Is this proof of God's existence?

[QED]

In another topic Harvey has set out a series of premises that lead him to the conclusion that God exists and is the creator of the universe. I think this deserves a debate topic of its own so I have copied his arguments below:

1. According to Paul Davies, most physicists who work on fundamental physics believe the laws of physics have some independent existence to the universe
2. The laws of physics are propositions if they exist independently to the universe
3. Propositions are semantic-based structures
4. We are justified in believing that the laws of physics are propositions and are semantic structures(from 1, 2, 3)
5. Semantic structures only have existence if they are interpreted and comprehended by an interpreter
6. Propositions require interpretation and comprehension by an interpreter to exist (from 3, 5)
7. We are justified in believing that the laws of physics require interpretation and comprehension by an interpreter to exist (from 3,6)
8. An interpreter exists independent of the proposition and the fictional or non-fictional world(s) that the proposition refers to (defined as having "implicit freedom")
9. An interpreter of a proposition is restricted by rules of interpretation which are separate from the proposition itself (i.e., defined as not having "explicit freedom")
10. An omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent being (God) is defined as having implicit freedom with respect to the propositions of the universe
11. The interpreter of the laws is God (from 4, 8, 9, 10)
12. We are justified in believing that God is the cause of the laws and the universe(s) that results from the laws (from 7,11)

Can anyone find fault in any of the above premises? Or is it a proof of God's existence?

[harvey1]

Good idea, QED.

Let me respond to Bugmaster's post:

Here's my list. I disagree with the following premises (and all the claims that rely on them, which I'll omit for brevity):

0: Paul Davies is the boss of me. He's not. He may be a great physicist, but we shouldn't accept philosophical or metaphysical claims just because it is he who makes them.

That's not premise (1) though. Premise (1) is that Davies is right about what most physicists who research fundamental physics believe about the primacy of the laws with regard to the material universe.

2: The laws of physics are propositions if they exist independently to the universe. As far as I know, propositions are logical constructs, made up by humans, such as "A->B = true". Even if the laws of physics exist independently of the universe, it doesn't automatically follow that they are propositions (they certainly weren't made up by humans, for one). Also, even if propositions do exist independently of the universe, this does not automatically imply that all things that exist independently of the universe are propositions.

A proposition doesn't mean that it must be uttered by humans to exist. A proposition is a statement or abstract object having meaning. So, for example, quantum cosmology attempts to find the wave function equation for the universe, and this wave function is a mathematical proposition. If the laws of physics exist independently of the universe, then they are propositions since they are meaningful statements or abstract objects.

5: Semantic structures only have existence if they are interpreted and comprehended by an interpreter. This depends on what you mean by "have existence". I don't think that semantic structures have any existence at all, other than as abstractions in our heads.

But, you are not part of the majority of physicists working on the fundamental problems that Davies is referring to. My justification is based on what they think is needed to believe about the laws in order for them to rationally, in a scientific sense, give an account for how the universe came to be.

Furthermore, even if dualism is true, this statement could be false; dualistic properties could have an existence independent of any interpreter.

It doesn't make sense for a proposition to exist without an interpreter since without an interpreter a proposition couldn't in principle have any meaning, and therefore it wouldn't be a proposition. For example, let's say that it is a law of physics (L) that W worlds must outnumber W* worlds. If the law exists independently of W and W* worlds, and in fact makes it the case that W worlds must logically or mathematically outnumber W*, then in order for that to be the case, the law must have some logical or mathematical meaning that is independent of W and W* (which is what makes it an independent law and a proposition). Now, let's say there is a conceivable law (L') that competes with this law. Let's say that L' states that no worlds should exist. Why should L have precedence over L'? The only possible reason is that L is meaningful with respect to logical or mathematical necessity whereas L' is not. However, to be meaningful is equivalent to being comprehended. Meaning requires comprehension, otherwise there is no difference between L and L'. For the Universe to have comprehension is to say the same thing as saying the Universe is a mind.

8: An interpreter exists independent of the proposition and the fictional or non-fictional world(s) that the proposition refers to (defined as having "implicit freedom"). Why can't the proposition themselves exist independently ? What makes the interpreter special ? Why can't ye olde laws of physics exist independently ?

You can have comprehension without an outside interpreter, but the property of having comprehension is to also have the property of being a mind. So, if you want to call that "outside interpreter" as the Universe itself, then that's fine.

