, and we can discern three different ways in which this causal force may be triggered. "Necessity" constitues one end of the continuum, "chance" constitutes the other end of the spectrum, and "volition" pertains to everything in between the two poles.

Getting back to my original specifications regarding the black box, in which there is no arbitrary limitation in causal efficacy, we may assume initially that the black box can trigger causal force according to any of the three methods listed above.

In Post 31, I wrote

Here you seem to include both the act of volition and its outcome in a single state of affairs X, and you speak of a relationship between them, clearly referring to the act of volition and its result as two separate elements within this single 'state of affairs'.

I recognise that it is perfectly legitimate to regard any number of events, or any number of states, having some thematic connection, as elements in a single 'event', or in a single 'state', simply by adopting a wide frame of reference..
And I believe the reverse is also true.
Throughout this thread, I have been referring to the act of volition as state (or event) X, and the outcome as state (or event) Y, and thus far you appear to have accepted this distinction between act and outcome.. (At least, you have not queried it.)
I propose to continue considering the act of volition and its outcome as two separate states, or events unless you can show some reason why this is not legitimate.

And in Post 53 you reponded with


I propose that "causal action" or "causal force" is what causes events. This causal action may be triggered in various ways.

1) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered automatically to produce state of affairs Y every time, without fail. Here we have "necessity."

2) Given some state of affairs X, casual action may be triggered automatically to produce either Y1, Y2, ..., or Yn. If there is no detectable correlation between the initial state and the resulting state, we speak of "chance."

3) Given some state of affairs X, causal action may be triggered in a controlled or discretionary fashion, such that variously strong or weak correlations can be drawn between the initial and the resulting state. Here we have "volition."

In other words, we need speak of only one causal force, and we can discern three different ways in which this causal force may be triggered. "Necessity" constitues one end of the continuum, "chance" constitutes the other end of the spectrum, and "volition" pertains to everything in between the two poles.

Getting back to my original specifications regarding the black box, in which there is no arbitrary limitation in causal efficacy, we may assume initially that the black box can trigger causal force according to any of the three methods listed above.

In Post 55 I wrote

Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

To which, in Post 56 your response was

Whether you're talking about chance, necessity, or volition, the "trigger" which releases the causal force can be thought of as logically distinct from the causal force itself.. Adding, in a supplementary Post 57

Just to clarify:

1) The "necessity trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct, though perfectly correlated.

2) The "chance trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct and completely uncorrelated.

3) The "volition trigger" and the resulting state of affairs are logically distinct and more-or-less correlated.

Because the causal efficacy within the black box is not arbitrarily limited, it is therefore epistemically most privative.

In Post 58 I asked again
..Can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?
And your response, in Post 60, was

I'm not sure your terminology is helpful, but we can proceed along the lines you propose provided you similarly view "the act of necessity and the result of that act as two separate events" and "the act of chance and the result of that act as two separate events."

Again, in my view, "chance" and "necessity" are simply the asymptotic bookends of the full "causal force activation continuum."


in Post 61, I gave you one last opportunity to answer

Given that you and I do not agree that 'volition' 'necessity' and 'chance' are three things of the same sort, can you show any legitimate reason why I should not consider the act of volition and the result of that act as two separate events?

To which your response, in Post 62, is

I see no reason why we should let this issue bog us down for now. Let's just note the disagreement as to whether we have a continuum of experiences which cover the spectrum of necessity, chance, and volition, and whether these experiences help us understand all three concepts well enough.





Post

[Jax Agnesson]

I see no reason why we should let this issue bog us down for now. Let's just note the disagreement as to whether we have a continuum of experiences which cover the spectrum of necessity, chance, and volition, and whether these experiences help us understand all three concepts well enough.

But there is no disagreement between us, AFAICS, about 'whether we have a continuum of experiences which cover the spectrum of necessity, chance, and volition'. I certainly acknowledge the existence of such a continuum of internal experiences.
Here is a list of the things I think we are agreed about:
We may think Y followed X because it was inevitable.
We may think Y followed X coincidentally.
We may think Y followed X through a mixture or blend of chance and necessity.
We may think Y happened only because we willed it to happen.
We may think our willing Y had some partial effect on the probability of Y happening.
We may think Y would have happened anyway, even if we had not been 'willing' it.
We may have all sorts of feelings, estimations, theories, about the reasons why Y happened. And we may even be correct sometimes.

If there is anything in this list you don't agree about, please specify.

If we have a disagreement on this point, it is on the question of the degree to which these experiences correspond to anything existing outside our own heads.

But OK, let's see what happens if we set aside any 'disagreement' regarding the continuum of our ideas about cause and effect.

The question you posed for debate (in your OP) was:

Question for debate: if some genuine volition exists within our universe, does theism—volitional non-contingent reality as defined above—provide the best epistemically justified explanation?

In my first response, I pointed out that this question, with the definitions you provided, allows only one possible answer, and therefore provides no scope for debate.
Your response, (post 40) more or less accepts this point, and poses another question:

Beyond that, I would be interested in how someone might try to define volition so as to avoid the force of the argument. . . .

