Brain / Mind

[InReverse]

Here are some facts (the list should be longer but it can be extended if needed):
-Damage to certain brain areas causes predictable loss of function. There is list with types of agnosias here.
There are also documented cases of damage to functions such as memory formation.(H.M.)
-Split brain patients cannot verbally relate to information presented only to their right hemisphere, but can nonetheless react to it unconsciously. (ref)
-Certain substances alter the function of the brain (by known mechanisms) and also the state of consciousness (alcohol, drugs, anesthetics)

Question: "Is evidence from neuroscience sufficient for one to reject the mind-brain dualism?"
If not, how does one reconcile the facts above (and many others) with the separation between mind and brain. Also, how would you disprove "minds are what brains do".

[scourge99]

Some scientists have spent large amounts of money trying to find evidence in support of these stories. All have met with failure.

No, the successes have just been declared "near death".

What successes? There are none that are accepted by experts in the field.

I humbly request you "put up or hush up".

There was a time when death was defined as not breathing, no heartbeat and now no brain activity. If it were not for grave robbers, we might still think that people are dead when they stop breathing.

Yes, because we discovered that death, just like life, isn't a black and white thing. For example, viruses, prions, brain death, zygotes, etc. All of these are grey areas because, as is often the case, the world isn't as simple as our black and white definitions make them appear.

The argument of naturalists against supernaturalists is that the claims can not be empirically verified.

Redherring. Whether you are a naturalist or a supernaturalist, or neither, none of the dualist claims have been verified with evidence.

The supernaturalists then say, "Da, if you could prove it empirically, it would not be considered supernatural.

How exactly does someone determine that something is supernatural? I'll tell you, by committing a logical fallacy. E. G., " i don't know why/how that happened, but i can imagine that it was caused by something supernatural therefore it was supernatural."

You can't ever know something is supernatural. You can only irrationally assert that it is. If you think otherwise then explain how.

So, for the supernaturalists the problem with naturalists is the exclusion of the unproven from the possible.

No. You don't understand what naturalism is. Scientists (theists and non-theists) are methodological naturalists for good reasons, not philosophical naturalists.

However, there are many things that are extrapolated by the naturalists.

What's wrong with extrapolation? Its a valid tool when used correctly.

Therefore, the ultimate difference isn't hard facts versus speculation. it is a difference in acceptable and unacceptable methodologies.

What exactly is this different methodology? Why are you hiding it from us? I believe its because this "different methodology" you propose is either nonexistent or is so full of problems that it would be devastating to your argument to present it. Its so much easier for you to talk it up instead of actually demonstrating its superiority.

[instantc]

There are no good arguments for dualism. Thus , dualists usually argue against the alternatives which doesn't actually do anything to support dualism. Its like how creationists argue against evolution with the faulty assumption that proving evolution wrong will make creationism more credible.

I beg to differ, rejection of physicalism regarding the mind inevitably leads to dualism. This is not the case with evolution/creationism, which is a false dichotomy.

I'd rather say that there are no good arguments for physicalism, and especially not for the reductionist view.

Against the reductionist view, in fact, I think we have a knock-down argument. Since there is a logically possible world where pain exists without C-fibers firing, the two are not identical things, for identity is a necessary relation. Granted that this does not necessarily lead to dualism, but at least it proves that the conceptual problem of the brain/mind is not as simple as some think.

[bluethread]

Some scientists have spent large amounts of money trying to find evidence in support of these stories. All have met with failure.

No, the successes have just been declared "near death".

What successes? There are none that are accepted by experts in the field.

I humbly request you "put up or hush up".

There was a time when death was defined as not breathing, no heartbeat and now no brain activity. If it were not for grave robbers, we might still think that people are dead when they stop breathing.

Yes, because we discovered that death, just like life, isn't a black and white thing. For example, viruses, prions, brain death, zygotes, etc. All of these are grey areas because, as is often the case, the world isn't as simple as our black and white definitions make them appear.

No, there is no humility in interrupting. As you can see, I presented examples that were successful discoveries of situations where one was thought to be dead when they actually where not. You call them grey areas, in the past they were seen as examples of the afterlife. See how that works. If a person who was "brain dead" revives, that is a grey area and since that person is the only witness, it can not be verified, so it is a "grey area". Just like the previous examples.

The argument of naturalists against supernaturalists is that the claims can not be empirically verified.

Redherring. Whether you are a naturalist or a supernaturalist, or neither, none of the dualist claims have been verified with evidence.

The supernaturalists then say, "Da, if you could prove it empirically, it would not be considered supernatural.

