Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[Bust Nak]

...you haven't shown "both" is a viable option. Show me something that is caused by both necessity and agency. As far as I can see, if I am doing something by necessity, that's not agency, if I can choose something else, then it's not a necessity...

Doctors choose to cut out a cancerous tumor; by necessity, they cause trauma to the body at the point of incision.

I asked for one thing that is cause by both necessity and agency. Not an example of necessity and one of agency. Care to try again?

We have three options: 1) necessity alone; 2) agency alone; or 3) necessity and agency.

The default assumption is that all three options are possible;

Well that's an improvement. At least you've dropped the the claim that "both" is the default.

to assume otherwise requires justification, since the arbitrary assumption of "impossible" is always less justified than "possible." So it is your burden to show why option #3, above, is "impossible."

Sure: necessity is impersonal, agency is personal. Impersonal and personal are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Therefore option #3 is impossible.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...Either this mind exist separate and distinct from all physical possibilities, or this mind is a physical entity requiring a physical reality (not itself) in which to reside. Which is it?...

This is the fallacy of the excluded middle, or an argument from ignorance. It's like, "either this water must exist separate and distinct from ice, or else water is merely ice and therfore requires a working freezer in which to reside."

There is no "middle ground" which exists between the immaterial and the material. By the their very definition, the two are fundamentally antithetical to one another. If you ascribe even one material aspect of being to that which is defined as "the absence of all things material", you assert contradiction. Your accusations of fallacious reasoning here are as humorous as the claim that one who denies the existence of square-circles is guilty of arguing from incredulity.

Do we measure magnetism? Or do we merely measure the regular effects of magnetism? How can we measure magnetism unless we measure the effects. We can see the effects, and we can predict the effects, but we still don't know what magnetism is in its ontological reality.

The locality of magnetic force alone implies an ontological quality which is spacial, and thus physical. The same applies for any entity which operates within a spacial context.

...In order for something to physically interact with something else, it must logically possess physical properties with which to interact. If it lacked these properties, there would be nothing "physical" to interact with. This isn't wild speculation, it is deductive logic...

That's akin to saying, "In order for something to solidly interact with something else, it must logically possess the properties of being solid. If water lacked the properties of solidness, then there would be nothing solid to interact with."

This is a very poor analogy. You're talking about different arrangements of atoms (physical constructs) physically interacting together. There is no logical impediment which would prevent this from occurring. What you imply when you assert that physical and non-physical entities can physically interact is something quite different. You're saying that the absence of all things physical can physically interact with that which is physical. Yet how can the absence of all things physical produce a physical effect without first possessing certain physical properties which would allow such interactions to occur (structure, space, localized force)? If any one of these attributes were to be ascribed to a non-physical entity it would effectively cease to be what it is, "non-physical".

Why can't solids and liquids (or even gases) interact?

Essentially what you're asking is "Why can't atoms interact with one another?"...They surely can.

If solids and liquids can interact, so can the material and the supramaterial or the transmaterial.

Can they? How do you know of such things? What evidence do you have that these properties are anything more than a product of your colorful imagination?

And what is a "solid" anyway? It's just an arrangement of strings of energy and mostly empty space. Same is true for liquids and gases. What seems obvious at one level becomes very murky at another level. Who is to say that our physical world is anything more than just the immaterial dream of a conscious reality which we cannot ever fathom.

Energy and space ARE physical properties, denoting a physical reality in which they reside. Nothing murky there. Regarding the question of whether or not reality is the product of a dream, I believe my argument has shown why this description of reality is not, at the very least, logically tenable.

Funny how the non-theist can reject personal agency--the most real thing we can ever know--and then insist on making absolute assertions on things which we do not know and may never know.

Funny how the EduChris charges the non-theist with making assertions regarding things unknown, whilst happily asserting the existence of made up properties completely foreign to his experience (transmaterial/supramaterial substance). How very hypocritical.

...I'm showing that imagination requires conceptualization, which in turn requires experiential context in order to constitute intelligent thought. You're putting the cart before the horse by saying this mind, which causally precedes everything, can derive the experiences necessary to form coherent concepts prior to the creation of anything to experience other than itself...