Accepting this challenge, my strategy has been to show that, of the three 'causal mechanisms' you define, two are descriptions of events which might happen independent of consciousness, and the third is an event that happens only within consciousness.
Within this context; if an 'act of volition' takes place inside the mind of some conscious being, and some event happens outside that mind that the conscious being suspects may be completely or partially caused said 'act of volition', then by your own definitions, the 'act of volition' event X, and the ensuing possibly-related event Y, must be linked by a 'causal mechanism'.
What could such a 'mechanism' be?

[EduChris]

...If there is anything in this list you don't agree about, please specify...

Things happen because "causal force" effects a change from state X to state Y. It isn't so much a question of what causes the change; instead, it's a question of, "Why that change, instead of some other change?"

...of the three 'causal mechanisms' you define, two are descriptions of events which might happen independent of consciousness, and the third is an event that happens only within consciousness...

Targeted selectivity toward a specific outcome may be seen in computers, for example, although in such cases there is a conscious mind that designed the conditional logic.

...if an 'act of volition' takes place inside the mind of some conscious being, and some event happens outside that mind that the conscious being suspects may be completely or partially caused said 'act of volition', then by your own definitions, the 'act of volition' event X, and the ensuing possibly-related event Y, must be linked by a 'causal mechanism'.
What could such a 'mechanism' be?

Regardless of chance, necessity, or volition, change occurs because there is causal force being applied. The only question is, "Why was causal force applied toward that end, as opposed to some other end?" Given necessity, the answer is because that's the way the causal force is always applied in that situation. Given chance, the answer is that there is no answer. And given volition, the answer is that within the boundaries of absolute necessity and unqualified chance, there lies a continuum of volitional possibility, such that an agent may direct causal force toward the selection of value.

[Jax Agnesson]

...If there is anything in this list you don't agree about, please specify...

Things happen because "causal force" effects a change from state X to state Y. It isn't so much a question of what causes the change; instead, it's a question of, "Why that change, instead of some other change?"

Well, is there anything in the list you disagree with?
I looked up "causal force" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and found no matches for that exact phrase.
I googled it, and found the term used in some religious discussions, but we are not presupposing God in this discussion, so I thought you must mean something else, when you refer to "causal forces". Is it possible to conceive of these 'causal forces' acting independent of any consciousness?
Is electromagnetic force (voltage) a causal force? Or air pressure? Or gravity?

...of the three 'causal mechanisms' you define, two are descriptions of events which might happen independent of consciousness, and the third is an event that happens only within consciousness...

Targeted selectivity toward a specific outcome may be seen in computers, for example, although in such cases there is a conscious mind that designed the conditional logic.

Do bees exhibit 'targeted selectivity'?

...if an 'act of volition' takes place inside the mind of some conscious being, and some event happens outside that mind that the conscious being suspects may be completely or partially caused said 'act of volition', then by your own definitions, the 'act of volition' event X, and the ensuing possibly-related event Y, must be linked by a 'causal mechanism'.
What could such a 'mechanism' be?

Regardless of chance, necessity, or volition, change occurs because there is causal force being applied.

Is this 'causal force' something that exists separate from the 'causal mechanisms' that you have been proposing up to now? If so, how is it related to them?

The only question is, "Why was causal force applied toward that end, as opposed to some other end?"

If this is the only question, then the way you are using 'ends' here, and the way you speak of the 'causal force' 'being applied', you seem to be presupposing a conscious and purposive mind behind all change in the world. Was that what you intended?

[EduChris]

... is there anything in the list you disagree with?...

I don't disagree with your list. I simply wanted to clarify that neither "chance" nor "necessity" nor "volition" represent the actual forces which cause change; instead, they represent directional or selective application of causal force(s).

...when you refer to "causal forces". Is it possible to conceive of these 'causal forces' acting independent of any consciousness?...

We don't know; but obviously we'd like to find out.

...Is electromagnetic force (voltage) a causal force? Or air pressure? Or gravity?...

Yes, so it seems.

...Do bees exhibit 'targeted selectivity'?...

Yes, so it seems.

...Is this 'causal force' something that exists separate from the 'causal mechanisms' that you have been proposing up to now? If so, how is it related to them?...

What I had been referencing as "causal mechanisms" are actually "causal selection or direction mechanisms." It's like saying, "President Obama raised taxes on everyone," when in fact all the President did was sign a piece of paper. The actual taxes were then collected via whatever mechanism(s) taxes are usually collected.

...The only question is, "Why was causal force applied toward that end, as opposed to some other end?"

If this is the only question, then the way you are using 'ends' here, and the way you speak of the 'causal force' 'being applied', you seem to be presupposing a conscious and purposive mind behind all change in the world. Was that what you intended?

The point is to level the playing field. I don't need to describe precisely how it is that "volition" brings about change, any more than you need to describe precisly how it is that "necessity" or "chance" bring about change. In all three cases, normal causal forces (gravity? magnetism? pressure?) bring about the change--as directed by the applicable causal selection mechanism.

