Presuppositional Apologetics

[Haven]

Recently, many Christians have become fond of presuppositional apologetics, a method of defending Christianity in which the truth of the Christian worldview is assumed and the apologist seeks to expose the flaws and inconsistencies of other worldviews. Presuppositionalists generally hold to either the Clarkian or Van Tillian approaches, which have minor differences but make the same general assumption that the Bible / Christian god is the basis for all knowledge and that one cannot know anything apart from that foundation.

Critics point this out as logically invalid via the fallacy of begging the question, and feel that presuppositionalism is nothing more than a pointless exercise in circular reasoning. Many atheists refuse to debate presuppositionalists, stating that any such debate is an exercise in futility.

Debate question: What do you think? Is presuppositional apologetics sound? Is it a path to truth? Does it beg the question? Is it simply pointless circular reasoning, or is it an argument which skeptics must take seriously?

[Flail]

While I would cede your point here to some extent, the scientific process is quite a different matter than the religious belief process. Whereas the former uses hypothesis and evidence, the latter substitutes dogma and ritual; when science arrives, thru testing within the scientific community, to a 'truth', it still leaves the door open, if ever so slightly, for further testing and challenge of the hypothesis or theory. Most religions however, keep that door slammed shut lest doubt 'water down' adherence and diminish memberships. Where doubt is encouraged in science, doubt is viewed as the presence of an 'evil spirit' in many religions. Perhaps this is why we seem stuck in old religions while scientific theory evolves.

Perhaps this is a simplification of religious doctrine. Consider the doctrine of the Trinity, for example. Arguably, it is rooted in a religious phenomenology and core texts as the evidence from which the theory emerged. (This is not evidence in the sense that it proves the Trinity true, but rather in the sense that it was the raw material from which theology sought to build a system of doctrine). Early trinitarian disputes over this "evidence" concerned the basic premise: can there be one God who is several persons? Modalism and sabellianism said no, orthodoxy said yes. There was logical debate back and forth, and it seems there was progress: Sabellianism lost the day. The next dispute was over whether Jesus had to be fully God. Arius said no, Athanasius yes (to grossly simplify). However, if you read the primary literature, you'll see that Arius and those who shared his view accused the Athanasians of Sabellianism, but Athanasius still rejected Sabellianism as heresy. In other words, there were new debates, new points of doctrine, but always built on previous development: the rejection of earlier flawed theories (in this case Sabellianism). So it proceeds through Nestorianism, Applinarianism, Monothelytism, the filioque controversy, into Joachin of Fiore's quaternity (which was rejected), debates on the trinity in history, etc. Even in the past 50 years we've seen the formulation of new aspects of Trinitarian theology, which are open for debate: Wayne Grudem (an evangelical) who claims the Son was eternally co-equal, but eternally subordinate, and Karl Rahner (a catholic) who claims the "immanent trinity is the economic trinity."

What we see is something akin to science. Basic phenomenal data (although religious experience is not testable or repeatable in the same way as scientific phenomenal data). Elementary theories to explain the phenomenal data, which are then rejected or refined through their plausibility, consistency, and believed facticity (science advances this through testing, theology through logic/philosophy, history/archaeology, ethical and aesthetic application, and textual exegesis). A shared community debating the veracity of the paradigm as a whole (the church and the scientific academy). It's a loose analogy, but better than "truth vs. dogma", "open vs. closed", "dreaded Holy Ghost vs. beloved reason", etc. Science rarely presents such an open door, nor religion such a closed one, as you might suspect.

Perhaps one reason you don't see people abandoning certain theological tenets today is that we don't have new methods of logic to the same degree that we have new methods of science. The same argument that is logically flawed in 300 CE will be logically flawed in 1300 CE and in 2300 CE. The scientific hypothesis that fails in 300 CE can succeed in 2300 CE as a result of new technology.

I'm with you as religions relate logical concepts as moral teachings/ethics, duty, relationships and I appreciate and understand the process of testing those concepts and even the mythos that informs them. But when it comes to the actual existence of any particular supernatural beings (virgin births, resurrections etc), religion morphs from reasoned philosophy into abject superstition. Nothing in science does anything akin.