11: The interpreter of the laws is God (from 4, 8, 9, 10)... which God do you mean ? Jesus ? Allah ? Athena ? Come to think of it, why does this interpreter of yours have to have a personality at all ?

God doesn't need a personality. The comprehension that the Universe (with a capital "U") possesses as a property also has as its property that of being omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent with respect to all the worlds that exist in the Universe.

[QED]

Starting with (1) I don't know if Davies is right in thinking that most physicists who research fundamental physics believe in the primacy of laws or not. It doesn't add to the argument either way. Arthur Eddington, Paul Dirac and many other distinguished physicists hold different views. So did Newtons arch rival Leibniz who was a gnats whisker away from beating Einstein to relativity by a cool 300 years.

On to (2). Not everyone agrees that Laws of physics exist independently to the universe. There are reasons to believe that they are contingent on the content of the universe. For example, the speed of light that you quoted elsewhere has been experimentally seen to vary beyond its supposed maximum. Relativity is the current flavour in all things cosmological these days and the laws seem not to be exempt.

[Bugmaster]

I don't have time for a full reply now, but I'll paste my other post here for reference. Which is kinda weird, since harvey1 already replied to it, above, but oh well.
-----

Let me understand which premise you disagree with...

Here's my list. I disagree with the following premises (and all the claims that rely on them, which I'll omit for brevity):

0: Paul Davies is the boss of me. He's not. He may be a great physicist, but we shouldn't accept philosophical or metaphysical claims just because it is he who makes them.

2: The laws of physics are propositions if they exist independently to the universe. As far as I know, propositions are logical constructs, made up by humans, such as "A->B = true". Even if the laws of physics exist independently of the universe, it doesn't automatically follow that they are propositions (they certainly weren't made up by humans, for one). Also, even if propositions do exist independently of the universe, this does not automatically imply that all things that exist independently of the universe are propositions.

5: Semantic structures only have existence if they are interpreted and comprehended by an interpreter. This depends on what you mean by "have existence". I don't think that semantic structures have any existence at all, other than as abstractions in our heads. Furthermore, even if dualism is true, this statement could be false; dualistic properties could have an existence independent of any interpreter.

8: An interpreter exists independent of the proposition and the fictional or non-fictional world(s) that the proposition refers to (defined as having "implicit freedom"). Why can't the proposition themselves exist independently ? What makes the interpreter special ? Why can't ye olde laws of physics exist independently ?

11: The interpreter of the laws is God (from 4, 8, 9, 10) Firstly, 4 is unsound. Secondly, which God do you mean ? Jesus ? Allah ? Athena ? Come to think of it, why does this interpreter of yours have to have a personality at all ?

[ST88]

In another topic Harvey has set out a series of premises that lead him to the conclusion that God exists and is the creator of the universe. I think this deserves a debate topic of its own so I have copied his arguments below:

1. According to Paul Davies, most physicists who work on fundamental physics believe the laws of physics have some independent existence to the universe
This is debatable. I would say that the laws of physics are the universe. That is, our perception of something we like to call The Universe is merely the result of our sensate experience of being among the physical laws. To assume that an entity exists called The Universe, we must first assume that it should be independent of the laws it contains. That makes no sense to me. It would make more sense that the concept of The Universe is merely the best metaphorical representation we have of the amalgamated laws which are now in existence and to which we are subject.

2. The laws of physics are propositions if they exist independently to the universe
This doesn't quite capture the situation, even if the basic concept is true. If we were to discover that object A has velocity B, then in order to state the proposition we would have to separate the object from its velocity. We can do this in mathematics in order to discover predictive values for its future behavior, but is it really true that its speed is a separate function from its existence? Its speed is dependent on its material structure, its location, its history, etc, each measurable characteristic variable, and vice-versa. Is an object separate from its material structure? That would appear to me to be nonsense. It would mean that every object is a metaphorical representation of itself, which would imply a different plane of existence that itself would need to be a representation of itself ad infinitum. At what point during the disintegration of the object -- should it occur -- does it cease becoming itself?

[harvey1]

This is debatable. I would say that the laws of physics are the universe. That is, our perception of something we like to call The Universe is merely the result of our sensate experience of being among the physical laws. To assume that an entity exists called The Universe, we must first assume that it should be independent of the laws it contains. That makes no sense to me. It would make more sense that the concept of The Universe is merely the best metaphorical representation we have of the amalgamated laws which are now in existence and to which we are subject.

