Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...How dare you accuse me of "repeating" arguments...

Consider this my third and final invitation for you to contribute to this thread per the parameters of the OP and post #201.

[EduChris]

I don't see your logic here at all. For example, the statement, "It might be the case that nothing exists," runs afoul of the obvious fact of our existence. Therefore, it cannot possibly be the case that "nothing exists."

But it can, that's the point. In some possible universe there might be nothing.

If it is possible for a universe to consist of nothing, then everything in our universe is contingent--just as I have claimed all along.

On the other hand, if we say, "It might be the case that no leprechauns exist," that statement is not contradicted by logic or by any known body of facts.

For any one possible world either they exist or they don't. If infact they don't, then by your argument, they don't exist necessarily. If infact they do, then they do necessarily. What you are calling a contingent, is simply an unknown.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

Leprechauns might exist in some possible universe, but it is not immediately and obviously necessary (logically or empirically) that any should actually exist in any universe. Therefore, we are justified in assuming that leprechauns are contingent.

What possibility? Your reasoning have rule that out, everything is necessarity true because they match certain facts or necessarity false because they don't match any facts...

Something is "necessary" if it exists in all possible worlds. Something is "impossible" if it exists in zero possible worlds. Something is contingent if it exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible words.

Is the statement China is in Europe contingent? It runs afoul of the obvious fact that China is in Asia. Would you therefore conclude that, it cannot possibly be the case that "China is in Europe"?

It might well be the case that there is a possible world in which there is a country named "China" which is located on a continent named "Europe." The fact that all possible universes needn't have a country named "China" located on a continent called "Asia" is all the demonstration we need that the naming of our countries and continents is a contingent phenomenon.

In some possible universe, God exist, in other universes, God don't exist...

Per the OP, God is not an entity which is confined to any particular universe. God is the logically necessary, source and fount of all possibility (and possible universes, including our own, are a subset of all possibility).

Again I am not following your logic. The "something" which "exists necessarily" is "that which gives rise to any and all actualities." There cannot not exist this "something which gives rise to any and all actualities" if in fact anything at all (such as our universe) exists.

But that "something" is not in any world, as opposed to something that is in every world - there are worlds where nothing exists. This "something" makes the possibility of nothing existing possible.

It might be the case that at least one "nothing universe is possible. But our universe is evidently also possible, and our universe is not "nothing"; therefore, a "nothing universe," if it can exist, can only exist contingently. Our universe also exists, and it is contingent. The existence of the full set of possible universes (of which our universe is one member) demonstrates that the prior probability for this set of universes must have been greater than zero. The source and fount from which the full set of universes derives, is logically necessary. The universes themselves are contingent.

But regarding personal agency, non-theism relies on an assumption of "impossible," which pertains to all possible worlds.

No, non-theism relies on one assumption - that it "isn't" in this world.

If the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility involves any element of personal agency at all, then theism is the case. Non-theism therefore must insist that for each and every possible universe, there can be no personal agency involved in any way for the actualization of that universe.

The theist's assumption of "possible," is more privitive since it need pertain to only one possible world.

Just like the non-theist position.

No. See above.

[scourge99]

On the other hand, if we say, "It might be the case that no leprechauns exist," that statement is not contradicted by logic or by any known body of facts.

For any one possible world either they exist or they don't. If infact they don't, then by your argument, they don't exist necessarily. If infact they do, then they do necessarily. What you are calling a contingent, is simply an unknown.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

[EduChris]

... If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

God is not an entity which exists in a universe; rather, God is the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility; God "exists" independently from any and all universes.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is less than personal, or not. To assume it is less-than-personal is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal. Non-theism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Theism, by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-personal. Theism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-theism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

[Bust Nak]

If it is possible for a universe to consist of nothing, then everything in our universe is contingent--just as I have claimed all along.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

Something is "necessary" if it exists in all possible worlds. Something is "impossible" if it exists in zero possible worlds. Something is contingent if it exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible words.