How exactly does someone determine that something is supernatural? I'll tell you, by committing a logical fallacy. E. G., " i don't know why/how that happened, but i can imagine that it was caused by something supernatural therefore it was supernatural."
You can't ever know something is supernatural. You can only irrationally assert that it is. If you think otherwise then explain how.

So, for the supernaturalists the problem with naturalists is the exclusion of the unproven from the possible.

No. You don't understand what naturalism is. Scientists (theists and non-theists) are methodological naturalists for good reasons, not philosophical naturalists.

Again, patience is a virtue, though I can not prove that empirically, it is clearly the case here. Yes, you can not know if something is supernatural empirically, However, one can choose to accept testimony, one's own experience or extrapolation. Those options are not afforded to the supernaturalist, by the naturalist.

However, there are many things that are extrapolated by the naturalists.

What's wrong with extrapolation? Its a valid tool when used correctly.

This is a perfect example. If the empiricist extrapolates beyond empirical data to presume that say, the stars still exist, that is acceptable. However, if one extrapolates that there is an afterlife, because people who were thought dead revived and gave testimony to it, that is unacceptable. That is a double standard.

Therefore, the ultimate difference isn't hard facts versus speculation. it is a difference in acceptable and unacceptable methodologies.

What exactly is this different methodology? Why are you hiding it from us? I believe its because this "different methodology" you propose is either nonexistent or is so full of problems that it would be devastating to your argument to present it. Its so much easier for you to talk it up instead of actually demonstrating its superiority.

This is like the slaveholder calling his slave uppity, just because he proposes that he sees himself as equal in the eyes of a deity. I did not say that the other methodologies, ie. legal and experiential, are superior. I am just asking that they not be excluded out of hand. My ultimate point is that these two positions can not be reconciled as long as one side rejects the methodology of the other. So, the argument is really over appropriate methodology.

[scourge99]

There are no good arguments for dualism. Thus , dualists usually argue against the alternatives which doesn't actually do anything to support dualism. Its like how creationists argue against evolution with the faulty assumption that proving evolution wrong will make creationism more credible.

I beg to differ, rejection of physicalism regarding the mind inevitably leads to dualism. This is not the case with evolution/creationism, which is a false dichotomy.

In general, i agree that physicalism and dualism are a dichotomy. But the problem is that there are many forms and aspects of physicalism and dualism. So proving one form or aspect of dualism wrong doesn't make physicalism more tenable or vice versa.

I'd rather say that there are no good arguments for physicalism, and especially not for the reductionist view.

There are many, some of which are offered by the OP that you have failed to address.

Against the reductionist view, in fact, I think we have a knock-down argument. Since there is a logically possible world where pain exists without C-fibers firing, the two are not identical, for identity is a necessary relation. Granted that this does not necessarily lead to dualism, but at least it proves that the conceptual problem of the brain/mind is not as simple as some think.

I don't know anything about C-fibers or what they do. I somehow doubt you have any deep understanding of them either. I'm also unaware of any neuroscientist, physicalist, dualist, or any expert of repute ever mentioning this argument you make. So I'm lead to believe

1) you've just discovered a knock-down argument against physicalism that no one ever thought of before and is probably deserving of a noble prize.

2) you are mistaken.


But let's examine your argument.

From what i gather on Wikipedia, C-fibers are responsible for a certain type of pain termed as "second pain".

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_C_nerve_fiber

So right off the bat we see that your assessment is inaccurate. Pain can still be felt even if C-fibers are not firing because other fibers elicit pain other than C-fibers.

For the sake of argument, lets assume that scientists believe that all pain is caused by C-fibers. You claim that there is a logically possible world where pain could be felt. What does that even mean? Is there also a logically possible world where gravity is related to mass? So on that same line of reasoning is gravity proven wrong? I'm perplexed on how your ability to imagine something logical has any bearing on what ACTUALLY is.

Lastly, lets move on and also assume that your argument is valid therefore scientists have incorrectly correlated C-fibers with pain. How does that prove physicalism wrong? It seems that the only thing it does it demonstrate that scientists are wrong about the correlation they've drawn between C-fibers and pain. I don't see how that knocks down physicalism or proves the conceptual problem of mind/body is "not as simple as some think".


So from top to bottom we see that your argument is flawed.

[scourge99]

Some scientists have spent large amounts of money trying to find evidence in support of these stories. All have met with failure.

No, the successes have just been declared "near death".

What successes? There are none that are accepted by experts in the field.

I humbly request you "put up or hush up".

There was a time when death was defined as not breathing, no heartbeat and now no brain activity. If it were not for grave robbers, we might still think that people are dead when they stop breathing.