Prior to the electroweak symmetry breaking event, there were no distinguishable differences between photons (carriers of the electromagnetic force) and Z/W particles (carriers of the weak force). So, another way of stating this premise might be whether there are "rules" on how symmetry breaking events were to occur. If there are "rules," then it is only natural to say these rules are independent of the particles that exemplify what the rules dictate can happen.

This doesn't quite capture the situation, even if the basic concept is true. If we were to discover that object A has velocity B, then in order to state the proposition we would have to separate the object from its velocity. We can do this in mathematics in order to discover predictive values for its future behavior, but is it really true that its speed is a separate function from its existence?

No, I would say not. Velocity is a relation a moving object has with stationary objects or other moving objects. However, if there are laws that dictate why an object A has velocity B, then we cannot say that object A is a law unto itself. That's not a law, it's a brute fact that is charading as a law.

Its speed is dependent on its material structure, its location, its history, etc, each measurable characteristic variable, and vice-versa. Is an object separate from its material structure? That would appear to me to be nonsense.

I think it's not a good idea to mix up properties, relations, and laws. An object can have a set of properties, and those properties can cause it to have a relation with other objects with different properties, however the lawful behavior is referring to a totally different phenomena. With respect to a law, we are referring to how the objects behave. Do they behave similarly such that they conform to a law (e.g., Newton's F=ma), or do they behave similarly because there is a contingent relation that only looks like a law (e.g., Jane mows her grass on Sundays). In the case of a law, we are referring to a behavior that is not contingent--not based some peculiar contingent fact based on the object itself. So, often laws are referred to in terms of possible worlds that are identical up to some event E where world W and world W* differ after E. If there are no laws, then it is not possible that W and W* diverge, or they only differ after some contingent event occurs. If no other contingent event occurs, then it is only possible for W and W* to be separated by that one contingent event that occurred.

In case there are laws, there is another reason why W and W* can continue to diverge. That is, there might be some law L that applies to W differently than it does to W*, and therefore W and W* are more than separated by one contingent event. This is what symmetry breaking is basically stating. Once the symmetry is broken, W moves in a totally different direction dictated by the new symmetry law. W* moves in a totally different direction also dictated by the new symmetry law.

I think what Paul Davies is saying is that most physicists working on fundamental issues believe that the laws of physics require us to think more in these terms. If there are other worlds, they might have different laws because of a broken symmetry that did not occur in our young universe.

It would mean that every object is a metaphorical representation of itself, which would imply a different plane of existence that itself would need to be a representation of itself ad infinitum. At what point during the disintegration of the object -- should it occur -- does it cease becoming itself?

Since you are referring to properties and relations, I don't think this is a reasonable paradox to present the nomic structure that I'm referring to. There are no laws upon laws since once an object enters a new state space, there is no reason to think that this refers to yet another state space ad infinitum. When you enter a room do you think that you have to give account of your new relation of being in the room as also having a relation of being in the room, ad infinitum? I hope not. No, we enter a room because we entered a room, not our relation, not our properties. However, we can enter a room with different rules of behavior, and that's what is separate from us. It makes no sense to ask what are the rules of those rules since the rules are relations to some fixed standard. In my argument, that fixed standard is truth. The relation that God is in charge of maintaining.

[harvey1]

Arthur Eddington, Paul Dirac and many other distinguished physicists hold different views.

Dirac was a platonist. He championed the concept beauty perhaps more than any other in physics. See this interview for example:

The papers you produced have been universally considered beautiful. Were you guided by notions of beauty?

Very much so. One can't just make random guesses. It's a question of finding things that fit together very well. You're solving a problem, it might be a crossword puzzle, and things don't fit, and you conclude you've made some mistakes. Suddenly you think of corrections and everything fits. You feel great satisfaction. T he beauty of the equations provided by nature is much stronger than that. It gives one a strong emotional reaction.

So did Newtons arch rival Leibniz who was a gnats whisker away from beating Einstein to relativity by a cool 300 years.