Correct, now apply this logic to the statement "something exist" and acknowledge that you were incorrect when you stated "something exists necessarily."

It might well be the case that there is a possible world in which there is a country named "China" which is located on a continent named "Europe." The fact that all possible universes needn't have a country named "China" located on a continent called "Asia" is all the demonstration we need that the naming of our countries and continents is a contingent phenomenon.

But according to you, "nothing at all exists" is immediately and instantly contradicted by the fact that we do exist. Since we cannot negate the statement, "something exists," without facing instant and obvious contradiction, it follows that something exists necessarily.

Why doesn't the fact that "China is in Europe" is immediately and instantly contradicted by the fact that China is in Asia, lead you to the conclude that since China isn't in Europe cannot be negated without facing instant and obvious contradicted, it follows that China isn't in Europe necessarily?

Per the OP, God is not an entity which is confined to any particular universe. God is the logically necessary, source and fount of all possibility (and possible universes, including our own, are a subset of all possibility).

Ok, would you agree that then if you make assumption on this "God" you aren't assuming anything about any possible worlds, let alone all possible worlds?

It might be the case that at least one "nothing universe is possible. But our universe is evidently also possible, and our universe is not "nothing"; therefore, a "nothing universe," if it can exist, can only exist contingently. Our universe also exists, and it is contingent. The existence of the full set of possible universes (of which our universe is one member) demonstrates that the prior probability for this set of universes must have been greater than zero. The source and fount from which the full set of universes derives, is logically necessary. The universes themselves are contingent.

Granted.

If the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility involves any element of personal agency at all, then theism is the case.

Well, there is still the part of the counter-argument that if any element of impersonal agency is involve, the personal part is constrained, and hence not the source of all possibility, but I will set that aside for now. I grant that "God" has to have no element of personal agency at all, for non-theism is the case.

Non-theism therefore must insist that for each and every possible universe, there can be no personal agency involved in any way for the actualization of that universe.

By your argment, theism must insist that for for each and every possible universe, there is be some element of personal agency involved in the way for the actualization of that universe.

Alternatively, and I think this is simplier: I assume one thing, that no element of personal agency is involved. You assume the opposite, that some element of personal agency is involved. Either way your standard and normal epistemological rules argument is debunked.

[scourge99]

... If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

God is not an entity which exists in a universe; rather, God is the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility; God "exists" independently from any and all universes.

Ok. So you've kicked the can down the road. So god doesn't "exist" in a universe but instead in some meta-universe. Therefore the same question applies to the meta-universe. Is it possible that this meta-universe that god "exists" in does not necessarily exist or could be different? I think the answer is yes.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

But we are talking about possibilities here. You agreed before that our universe need not exist. Have you changed your mind? Is our universe now necessary (and therefore its not contingent)? If our universe isn't necessary then referencing its existence isn't proof that whatever it is contingent upon is necessary (I.E., god).

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is less than personal, or not. To assume it is less-than-personal is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal. Non-theism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Theism, by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-personal. Theism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-theism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is not less than malevolent. To assume it is less-than-malevolent is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-malevolent. Non-malevolentism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Malevolentism , by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-malevolent. Malevolentism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-malevolentism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

Why can "not-less-than-personal" be substituted with any number of other adjectives?

[Ionian_Tradition]

...All true thought, if it is to be named such, requires contextualization to some degree...

How do we know this?

Uncontextualized thoughts are logically incoherent and therefore cannot constitute intelligent thought. Consider the concept of "pain". "Pain" as a concept is only made intelligible with reference to physical sensation. In the absence of experiential knowledge regarding what physical sensation implies, the concept of "pain" could never be coherently formed ("pain" without reference to sensation is a contradiction in terms). Thus physical sensation serves as the contextual framework from which the concept of "pain" derives its coherency.

This same principle applies for all thoughts. There is no coherent thought which can exist which is not first made in reference to some subjective experience. Again, this is because experiential knowledge provides the contextual framework from which coherent thoughts are formed. It will be incumbent upon you to show why this need not be the case if you wish to pose a serious challenge to the argument I have presented.