[theopoesis]

I'm with you as religions relate logical concepts as moral teachings/ethics, duty, relationships and I appreciate and understand the process of testing those concepts and even the mythos that informs them. But when it comes to the actual existence of any particular supernatural beings (virgin births, resurrections etc), religion morphs from reasoned philosophy into abject superstition. Nothing in science does anything akin.

Again, I find accusations of "abject superstition" to be a bit suspect here. It's only abject superstition of it didn't happen or isn't true. Now, here comes the objection: "but it didn't happen and can't be true!" This is where presuppositionalism come in. I've recently read a book called A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by Herman Dooyeweerd, one of the founders of presuppositionalist epistemology (though under a different name). His basic philosophical point is that all thought is undertaken within thought structures or systems themselves. You can't choose your thought system except through thinking, so inevitably, you must be operating within some system, presupposing some set of ideas. Thought systems in some way are received by us apart from thinking. They are rooted in or grounded in something. Dooyeweerd would call this the "religious ground motive." But ultimately, whether Christian or atheist, Muslim or Hindu, we assess the data before us within an existing rational system that we didn't completely choose through reason (it would be impossible to do so). So one person begins by claiming "abject superstition", the other "religious truth." But arbitrating between the two is a challenge indeed.

I think this plays out in my experience of religious studies too. Now I've studied under Bart Ehrman, and I've listened to the recorded lectures of evangelical Christian professors. Ehrman's lectures included an explanation of why miracles must be discounted in the approach to the scriptures, and the Christian professors began with an explanation of why miracles were possible given God. Both began their entire project, their entire analysis of the data, with a certain framework and orientation presupposed.

You say that science has nothing akin to the religious assumption (or superstitions) of Christianity, but I say that this claim fails to understand the real nature of worldviews proposed by presuppositionalism and by those who study the history of thought. For example, the recent book The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Alan Gillespie suggests that modern science has a theological origin. To paint the picture minimally, Ockham developed a school called nominalism which suggested that God was pure will and that this will sustained all other entities. The entire late medieval and early modern project was then an attempt to bring this theological claim under control, culminating in Descartes and Hobbes, who both seemed to accept nominalist premises of God, and whom sought to bring the potentially chaotic nominalist picture of the world under control through various metaphysical arguments which led to the origins of modern science. I'm hugely simplifying his argument (which takes hundreds of pages to make), but the point is, if Gillespie is correct, then science as we know it is built upon religious assumptions which are now hidden beneath metaphysic of natural science.

Now, this isn't just a Christian thing, where we're trying to rethink history in a way to make us look more legitimate. This approach to history is not just a byproduct of Christian apologetics. Secular thinkers within the past fifty to a hundred years have been tracing similar genealogies of thought. Think Neitzsche or Foucault.

[Flail]

I'm with you as religions relate logical concepts as moral teachings/ethics, duty, relationships and I appreciate and understand the process of testing those concepts and even the mythos that informs them. But when it comes to the actual existence of any particular supernatural beings (virgin births, resurrections etc), religion morphs from reasoned philosophy into abject superstition. Nothing in science does anything akin.

Again, I find accusations of "abject superstition" to be a bit suspect here. It's only abject superstition of it didn't happen or isn't true. Now, here comes the objection: "but it didn't happen and can't be true!" This is where presuppositionalism come in. I've recently read a book called A New Critique of Theoretical Thought by Herman Dooyeweerd, one of the founders of presuppositionalist epistemology (though under a different name). His basic philosophical point is that all thought is undertaken within thought structures or systems themselves. You can't choose your thought system except through thinking, so inevitably, you must be operating within some system, presupposing some set of ideas. Thought systems in some way are received by us apart from thinking. They are rooted in or grounded in something. Dooyeweerd would call this the "religious ground motive." But ultimately, whether Christian or atheist, Muslim or Hindu, we assess the data before us within an existing rational system that we didn't completely choose through reason (it would be impossible to do so). So one person begins by claiming "abject superstition", the other "religious truth." But arbitrating between the two is a challenge indeed.