There's actually a website that keeps track of many of the platonist quotes, believe it or not... Here's some of my favorites:

All our surest statements about the nature of the world are mathematical statements, yet we do not know what mathematics is. . . and so we find that we have adapted a religion strikingly similar to many traditional faiths. Change mathematics to God and little else might seem to change. The problem of human contact with some spiritual realm, of timelessness, of our inability to capture all with language and symbol all have their counterparts in the quest for the nature of Platonic mathematics. (John D. Barrow)

Mathematics is the supreme arbiter. From its decisions there is no appeal.
( Tobias Dantzig)

One of the endlessly alluring aspects of mathematics is that its thorniest paradoxes have a way of blooming into beautiful theories. (Philip Davis)

The creative principle resides in mathematics. In a certain sense, therefore, I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed. (Albert Einstein)

The laws of mathematics are not merely human inventions or creations. They simply ‘are;’ they exist quite independently of the human intellect. The most that any(one) ... can do is to find that they are there and to take cognizance of them. (Escher Maurits Cornelis)

The Universe is a grand book which cannot be read until one first learns to comprehend the language and become familiar with the characters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics. (Galileo Galilei)

I believe that mathematical reality lies outside of us, and that our function is to discover, or observe it, and that the theorems which we prove, and which we describe grandiloquently as our creations are simply notes on our observations. (Godfrey Harold Hardy)

I think that modern physics has definitely decided in favor of Plato. In fact the smallest units of matter are not physical objects in the ordinary sense; they are forms, ideas which can be expressed unambiguously only in mathematical language. (Werner Heisenberg)

One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical formulae have an independent existence and an intelligence of their own, that they are wiser than we are, wiser even than their discoverers, that we get more out of them than we originally put in to them. (Heinrich Hertz)

If I were to awaken after having slept for a thousand years, my first question would be: Has the Riemann hypothesis been proven? (David Hilbert)

Mathematical science is in my opinion an indivisible whole, an organism whose vitality is conditioned upon the connection of its parts. (David Hilbert)

All the pictures which science now draws of nature and which alone seem capable of according with observational fact are mathematical pictures ... From the intrinsic evidence of his creation, the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician. (James Jeans)

God exists since mathematics is consistent, and the devil exists since we cannot prove the consistency. (Morris Kline)

The mathematical rules of the universe are visible to men in the form of beauty. (John Michel)

Reason’s last step is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. (Blaise Pascal)

Mathematics takes us still further from what is human into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform. (Bertrand Russell)

The most distinct and beautiful statement of any truth must take at last the mathematical form. (Henry David Thoreau)

My work has always tried to unite the true with the beautiful and when I had to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful. (Hermann Weyl)

On to (2). Not everyone agrees that Laws of physics exist independently to the universe. There are reasons to believe that they are contingent on the content of the universe. For example, the speed of light that you quoted elsewhere has been experimentally seen to vary beyond its supposed maximum.

I think I mentioned that signal speed of light...

[ST88]

This is debatable. I would say that the laws of physics are the universe. That is, our perception of something we like to call The Universe is merely the result of our sensate experience of being among the physical laws. To assume that an entity exists called The Universe, we must first assume that it should be independent of the laws it contains. That makes no sense to me. It would make more sense that the concept of The Universe is merely the best metaphorical representation we have of the amalgamated laws which are now in existence and to which we are subject.

Prior to the electroweak symmetry breaking event, there were no distinguishable differences between photons (carriers of the electromagnetic force) and Z/W particles (carriers of the weak force). So, another way of stating this premise might be whether there are "rules" on how symmetry breaking events were to occur. If there are "rules," then it is only natural to say these rules are independent of the particles that exemplify what the rules dictate can happen.

You needn't go all the way back that far. You can state the same thing for any event in which particles are involved. We can conceptualize these things as particles which carry forces, and the various breaking events -- whatever that means -- but the expression of these particles/forces must be in terms we can conceptualize. That is, it is convenient to separate the particles from the rules they must obey because that is how we classify them. Do weak-force particles behave as electromagentic particles do? No, but not because there is a rule which says they can't -- it's because that's their intrinsic value. The forces they exert and are subjected to depend on their structure. Photons can't be subject to weak force particles because they are photons. (I don't really know if this is true or not, I'm using your dichotomy.)

This doesn't quite capture the situation, even if the basic concept is true. If we were to discover that object A has velocity B, then in order to state the proposition we would have to separate the object from its velocity. We can do this in mathematics in order to discover predictive values for its future behavior, but is it really true that its speed is a separate function from its existence?

No, I would say not. Velocity is a relation a moving object has with stationary objects or other moving objects. However, if there are laws that dictate why an object A has velocity B, then we cannot say that object A is a law unto itself. That's not a law, it's a brute fact that is charading as a law.

