Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...It may be that the word "immaterial" is a hindrance to communication; it may be that some other word (transmaterial, supramaterial) ought to be used in its place. But so long as you keep insisting on using the word in one way, while others use in a different sense, nothing worthwhile will ever come of your equivocations.

You have yet to define what such things are and I am quite convinced you've made them up. I also wouldn't be surprised to find some logically inconsistent notion lurking somewhere in whatever definition you provide, but I suppose I shall have to wait and see...

I have elsewhere and often said that God is best understood as "not arbitrarily limited by any spatio-temporal dimensions." This is consistent with numerous sacred texts, and it accords well with the logical principle that arbitrary elements require greater explanation than non-arbitrary elements.

By defining God as that which is immune to all arbitrary constraints of spatio-temporal dimension, you have in no way inoculated God against the constraints which are not arbitrary, but logically necessary. My argument was an appeal to these very constraints. None the less, this particular definition of God's nature carries with it some rather intriguing implications which I would like to explore:

If God is not arbitrarily limited in spatio-temporal dimensions, then God provides the basis for space and time (in whatever number of dimensions are possible, if there are non-arbitrary limits). In this understanding, dimensions are not something "added to" or "foreign to" God; rather, God provides some finite room for us to "live and move and have our being" within God's own trans-dimensionality.

Dimension, of any kind, is a product of space. In the absence of space, there can exist no dimension. By rooting dimension in God's intrinsic nature, you ascribe to God a spacial quality which is intrinsically physical. This would suggest some form of pantheism in which God is defined merely as "the space in which things exist". Space & dimension, however, are both a product of the physical universe. If you assert that God is the creator of the universe, then we have a contradiction on our hands. How can God, serve as the creator of all spacial dimension (the universe) when such is an intrinsic aspect of God's own nature? Either God is a cause separate and distinct from spacial dimension (immaterial), or the physical universe (spacial dimension) is a cause unto itself. The former breeds contradiction and the latter suggests a universe uncaused. In both cases, conscious volition is shown not to be that which caused the physical universe to begin existing.

Now you might wish to go further and claim that though God is not the creator of spacial dimension itself, the mind of God has caused things to exist within itself (space). Apart from this being just another way of saying "the physical universe caused spacial aspects of itself to assume particular forms", the question remains of how a conscious mind might acquire the experiential context necessary to form the concepts from which to begin creating anything. You've yet to present anything which might serve to substantiate the claim that a disembodied mind is capable of experiencing anything exterior to its own thoughts. Since thoughts cannot be experienced prior to their own existence, we're left without a viable means by which the mind of God might have acquired the experiential context necessary to begin thinking conceptual (intelligent) thoughts.

...if you'll be so bold (and might I say hypocritical) as to claim any measure of knowledge concern something so utterly foreign to your experience...

I am not the one claiming "knowledge" concerning something so "utterly foreign" to human experience; rather, you are attempting to force finite limits on that which is not deemed to be finite.

The only constraints I place upon this mind are those dictated by logic. I grant that infinite minds may very well transcend such limitations, but we could not discuss such minds intelligibly, nor could we ever hope to infer their existence through reason.

You are the one who is insisting that the "context for everything" requires its own separate and larger context. Your requirement is incoherent; it is no different than the non-theists' incessant and incoherent demand for an "explanation" for that which has already been determined to be logically necessary.

No my friend, I insist that conceptual thought requires experiential context in order to be made coherent. Thought, however, cannot logically provide experiential context for its own existence. Again, this is because thought cannot be experienced before it exists. Therefore, the mind of God requires experiential context, external to its thoughts, in order to exist as a being which is capable of conceiving intelligent thoughts...The intelligent, personal, thinking aspect of God's nature is therefore contingent. As such, Theism, as you have defined it ("the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.") is shown to be false.

[Justin108]

We know of only two possible causal mechanisms: agency and non-agency, so we start with both of these and we try to determine what justification there might be for eliminating one or the other. Without justification, we cannot eliminate either causal factor without falling into arbitrariness.

