Arguments against first cause/uncaused cause?

[BearCavalry]

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.

It doesn't prove whether Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Jainists have the right idea about God. It doesn't prove whether God is good or evil. It doesn't prove whether God is a personal, loving entity or something as impersonal as some self-causing physics concept that propogates the galaxy.

But I think it does prove the existence of God if God is defined as an entity so infinitely powerful that it becomes self-causing by permeating all time and space. I just don't logically see how something could come out of nothing. In my opinion, that's an absolute, self-evident truth the way Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is. However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

[Ionian_Tradition]

There could very well be a mind that could form completely new concepts.

There is nothing in our experience which would suggest that this is the case, or that it is even plausible. Concepts are never shown to emerge from nothing. They are always preceded by some prior knowledge. Much in the same way that we do not see a table form from nothing. The table is always preceded by the the material which comprise it. How then do you suggest it is possible for a "new concept" to form in the absence of some prior knowledge from which to construct it? I must admit, this seems like rather spurious ground upon which to found an argument for an intelligent first cause.

An example of a concept that can 'emerge from nothing' and has the added benefit of being related to this topic is this:

The universe has always been. It has no beginning, it has no end. It just is. This concept does not come from prior experience or prior knowledge. Just because every thing else has a prior cause, does not mean the universe needs one too.

It seems to me you required a few bits of knowledge in order to form this concept. Firstly, you needed to know what a universe was in order to conceive of one existing without beginning or end. Secondly you needed to be familiar with what actually constitutes a "beginning" and "end" in order to also deduce what conditions might qualify as their antithesis. Put simply, you required experiential knowledge of the known universe in order to conceive of a conceptually infinite one. I'm not sure this example qualifies as concept emerged from "nothing".

You might as well add 'language' or 'logic' to your list of 'bits of knowledge one is supposed to do without to qualify under your conditions.

Both of which are necessary elements of thought so I suppose they would qualify, yes. That both are derived through experience underscores my point.

If you want to define your conditions that tightly, simply living as a conscious being would disqualify a person from being able to fulfill your conditions. Conditions defined that absolutely render the challenge absurd.

My intention was to test whether or not it is possible for a concept to be born without reference to prior experiential knowledge? If we wish to explore the question thoroughly we must examine the whole not merely the part. I find nothing absurd in this approach. We need to trace concepts back to their source in order to determine if conceptualizations can emerge from truly nothing. This requires the very conditions you deem "too stringent".

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

But I wasn't asking for a concept which refers to an idea foreign to our experience. I was asking for an example of a novel concept which can be derived without calling upon prior knowledge born from experience. A concept, in effect, born from "nothing". You are welcome to take another stab at it if you wish.

I'd be happy to if you can tell me one thing or concept or idea that cannot be related to any other thing, concept or idea.

I can't. I was hoping you could. Are we then in agreement that all concepts are rooted in prior experiential knowledge?

[Danmark]

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

But I wasn't asking for a concept which refers to an idea foreign to our experience. I was asking for an example of a novel concept which can be derived without calling upon prior knowledge born from experience. A concept, in effect, born from "nothing". You are welcome to take another stab at it if you wish.

I'd be happy to if you can tell me one thing or concept or idea that cannot be related to any other thing, concept or idea.

I can't. I was hoping you could. Are we then in agreement that all concepts are rooted in prior experiential knowledge?[/quote]

No we are not in agreement. I have given you an example of a concept that is not 'rooted in prior experiential knowledge' [the concept that the universe has always been and did not need a cause] and your response dismissed that because the concept can be related to other knowledge. I think you are confusing 'concept' with the communication of the concept. I believe you are setting up conditions so stringent that the challenge is meaningless.

We agree that in some way, however attenuated, everything is related to everything.
I stand by my statement that since to our knowledge we have not experienced anything that was not caused by something else, the concept of the universe have always been in existence is a concept that meets the conditions set.
Your disagreement is noted. We can agree to disagree, but I believe the reasons for the disagreement are those I have noted.

