Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.

Unfortunately, if untethered assumptions, unsupportable by logic or evidence, are all there is to work with, then there is nothing left to do but say, "You may assume whatever you wish, but I am not interested in debating untethered assumptions."

Did you even read my previous response? Will you truly content yourself to cower behind these, as yet, unfounded assertions without responding directly to even one the many points I put forward in support of my argument? I must say this is quite disappointing.

If there is a mind which provides the context for all contingencies

I have already shown why this cannot logically be the case. Perhaps you would benefit from taking the time to read my entire response, rather than simply dismissing it out of hand as "untethered assumption".

[EduChris]

...The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.

Unfortunately, if untethered assumptions, unsupportable by logic or evidence, are all there is to work with, then there is nothing left to do but say, "You may assume whatever you wish, but I am not interested in debating untethered assumptions."

Did you even read my previous response? Will you truly content yourself to cower behind these, as yet, unfounded assertions without responding directly to even one the many points I put forward in support of my argument? I must say this is quite disappointing.

If there is a mind which provides the context for all contingencies

I have already shown why this cannot logically be the case. Perhaps you would benefit from taking the time to read my entire response, rather than simply dismissing it out of hand as "untethered assumption".

I read your post, and found nothing of value in it. Even for finite contingent minds much of what you say would be controversial. There is no way to reasonably extrapolate and/or ascribe the limitations of finite contingent minds to the source and fount of all reality. Such is sheer nonsense--it's like Scourge's inability to grasp the idea that "logical necessity" does not require or countenance any further explanation (else it wouldn't be logically necessary).

Just as an example of the sheer impossiblity of debating with you, here is what you said: "I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space"." Of course you are uncertain about this! But your argument from ignorance is just that--an argument from the radical, necessary ignorance which comes from having a finite and contingent mind! And yet you would presume to acribe your limitations to that which we humans cannot possibly ever wrap our minds around!

I'm sure you are very proud of your argument, and I'm sure it makes perfectly good sense to you. But to me, there's no substance, nothing to debate. All I could ever do would be to just continue to mark off each of your sentences with alternating refrains of, "How do you know this?" or "Argument from ignorance." I'm sorry but that sort of dialogue doesn't interest me in the least.

[scourge99]

Such is sheer nonsense--it's like Scourge's inability to grasp the idea that "logical necessity" does not require or countenance any further explanation (else it wouldn't be logically necessary).

If you are going to make personal accusations against members then you need to back it up. If you don't then i expect you to retract or I'll be reporting it as slander.

[EduChris]

... you've kicked the can down the road...god doesn't "exist" in a universe but instead in some meta-universe. Therefore the same question applies to the meta-universe. Is it possible that this meta-universe that god "exists" in does not necessarily exist or could be different? I think the answer is yes...

Once you have arrived at "logical necessity," the can cannot be kicked any further down the epistemological road; it has reached its final, ultimate endpoint. Logical necessity neither requires nor entertains any further explanation than its own necessity; it cannot not be, and that is that. There is nothing left to explain once you have arrived at logical necessity.

And BTW, God does not "exist in the metaverse," as you phrase it; rather, God is the "metaverse," though even to use that term is to interject unnecessary confusion. What you are describing as a "metaverse" is in fact the source and fount of all possibility.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

But we are talking about possibilities here. You agreed before that our universe need not exist. Have you changed your mind? Is our universe now necessary (and therefore its not contingent)? If our universe isn't necessary then referencing its existence isn't proof that whatever it is contingent upon is necessary (I.E., god)....

Our universe need not have existed. Similarly, the "nothing universe" need not exist. But if the "nothing universe" is a possible universe, than any "non-nothing universe" is contingent. And if any universe(s) other than (and different from) our universe is possible, then our universe (and the other possible universe[s]) are likewise contingent.

If no universe of any kind existed, then no one would be around to wonder whether or not there was any logically necessary source and fount of all possibility. But as soon as any possible universe is actualized, all of a sudden the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility tips its hand; there is no longer any doubt that the source and fount of all possibility is indeed necessary, since without it there could have been no possibility for any contingent universe to have become actualized.

...Why can "not-less-than-personal" be substituted with any number of other adjectives?