We came to the conclusion that the origin must be agency or non-agency using logic. Logic tells us the bare minimum requirement for all possibility is one or the other. I stress bare minimum requirement to point out that the minimum would be one or the other. To add them together is arbitrary speculation because then one begins to speculate the means by which all possibility arose. By adding these together, you are essentially saying the Agent used allready-existing Necessity to create all possibility. I contest that the bare minimum is EITHER one OR the other. By seperating them, I am not arbitrarily eliminating anything. They are both still options so neither is eliminated.

Keeping logic in mind, it would be illogical to assume the cause to be both agency and non-agency, Bare minimum requires but one or the other. To assume Agency acted in accordance with Necessity has two problems:
1. You are adding assumption as to the methods of the original cause
2. If the Agent must conform to pre-existing Necessity then the end result is Necessity is the origin of all possibility. I remind you of my chicken-or-the-egg comparison.

...so we start with both of these and we try to determine what justification there might be for eliminating one or the other.

I still start with both but I keep them seperate. Coupling them to the same causality would require justification. Keep in mind that separating them as "either/or" is not due to elimination as they are both still options.

Ultimately, I disagree with the pairing of Agency and Necessity and see it as unjustified. I understand that you see it as a starting point that requires elimination, but I see it as an "innocent until proven guilty" situation whereby we must assume, since it is logically unnecessary to couple them, that they each stand on their own until justification suggests they be paired.



I will respond to the rest of the post later today or tomorrow. Until then, feel free to ponder this

[EduChris]

...By defining God as that which is immune to all arbitrary constraints of spatio-temporal dimension, you have in no way inoculated God against the constraints which are not arbitrary, but logically necessary...

Agreed.

...My argument was an appeal to these very constraints...

No, you do not appeal to logical constraints at all; rather, you appeal to the absurd and illogical assumptions that the finite can comprehend the infinite, that the contingent can fully grasp the non-contingent, and that the conceptual must always derive from the actual.

...Dimension, of any kind, is a product of space. In the absence of space, there can exist no dimension. By rooting dimension in God's intrinsic nature, you ascribe to God a spacial quality which is intrinsically physical...

There is no need to posit actual, physical dimensionality to God; instead, we need only posit that God comprehends and conceives all dimensionality.

...How can God, serve as the creator of all spacial dimension (the universe) when such is an intrinsic aspect of God's own nature?...

Your point is moot if conceptualization precedes actualization.

...the question remains of how a conscious mind might acquire the experiential context necessary to form the concepts from which to begin creating anything...

Your question is moot if all concepts arise from God's intrinsic nature. Asserting that the actual must always precede the conceptual is simply to beg the question.

...The only constraints I place upon this mind are those dictated by logic...

I have demonstrated otherwise, above.

...I grant that infinite minds may very well transcend such limitations, but we could not discuss such minds intelligibly...

Theists do not presume that we can discuss the mind of God intelligibly--at least not unless such Mind were to reveal something of itself to us.

...nor could we ever hope to infer their existence through reason...

Non sequitur. That we cannot fully wrap our mind around something does not entail that the "something" in question does not or cannot exist. By your criteria, quantum physics doesn't "exist" because no one fully understands all that it entails.

...No my friend, I insist that conceptual thought requires experiential context in order to be made coherent...thought cannot be experienced before it exists...

You assert this, but you have not (and cannot) demonstrate any such thing.

...As such, Theism, as you have defined it is shown to be false.

Your entire argument boils down to the fallacy of bare assertion.

[Ionian_Tradition]

That said I think the idea of an original mind, rather than an original something else, makes sense for three main reasons:

1 > Thought is an indisputable characteristic of our being (cogito ergo sum), but supposing that it's not a basic characteristic of reality in general raises the problem of how thought (most specifically subjective experience) came to be at all. We might say that whereas alternatives involve presumption about what we can't experience as subjects, idealism simply involves extrapolation from what we do experience as subjects

My argument is predicated upon exactly what we experience from thought, namely the notion of experiential context as a necessary precursor to intelligent thought. The logical discrepancies seem, to me, to call into question the viability of positing thought as the original catalyst for existence as we perceive it.