Again you assume a mind which is subject to arbitrary limitations. You have never seen the ultimate source of all possibility, and so you are not qualified to make such triumphalistic pronouncements.

I am however qualified to comment on that which can be discussed intelligibly. This entity you posit is afront to the very logic you attempt to employ to defend your argument. As such, I can find no rational justification for these fantastic claims you ironically feel qualified to make grandeous pronouncements concerning.

...unconscious processes are not subject to the logical constraints intrinsic to conscious agencies. Naturally the two are not one...

How do you know that at the ultimate level, there is any such thing as unconscious properties?

What is the "ultimate level"? Define it for me Chris, if you can. Somehow I suspect you haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about. Do you honestly expect us you take your argument seriously when you defend it with nothing more than an unending string of "what if's" and "how do you know's"? You're asking us to accept as fact that which you admit you know absolutely NOTHING about. Is this the foundation of your worldview? Wild speculation?

...conceptual agency is subject to certain logical constraints which prevent us from concluding that such is the initial cause of ALL things...

You are simply asserting this, having no knowledge of what you speak. For you, just because you think something is true, you assume it must be true. But you haven't shown why anyone should agree with you.

I understand, conceptually, the difference between conscious agency and it's antithesis. Regarding these topics, I can speak quite intelligibly. I had assumed that theism operated upon premises which could be discussed in this manner. Now I see, that you're brand of theism is rooted in baseless speculation concerning entities and properties you haven't a clue about and can make no reasonable pronouncements concerning. For this reason, it is apparent to me that theism, as defined by EduChris, is based upon wild speculation concerning incoherent concepts which cannot be discussed rationally or intelligibly, and as such, does not provide a rationale basis upon which to found one's worldview.

...conscious thought requires certain preconditions in order to get off the ground, namely experiential knowledge...

You can't know this to be true, and you can't demonstrate it logically. It is just an empty pronouncement.

I already have demonstrated this logically, yet you refuse either accept it or comprehend it.

...The contextual knowledge necessary to form coherent concepts pertaining to any physical universe were not available to the mind of God prior their existence...

How do you know this?

Think about it Chris, if the physical universe was caused to exist by a deity which preceded it, how could the universe have been experienced, by said deity, prior to its existence?

...Thus such knowledge could not have provided the context needed to ever conceive of a universe. Its not that consciousness hinders information processing, its that consciousness cannot process information it does not have access to.

It sure can. I can generalize, extrapolate, imagine, dream, create. Many people claim to have experienced altered states of mind, where where they have become aware of realities not previously known to them and which they cannot put into words.

Yet ALL of it is contextualized through prior experiential knowledge. Name one of these alleged cases and I will show that anything perceived within that altered state of mind was contextualize by knowledge acquired through some prior experience.

Unfortunately, I think the only thing we're accomplishing is talking past one another.

Indeed.

[EduChris]

...There is no "middle ground" which exists between the immaterial and the material. By the their very definition, the two are fundamentally antithetical to one another...

This is the heart of our disagreement. You insist on using 'immaterial" in a certain way. Other people use the term in a different way. Your argument thus consists of an equivocation--using the same word as though it meant the same thing, when in fact there are real differences in the way it is used.

It may be that the word "immaterial" is a hindrance to communication; it may be that some other word (transmaterial, supramaterial) ought to be used in its place. But so long as you keep insisting on using the word in one way, while others use in a different sense, nothing worthwhile will ever come of your equivocations.

[EduChris]

...you haven't shown "both" is a viable option. Show me something that is caused by both necessity and agency. As far as I can see, if I am doing something by necessity, that's not agency, if I can choose something else, then it's not a necessity...

Doctors choose to cut out a cancerous tumor; by necessity, they cause trauma to the body at the point of incision.

I asked for one thing that is cause by both necessity and agency. Not an example of necessity and one of agency. Care to try again?...

Apparently you think it is possible for the doctor to choose to remove the cancerous tumor without necessarily causing trauma to the body at the point of incision. Perhaps one day we will have adequate technology for such an event, but until then my example stands.