Why should we believe it to be true?

Because its negation would render all thought uncontextualized, and thus logically incoherent.

When do we know that the "to some degree" turns into "to some sufficient degree"?

The degree to which experiential context renders thoughts coherent is the degree to which it is sufficient.

...Experience is that which provides thought its context...

Experience of what? The material world? How do we know that the material world exists? All we know with any certainty is that "thoughts are occurring."

The material world may or may not be an illusion, but this is more or less irrelevant to the point. The fact remains that minds experience what is perceived to be a "material world". Such experiences provide the contextual framework within which coherent thoughts concerning a perceived reality are capable of forming. If the "material world" (illusion or not) was entirely divorced from experience, no thoughts concerning it would occur.

...In order for a mind to form substantive thoughts, it must rely on its own subjective experience to apply to its thoughts the necessary measure of context true thought demands...

Even if this were true of a finite mind, what evidence do we have that this is true for a mind which provides the context for all reality?

Context is acquired through experience. If this mind provides the context for anything, it will be context born from experience. By what means then has this mind gained experiential knowledge of itself? Surely not by touch, taste, smell, sight or hearing, lest you posit this mind as something material. The only remaining alternative left to a immaterial mind would be experience acquired through the awareness of its own thoughts. However, as my argument has shown, thought cannot be experienced before it exists. Given that thought is contingent upon experience, the "non-contingent" mind of God seems be bereft of any viable means by which to begin thinking. Minds that cannot think are no minds at all. If thoughts are contingent upon experience in order to produce a functional (personal) mind, the person of God would seem to be quite contingent indeed.

...We might then say that thought is contingent upon experience...

Or we might say that finite experience is contingent upon possibilities actualized from the imagination of unbounded thought.

Imagination implies coherent conceptualization. Concepts require context in order to be made intelligible. Context is only acquired through subjective experience. I fear you're putting the cart before the horse my friend.

...A immaterial mind, by nature, lacks the physical apparatus necessary to experience anything beyond its own thoughts...

How do we know this? How many immaterial minds have you studied?

Well for one, if such a mind preceded the genesis of all things then I suppose experiential knowledge concerning such things would be somewhat absent prior to their very existence. Moreover, I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space". In order for a non-spacial mind to experience spacial occupancy it must first cease to be what it is (a non-spacially located mind). As previously mentioned, this would imply the existence of space prior to the point where God actually conceived the concept which resulted in its creation. Quite the set of utterly absurd contradictions, if I may be so bold in saying.

...Therefore, it naturally requires experience of its own thoughts in order to form the contextual basis for intelligible thoughts conducive with personhood...

Why cannot thought provide its own contextual basis?

It can, provided it can be experienced. Unfortunately, experience of thought is required in order to conceive it. Thought cannot be experienced before it is conceived, thus thought alone cannot provide the contextual basis required in order to bring thought into existence.

...The experience of thought required to contextualize, and thus conceive, any intelligible thought cannot precede the existence of thought itself...

It must proceed in temporal sequence? What if unbounded thought is not arbitrarily limited in any spatio-temporal dimensions?

Context, derived from experience, is both logically and ontologically prior to thought itself. This certainly denotes a contingency you say the personal mind of God intrinsically lacks and also demonstrates why experiential context must precede the formation of all thought. If you place a thought in ontological priority over the contextual frame work from which it was derived, paradox invariably ensues.

...Therefore we may draw the following conclusions...

This argument begins and ends with assumptions which cannot be supported through evidence or reason; therefore, nothing whatsoever can be concluded.

Pardon my candor, but you've demonstrated nothing of the kind. The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.

[EduChris]

...The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.

Unfortunately, if untethered assumptions, unsupportable by logic or evidence, are all there is to work with, then there is nothing left to do but say, "You may assume whatever you wish, but I am not interested in debating untethered assumptions."

