The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Haven]

I was not familiar with W.D. Ross, but from what I've read on the website you directed me to, I don't see how Ross really helps you escape nihilism . . .

Three things:

(1) A variant of Ross' theory, sometimes called moral sense theory, claims that human beings are capable of sensing morality in the same way that one can sense beauty or aesthetic goodness. It is not based on any deeper ontology, but simply an apparent fact about the human experience. Yes, it is a presupposition -- and a faith-based one at that -- but I don't see how that puts the non-theist into any worse position than your own, which you have admitted is both presuppositional and faith-based.

But I do not see where his theory, accepted on presupposition or intuition, is superior to Christian Trinitarianism, as it still runs afoul of the problems regarding epistemology and subjectivity which we have discussed before.

The secular moral realist could avoid the epistemic problem by relying on "moral sense," i.e., empiricism. As moral feelings are immediately available to the senses, no further epistemic justification is needed to explain them. As for the problem of subjectivity, one can avoid that by appealing to pragmatism -- i.e., the vast, vast majority of human beings are (and always have been) in agreement on certain fundamental moral values (to use Ross' words: fidelity, non-maleficience, maximizing good, etc.), so it seems reasonable to (on the basis of faith) assume such values objective and binding for pragmatic reasons.

. . . and furthermore, what happens when an individual who does not share this intuition (i.e. a sociopath) fails to comply to the moral standard? . . . But are we naturally good? Or are we naturally sinful? (And does Ross' system even allow us to sensibly ask this question?) If it seems intuitive to a majority throughout history to kill the foreigner when he enters your territory, does that make violence moral by intuition?

I don't understand this criticism. Does the fact that some people are born blind or experience visual hallucinations cause us to question the use of sight as a valid epistemic tool?

I assume, as a presupposition, that humans are naturally good. The term "sinful" makes no sense outside of Abrahamic monotheism, so I'll dismiss it as meaningless.

I'm also curious as to how Ross can overcome Hume's objection that we cannot move from the "is" to the "ought."

The same way the trinitarian theist overcomes it: by a subjective appeal to teleology (if I want to accomplish X, I ought to do X; if I want to be good, I ought to not murder, if I want to practice fidelity, I ought to tell the truth, etc.).

So, you've made a promise. Supposing that even creates an objective duty or obligation, why ought you fulfill that obligation?

I ought to fulfill it to be a faithful, and hence good, person.

It also seems that Ross is mostly presenting his ideas in relation to utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, but I see no dialogue between Ross and virtue ethicists or theological ethicists. That makes it difficult to deduce in what areas he may be superior.

When Ross claims "there is a system of moral truth, as objective as all truth must be, which, and whose implications, we are interested in discovering" but he claims that the discovery is by intuition and not by empiricism. If we are, based on intuition, allowed to accept moral truths, why can we not, on intuition, and along with a majority of humanity across history, accept spiritual truths on intuition as well?

I'm no longer an atheist, so I don't have any problem with individuals accepting "spiritual truths" on intuition, or, on sense, which is more germane to moral sense theory. I simply don't find god's existence / nonexistence relevant.


As for fundamentalist / conservative Christianity, I'd say the fact that its logically impossible view of personhood (substance dualism), the philosophical conundrum of the problem of evil, and the empirical evidence against it (mind monism, evolution, Bible errors and contradictions) do well to refute it as a serious intellectual contender.

[theopoesis]

(1) A variant of Ross' theory, sometimes called moral sense theory, claims that human beings are capable of sensing morality in the same way that one can sense beauty or aesthetic goodness. It is not based on any deeper ontology, but simply an apparent fact about the human experience. Yes, it is a presupposition -- and a faith-based one at that -- but I don't see how that puts the non-theist into any worse position than your own, which you have admitted is both presuppositional and faith-based.

I think we have to assess worldviews as a whole, and this is where Ross would seem different from Christianity. I don't yet see how his ideas can justify epistemology or overcome the problem of subjectivity.

But I do not see where his theory, accepted on presupposition or intuition, is superior to Christian Trinitarianism, as it still runs afoul of the problems regarding epistemology and subjectivity which we have discussed before.

The secular moral realist could avoid the epistemic problem by relying on "moral sense," i.e., empiricism. As moral feelings are immediately available to the senses, no further epistemic justification is needed to explain them. As for the problem of subjectivity, one can avoid that by appealing to pragmatism -- i.e., the vast, vast majority of human beings are (and always have been) in agreement on certain fundamental moral values (to use Ross' words: fidelity, non-maleficience, maximizing good, etc.), so it seems reasonable to (on the basis of faith) assume such values objective and binding for pragmatic reasons.

I was not speaking of the problem of epistemology and subjectivity with respect to morality, but of the problem of epistemology and subjectivity in general. The sort of thing I brought up in my last post about nihilism.