I see your point, here. But objects have properties which themselves are subject to the properties of other objects. How do you make the distinction between a relation and a law? I use as an example a dwarf star. Because gravity acts upon a slowly expanding star, its properties change. But the expansion is a part of the star's makeup only insofar as each individual particle of the star can be counted in the aggregate as "a star". We describe such a system as "a star" because it is convenient for us to think of it in those terms. But it need not be an entire thing which possesses an individual identity -- it is also a conflagration of countless pieces of matter which themselves have inherent properties that affect the properties of the particles that surround them.

You may say that gravity is such a semantic law. But "gravity" as we conceptualize it, is merely the expression of how particles interact with one another and/or with space-time. Barring the discovery of what it actually is, we can state with certainty that the center of a dying dwarf star collapses, pulling in its material through a process that we can call "gravity". That we can say that the individual particles are subject to the law of gravity is just a conceit for what actually happens.

Its speed is dependent on its material structure, its location, its history, etc, each measurable characteristic variable, and vice-versa. Is an object separate from its material structure? That would appear to me to be nonsense.

I think it's not a good idea to mix up properties, relations, and laws. An object can have a set of properties, and those properties can cause it to have a relation with other objects with different properties, however the lawful behavior is referring to a totally different phenomena.

I would have to disagree. Behavior is subject to laws as we see them. We can write them down and use them to predict behavior. But these "laws" as you call them are merely expressions of the object's properties and relations.

With respect to a law, we are referring to how the objects behave. Do they behave similarly such that they conform to a law (e.g., Newton's F=ma), or do they behave similarly because there is a contingent relation that only looks like a law (e.g., Jane mows her grass on Sundays). In the case of a law, we are referring to a behavior that is not contingent--not based some peculiar contingent fact based on the object itself.

I don't see the distinction there. Newton's F=ma is contingent on the object having a mass, is it not? We can just as easily say that objects with a mass will obey this law, and that we observe this behavior in objects that have a mass.

So, often laws are referred to in terms of possible worlds that are identical up to some event E where world W and world W* differ after E. If there are no laws, then it is not possible that W and W* diverge, or they only differ after some contingent event occurs. If no other contingent event occurs, then it is only possible for W and W* to be separated by that one contingent event that occurred.

In case there are laws, there is another reason why W and W* can continue to diverge. That is, there might be some law L that applies to W differently than it does to W*, and therefore W and W* are more than separated by one contingent event. This is what symmetry breaking is basically stating. Once the symmetry is broken, W moves in a totally different direction dictated by the new symmetry law. W* moves in a totally different direction also dictated by the new symmetry law.

OK. But why would E produce L? If, theoretically, the "breaking event" occurred or did not occur, then the laws would be different in either case because the breaking event would not have produced the same particles, which would themselves not have the same properties.

I understand that you believe these laws (rules) are immutable. I would guess they would have to be in order to be based on an immutable standard of Truth. So, then, would your standard for disproof of God lie in the mutability of these rules?

[harvey1]

...objects have properties which themselves are subject to the properties of other objects. How do you make the distinction between a relation and a law?

There are many kinds of relations, but when talking about the cause of something, I think we are talking about causal relations. That is, a causal relation is an cause and effect association that exists between multiple events or states of affairs (e.g., a causal relation that exists between a star expanding and it becoming a dwarf star). A law is also causal by nature, but it explains why an event occurred without reducing to the currently observed events and states of affairs.

What a causal law does is refer you to an antecedent state which, due to the law, necessarily brought about the consequent state (i.e., cause brings about an effect). Everything has an eventual beginning, and as we move "back" to the previous causal chain of events, we eventually get to the beginning. The basic notion of my argument in this thread is to say that the very beginning is a causal law of negative necessity. That is, whatever state we can possibly conceive, the only possible state of affairs that can exist in the beginning is one in which there exists cause/logic/truth/possibility/mind. If we could conceive of a state which did not have cause/logic/truth/possibility/mind, then this conceivable state would actually be assuming these things, and therefore it would not be a real conceivable state. As it turns out, only the conceivable states where cause/logic/truth/possibility/mind are meaningful concepts is part of the real world.

So, whereas you might call this view of a law a relation between universals (e.g., a truth relation), I think the term "law" is more useful than just labelling it a relation since it is a very unique relation in that it bridges the gap in terms of an explanation between an antecedent state of affairs and a consequent state of affairs.

You may say that gravity is such a semantic law. But "gravity" as we conceptualize it, is merely the expression of how particles interact with one another and/or with space-time. Barring the discovery of what it actually is, we can state with certainty that the center of a dying dwarf star collapses, pulling in its material through a process that we can call "gravity". That we can say that the individual particles are subject to the law of gravity is just a conceit for what actually happens.