[Ionian_Tradition]

My example however, fulfills the conditions set in a meaningful way, because it is a concept we have no experience with, by definition.

But I wasn't asking for a concept which refers to an idea foreign to our experience. I was asking for an example of a novel concept which can be derived without calling upon prior knowledge born from experience. A concept, in effect, born from "nothing". You are welcome to take another stab at it if you wish.

I'd be happy to if you can tell me one thing or concept or idea that cannot be related to any other thing, concept or idea.

I can't. I was hoping you could. Are we then in agreement that all concepts are rooted in prior experiential knowledge?

No we are not in agreement. I have given you an example of a concept that is not 'rooted in prior experiential knowledge' [the concept that the universe has always been and did not need a cause] and your response dismissed that because the concept can be related to other knowledge. I think you are confusing 'concept' with the communication of the concept. I believe you are setting up conditions so stringent that the challenge is meaningless.

I'm afraid I must disagree. The simple fact of the matter is you could never have produced the concept you put forward without reference to prior experiential knowledge (the universe, ends, beginnings). Your reference to this wasn't merely based in a necessity to communicate your thoughts intelligibly. In order for you to conceive your concept you needed prior knowledge with which to contextualize its meaning. How could you conceive of a infinite universe if you did not know what one was? How could you conceive of a universe lacking a beginning and an end if you did not know what the terms "beginning" and "end" refer to? The very meaning of a concept is predicated upon a prior knowledge base. I do not believe I am confusing "concept" with "communication of concept" given that before you could even worry about communicating your concept adequately, you must first understand it yourself. Your understanding of the concept you've created is contingent upon the pre-existing knowledge you used to contextualize it. Therefore, this is not an example of a concept emerging from "nothing" experientially known.

We agree that in some way, however attenuated, everything is related to everything.
I stand by my statement that since to our knowledge we have not experienced anything that was not caused by something else, the concept of the universe have always been in existence is a concept that meets the conditions set.

I grant that the concept refers to a theoretical notion we haven't directly experienced, but the notion itself was predicated upon pre-existing knowledge from which the concept was born. Thus it is not an example of a concept emerging from the absence of experiential knowledge. Perhaps you've misunderstood my question. My question was not "Can we derive theoretical concepts which refer to things foreign to our direct experience?", rather my question was "Can ANY concept be formed without reference to direct experience?".

Your disagreement is noted. We can agree to disagree, but I believe the reasons for the disagreement are those I have noted.

Perhaps our disagreement is due to confusion regarding what was being asked...None the less I respect your opinion.

[StephanM]

Could you refer me to the exact post# where you make this argument?

I'll just retype my answer instead of quoting myself quoting myself from before...

Based on the OP, we're discussing whether or not a first cause proves the concept of a god of some sort, so any discussion assumes a first cause (which is a whole other subject)

Premise A
There was a first cause, which means it was not cause by anything else

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.
... However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

[Goat]

Could you refer me to the exact post# where you make this argument?

I'll just retype my answer instead of quoting myself quoting myself from before...

Based on the OP, we're discussing whether or not a first cause proves the concept of a god of some sort, so any discussion assumes a first cause (which is a whole other subject)

Premise A
There was a first cause, which means it was not cause by anything else

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.
... However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Why should an uncaused cause have a 'mind'? Why must it have intention?

All the 'first cause' argument does is claim there is an uncaused cause. all that means is that there in principle can be uncaused causes.. it makes not claim about the nature of this uncaused cause.. or why there should only be one.

[StephanM]

Could you refer me to the exact post# where you make this argument?

I'll just retype my answer instead of quoting myself quoting myself from before...

Based on the OP, we're discussing whether or not a first cause proves the concept of a god of some sort, so any discussion assumes a first cause (which is a whole other subject)

Premise A
There was a first cause, which means it was not cause by anything else

I've always believed that the argument of first cause/uncaused cause is an unbeatable argument for proving the concept of God.
... However, I was curious if any of the cynics had anything to say.

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Why should an uncaused cause have a 'mind'? Why must it have intention?