. . . and furthermore, what happens when an individual who does not share this intuition (i.e. a sociopath) fails to comply to the moral standard? . . . But are we naturally good? Or are we naturally sinful? (And does Ross' system even allow us to sensibly ask this question?) If it seems intuitive to a majority throughout history to kill the foreigner when he enters your territory, does that make violence moral by intuition?

I don't understand this criticism. Does the fact that some people are born blind or experience visual hallucinations cause us to question the use of sight as a valid epistemic tool?

Perhaps a better analogy is not sociopaths and the blind. Perhaps we would question sight if one person saw a tree, another a helicopter, and another their grandmother, all when looking at the same object.

There just hasn't been the degree of unanimity we need to empirically derive moral values. Take, for example, the basic wrong of killing a baby. Surely, this is wrong, isn't it? But we can look across the ages and see numerous cultures who did not think this was the case. In ancient Rome, the father could choose whether or not to accept a baby as born in his likeness. If he did not accept the baby, it was left exposed to die. In ancient Canaan, Moab, and Edom, babies and children were sacrificed in the fire to various gods. In some African cultures, if twins were born they were left exposed to die. In modern day China, due to restrictions on number of children, it is common for baby girls to be abandoned and left for dead or to be killed. And then there is the entire question of abortion, practiced in ancient, medieval, and modern cultures. These are just examples I am aware of on the top of my head; I didn't even spend a second in research.

Sociopaths are just one statistically significant group (maybe 5%) who would not share your moral intuition. But there are entire cultures who would not share your moral intuition, simply because moral intuition is culturally shaped. Therefore, I object to the idea that it can find a "moral truth" that is "axiomatically there." Such axioms are merely a reification of one's cultural perspective, and thereby a cultural imperialism toward others by declaring those who disagree "blind" (in your terminology) or of "[in]sufficient mental maturity" to use Ross's. How valid can an empirical approach to ethics that measures intuition be if it invalidates as blind or immature those perspectives whose intuition is different from its own?

I assume, as a presupposition, that humans are naturally good. The term "sinful" makes no sense outside of Abrahamic monotheism, so I'll dismiss it as meaningless.

A more charitable thing to do would be to attempt to translate the idea of "sinful" into a word you are willing to accept, such as "evil" or "wrong" or "immoral" or "not good." Dismissing a meaningful word as meaningless precludes discussion.

Translated, the question remains: are people intrinsically good, or intrinsically evil? If good, then how do we explain war, crime, violence, abuse, injustice, hatred, racism, political corruption, slavery, or genocide? If evil, then why do we trust humanity's moral intuition?

I'm also curious as to how Ross can overcome Hume's objection that we cannot move from the "is" to the "ought."

The same way the trinitarian theist overcomes it: by a subjective appeal to teleology (if I want to accomplish X, I ought to do X; if I want to be good, I ought to not murder, if I want to practice fidelity, I ought to tell the truth, etc.).

Teleology is a word that refers to design or purpose. When I mention teleology, I refer to a divine teleology coupled with a human one. The divine teleology is important because there is an actual design which yields good results. A non-theist following Ross cannot appeal to teleology in the same way.

Furthermore: (1) Without ontological content, the obvious benefit for doing the good that Trinitarianism posits is not there; (2) an objective good that yields a universal answer to how to fulfill the desire to be good seems inscrutable given cultural relativism; (3) if Ross requires empiricism, statements like this can at best be hypotheses, always subject to being abandoned in light of new evidence. Moral certainty is impossible.

When Ross claims "there is a system of moral truth, as objective as all truth must be, which, and whose implications, we are interested in discovering" but he claims that the discovery is by intuition and not by empiricism. If we are, based on intuition, allowed to accept moral truths, why can we not, on intuition, and along with a majority of humanity across history, accept spiritual truths on intuition as well?

I'm no longer an atheist, so I don't have any problem with individuals accepting "spiritual truths" on intuition, or, on sense, which is more germane to moral sense theory. I simply don't find god's existence / nonexistence relevant.

Noted. However, if you grant the validity of intuitive knowledge of morals, and now also of the intuitive knowledge of the spiritual realm, wouldn't that undermine the ignostic position towards God? If intuitive spiritual knowledge is no longer problematic, then knowledge of God is possible intuitively (if not definitionally, which I grant for the sake of argument), and thus ignosticism fails.

God's existence is a fundamental existential question: Do we view history and the events around us as random, or as purposeful? Do we view our identity in terms of the image of God and the ransomed children of God, or do we view our identity in terms of our relationships with earthly beings? Do we view our mistakes as mistakes against ourselves, requiring our acceptance to move on, or do we view them as against an eternal being, and seek an eternal forgiveness? Do we view the world in immanent terms, or do we try to understand the transcendent? Do we view death as the end of existence, or as the last opportunity to live in this world in a way that honors God, and as the beginning of a new life?