[Ooberman]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

1. There is no evidence, using the universe and our selves as evidence, that the natural world was required to be made by a God, by your definition.

For example, rocks and oceans seem to exhibit no qualities that require them to be made by a "no less than personal" entity.

Space, planets, stars, and 99.9999999999999% of all the universe are similar in nature to the analogs we have on Earth.

The little that is made on Earth by personal beings are modest, specific, discrete and have a very different appearance and use.

Life itself is not made by personal beings, but made by processes that are not controlled whatsoever by personal beings (we cannot manipulate our dna, or the dna of our children in the womb by anything that would be called "designed".)


I mention these observations because the first, intuitive appearance of the universe and life is that it is beyond our control, and more in the control of natural forces. (Hence why some children, for no seemingly good reason, are born with birth defects, for example). The "appearance of design" the teleological argument appeals to is only metaphorical, and is more likely a case that we design as nature has "designed" because we are of nature - not the other way around.


So, if this interpretation seems correct, and it does to me, then I am justified in not presuming a personal being created the universe.


The rest can easily unfold from this first, modest assumption.

[EduChris]

...There is no evidence, using the universe and our selves as evidence, that the natural world was required to be made by a God, by your definition...

If you had been using my definition, you would have seen that the indefinite article, "a," attached to "God" makes no sense.

...For example, rocks and oceans seem to exhibit no qualities that require them to be made by a "no less than personal" entity...

Do they not depend for their existence on a precise set of physical laws? Where did these physical laws come from?

...Space, planets, stars, and 99.9999999999999% of all the universe are similar in nature to the analogs we have on Earth...

Except for life, consciousness, agency, etc.

...The little that is made on Earth by personal beings are modest, specific, discrete and have a very different appearance and use...

And yet despite our limitations, we think we know so much, don't we?

...Life itself is not made by personal beings...

Question begging.

...but made by processes that are not controlled whatsoever by personal beings...

Question begging.

...we cannot manipulate our dna, or the dna of our children in the womb by anything that would be called "designed"...

What is gene therapy, in your view?

...I mention these observations because the first, intuitive appearance of the universe and life is that it is beyond our control, and more in the control of natural forces...

What are "natural forces"? Where did they come from? Given these "natural laws," was it inevitable that sentience and agency should arise in this universe?

...Hence why some children, for no seemingly good reason, are born with birth defects, for example...

Certainly there might be any number of explanations for birth defects. And certainly we may be capable of learning how to prevent them and treat them. Don't you agree?

...The "appearance of design" the teleological argument appeals to is only metaphorical, and is more likely a case that we design as nature has "designed" because we are of nature - not the other way around...

This is an interesting opinion. What evidence do you have for your opinion? How can we translate it into a hypothesis which can be tested empirically?

...So, if this interpretation seems correct, and it does to me, then I am justified in not presuming a personal being created the universe...

You agree that what you have is an interpretation, as opposed to an actual argument?

...The rest can easily unfold from this first, modest assumption.

Can you present your case more like an actual argument, rather than a haphazard conglomeration of assumptions? I'd like to see if your argument can be made without any resort to non-sequitur and question-begging.

[Bust Nak]

Apparently you think it is possible for the doctor to choose to remove the cancerous tumor without necessarily causing trauma to the body at the point of incision. Perhaps one day we will have adequate technology for such an event, but until then my example stands.

No, I don't think that it is possible to remove cancerous tumor without causing trauma to the body with the current technology. But I don't need to think that to point out remove cancerous tumor is not the same thing as causing trauma to the body and hence doesn't qualify as something cause by both necessarity and agency. Your very admittance that one day it might be possible to do one without the other, shows that you know they are not the same thing.

But if you insist that they are the same thing. Give me an example of something caused purely by agency.

[EduChris]

...Your very admittance that one day it might be possible to do one without the other, shows that you know they are not the same thing...

Non sequitur. But if you want an example that has nothing to do with current technological limitations, here's one: God chooses to create a world that is: 1) other-than-God, and 2) allows a measure of creaturely freedom and self-actualization. By necessity, the potential for evil is also created as a inseparable condition of #1 and #2.