This is an interesting question--one which I have not already dealt with multiple times on this thread and others, and with numerous debate partners. I will address it later when I have more time.

[EduChris]

...not less than malevolent...less-than-malevolent...Non-malevolentism...Malevolentism...

Please explain clarify your terms.

What do you mean by, "not less than malevolent"? Do you mean, "Malevolent certainly, and perhaps even outright vicious"?

What do you mean by, "less than malevolent"? Do you mean, "Not at all malevolent?"

What do you mean by, "Non-malevolentism"? Do you mean, "Never characterized by malevolence"?

What do you mean by, "Malevolentism"? Do you mean, "Always characterized by malevolence"? or "Sometimes characterized by malevolence"?

[Ionian_Tradition]

...The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.

Unfortunately, if untethered assumptions, unsupportable by logic or evidence, are all there is to work with, then there is nothing left to do but say, "You may assume whatever you wish, but I am not interested in debating untethered assumptions."

Did you even read my previous response? Will you truly content yourself to cower behind these, as yet, unfounded assertions without responding directly to even one the many points I put forward in support of my argument? I must say this is quite disappointing.

If there is a mind which provides the context for all contingencies

I have already shown why this cannot logically be the case. Perhaps you would benefit from taking the time to read my entire response, rather than simply dismissing it out of hand as "untethered assumption".

I read your post, and found nothing of value in it. Even for finite contingent minds much of what you say would be controversial. There is no way to reasonably extrapolate and/or ascribe the limitations of finite contingent minds to the source and fount of all reality. Such is sheer nonsense--it's like Scourge's inability to grasp the idea that "logical necessity" does not require or countenance any further explanation (else it wouldn't be logically necessary).

This is not an impression of the limitations of finite minds upon the mind of God regardless of how many times you affirm the contrary. It is, and has always been, a logical deconstruction of conceptual thought as well as an assessment of the constraints logic places on any manner of thought we could hope to have an intelligible discussion concerning. Lest you posit a God which is immune to logical scrutiny, my argument has not been shown to be anything other than a legitimate challenge to theism as you have defined it.

Just as an example of the sheer impossiblity of debating with you, here is what you said: "I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space"." Of course you are uncertain about this! But your argument from ignorance is just that--an argument from the radical, necessary ignorance which comes from having a finite and contingent mind! And yet you would presume to acribe your limitations to that which we humans cannot possibly ever wrap our minds around!

You're inability to detect sarcasm leaves much to be desired. As does your pension for disingenuously distorting my argument to fit your preconceived conclusions. Read again my friend, context is key. I said:

Well for one, if such a mind preceded the genesis of all things then I suppose experiential knowledge concerning such things would be somewhat absent prior to their very existence. Moreover, I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space". In order for a non-spacial mind to experience spacial occupancy it must first cease to be what it is (a non-spacially located mind). As previously mentioned, this would imply the existence of space prior to the point where God actually conceived the concept which resulted in its creation. Quite the set of utterly absurd contradictions, if I may be so bold in saying.

I'm hardly appealing to ignorance here. Rather I've clearly shown why the notion of a immaterial God who is capable of physical experiences is logically untenable.

I'm sure you are very proud of your argument, and I'm sure it makes perfectly good sense to you. But to me, there's no substance, nothing to debate. All I could ever do would be to just continue to mark off each of your sentences with alternating refrains of, "How do you know this?" or "Argument from ignorance." I'm sorry but that sort of dialogue doesn't interest me in the least.

Such would only be the case were you to attempt to debate this straw man caricature of my argument you so desperately cling to. I've already answered the questions you posed to my initial post. You've refused to address them save for ripping a single excerpt from its fuller context in order to serve a point utterly removed from the facts. No matter. Let the reader decide which of us is operating from "untethered assumptions".

[Artie]

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

Sorry but you just obliterated your whole argument that God is a personal agent. You appear to assume that He doesn't have any free will.

"If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist."

No it's not. It's perfectly possible that your God simply didn't bother to create them in any world. You appear to say that this God of yours doesn't have any free will to create or not create whatever he wants. According to you there are no restrictions on worlds God can make, with or without leprechauns. All worlds are possible to Him, whether they conform to your logic or not, right?

"If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent."

According to you whether leprechauns exist in any or all words would just depend on whether your God felt like putting them there. Also according to you "If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist."