As for fundamentalist / conservative Christianity, I'd say the fact that its logically impossible view of personhood (substance dualism), the philosophical conundrum of the problem of evil, and the empirical evidence against it (mind monism, evolution, Bible errors and contradictions) do well to refute it as a serious intellectual contender.

As I noted before, you have done nothing to establish the logical impossibility of substance dualism, and exegetes throughout history, though a minority, have interpreted the Bible in monistic terms.

I do not view myself as a fundamentalist, but I do view myself as a conservative Christian. And our conversations have yet to convince me that my views are not "a serious intellectual contender." This is for two reasons:

First, while it is quite common to see you make grandiose statements about what is "logically impossible" or to see sweeping generalizations about the lack of evidence, whenever we probe these claims, they wind up being smoke. Anselm's substitutionary atonement, for example, began as logically impossible and ridiculous nonsense. By the end of our discussion on it, you claimed it was only counterintuitive. Most recently, in this thread, the purported evidence overwhelmingly pointed to the historical falsehood of the entire old testament narrative. As soon as I point out archaeological evidence for David, or longstanding tradition of interpreting Genesis allegorically even prior to the development of the theory of evolution, you cease debating and change your position.

Second, this changing of position seems in some ways telling. Whereas you once claimed nihilistic atheism and ignosticism, now you denounce nihilism openly and tacitly deny ignosticism by allowing for the validity of spiritual intuition. You previously granted that this was partly as a result of a conversation with me. The changes in position seem to indicate to me at least that my conservative version of Christianity was able to raise significant enough challenges to nihilism of this variety as to prompt you to abandon it. A significant achievement for a worldview that isn't a "serious contender."

Now I don't want to be vain enough to suggest that I am exclusively (or even anything near mostly) responsible for this recent change. But I do not think it vain to affirm that conservative Christianity can, in fact, be a serious contender. And in my book, you have yet to level a significant challenge to it.

[Haven]

Thanks for responding! I'll post a long (very long) response providing evidence for my worldview in a few days . . . I'm busy with school at the moment. Still, I'll give a short response, and I apologize for not backing up my arguments.

I think we have to assess worldviews as a whole, and this is where Ross would seem different from Christianity. I don't yet see how his ideas can justify epistemology or overcome the problem of subjectivity.

His ideas don't attempt to deal with those problems directly, only offer a coherent moral theory compatible with non-theism. Although I can't speak for Ross, my personal view is to take a "foundherentist" epistemology, based on Haack's ideas, working from generally accepted axioms (the reality of the external universe, the reliability of the senses, the accuracy of logic and reason, etc.) and testing / comparing various worldviews (belief sets) for coherence. Although such an epistemic system (as, I would argue, are all epistemic systems) is prone to some level of subjectivity, I feel it is, at the very least, equivalent in status to your trinitarian epistemology.

Perhaps a better analogy is not sociopaths and the blind. Perhaps we would question sight if one person saw a tree, another a helicopter, and another their grandmother, all when looking at the same object. There just hasn't been the degree of unanimity we need to empirically derive moral values. Take, for example, the basic wrong of killing a baby. Surely, this is wrong, isn't it? But we can look across the ages and see numerous cultures who did not think this was the case. In ancient Rome, the father could choose whether or not to accept a baby as born in his likeness. If he did not accept the baby, it was left exposed to die. In ancient Canaan, Moab, and Edom, babies and children were sacrificed in the fire to various gods. In some African cultures, if twins were born they were left exposed to die. In modern day China, due to restrictions on number of children, it is common for baby girls to be abandoned and left for dead or to be killed. And then there is the entire question of abortion, practiced in ancient, medieval, and modern cultures. These are just examples I am aware of on the top of my head; I didn't even spend a second in research.

I would contend that moral opinions don't differ to the degree you insinuate in this above paragraph. For instance, nearly everyone can agree that torturing a child for the purposes of entertainment is evil, while saving an innocent person from a torturous death (ceteris paribus) is good. I doubt you could find a culture in the world that views such things differently.

Also, the moral sense theorist doesn't claim that our moral intuitions are incorrigible, only that they help rational individuals understand moral truths. It is entirely possible for Ross' theory to obtain and for people to be mistaken about what is moral, particularly if those people (your African tribespersons, ANE Molech-worshippers) are in want of education, information, or critical-thinking skills.

How valid can an empirical approach to ethics that measures intuition be if it invalidates as blind or immature those perspectives whose intuition is different from its own?

I think this is a misunderstanding of my position. I don't claim that my intuitions are necessarily right or that moral certainty is possible, I only claim that moral senses (empirical) and moral intuitions help us understand what is right and wrong.