...But if you insist that they are the same thing. Give me an example of something caused purely by agency.

Please give me an example of what you're looking for here.

[Bust Nak]

Non sequitur.

Really? Concluding that A is not the same thing as B, from the permise that it is possible to do A without doing B, is a non sequitur? You are going to have to explain that one.

But if you want an example that has nothing to do with current technological limitations, here's one: God chooses to create a world that is: 1) other-than-God, and 2) allows a measure of creaturely freedom and self-actualization. By necessity, the potential for evil is also created as a inseparable condition of #1 and #2.

Again, not one thing: 1) creating a world, 2) allowing self-actualization, 3) allowing evil. I am after one thing, caused by both agency and neccessity.

Please give me an example of what you're looking for here.

I would for example say picking up a cup is caused purely by agency. But according to your reasoning any number of connected issues, say my simple movement would necessarily create a localised change in air pressure, would render picking up a cup a matter of both agency and necessity. So I am asking you - give me an example of something that is purely caused by agency.

[Ionian_Tradition]

With that said, I would like to return to a point regarding the problem of infinite regress which I made during our previous discussion. If I'm not mistaken, you've yet to comment on it and I would like to hear your response. I said the following:

The problem here is there could be no meaningful context from which to coherently conceive a state of being "different" from its own. From what experience might it derive context regarding the concept of additional states of being which are fundamentally antithetical to the only states of being it possesses an experiential referent for? How could spacial existence be meaningfully implied from a non-spacial framework? How could the concept of "matter" be conceived from a state in which there is nothing from which to provide the term meaningful context?

Now I suppose this mind might derive the concept of finitude from witnessing its own thoughts come in and out of being. Perhaps this also might imply causality. However, this notion would prove lethal to the argument for the simple reason that if we assume this mind has always been thinking finite thoughts causally connected to corresponding antecedent thoughts, then it would seem that our eternal mind would suffer the problem of an infinite regress of thoughts which would prevent the concept of a "physical universe" from ever arising. In other words, there would always be an infinite number of antecedent thoughts preceding the thought which prompted the choice to create the universe. Thus the universe could never come about.

If you posit an eternally thinking mind which conceives increasingly complex concepts over time, by way of extrapolation, then you place before the concept which prompted the creation of our universe an infinite number of preceding thoughts from which it was extrapolated. It seems to me the problem of an infinite thought regression proves fatal to any notion of a Theistic mind, conjuring up the universe through extrapolated thought. What say you?

Howdy again Ionian. I'll comment on this first, because you're right that I only replied to it briefly before.

It seems to me that any speculated explanations for reality will be reduced to apparent absurdity one way or another: Either we'd need to imagine some kind of infinite regress, or some kind of eternal or necessary state/s of being, or some kind of uncaused or random event. I agree that any kind of infinite regress seems the most absurd of these, since the existence of something which was actually infinite would lead to logical contradictions - if it were infinite, what is half of it? However there is the caveat (which is relevant to the notion of necessary existence also) that logic describes how we think, and might not describe constraints on reality.

Yes, but we can only debate what can be discussed intelligibly. It may be that human logic is ill-equipped to define reality in its totality, but that which it cannot define will be that which we cannot reasonably discuss. I believe Wittgenstein said it best, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

That said I think the idea of an original mind, rather than an original something else, makes sense for three main reasons:

1 > Thought is an indisputable characteristic of our being (cogito ergo sum), but supposing that it's not a basic characteristic of reality in general raises the problem of how thought (most specifically subjective experience) came to be at all. We might say that whereas alternatives involve presumption about what we can't experience as subjects, idealism simply involves extrapolation from what we do experience as subjects

My argument is predicated upon exactly what we experience from thought, namely the notion of experiential context as a necessary precursor to intelligent thought. The logical discrepancies seem, to me, to call into question the viability of positing thought as the original catalyst for existence as we perceive it.