All the 'first cause' argument does is claim there is an uncaused cause. all that means is that there in principle can be uncaused causes.. it makes not claim about the nature of this uncaused cause.. or why there should only be one.

I know that the statement that there was a first cause doesn't not claim anything more. I'm saying that like any statement, a first cause can be a logical premise for other statements. I just showed why I think it must have a mind/intention. What part do you not agree with?

[Ionian_Tradition]

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

This isn't necessarily true. Imagine a stack of books which have existed for an eternity. The bottom book is performing the action of holding the books above it in their specific location. In other words, the bottom book is "causing" the books above it to occupy the space that they are. Nothing caused the bottom book to cause the others to occupy their current location. This fact however does not imply that the bottom book "chose" to act in the manner it is. Similarly, this illustration may in fact be analogous to what is implied by a tenseless model, or "B-theory", of time (more commonly understood as the block time/universe suggested by Einsteinian relativity).

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

Here is the crux of the issue. Choice is predicated upon knowledge. A mind cannot choose what a mind does not first know. Knowledge itself is predicated upon experience (either internal or external). This is because, true knowledge is rooted in existent things (that which does not exist cannot be known). To recognize something which exists in reality is to experience it in some form. Therefore if the first cause possessed knowledge concerning what a universe is and how to create it, (from which to make the choice to actually create it) the first cause must first have experienced the properties of which the universe is comprised prior to their own existence. It follows from what I've stated above that this is logically impossible. Therefore, the actions of the first cause cannot meaningfully be construed as conscious "choice".

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Aside from the prior issues I've stated, I find it odd that you seem so comfortable in ascribing to this mind qualities and characteristics you can't be sure are a viable possibility, yet remain quite hesitant in ascribing any of the viable qualities of cognition we understand by virtue of the fact that they are found evident in human minds (except of course for those human cognitive traits which service your argument, such as desire and conscious volition,...Those seem to get a free pass.) If the mind of the first cause is so foreign to us why must we assume it possesses the capacity for desire? This is a human trait after all, is it not?

[StephanM]

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

This isn't necessarily true. Imagine a stack of books which have existed for an eternity. The bottom book is performing the action of holding the books above it in their specific location. In other words, the bottom book is "causing" the books above it to occupy the space that they are. Nothing caused the bottom book to cause the others to occupy their current location. This fact however does not imply that the bottom book "chose" to act in the manner it is. Similarly, this illustration may in fact be analogous to what is implied by a tenseless model, or "B-theory", of time (more commonly understood as the block time/universe suggested by Einsteinian relativity).

It'll take some more time to think about this one.

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

Here is the crux of the issue. Choice is predicated upon knowledge. A mind cannot choose what a mind does not first know. Knowledge itself is predicated upon experience (either internal or external). This is because, true knowledge is rooted in existent things (that which does not exist cannot be known). To recognize something which exists in reality is to experience it in some form. Therefore if the first cause possessed knowledge concerning what a universe is and how to create it, (from which to make the choice to actually create it) the first cause must first have experienced the properties of which the universe is comprised prior to their own existence. It follows from what I've stated above that this is logically impossible. Therefore, the actions of the first cause cannot meaningfully be construed as conscious "choice".

I don't agree that the concept of knowledge requires that it must be gained through experience. For example: say some mind thinks of a completely new concept, and then knows what that concept would taste like on a Ritz cracker. Whether or not a human mind can think of a completely new concept is not important, since humans minds are not the only potential minds.

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Aside from the prior issues I've stated, I find it odd that you seem so comfortable in ascribing to this mind qualities and characteristics you can't be sure are a viable possibility, yet remain quite hesitant in ascribing any of the viable qualities of cognition we understand by virtue of the fact that they are found evident in human minds (except of course for those human cognitive traits which service your argument, such as desire and conscious volition,...Those seem to get a free pass.) If the mind of the first cause is so foreign to us why must we assume it possesses the capacity for desire? This is a human trait after all, is it not?

I'm not using the cognitive traits to prove anything, and I'm not assuming anything about the mind in question. I'm using deductive reasoning; starting from premises, and reaching conclusions about the traits and existence of the mind in question.