A more charitable thing to do would be to attempt to translate the idea of "sinful" into a word you are willing to accept, such as "evil" or "wrong" or "immoral" or "not good." Dismissing a meaningful word as meaningless precludes discussion. Translated, the question remains: are people intrinsically good, or intrinsically evil? If good, then how do we explain war, crime, violence, abuse, injustice, hatred, racism, political corruption, slavery, or genocide? If evil, then why do we trust humanity's moral intuition?

I apologize.

Good and evil are both features of humanity, and I feel reducing human nature to either "good" or "evil" is a gross oversimplication of a very complex issue. Every person has the potential for good or evil action.

Teleology is a word that refers to design or purpose. When I mention teleology, I refer to a divine teleology coupled with a human one. The divine teleology is important because there is an actual design which yields good results. A non-theist following Ross cannot appeal to teleology in the same way.

Furthermore: (1) Without ontological content, the obvious benefit for doing the good that Trinitarianism posits is not there; (2) an objective good that yields a universal answer to how to fulfill the desire to be good seems inscrutable given cultural relativism; (3) if Ross requires empiricism, statements like this can at best be hypotheses, always subject to being abandoned in light of new evidence. Moral certainty is impossible.

I agree that moral certainty is impossible, and I agree that the theist is in a better position relative to moral teleology (the Euthyphro dilemma notwithstanding). Still, I don't see how this objection is fatal to non-theist moral realism. I'll provide a more detailed critique with my later post.

Noted. However, if you grant the validity of intuitive knowledge of morals, and now also of the intuitive knowledge of the spiritual realm, wouldn't that undermine the ignostic position towards God? If intuitive spiritual knowledge is no longer problematic, then knowledge of God is possible intuitively (if not definitionally, which I grant for the sake of argument), and thus ignosticism fails.

I feel you misunderstood my post on spiritual intuition (granted, it is my fault for not making myself clear -- I see how you could read it that way). I wasn't intending to argue that one could intellectually gain knowledge of the spiritual realm by intuition (I don't believe a spiritual realm exists), I was simply stating that I have no personal problem with others' spiritual beliefs. In short, I was making a pragmatic statement, not an intellectual observation.

God's existence is a fundamental existential question: Do we view history and the events around us as random, or as purposeful? Do we view our identity in terms of the image of God and the ransomed children of God, or do we view our identity in terms of our relationships with earthly beings? Do we view our mistakes as mistakes against ourselves, requiring our acceptance to move on, or do we view them as against an eternal being, and seek an eternal forgiveness? Do we view the world in immanent terms, or do we try to understand the transcendent? Do we view death as the end of existence, or as the last opportunity to live in this world in a way that honors God, and as the beginning of a new life?

I agree such questions are important from an existential and epistemic standpoint. My apatheism rests on a pragmatic concern with daily life, the ins-and-outs of the human experience -- work, love, friendship, family, moral practice, etc. I don't think theism-atheism-ignosticism, etc. is important in that arena, which I feel is far more important than philosophy or intellectualism.

Second, this changing of position seems in some ways telling. Whereas you once claimed nihilistic atheism and ignosticism . . .

I still claim ignosticism, and I still disbelieve in the existence of gods, so I could be considered an atheist (although I no longer choose to identify with the term "atheist" for numerous reasons). Your arguments, along with my moral intuitions and lessons learned from my studies of sociology, have contributed to my change of position on moral matters.

now you denounce nihilism openly and tacitly deny ignosticism by allowing for the validity of spiritual intuition.

See above.

[Haven]

I still think you are wrong about linking up the concepts of denial of the concept of 'personhood' and morality with atheism though. I do see them as ethical and philosophical questions that are not related to atheism.

I agree that such concepts can be compatible with atheism and grounded on secular principles.

[theopoesis]

Thanks for responding! I'll post a long (very long) response providing evidence for my worldview in a few days . . . I'm busy with school at the moment. Still, I'll give a short response, and I apologize for not backing up my arguments.

No worries at all. I'll address this post in due time. For now, Ionian_Tradition gets another for the head to head. Before you too thoroughly defend your worldview, I should let you know that I am moving in about two weeks and then will be out of town the month of July. My conversations here are all wrapping up. Not that you shouldn't post your views, but just a heads up in case you expect a longer debate from me.

[Bust Nak]

I still suppose there is a categorical type of different between the type of thinking involved. However, the more I think about it, the more I think that I need to undertake a study of the physiology of the brain. I've been suggesting that differences between instinct & conscious reasoning, between abstract & conscious reasoning, between functions performable at low IQs & at high IQs, etc. were self evidently different...

Do you know anything about this?

Just the basics. The frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex is responsible for decision making, problem solving and planning, temporal lobe is responsible for language. These two seems relevent to philosophical thinking.

It seems there are definite "levels" of funtions in the brain, from the primitive to advance, corresponding with a particular region of the brain (cerebellum, brainstem etc.) And it seems philosophical is on the same level as language and problem solving.