In that general sense we could as easily note that every material thing we observe requires other material things as necessary precursors. A point which could perhaps mirror your whole specific argument regarding thoughts and contexts, albeit limited by our non-experience of matter as subjects. Any speculative original thing - no matter what it is - would necessarily be unique in some ways.

I suppose matter could conceivably be reduced down to some primary substance upon which all others are based without logical impediment. It is when we attempt to endow this substance with cognitive traits analogous to our own that we run into issues.

2 > As I suggested towards the end of post 92, it seems to me that the nature of thought is intimately associated with choice. Thought or minds are the only type of being I can imagine which have a necessary association with a type of behaviour, whereas supposing that reality consists of some other type of being/substance still leaves us with the problem of why it should behave in any particular way. In that respect idealism could be considered a simpler theory than alternatives.

I'm not so sure. Positing idealism seems to push the question back a step. We might ask why a mind might choose a certain thing and not another. Choice itself provides no intrinsic impetus for what is actually chosen. Is this not a question regarding behavior? How then does idealism provide a simpler explanation of behavior when the behavior of choice itself cannot be simplistically explained by idealism.

We could certainly ask the why of any particular choice, as we do of many human choices without only limited success. Specific choices, like any other specific behaviour (things of mass attracting rather than repelling each other, for example), may or may not be readily understandable. But my point is simply that as a general type of behaviour choice is intimately associated with thought in a way that is not obviously or necessarily the case for any other pairing of behaviour and being. We can readily imagine a material type of being which behaves entirely randomly, or does not have any behaviour whatsoever, or changes strictly deterministically, or changes according to a limited field of probabilities. But thought which was entirely inactive would not be thought at all, nor if it was strictly deterministic, nor if it was entirely random (both would be meaningless, and so couldn't be considered thought). If we presume from our non-experience a material type of being, its type of behaviour, however extensively observed, is still entirely inexplicable; if we extrapolate from our experience to a mental type of being, choice must necessarily be its type of behaviour.

(To pre-empt some possible questions, I understand choice to be best described as a limited field of possible outcomes, for the actual outcome of which a mind feels responsible.)

Even if this were the case, the contingency which exists between objects of choice and choice itself underscores the fact that something external to choice must preceded it in order for choice to manifest. Choice is fundamentally predicated upon knowledge (A mind cannot choose what a mind does not know). More specifically, a mind cannot choose what does not first exist. Given that objects of choice will always precede choice itself, we may conclude that some non-choosing entity will always exist ontologically prior to thoughtful choice. As such, even were I to grant that the behavior of choice is more explicable than a substance external to choice, it cannot be shown to provide an ontological foundation upon which our perceived reality is built. In other words, choice can't explain why the objects of choice, external to it, exist in the manner they do.

3 > While there are limitations to what we might reasonably theorize thought could accomplish, as you've persuasively argued here, ultimately I suspect that it's a more inclusive type of theory than materialism (and perhaps other alternatives). Things like divine intervention and possible life after death are neccessarily excluded by materialism, which means that reported first-hand experiences regarding such things must be either plausibly addressed or dismissed out of hand by a materialist, whereas the idealist is not commited to a view on them one way or the other. To put it the other way around, we might say that idealism has a wider range of potential 'explanatory' scope

This seems more an appeal to pragmatism than anything.

Not at all; if one theory rules many things out as impossible while another makes no commitment either way, obviously the former theory shoulders a higher burden of proof since it asserts a lot more. If anything it would be simpler in practice to just rule those things out - but not logically simpler.

The explanatory scope of idealism cannot be inferred merely by what it asserts. If its central tenets are logically unsound, any explanation of observed phenomena, derived from its tenets, will be made illusory. Thus to prefer idealism above its rivals simply for its superior potential to provide explanation prior to actually establishing the logical consistency of its central claims would, in my mind, constitute an appeal to pragmatism.