If there is a mind which provides the context for all contingencies, including our material world, then it is futile to prescribe for such a mind the same limitations which pertain to contingent, arbitrarily limited minds such as we possess.

[scourge99]

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is less than personal, or not. To assume it is less-than-personal is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal. Non-theism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Theism, by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-personal. Theism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-theism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

Another problem i see is that its false that non-theism assumes that every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal.

Non-theism (per your definition) is the position that theism need not be the case. Thus, non-theism must only maintain that in at least one possible universe the source of all possibility is not less than personal. That satisfies the condition that theism need not be the case.

On the flip side, theism must assert that the source of all possibility is not less than personal AND that this universe, of all possible universes, is such a universe. Theism is NOT the claim that theism is possible. Its the claim that theism is the case.

I think its clear which is assuming more.

[EduChris]

... you've kicked the can down the road...god doesn't "exist" in a universe but instead in some meta-universe. Therefore the same question applies to the meta-universe. Is it possible that this meta-universe that god "exists" in does not necessarily exist or could be different? I think the answer is yes...

Once you have arrived at "logical necessity," the can cannot be kicked any further down the epistemological road; it has reached its final, ultimate endpoint. Logical necessity neither requires nor entertains any further explanation than its own necessity; it cannot not be, and that is that. There is nothing left to explain once you have arrived at logical necessity.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

But we are talking about possibilities here. You agreed before that our universe need not exist. Have you changed your mind? Is our universe now necessary (and therefore its not contingent)? If our universe isn't necessary then referencing its existence isn't proof that whatever it is contingent upon is necessary (I.E., god)....

Our universe need not have existed. Similarly, the "nothing universe" need not exist. But if the "nothing universe" is a possible universe, than any "non-nothing universe" is contingent. And if any universe(s) other than (and different from) our universe is possible, then our universe (and the other possible universe[s]) are likewise contingent.

If no universe of any kind existed, then no one would be around to wonder whether or not there was any logically necessary source and fount of all possibility. But as soon as any possible universe is actualized, all of a sudden the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility tips its hand; there is no longer any doubt that the source and fount of all possibility is indeed necessary, since without it there could have been no possibility for any contingent universe to have become actualized.

...Why can "not-less-than-personal" be substituted with any number of other adjectives?

Epistemology does not permit you to just "insert" any adjective you want. In the case of personal agency, it is an object of scrutiny by the fact that it is one of only two known causal mechanisms. We see that there must be some causal mechanism involved in the process of turning a merely "possible" universe into an "actualized" universe. Which causal mechanism might be responsible? It might be necessity, or it might be personal agency, or it might be some combination of the two. There are no other known causal mechanisms. Given that we have two viable causal mechanisms, we can't just pick one or the other and suppose we have done our job. Rather, we start by assuming that both are possible, and we require good reason to declare one or the other causal mechanism impossible. But to declare any causal mechanism impossible, you must assume that there is no possible universe (actualized or not) which involves that causal mechanism. In declaring personal agency impossible, non-theism makes an assumption about all possible worlds. But if personal agency is involved in even a single possible universe (actualized or not) then personal agency inheres within the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility.

In the case of other adjectives, there has to be a sound reason to consider it in the first place--it has to solve some problem. The actualization of a possible universe is completely agnostic regarding "malevolence" or "daintiness" or "yellow" or "loud" or whatever. Such adjectives have no bearing on anything. There is no good reason to assume that some possible universe owes its being to a "logically necessary, yellow source and fount of all possibility"; the adjective "yellow" vs. "non-yellow" is superfluous in a way that "agency vs. necessity" is not.

To argue it another way, suppose we were to say that the "logically necessary source and fount of all possibility" might be malevolent or non-malevolent. What does the "malevolent or non-malevolent" add to the case we are considering? Nothing at all. As with the case of personal vs. impersonal, we would have to start with the supposition of both adjectives--malevolence and non-malevolence--within the source and fount of all possibility. These two opposites cancel each other out in a way that the "personal vs. impersonal" do not.