[Jax Agnesson]

... is there anything in the list you disagree with?...

I don't disagree with your list.

Good!
From that list:
"We may think Y happened only because we willed it to happen.
We may think our willing Y had some partial effect on the probability of Y happening.
We may think Y would have happened anyway, even if we had not been 'willing' it. "
Do you agree that, if you believe that Y happened because you willed it, you might possibly be wrong about that?

I simply wanted to clarify that neither "chance" nor "necessity" nor "volition" represent the actual forces which cause change; instead, they represent directional or selective application of causal force(s).

Does this mean you agree with me that 'chance' necessity' and 'volition' are merely words expressing our ideas about the causal connection, (or lack thereof) between any two states or events? Yet more agreement??

...when you refer to "causal forces". Is it possible to conceive of these 'causal forces' acting independent of any consciousness?...

We don't know; but obviously we'd like to find out.

And how do we go about finding out?
Can I suggest science might help?

...Is electromagnetic force (voltage) a causal force? Or air pressure? Or gravity?...

Yes, so it seems.

...Do bees exhibit 'targeted selectivity'?...

Yes, so it seems.

...Is this 'causal force' something that exists separate from the 'causal mechanisms' that you have been proposing up to now? If so, how is it related to them?...

What I had been referencing as "causal mechanisms" are actually "causal selection or direction mechanisms." It's like saying, "President Obama raised taxes on everyone," when in fact all the President did was sign a piece of paper. The actual taxes were then collected via whatever mechanism(s) taxes are usually collected.

...The only question is, "Why was causal force applied toward that end, as opposed to some other end?"

If this is the only question, then the way you are using 'ends' here, and the way you speak of the 'causal force' 'being applied', you seem to be presupposing a conscious and purposive mind behind all change in the world. Was that what you intended?

The point is to level the playing field. I don't need to describe precisely how it is that "volition" brings about change, any more than you need to describe precisely how it is that "necessity" or "chance" bring about change.

But I don't believe that chance or neccesity can bring about change. You claimed that chance necessity and volition were three 'causal mechanisms'. I have argued throughout that there is a serious difference between 'volition' and the other two.
I have consistently claimed that 'chance' and 'necessity' are words describing our theories about events that could possibly occur in a world that contained no consciousness at all; and you have sometimes seemed to agree with that..
But when we use the word 'volition' we are speaking about something that is exclusively a conscious experience.

In all three cases, normal causal forces (gravity? magnetism? pressure?) bring about the change--as directed by the applicable causal selection mechanism.

You are implying that an entity called 'chance' actually directs things?
You are implying that an entity called 'necessity' can make 'choices'?

[EduChris]

...Do you agree that, if you believe that Y happened because you willed it, you might possibly be wrong about that?...

We might be wrong about anything. In fact, given non-theism, it would be astonishing if our beliefs correspond to objective reality at all. Nevertheless, the direct, unmediated, pervasive, and universal belief that we humans can and do willfully cause at least some things to happen provides the highest possible justification we could ever have for believing anything at all.

...Does this mean you agree with me that 'chance' necessity' and 'volition' are merely words expressing our ideas about the causal connection, (or lack thereof) between any two states or events?...

Yes, I agree.

...when you refer to "causal forces". Is it possible to conceive of these 'causal forces' acting independent of any consciousness?

We don't know; but obviously we'd like to find out.

And how do we go about finding out?...Can I suggest science might help?

Unfortunately, everything we think we know in science ultimate vanishes into mystery and ignorance. Science can never get us to a point where we stop asking, "Okay, then why is that?" In other words, science is all about physics; by its very nature, science is of little help with metaphysics.

...I don't believe that chance or neccesity can bring about change. You claimed that chance necessity and volition were three 'causal mechanisms'. I have argued throughout that there is a serious difference between 'volition' and the other two...I have consistently claimed that 'chance' and 'necessity' are words describing our theories about events that could possibly occur in a world that contained no consciousness at all; and you have sometimes seemed to agree with that...But when we use the word 'volition' we are speaking about something that is exclusively a conscious experience.

We have direct, unmediated, universal access to volition; by contrast, we have no evidence that necessity or chance actually exist or can exist apart from volition.

...You are implying that an entity called 'chance' actually directs things?...You are implying that an entity called 'necessity' can make 'choices'?...

What I am saying is that we have no evidence that the black box of non-contingent reality is less than personal/volitional.

We do know that we possess volition, and we'd like to understand where volition comes from. If it arose merely through chance, then we lack any epistemically justified explanation for volition--but this should be our last resort, since as rational beings we are obliged to seek epistemically justified explanations wherever possible.

On the other hand, if our volition arose via unbroken chain of necessity, then volition belongs inside the black box of non-contingent reality (i.e., volition exists because it is impossible for it not to exist). In which case we have theism.

And of course, if our volition exists because of some prior volition, then again theism is the case. Any way you look at it, theism offers the best and only epistemically justified explanation for our human volition. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to duck our responsibility as rational agents, and willfully opt for no explanation at all.