[Ionian_Tradition]

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

Here is the crux of the issue. Choice is predicated upon knowledge. A mind cannot choose what a mind does not first know. Knowledge itself is predicated upon experience (either internal or external). This is because, true knowledge is rooted in existent things (that which does not exist cannot be known). To recognize something which exists in reality is to experience it in some form. Therefore if the first cause possessed knowledge concerning what a universe is and how to create it, (from which to make the choice to actually create it) the first cause must first have experienced the properties of which the universe is comprised prior to their own existence. It follows from what I've stated above that this is logically impossible. Therefore, the actions of the first cause cannot meaningfully be construed as conscious "choice".

I don't agree that the concept of knowledge requires that it must be gained through experience. For example: say some mind thinks of a completely new concept, and then knows what that concept would taste like on a Ritz cracker. Whether or not a human mind can think of a completely new concept is not important, since humans minds are not the only potential minds.

If the concept correlates with taste and can be applied to a consumable product (such as a Ritz cracker) then the concept is obviously predicated upon prior experiential knowledge concerning what taste and consumption is like. The concept wasn't born in the absence of this knowledge, rather it was formed from it. If prior experiential knowledge concerning taste and consumption was not present within the mind which composed this new concept, the concept would be bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts cannot produce truly coherent concepts. I would go further to argue that uncontextualized thoughts do not even exist. I believe they are quite literally "non-thought". For this reason, I believe your analogy demonstrates nicely why all novel concepts require a prior base of experiential knowledge in order to form.

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Aside from the prior issues I've stated, I find it odd that you seem so comfortable in ascribing to this mind qualities and characteristics you can't be sure are a viable possibility, yet remain quite hesitant in ascribing any of the viable qualities of cognition we understand by virtue of the fact that they are found evident in human minds (except of course for those human cognitive traits which service your argument, such as desire and conscious volition,...Those seem to get a free pass.) If the mind of the first cause is so foreign to us why must we assume it possesses the capacity for desire? This is a human trait after all, is it not?

I'm not using the cognitive traits to prove anything, and I'm not assuming anything about the mind in question. I'm using deductive reasoning; starting from premises, and reaching conclusions about the traits and existence of the mind in question.

Per my objections above, I'm not yet certain your premises, made in reference to human cognitive traits familiar to you, are sound. Thus the conclusions you've drawn do not seem to follow.

[StephanM]

Premise C
Any entity that can make a choice has a mind

Here is the crux of the issue. Choice is predicated upon knowledge. A mind cannot choose what a mind does not first know. Knowledge itself is predicated upon experience (either internal or external). This is because, true knowledge is rooted in existent things (that which does not exist cannot be known). To recognize something which exists in reality is to experience it in some form. Therefore if the first cause possessed knowledge concerning what a universe is and how to create it, (from which to make the choice to actually create it) the first cause must first have experienced the properties of which the universe is comprised prior to their own existence. It follows from what I've stated above that this is logically impossible. Therefore, the actions of the first cause cannot meaningfully be construed as conscious "choice".

I don't agree that the concept of knowledge requires that it must be gained through experience. For example: say some mind thinks of a completely new concept, and then knows what that concept would taste like on a Ritz cracker. Whether or not a human mind can think of a completely new concept is not important, since humans minds are not the only potential minds.

If the concept correlates with taste and can be applied to a consumable product (such as a Ritz cracker) then the concept is obviously predicated upon prior experiential knowledge concerning what taste and consumption is like. The concept wasn't born in the absence of this knowledge, rather it was formed from it. If prior experiential knowledge concerning taste and consumption was not present within the mind which composed this new concept, the concept would be bereft of context. Uncontextualized thoughts cannot produce truly coherent concepts. I would go further to argue that uncontextualized thoughts do not even exist. I believe they are quite literally "non-thought". For this reason, I believe your analogy demonstrates nicely why all novel concepts require a prior base of experiential knowledge in order to form.