2 > As I suggested towards the end of post 92, it seems to me that the nature of thought is intimately associated with choice. Thought or minds are the only type of being I can imagine which have a necessary association with a type of behaviour, whereas supposing that reality consists of some other type of being/substance still leaves us with the problem of why it should behave in any particular way. In that respect idealism could be considered a simpler theory than alternatives.

I'm not so sure. Positing idealism seems to push the question back a step. We might ask why a mind might choose a certain thing and not another. Choice itself provides no intrinsic impetus for what is actually chosen. Is this not a question regarding behavior? How then does idealism provide a simpler explanation of behavior when the behavior of choice itself cannot be simplistically explained by idealism.

3 > While there are limitations to what we might reasonably theorize thought could accomplish, as you've persuasively argued here, ultimately I suspect that it's a more inclusive type of theory than materialism (and perhaps other alternatives). Things like divine intervention and possible life after death are neccessarily excluded by materialism, which means that reported first-hand experiences regarding such things must be either plausibly addressed or dismissed out of hand by a materialist, whereas the idealist is not commited to a view on them one way or the other. To put it the other way around, we might say that idealism has a wider range of potential 'explanatory' scope

This seems more an appeal to pragmatism than anything. None the less, the explanatory power of the idealism will be contingent upon whether or not its core premises can be shown to be logically valid. I've argued this is not the case.

With all that in mind, if the problem of an infinite regress in thoughts were an insurmountable problem (rather than merely a limitation in how we can think about it), I don't think it's a crippling blow to the theory. We would simply have to propose one of the other absurdities which any theory of this type must appeal to: Perhaps this original mind came into being uncaused or randomly, with the simplest thoughts/experiences of different aspects of its own being in place. If my three points above are valid, that would still be a more reasonable theory than any alternatives I've encountered. Or perhaps the mind and some of its 'thought' exists eternally or necessarily, but certain particular thoughts arose spontaneously and began the progression which led ultimately to our reality. Again not a very satisfactory notion, but again it's no different (and for the reasons above potentially better) than an eternal singularity which spontaneously expanded.

Again, the experiential context such random, or eternal, thoughts would invariably lack would render each a logically impossible feat. A thought without context is really no thought at all. While I understand that each worldview takes its own liberties, endowing their initial cause with fanciful attributes largely foreign to human experience, I believe idealism (and certain alternative worldviews) stands at a distinct disadvantage in that its attempts to do so must necessarily result in certain logical contradictions which prevent us from maintaining rational or intelligible discourse concerning it. Notions of a block universe, or uncaused cause on the other hand might seem equally fanciful, but they have the added benefit of not being, at least at face value, internally contradictory.

So you raise a good point to bear in mind, but I think at most it could serve to shape how we think about this hypothetical original mind or 'God,' not disprove it.

Personally I find such arguments underscore the utter futility of carrying on discussions regarding hypothetical deities. When, for pragmatic purposes, we feel compelled to endow hypothetical causes with strange, colorful, and logically absurd properties in order to side step the disconcerting implications born from our intrinsic ignorance, I believe we've done no more than admit we are sufficiently out of our depth. My argument isn't so much an attempt at "disproving God" as it is an attempt to show the limits of what can be intelligibly concluded. When apologetics, of any kind, is reduced to an appeal to a set of contradictory "what if's", rational discourse is at an end.

Nevertheless, I think I might be able to condense my response into three points which I don't think you have sufficiently answered in this or the other thread. As long as our hypothetical original mind was not completely homogenous - ie, it must have more than one aspect of its being (as indeed it must to be a thinking thing at all!) - I think it remains possible (or even plausible) as an explanation for the rest of existence. The three points which I feel need to be addressed are:

1> Concepts form not only from direct experience, but also from extrapolation and negation of experience (and existing concepts)
Concepts of dragons, faeries and so on amply demonstrate this

I believe I agreed with this statement during our previous discussion. My only caveat was that such concepts require a particular set of experiential references in order to form. Without the proper experiential referent, certain concepts cannot logically be conceived. Take the concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight", for instance. The concept of a "fearsome fire breathing dragon in flight" is certainly an extrapolation upon prior experiences (visual perceptions of color, fire, size, flight, etc. coupled with sensory experience of heat, fear, breath, etc.). However, I ask you, if such experiences were completely foreign to the mind to which we ascribe this concept, could such a concept logically have been formed? Can the concept of a dragon in flight exist in the absence of the aforementioned referents? I personally believe the answer is simply no. There is no context by which to lend coherency to the concept of a fire breathing dragon in the absence of experiential knowledge concerning color, fire, size, flight, heat, breath etc.