With all that in mind, if the problem of an infinite regress in thoughts were an insurmountable problem (rather than merely a limitation in how we can think about it), I don't think it's a crippling blow to the theory. We would simply have to propose one of the other absurdities which any theory of this type must appeal to: Perhaps this original mind came into being uncaused or randomly, with the simplest thoughts/experiences of different aspects of its own being in place. If my three points above are valid, that would still be a more reasonable theory than any alternatives I've encountered. Or perhaps the mind and some of its 'thought' exists eternally or necessarily, but certain particular thoughts arose spontaneously and began the progression which led ultimately to our reality. Again not a very satisfactory notion, but again it's no different (and for the reasons above potentially better) than an eternal singularity which spontaneously expanded.

Again, the experiential context such random, or eternal, thoughts would invariably lack would render each a logically impossible feat. A thought without context is really no thought at all. While I understand that each worldview takes its own liberties, endowing their initial cause with fanciful attributes largely foreign to human experience, I believe idealism (and certain alternative worldviews) stands at a distinct disadvantage in that its attempts to do so must necessarily result in certain logical contradictions which prevent us from maintaining rational or intelligible discourse concerning it. Notions of a block universe, or uncaused cause on the other hand might seem equally fanciful, but they have the added benefit of not being, at least at face value, internally contradictory.

There's no logical contradiction in the idea of thoughts whose only initial content concern the different attributes of the mind which thinks them. There's no logical contradiction in acknowledging that thoughts can coherently extend far beyond direct experience, through extrapolation and negation of what is experienced.

There is a contradiction in assuming that a mind is capable of perceiving the only aspects of mind which render its existence discernible (thought) prior to the existence of thought itself. Idealism, implies this very thing.

You are the one proposing that such a process could not ultimately produce concepts which (whatever they may be like in that mind) we experience as space, shape, motion, matter and energy. And I'm sorry, but I just can't see how you've proven your point.

If I were to guess why I can't see it, it'd probably be because I imagine a greater possible distinction between what we experience and what our hypothetical mind conceives. A possible analogy might be that whereas an artist might see pain or anguish in a painting, I just see a mess of colours. Where I hear power or majesty in a symphony, someone else might just hear a bunch of different tones and frequencies. Where we experience space, shape, motion, matter or energy, our original mind might only be conceiving different patterns of numbers or states of being.

I don't think we'll be able to simplify or discuss the problem any further than that, to be honest.

I believe you may be conflating source experience with impression. An artist might derive from a painting impressions of pain or suffering but at the point this occurs, the artist is no longer perceiving the painting itself. Rather, the artist is perceiving her own aesthetic judgements concerning the painting, as well as the ensuing emotional responses produced in her as a result of the meaning she assigned to the piece. This does not imply that she has perceived the painting in a manner different than it actually exists, rather she has perceived the value judgements she has subjectively assigned to a dispassionate amalgam of colors which have not changed. These value judgments, like all conceptual thoughts, are contextualized by prior experience. In like manner, if our hypothetical mind seeks to form conceptual judgements concerning objects native to its experience, those concepts will still require a contextual base from which to form. If there is no experiential context available from which to form a particular concept (e.g. spacial location), it cannot be conceived.

[EduChris]

...a mind cannot choose what does not first exist...objects of choice will always precede choice itself...some non-choosing entity will always exist ontologically prior to thoughtful choice...If there is no experiential context available from which to form a particular concept (e.g. spacial location), it cannot be conceived.

This is the heart of the problem with your argument. Our finite minds have a beginning, and therefore we need to learn; but why should you or anyone else suppose the same should be true of a mind which has no beginning and which intrinsically conceives or creates all possibilities?

Let's just change a few things from your quote, above, as follows:

...a mind cannot actualize what is not first conceptualized...conceptualized objects of choice will always precede actualization itself...some conceptualization will always precede thoughtful choice...If there is no conceptualized context available from which to actualize a particular concept (e.g. spacial location), it cannot be actualized...

Why is the first quote from you any more logical or necessary than the second?

[Justin108]

Now if agency is real, if our daily lived experience counts as evidence, then I can see no non-question-begging justification for removing it.