I think this plays out in my experience of religious studies too. Now I've studied under Bart Ehrman, and I've listened to the recorded lectures of evangelical Christian professors. Ehrman's lectures included an explanation of why miracles must be discounted in the approach to the scriptures, and the Christian professors began with an explanation of why miracles were possible given God. Both began their entire project, their entire analysis of the data, with a certain framework and orientation presupposed.

You say that science has nothing akin to the religious assumption (or superstitions) of Christianity, but I say that this claim fails to understand the real nature of worldviews proposed by presuppositionalism and by those who study the history of thought. For example, the recent book The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Alan Gillespie suggests that modern science has a theological origin. To paint the picture minimally, Ockham developed a school called nominalism which suggested that God was pure will and that this will sustained all other entities. The entire late medieval and early modern project was then an attempt to bring this theological claim under control, culminating in Descartes and Hobbes, who both seemed to accept nominalist premises of God, and whom sought to bring the potentially chaotic nominalist picture of the world under control through various metaphysical arguments which led to the origins of modern science. I'm hugely simplifying his argument (which takes hundreds of pages to make), but the point is, if Gillespie is correct, then science as we know it is built upon religious assumptions which are now hidden beneath metaphysic of natural science.

Now, this isn't just a Christian thing, where we're trying to rethink history in a way to make us look more legitimate. This approach to history is not just a byproduct of Christian apologetics. Secular thinkers within the past fifty to a hundred years have been tracing similar genealogies of thought. Think Neitzsche or Foucault.

I am familiar with the lines of thought you present although not as thoroughly as you appear to be. I will do some more reading. Thank you. I used to debate Jester on his Worldview thread along the same lines. Interesting stuff.

My primary objections to Christianity and Islam are as to the specificity of particular supernatural claims. As an Ignostic, I have no real idea of supernaturals and am open to possibility. But from where I sit I find zero value beyond philosophy in anything Christian or Muslim; and the idea of worshipping any given supernatural being is so foreign to me that I sometimes get hyperbolic in my assessments.

[theopoesis]

I am familiar with the lines of thought you present although not as thoroughly as you appear to be. I will do some more reading. Thank you. I used to debate Jester on his Worldview thread along the same lines. Interesting stuff.

My primary objections to Christianity and Islam are as to the specificity of particular supernatural claims. As an Ignostic, I have no real idea of supernaturals and am open to possibility. But from where I sit I find zero value beyond philosophy in anything Christian or Muslim; and the idea of worshipping any given supernatural being is so foreign to me that I sometimes get hyperbolic in my assessments.

If we had to pick one universal religion, then I think we can agree we are all hyperbolists at times. That also makes it easy for people like me to cherry pick and attack a hyperbole. I do see your objections, and certainly think that you believe what you do (or don't) for a reason. But in painting the same analysis in two different ways, I hope we can show those who don't know what they believe the best of both options.

I'd better focus more on my work now, have a good day Flail.

[Haven]

In my opinion, Dooyeweerd's thought (like that of other 20th century Neo-Calvinists) seems woefully, viciously circular. He goes beyond the minimalistic presuppositionalism that I hinted at earlier and presupposes a system of thought based on a rich, in-depth Christan theology, and then uses that viewpoint to argue for those same presuppositions! How can such a methodology avoid the charge of vicious circularity?

[theopoesis]

In my opinion, Dooyeweerd's thought (like that of other 20th century Neo-Calvinists) seems woefully, viciously circular. He goes beyond the minimalistic presuppositionalism that I hinted at earlier and presupposes a system of thought based on a rich, in-depth Christan theology, and then uses that viewpoint to argue for those same presuppositions! How can such a methodology avoid the charge of vicious circularity?

You've read "A New Critique"? Never thought I'd find someone familiar with Dooyeweerd around here. He's obscure, a bit boring, and difficult.