With the exception of 'fearsome,' everything in the concept consists of different types of substance, shape, size and motion. It seems to me the biggest hurdle - really the only one - we're facing here is whether our hypothetical mind could develop a concept of space. From that, shape, size and motion should pose no problem. Concepts of changes over time and different types of being or substance would be part of its experience as a thinking thing, and we can't really say there's certain types of substance it could not imagine (though again, how it would conceive matter, fire and so on might not be the same as how we perceive them).

I believe concepts of material substance would also be necessary in order to conceptualize the aforementioned properties. Empty space does not immediately produce the contextual basis for the substantive or textural solidity implied by the assemblage of material constituent parts within space.

2> We cannot arbitrarily define limits on what might be conceived by extrapolation and negation (and relationships between subsequent concepts)
For example, it's probable that with no limit on time a mind with concepts only of 1 and 2 could ultimately conceive of thousands, billions, and arithmetic, and algebra. On this point, and related to what you above dismiss as a "set of utterly absurd contradictions," your response to my earlier argument seems uncertain/incredulous at best:

• Mithrae wrote: Could adding and subtracting numbers plausibly produce some concept of linear space?
  
  Ionian_Tradition wrote: I think at best mere addition and subtraction will produce an increasing range of values. Notions of linear space however are contextualized by spacial existence...Something our hypothetical mind would surely lack, provided it preceded the physical universe. I'm not sure a strong correlation can be drawn between purely quantitative values and spacial occupancy.

I'm not so sure. Its not an appeal to incredulity to state that a knowledge of quantitative values cannot provide the necessary context required to render concepts of linear space intelligible. Quantitative value and spacial location are, by definition, two very different things. The extrapolation of quantity will certainly produce a greater range of values and may also produce increasingly intricate ways in which said values relate to one another, but to marry quantity with spacial location requires that some concept of space already exist. Abstract quantity, in and of itself, carries with it no notion of spacial occupancy. It is only when we introduce spacially located objects that we can apply abstract notions of quantity to such objects in order quantify to how they relate to each other within the space they occupy. In the absence of experiential knowledge concerning spacial occupancy, the notion of applying abstract quantitative values to spacial objects would utterly lack coherency, and thus could not logically constitute a truly intelligent thought.

I'm afraid I just can't see how you can feel so sure about this. Our own experience of space always precedes our concept of numbers, and I think it's a fairly safe guess that even as children we all think of numbers in linear terms. Beyond that we have no point of reference one way or the other - that numbers could produce a concept of space or that they couldn't. But they would obviously have to involve the concept of a non-temporal relationship between the different numbers. Again, the question isn't really "could this mind conceive space as we experience it," so much as "could this produce a concept which we experience as space?"

I really think that you've got no basis for arguing that it could not.

"We can't know one way or the other" isn't much of an argument in support of the notion that concepts of quantity CAN produce concepts of linear space (which is what idealism requires). None the less, I'll just have to respectfully disagree. Quantitative values, in and of themselves, don't imply locality. Only once space is introduced can values be made to occupy a particular location within linear space. I just don't see any meaningful correlation between quantitative value and spacial location.

3> A hypothetical original mind needn't experience or even conceive everything we experience and conceive; it need only conceive the reality from which our experience is drawn
Earlier in the thread I commented...
Mithrae wrote: But as far as I can imagine the simplest form which any metaphysical theories could take would have to involve both substance and behaviour (and arguably a substrate, or place to be and happen, such as the dimensions of time and space).

But as I suggested to you in our discussion, time and space are ways of describing relationships between things which (despite our perception of them) current physics suggests may be inter-related. And since behaviour merely describes changes in state of being over time, it's possible that every objective thing might be reduced down to different states of being and the description of relationships between them.