Our daily experience can not be evidence for the origin of the universe since we can not experience the origin of the universe. If your point is that we experience agency in ourselves then that would not lend anything to the origin of the universe since nothing suggests that the universe comes from something such as outselves.

Experience tells us the contrary as we see agency derive from necessity all the time in pregnancy. Pregnancy is a process of necessity and from that necessity comes agency (life)

But suppose you tried to eliminate agency anyway, just to see what would happen. In that case, non-agency (or necessity) would be the only remaining causal factor. And if that were the only causal factor, then our universe (and by extrapolation, every other possible universe) instantly becomes every bit as "necessary" as our logically necessary "source of all possibility." That in turn would entail that our "source of all possibility" is really the "source of all necessity," as there could be no such thing as a genuine "possibility" in this scenario.

The problem for the non-theist, however, is that "necessity" (along with "impossibility") assumes more than "possibility." Thus, again it turns out that agency assumes less, and is therefore more justified than non-agency.

Necessity makes one assumption and that is that a universe can exist without agency. That is the ONLY assumption being made. The conclusion you came to was via a train of reason. It then becomes reason, not assumption, that leads to the conclusion.

One assumption is made for each case:
Necessity assumes the universe can exist without an Agent
Agency assumes the universe needs an Agent.

They both make one assumption: Therefore they are equal

That is my stance. You won't get more than a 50% out of me

[Justin108]

Justin108 wrote:
...It would be contradictory to say the source is both personal AND impersonal...

Again I disagree, given the examples I gave previously. It seems that in our daily lives, at least, we find that our (admittedly finite) agency is often limited by the parameters of non-agental factors.

Remember we are talking about the origin of everything that exists. So before the beginning, there was nothing the Agent could have used or conform to to cause the universe. If an Agent is the cause of the universe then surely it is the agent who is also responsible for the limitations in the universe. It would not make sense for this agent to also be limited by these limitations if the Agent is meant to be responsible for these limitations.

Logically, something cannot be both be personal AND impersonal. If there is a single most cause to the universe then the single most cause must be one or the other.


Chicken-or-the-egg: If the Agent must conform to Necessity then Necessity came first. If Necessity was established by the Agent then the Agent came first.

Justin108 wrote:
...If the Agent has no purpose and there is no trace of the Agent then what reason would there be to believe an Agent even exists?...

We're not talking about the existence of an agent; rather, we're talking about whether the logically necessary source of all possibility involves agency as a causal mechanism.

I agree that if we were justified in removing agency, then there would be no need to retain agency, and in that case theism could be justifiably rejected.

If there is no need for an Agent, then I believe it is justifiably rejected. I would not argue that the Agent must have a magical staff to create the universe because a magical staff cannot be justified to be needed. I cannot give you any reason this Agent would need a magical staff. So because there is no reason to suppose a magical staff is needed, it is then justifiable to reject the magical staff. Similarly, if an Agent is not needed to create the universe, then the Agent justifiably rejected.

That is actually why atheism is seen as a default because we do not see why an Agent is needed. And if it is not needed, it can be justifiably rejected.

But I don't see any way that agency, if it is real and genuine per our daily lived experience, can be justifiably eliminated. Any attempt to do so seems quite arbitrary.

Arguing that agency exists and arguing that agency is the origin of the universe is two different things. Even if we assume determinism to not be the case.

Assuming so, all we see is that agency exists. We never see agency creating the universe. In fact, we never see agency creating anything. What agents such as ourselves do is we reassemble nature to conform to the functions we desire. We use pre-existing metals to create cars. We use pre-existing wood to make tables.

[Justin108]

Justin108 wrote:
...Well many believe that free will in certain theistic religions is a contradiction. In Christianity, for example, God is known to have planned the future. Therefor he also planned our actions (or atleast knew them before hand). This would result in determinism all the same...