Just a few brief ideas:

(1) Calling circularity "vicious" seems nothing more than a rhetorical tool. As presuppositionalism as I present it suggests, all worldviews are necessarily circular to some extent. We would need some explanation for why one circularity was vicious and another not. Otherwise, you could develop a worldview without presuppositions: you cannot assume language works, that you exist, or any of the laws of logic. This must all be demonstrated. Go...

(2) Dooyeweerd seems to offer logical arguments for why circularity is necessary. I don't think it's just a blind leap into his system. Of course, he could be wrong, but then one would need to refute his arguments. Below I've pasted two of them which I summarized on another thread, and which I find compelling.

(3) Would you prefer that Dooyeweerd begin with a rich Islamic worldview to argue the truthfulness of Christianity? If his arguments were sound, doing so would refute Islam by replacing it with Christianity. But as soon as Islam was refuted, the foundations of the arguments for Christianity would be refuted, and thus so would Christianity. Then you'd be back at square one!

(4) I suppose there are any number of individuals who convert to Christianity beginning with another worldview, but once they articulate and defend the worldview they have accepted, they do so looking back at the past through the very Christian worldview they have adopted. They still cannot escape their presuppositions, even in explaining how another worldview led to Christianity. Our memories are not perfect enough to overcome this. I'm just not sure it is possible for anyone to explain why they believe without doing so from a Christian (or at least partly Christian) worldview.


Dooyeweerd's Arguments
The Priority of the Self
(1) The thinking self is the center of all philosophical thought. It is the self which thinks the thoughts that are the subject of philosophy.
(2) Any move to make the thinking self an object of logical thought must itself be initiated by the thinking self.
(3) The self, therefore, cannot be constructed exclusively by logical thought, as such construction would presuppose the existence of a thinking self.
(4) Therefore, the self at least in part exists external to logical and philosophical thought.

The Archimedian Point
(1) Suppose a self wishes to assume an "Archimedian" point from which to view all thought, and from this point wishes to choose a system of thought. In other words, suppose a self wishes to choose, externally of thought, a particular system of reason and rationality, of logic and belief, and of all types and kinds of thoughts.
(2) Any discrete thought is already within a particular modality of thought, a particular way of thinking.
(3) Thus, any effort to reach an "Archimedian" point with respect to thought must itself be made apart from the use of any thought.
(4) Since philosophic thought (logic, reason, etc) are thoughts, the "Archimedian" selection of thought cannot proceed by means of philosophy or reason, but must by other means.
(5) Premise #1 presupposes that it is the self which is selecting the system of thought.
(6) Therefore, any "Archimedian" selection of a system of thought by the self must be done by the aspect of the self which is not itself thinking or thought.

[Haven]

First of all, I'm sorry it has taken me so long to respond to this post.

Anyway, to answer your points:

a) I haven't actually read "A New Critique" (it's on my summer reading list) but I am familiar with the basics of Dooyeweerd's arguments.

b) Presuppositionalism seems unsatisfactorily circular ('vicious' may have been too strong a term) because it ignores all forms of foundationalism, leaving the adherent with a purely coherentist epistemology. The problem with that is it is entirely possible for a worldview to be perfectly coherent, robust in explanatory power and scope, and utterly false. Coherence does not imply truth (even though truth necessarily implies coherence), and truth is what we're after in the acceptance of any worldview. The second reason why presuppositionalism is invalid is that it is suceptible to counterexamples. For instance, one could presuppose atheistic nihilism as a worldview, and note both its coherence (it is not internally contradictoty) and its explanatory power and scope (it explains morality, esthetics, origins, knowledge, etc.), making it an equally valid worldview to Christian theism, on presuppositionalism.

Without starting from an unbiased perspective (well, as unbiased as is humanly possible), one's thoughts will not lead to truth, but simply to a worldview that fits her personal preference.

[Flail]

First of all, I'm sorry it has taken me so long to respond to this post.