The idea that everything might be broken down to numbers may not be as absurd as it seems.

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "different states of being", in regard to an immaterial mind. Perhaps you mean that such a mind might think one thought and then another and this shift in thought would constitute a "shift in states"? The fact remains that the intrinsic state of immaterial being does not shift or change in the sense you imply. Immaterial entities, are by definition, bereft of constituent parts. In the absence of any and all constituent parts, there is nothing intrinsic to an immaterial mind's being which would constitute an actual shift in state, such that an entirely new state of being ( a material or spacial state of being) could be derived. I'm just not convinced you've shown that knowledge concerning quantitative values, acquired within the context of an unchanging state of immaterial being, provides the necessary experiential context required to render concepts like "matter" and "space" even remotely coherent.

What you're saying about immaterial entities doesn't make sense, unless perhaps you were talking about a 'god' which is substantially different from the universe (ie, not idealism).

The typical theistic depiction of God is one of a timeless, spaceless, immaterial entity which is the cause of all things. I would assume if the mind posited by idealism is the cause of all things then we must assume that it is without a material form which occupies space....Lest we assume this mind occupies some spatial reality. In which case, we must ask from whence came the spacial reality in which our hypothetical mind resides

From the state of the universe now, with its stars, galaxies and so on, we can infer that its initial state was not homogenous. That holds true whether we're talking about its initial 'physical' state involved in the big bang theory, or about the initial state (or arbitrarily pre-big bang state, if such a thing makes sense) of reality itself. It doesn't make sense to talk about 'immaterial' things at all in that context, any more than it would make sense to talk about material things. You're slipping in dualist thinking, but I'm talking about monism.

Ok, I'll argue within a monistic framework then. How are different "states of being" differentiated within the context of one homogenous state of initial being?

All that's fundamentally necessary, I think, is a concept of change/time (a concept of relationship between things) and a concept of differences, any kind of differences. The latter comes necessarily with non-homogeneity. The former must be introduced in any theory (else there would be no change or time), so for now I'm not particularly concerned with whether we're introducing it arbitrarily or not. But whatever inhomogeneities that concept of 'different' came from, there's no reason to suppose that there couldn't develop a concept of 'more different.' If memory serves you don't accept dualism either, so immaterial and material aren't the right way to think about it: Whether we imagine that light, matter and consciousness are different arrangements of strings, or different frequencies of some kind of 'energy,' or different types of thoughts, we agree that they're basically the same stuff - just different types of it.

In regard to the former, what is actualizing said change in order to produce non-homogeneity? You posit change but what is your catalyst? If it is thought then you'll still need to provide an experiential referent from which produce thought in the first place. Thought cannot be experienced prior to its own existence, so what else is there to be experienced? If you claim that experiential context is somehow acquired apart from awareness of thought, with what apparatus does this mind intelligibly differentiate aspects of its own state of being? Can it even do so without enlisting the aid of thought?

The only big question seems to be whether a concept could arise of relationship between things which is not temporal. That's what we experience and describe as space, isn't it? And I gather current physics suggests that space and time are both part of the same package, both simply ways of describing things relative to each other.

From my understanding, space-time is merely the relationship shared between space curvature and the rate of change within that region of space. This does not imply that time is space any more than the relationship shared between changes in pressure and temperature imply that pressure and temperature are one and the same.

The concept of numbers, which would almost inevitably arise from concepts of differences and change, could provide that concept of non-temporal relationships even if we assume (as I have been, perhaps errantly) that this hypothetical mind must not originally have any spacial characteristics or concepts.

I guess I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. Could you elaborate?

That aside, we are still left with the question of how these concepts are acquired in the first place. Thought requires experiential context in order to be made intelligible. By what method is this mind deriving experiences? Not by thought, because thought cannot be experienced before it exists. Neither can aspects of being be intelligibly differentiated in the absence of intelligent thought. It seems our hypothetical mind is left without the means to even begin thinking, let alone consciously dream up our universe.