Bare philosophical theism need not concern itself with the intricacies of any specific religious doctrine. However, most Christians do not believe that we are predetermined to do what we do. And as I have said many times, "omniscience" doesn't mean "knowing absolutely everything, including the future choices of free agents." Instead, theologians speak of it more along the lines of, "not arbitrarily limited in the capacity to handle and process information."
.

True but I just used it as an example against your notion that free will would indicate theism since even in theism (not bare theism but a branch of theism) free will would not necessarily exist.

Justin108 wrote:
...As for creature freedom suggesting theism - I wouldn't be able to say. Buddhists for example are atheistic but believe in spirituality. They obviously do not believe in determinism as they believe in some sort of soul so they would most probably reject my 3rd argument...

Again philosophical theism need not concern itself with the intricacies of any specific religious doctrine or teaching. Buddhism is a rather interesting case, but in my mind it is closer to theism than to non-theism, even if it isn't explicitly theistic.

Again this just serves as an example of atheism (albeit not bare-atheism) having free will to argue against your notion that atheism automatically indicates lack of free will.

Justin108 wrote:
...the fact that the Agent in theism exists WITH free will despite not having a creator (i.e no one created God - he just exists), it would suggest a sentient being (such as ourselves) should logically be able to have free will without having been created...

What about the converse? If agency did not inhere within the source of all possibility, then would "sentient beings" be less likely to possess some measure of genuine agency?

It would not matter. The focus here is on the notion that sentience can logically come from non-sentience. If it is logical to suppose God (a sentient being) can exist without having been created by a sentient being, then other sentient beings (us) should also logically be able to exist without having been created by a sentient being.

Anyway, if a finite creature can develop sentience and agency, then why should we arbitrarily deny such qualities to the very source of such (and all) possibility?

I'm not denying it as a possibility. I am merely adding that it is also possible for this creature to develope sentience and agency without it having to be the source of all possibility. I am an Agnostic Atheist in truth. I recognize the existence of a deity as a possibility. But I also recognize a universe without a deity as a possibility.

If we aren't agents, then nothing we do is unjustified (since everything we do would be predetermined by external factors). However, if we are agents, then to believe otherwise is at least false, and probably (if my arguments are correct) unjustified as well.

This changes nothing about the reality of the situation. All you would then prove is that everything we do is justified. In which case I would say: so what? What matters is not what we believe and whether it is justified or not. What matters is the reality of the situation and if the reality is determinism then what we think about it doesn't matter. Your position here seems to be simply that you mislike determinism but that would not make it any less true.

I am saying that only an agent can be responsible for their beliefs. If we are not agents, then we are not responsible, and therefore our beliefs cannot be unjustified (since we are forced or compelled or predetermined to believe and think and act as we do, and we cannot do otherwise).

Again: so what? I would label this a Red Herring as you seem to turn the argument away from what is true to what is preferred.

How do we know that our senses are fooling us? Simply because we come to learn the truth, we have an "aha moment" which corrects our previous error. But with the experience of our agency, there seems to be no way to avoid living as though we actually are agents. There is no "aha moment" which suddenly causes us to change the way we experience ourselves as agents in our daily lives.

How do we know our senses AREN'T fooling us?
"Aha moments" don't always translate into practicality.

Think about a person with an irrational phobia of clowns. If he sees a clown, he panics. He can have a thousand "aha" moments but it wouldn't translate into practicality. He KNOWS clowns are just regular people wearing makeup. But that knowledge does nothing for how he acts. Similarly, even if we believed in determinism, our philosophy would not translate to practicality. It's like a Matrix situation. We know we are in the "Matrix" of agency and that agency is nothing but a farce but our knowledge cannot let us escape this illusion.

[Darias]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

Nothing in your definition of non-theism says that theism "is not the case." By your own definition non-theism is the position that states " theism is not necessarily the case." That definition leaves a heck of a lot of room for agnosticism (I don't know.)

Therefore, how can anyone say that the position of "theism isn't necessarily correct, but I don't know" should be dismissed? Indeed how can it? This is simply a response to the assumption, without evidence, that "theism is correct."