This is a descriptive view of laws. It tries to reduce a law to some unexplainable causal relation that exists between a cause and effect. However, I don't think this is reasonable since what a prescriptive law does is offer an explanation of why you get from a cause to its effect. A mere causal relation does not do that. For example, Feynman's use of the principle of least action is a quantum law that explains why particles act as a collective tend to follow Newton's law of motion (F=ma). It is because this is most likely the minimum action of a classical object in motion, and therefore we have a law that bridges quantum world behavior such that it explains classical world of behavior.

Prescriptive laws are especially more successful when explaining the early universe since we want to know why certain events occurred (e.g., an explanation on why there are four known forces, etc.). If you think in terms of relation, then this gets you in trouble with quantum theories where we have virtual particles that pop into existence and pop out of existence. A relation should conserve energy under every circumstance, but the uncertainty principle (or law) states that there are acceptable violations of conservation. The path integral also implies violations of conservation, as does other physical theories that are emerging (e.g., string theory).

I would have to disagree. Behavior is subject to laws as we see them. We can write them down and use them to predict behavior. But these "laws" as you call them are merely expressions of the object's properties and relations.

Of course, you can try and reduce laws to current properties and current relations, but this approach fails miserably when trying to understand why the current properties and current relations are as they are. In order to understand the current properties and current relations, you need to have an understanding of what laws were in effect for the previous physical system and then show how those laws affected the previous system to bring about the current system.

I don't see the distinction there. Newton's F=ma is contingent on the object having a mass, is it not? We can just as easily say that objects with a mass will obey this law, and that we observe this behavior in objects that have a mass.

Sure, but again, this is just applicable only when talking in terms of current properties and current relations. If you try to understand F=ma in terms of the quantum world, then it does no good to say that the object with this mass will have these quantum properties. However, if you use Feyman's path integral equation, you will be able to show why mass times acceleration equates to the object's force. This is what laws do for you that typical relations and properties cannot do for you. They explain how it is that system evolves.

OK. But why would E produce L? If, theoretically, the "breaking event" occurred or did not occur, then the laws would be different in either case because the breaking event would not have produced the same particles, which would themselves not have the same properties.

E doesn't produce L, rather E pushes the system to encounter L. L already exists. It just doesn't always apply unless a particular E occurs (or doesn't occur). If there are no laws, then the behavior of W and W* is fully determined by the effects of E. However, if E is very small and insignificant, then there is no reason why the behavior of W and W* should be drastically different. Afterall, E was very small and insignificant. However, this is wrong. A small perturbation can drastically affect the direction of the system.

I understand that you believe these laws (rules) are immutable. I would guess they would have to be in order to be based on an immutable standard of Truth. So, then, would your standard for disproof of God lie in the mutability of these rules?

Not really. This is a theory to try and understand the immense order that we see in the world. I don't buy into the Las Vegas origin of the world. I've been to Vegas and I know what happens when, in reality, you gamble. You lose. I don't believe in dumb luck. I think it's shocking and downright sad that so many people are so gullible to believe that a random beginning (or raw brute fact) would bring about all that we see.

Saying that, I have a tremendous curiosity as to how it did happen. So, this is where reasoning has taken me. I realize there are mystic theists who don't think we can ever approach this subject with the eye of reasoning. They might be right, but it seems like a shame not to try.

[QED]

Arthur Eddington, Paul Dirac and many other distinguished physicists hold different views.

Dirac was a platonist. He championed the concept beauty perhaps more than any other in physics.

Yet Dirac speculated that some of the "fundamental constants" would be subject to change over time. I seem to recall Dirac's proposition that the universal gravitational constant might be decreasing as the universe expands. I suppose he might also propose that some form of eternal law governed the variation of the constants but, in my opinion, he has already undermined this position with his other proposal. But none of this adds to the argument. We are a very long way off from saying for sure that laws exist eternally and independently from the universe.

On to (2). Not everyone agrees that Laws of physics exist independently to the universe. There are reasons to believe that they are contingent on the content of the universe. For example, the speed of light that you quoted elsewhere has been experimentally seen to vary beyond its supposed maximum.

I think I mentioned that signal speed of light...

OK but have you looked at the Research conducted by Professor Raymond Y. Chiao? FTL tunneling seems like a fascinating discovery.