Anyway, to answer your points:

a) I haven't actually read "A New Critique" (it's on my summer reading list) but I am familiar with the basics of Dooyeweerd's arguments.

b) Presuppositionalism seems unsatisfactorily circular ('vicious' may have been too strong a term) because it ignores all forms of foundationalism, leaving the adherent with a purely coherentist epistemology. The problem with that is it is entirely possible for a worldview to be perfectly coherent, robust in explanatory power and scope, and utterly false. Coherence does not imply truth (even though truth necessarily implies coherence), and truth is what we're after in the acceptance of any worldview. The second reason why presuppositionalism is invalid is that it is suceptible to counterexamples. For instance, one could presuppose atheistic nihilism as a worldview, and note both its coherence (it is not internally contradictoty) and its explanatory power and scope (it explains morality, esthetics, origins, knowledge, etc.), making it an equally valid worldview to Christian theism, on presuppositionalism.

Without starting from an unbiased perspective (well, as unbiased as is humanly possible), one's thoughts will not lead to truth, but simply to a worldview that fits her personal preference.

Ignosticism seems to be a good fit for an unbiased perspective, particularly when coupled with a healthy skepticism for all things presupposed.

[theopoesis]

First of all, I'm sorry it has taken me so long to respond to this post.

No sweat. Thanks for getting around to it.

b) Presuppositionalism seems unsatisfactorily circular ('vicious' may have been too strong a term) because it ignores all forms of foundationalism, leaving the adherent with a purely coherentist epistemology.

That would depend on the way you approach presuppositionalism. Foundationalism builds a system from certain basic beliefs. I would argue, so does Christianity. However, presuppositionalism would claim that the beliefs any worldview claims are "basic" are not chosen or justified through reason, but externally to or prior to or post hoc within a rational worldview.

In selecting which views are basic, one is already using the rational system which depends upon these "basic" principles. That's all that presuppositionalism says. You are then free to build an entire system upon this foundation, but it's merely recognizing that the foundational claims aren't so universal.

The problem with that is it is entirely possible for a worldview to be perfectly coherent, robust in explanatory power and scope, and utterly false.

Of course it is. But it is also entirely possible for a worldview to be based on an overwhelming amount of evidence with repeated experimentation and yet be utterly false. Ultimately one acknowledges these possibilities, but grants that we do the best we can with what we have at hand.

The second reason why presuppositionalism is invalid is that it is suceptible to counterexamples. For instance, one could presuppose atheistic nihilism as a worldview, and note both its coherence (it is not internally contradictoty) and its explanatory power and scope (it explains morality, esthetics, origins, knowledge, etc.), making it an equally valid worldview to Christian theism, on presuppositionalism.

I suppose this would depend upon what one means by "explains." Nihilism as I am most familiar with it "explains" morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc in terms of the historical development of these terms as used in society, but as it does so it invalidates morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc as morality, aesthetics, and knowledge instead of mere grasps for power. As such, it would seem that nihilism would have reduced explanatory scope, as it cannot account for knowledge as knowledge, morality as morality, aesthetics as aesthetics, but only morality, knowledge, and aesthetics as power. Indeed, in the end all nihilism has is power, or even nihil: nothing.

How this is equal in explanatory scope I do not know.

Without starting from an unbiased perspective (well, as unbiased as is humanly possible), one's thoughts will not lead to truth, but simply to a worldview that fits her personal preference.

But how unbiased is humanly possible?

[Haven]

Your view of presuppositionalism sounds very close to Reformed epistemology, in fact, nearly identical. I understand your point on bias -- obviously all people have it. However, I find it more rational to minimize the number of assumptions in constructing a coherent worldview. The assumption of Christianity seems unnecessary to me; I'm sure you disagree.

I disagree with your critique of nihilism. You seem to be saying that a reduction of knowledge, morality, etc. to human constructs is unsatisfactory, but you don't give a reason beyond your own aesthetic feeling. Why is that?

Also, the statement that "X does not exist" / "X is socially constructed" / "X is a form of power" still explains X, offering both explanatory power and scope. In this sense, I reiterate that nihilism is on par with RE / Christian presuppositionalism, offering a sound counterexample.