And if we were to use your definition of theism, how can one come to know anything about the nature of god without evidence to show it? The universe is evidence for its own existence. How then, can you show that the universe is not only evidence of a god, but also evidence for the character of god? This is akin to saying that thunder is evidence of Thor... and he's angry.

Therefore, if a believer claims that something is true without evidence, and the skeptic responds with "that need not be the case," the believer cannot respond: "haha, your position is easily dismissed as you lack evidence," without being extremely hypocritical.

[Ionian_Tradition]

...My argument was an appeal to these very constraints...

No, you do not appeal to logical constraints at all; rather, you appeal to the absurd and illogical assumptions that the finite can comprehend the infinite, that the contingent can fully grasp the non-contingent, and that the conceptual must always derive from the actual.

How ironic coming from you who so fervently attempts to "rationally" defend a worldview concerning the existence of an entity you claim rests well beyond the capacity of any finite mind to comprehend....including your own. If your God is so far removed from your ability to logically assess, what could you have hoped to accomplish by debating this issue?...Or did you simply come here to preach?

...Dimension, of any kind, is a product of space. In the absence of space, there can exist no dimension. By rooting dimension in God's intrinsic nature, you ascribe to God a spacial quality which is intrinsically physical...

There is no need to posit actual, physical dimensionality to God; instead, we need only posit that God comprehends and conceives all dimensionality.

Again, from what experiential referent has God acquired the context necessary to render such notions of dimensionality intelligible? I am increasingly persuaded that haven't the slightest clue. But is this not to be expected, given that your God is, as you say, so thoroughly removed from your finite understanding?

...How can God, serve as the creator of all spacial dimension (the universe) when such is an intrinsic aspect of God's own nature?...

Your point is moot if conceptualization precedes actualization.

Experiential context precedes conceptualization. You've yet to present a viable means by which such might logically be achieved. Moreover, I am confused by your shift in position. First, dimension was not something "foreign to" God, implying that such was intrinsic to God's nature. Now you say that dimension is an actualized concept conceived in the mind of God, implying that dimension, when actualized, is separate and distinct from God. More contradictions?

...the question remains of how a conscious mind might acquire the experiential context necessary to form the concepts from which to begin creating anything...

Your question is moot if all concepts arise from God's intrinsic nature. Asserting that the actual must always precede the conceptual is simply to beg the question.

Experiential context only emerges from the actual Chris. You can't experience what isn't there. The "actual" logically precedes the "conceptual". Deny this if you wish, but know that you do so at the expense of rational discourse.

...The only constraints I place upon this mind are those dictated by logic...

I have demonstrated otherwise, above.

Hardly.

...I grant that infinite minds may very well transcend such limitations, but we could not discuss such minds intelligibly...

Theists do not presume that we can discuss the mind of God intelligibly--at least not unless such Mind were to reveal something of itself to us.

And it only took 362 posts for you to admit the utter frivolity of this discussion. Or would you have us believe that the God of theism revealed to you something of himself/herself/itself that he/she/it somehow failed to mention to the rest of us?

...nor could we ever hope to infer their existence through reason...

Non sequitur. That we cannot fully wrap our mind around something does not entail that the "something" in question does not or cannot exist. By your criteria, quantum physics doesn't "exist" because no one fully understands all that it entails.

Read again my friend. I said we cannot infer their existence through reason. I never implied that God could not exist simply because he/she/it is purported to be beyond human comprehension...This is becoming quite typical of you, charging me with these baseless accusations of fallacious reasoning. Have you considered that your strawman caricature of my position may be in need of revision? You would do well to take better care in reading my words. If you keep it up, there are those among us who might stop taking you seriously.

...No my friend, I insist that conceptual thought requires experiential context in order to be made coherent...thought cannot be experienced before it exists...

You assert this, but you have not (and cannot) demonstrate any such thing.

Would also affirm that cherries are also sweet before they exist? This is becoming quite absurd Chris. Has theism fallen so low so as to appeal to contradiction in order to defend its claims?

...As such, Theism, as you have defined it is shown to be false.

Your entire argument boils down to the fallacy of bare assertion.

There you go again...