In this situation, the thing itself is completely new, and has some aspects that are common to things we see, and some aspects which are completely foreign. Even then, there could very well be some mind that thinks of something completely new with nothing that we would understand whatsoever. For a human mind to think of something completely without context, that would seem to me to be non-thought, too. But then again, I could be wrong. Just because I can't fathom it doesn't mean it can't exist. If I tell a mentally handicapped person that the moon exists, and he can't fathom that, it doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. If some super-genius tells me that he thought of something completely new, so new that he couldn't even describe it to me, then if I used that argument, it would be completely ineffective. A supreme, ideal mind would have even less potential limit than even the best human mind, so to argue from the human mind without a logical link to all potential minds is pointless.

A & B = D
The entity that performed the first cause chose the action

D & C = E
The entity that performed the first case had a mind

So what we have here is a common premise (first cause), combined with a couple premises of my own leading to a conclusion. Nothing in this conclusion states that the entity's mind must be like our own, so any appeal to the inability of the human mind to do something is irrelevant. In fact, since this entity by logic must have a mind, the more inadequacies we see in our own mind, the more impressive the mind if his entity is in comparison.

Aside from the prior issues I've stated, I find it odd that you seem so comfortable in ascribing to this mind qualities and characteristics you can't be sure are a viable possibility, yet remain quite hesitant in ascribing any of the viable qualities of cognition we understand by virtue of the fact that they are found evident in human minds (except of course for those human cognitive traits which service your argument, such as desire and conscious volition,...Those seem to get a free pass.) If the mind of the first cause is so foreign to us why must we assume it possesses the capacity for desire? This is a human trait after all, is it not?

I'm not using the cognitive traits to prove anything, and I'm not assuming anything about the mind in question. I'm using deductive reasoning; starting from premises, and reaching conclusions about the traits and existence of the mind in question.

Per my objections above, I'm not yet certain your premises, made in reference to human cognitive traits familiar to you, are sound. Thus the conclusions you've drawn do not seem to follow.

Good.

What is a real choice? Doing something because you were (completely or partially) caused may or may not be a real choice; but certainly doing something completely free of any outside cause would be a real choice.

Premise B
Any entity that performs an action (such as a cause) which was not caused by anything else is choosing the action

This isn't necessarily true. Imagine a stack of books which have existed for an eternity. The bottom book is performing the action of holding the books above it in their specific location. In other words, the bottom book is "causing" the books above it to occupy the space that they are. Nothing caused the bottom book to cause the others to occupy their current location. This fact however does not imply that the bottom book "chose" to act in the manner it is. Similarly, this illustration may in fact be analogous to what is implied by a tenseless model, or "B-theory", of time (more commonly understood as the block time/universe suggested by Einsteinian relativity).

The force of gravity and the nuclear forces are in a tug-of-war, with gravity trying to pull the book into the center of the earth (and the books into each other), and the nuclear forces away from the surface of the earth (and each other) because the book is in a location where both forces will act accordingly. (I'll eliminate the stack for simplicity's sake since I don't see how it adds to the conversation considering the earth has to be there). What caused the book and the earth to be in their current locations? There are 4 possible conditions.

1) They have always been in their locations for an infinite past.
This results in no cause at all since no states have changed. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

2) They have always been in their locations for a finite past.
Nothing has happened since the moment that they came into existence. This would require some sort of entity that can bring things into existence. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

3) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

4) They have moved into that position some time during an infinite past.
It's unknown what dislodged the book from its previous location. (Not evidence of a non-choosing uncaused causing entity)

More importantly, even if such a thing was evidence for an non-choosing uncaused causing entity, it seems to me to be an a priori definition of choice that it is any uncaused action by an entity. In that case, the truth of the statement is my starting point, and I would have to see evidence supporting that such a thing existed, not merely conjecture.

For example, I find it to be an a priori statement that I'm not a cyborg. If you make an argument based on me being a cyborg, I'm going to tell you that it's possible, but my position remains unchanged until you show conjure some keyword that makes me stand on my head, or show me an x-ray of my head full of metal.