Do you think God will give up His free will to your logic?

[Mithrae]

You're inability to detect sarcasm leaves much to be desired. As does your pension for disingenuously distorting my argument to fit your preconceived conclusions. Read again my friend, context is key. I said:

Well for one, if such a mind preceded the genesis of all things then I suppose experiential knowledge concerning such things would be somewhat absent prior to their very existence. Moreover, I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space". In order for a non-spacial mind to experience spacial occupancy it must first cease to be what it is (a non-spacially located mind). As previously mentioned, this would imply the existence of space prior to the point where God actually conceived the concept which resulted in its creation. Quite the set of utterly absurd contradictions, if I may be so bold in saying.

I'm hardly appealing to ignorance here. Rather I've clearly shown why the notion of a immaterial God who is capable of physical experiences is logically untenable.

Hi Ionian Tradition. I never got 'round to replying to our discussion on this topic from last week. But since this in particular is a point which I addressed in our discussion, I think it's worth throwing in my two cents here. And I'll first say again that you do raise a very good point with this line of thinking, which at the least is a crippling challenge to notions of 'God' being omniscient in the usual sense.

Nevertheless, I think I might be able to condense my response into three points which I don't think you have sufficiently answered in this or the other thread. As long as our hypothetical original mind was not completely homogenous - ie, it must have more than one aspect of its being (as indeed it must to be a thinking thing at all!) - I think it remains possible (or even plausible) as an explanation for the rest of existence. The three points which I feel need to be addressed are:

1> Concepts form not only from direct experience, but also from extrapolation and negation of experience (and existing concepts)
Concepts of dragons, faeries and so on amply demonstrate this

2> We cannot arbitrarily define limits on what might be conceived by extrapolation and negation (and relationships between subsequent concepts)
For example, it's probable that with no limit on time a mind with concepts only of 1 and 2 could ultimately conceive of thousands, billions, and arithmetic, and algebra. On this point, and related to what you above dismiss as a "set of utterly absurd contradictions," your response to my earlier argument seems uncertain/incredulous at best:

• Mithrae wrote: Could adding and subtracting numbers plausibly produce some concept of linear space?
  
  Ionian_Tradition wrote: I think at best mere addition and subtraction will produce an increasing range of values. Notions of linear space however are contextualized by spacial existence...Something our hypothetical mind would surely lack, provided it preceded the physical universe. I'm not sure a strong correlation can be drawn between purely quantitative values and spacial occupancy.

3> A hypothetical original mind needn't experience or even conceive everything we experience and conceive; it need only conceive the reality from which our experience is drawn
Earlier in the thread I commented...
Mithrae wrote: But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space).

But as I suggested to you in our discussion, time and space are ways of describing relationships between things which (despite our perception of them) current physics suggests may be inter-related. And since behaviour merely describes changes in state of being over time, it's possible that every objective thing might be reduced down to different states of being and the description of relationships between them.

The idea that everything might be broken down to numbers may not be as absurd as it seems.

Long and short, I think you make a good case that our hypothetical original mind couldn't conceive pain or pleasure, nor even colour or sound. But I don't think you've shown that it couldn't - by a long progression of extrapolation and negation from the different aspects of its own being - eventually conceive the states of being and relationships between them which make up the reality from which our sight and pain are drawn.

[EduChris]

...Lest you posit a God which is immune to logical scrutiny...

I don't mean to suggest that we cannot employ logic to discern at least some things about the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility. On another thread, I do arrive at the following conclusion that the context of all possibility which we call "God" is inherently and intrinsically characterized by:

1) Necessary non-contingent existence
2) Differentiation
3) Relationality
4) Information
5) Consciousness
6) Volition
7) Creativity
8) Love

[EduChris]

...It's perfectly possible that your God simply didn't bother to create them in any world...

I agree.

Any "possible world" may or may not be actualized. However, if there is no "possible world" (actualized or not) which contains leprechauns, then leprechauns are impossible. If there is no "possible world" (actualized or not) which fails to contain leprechauns, then leprechauns are necessary.

But I think we can all agree that it is perfectly reasonable to assume that there is a "possible world" with leprechauns, and a "possible world" without leprechauns. And this is the case regardless of whether any "possible world" is actualized.