Yes, because we discovered that death, just like life, isn't a black and white thing. For example, viruses, prions, brain death, zygotes, etc. All of these are grey areas because, as is often the case, the world isn't as simple as our black and white definitions make them appear.

No, there is no humility in interrupting. As you can see, I presented examples that were successful discoveries of situations where one was thought to be dead when they actually where not. You call them grey areas, in the past they were seen as examples of the afterlife. See how that works. If a person who was "brain dead" revives, that is a grey area and since that person is the only witness, it can not be verified, so it is a "grey area". Just like the previous examples.

1) I did not label the situation where once we thought someone was dead and now we don't, grey areas. Please re-read more carefully. What i did was explain that the definition of "dead" and "alive" has changed as our understanding of the medicine has increased. Before, we used to call people "dead" if they no longer were breathing. At some point we realized that people could come back to life as long as their heart was beating. So a stopped heart was the new definition of "dead". Still later we discovered that hearts could be restarted and it was actually the brain that mattered. So as long as the brain is still viable then you aren't dead. But even then we realized that's not quite accurate. Are definition if death is very different than it was long ago. And contrary to your conspiracy theory notions, today's medical definition of "dead" has got nothing to do with the afterlife. Its based on the condition at which we believe a person can no longer be revived.

2) Yes, people who are "brain dead" (I.E., have no noticeable activity in their brain) is a gray area. Sometimes they can be revived, sometimes they can't. But there is a difference in degree between brain dead people. For example, someone whose brain has been turned into mush from a 200mph car accident and a person who has a severe hypothermia and has no brain activity are both technically "brain dead". However, one stands a chance at possibly being revived and another doesn't. We aren't exactly sure on the exact limits to which brain damage causes irreversible harm but we do understand that there is a limit. Everything in between is a "gray area".

3) I have no idea what in the world you mean when you say "since that person is the only witness, it can not be verified, so it is a "grey area"." It seems you think that people who claim to have an NDE when they are unconscious is proof that whatever they claimed ACTUALLY happened.

The argument of naturalists against supernaturalists is that the claims can not be empirically verified.

Redherring. Whether you are a naturalist or a supernaturalist, or neither, none of the dualist claims have been verified with evidence.

The supernaturalists then say, "Da, if you could prove it empirically, it would not be considered supernatural.

How exactly does someone determine that something is supernatural? I'll tell you, by committing a logical fallacy. E. G., " i don't know why/how that happened, but i can imagine that it was caused by something supernatural therefore it was supernatural."
You can't ever know something is supernatural. You can only irrationally assert that it is. If you think otherwise then explain how.

So, for the supernaturalists the problem with naturalists is the exclusion of the unproven from the possible.

No. You don't understand what naturalism is. Scientists (theists and non-theists) are methodological naturalists for good reasons, not philosophical naturalists.

Again, patience is a virtue, though I can not prove that empirically, it is clearly the case here. Yes, you can not know if something is supernatural empirically, However, one can choose to accept testimony, one's own experience or extrapolation. Those options are not afforded to the supernaturalist, by the naturalist.

Red-herring. Telling me that you can believe testimony about an afterlife doesn't change the problem. The problem just gets changed to how the person whose testimony you are listening to KNOWS it was real and not just a dream.

We know people have vivid dreams and can even hallucinate while awake. But we don't know that any afterlife exists. So when someone claims they saw an afterlife, how can they prove it, even to themselves, that what they experienced was NOT a dream? What reason do they have to believe it was NOT the most LIKELY conclusion that it was a dream?

And also consider the fact that people usually have "near death experiences" of the religion they belong to. Christians usually get Christian NDEs. Muslims usually have Muslim NDEs, and Hindus usually have Hindu NDEs. WOW. What a surprise. But let me guess your answer. "Everyone else is "dreaming" or possessed by demons/devil, and only some the Christian NDE's are actually right.":roll:

However, there are many things that are extrapolated by the naturalists.

What's wrong with extrapolation? Its a valid tool when used correctly.

This is a perfect example. If the empiricist extrapolates beyond empirical data to presume that say, the stars still exist, that is acceptable. However, if one extrapolates that there is an afterlife, because people who were thought dead revived and gave testimony to it, that is unacceptable. That is a double standard.

That is NOT a double standard. The stars can be VERIFIED to exist by ANYONE. If an afterlife could be verified to exist we wouldn't even be having this conversation.

I've already explained how people who have near death experiences have no way of distinguishing whether their experience was a dream or real. But they have good reason to believe it was not real because we KNOW people have dreams. Even very vivid dreams. The problem is that you think testimony that is backed up by flawed reasoning is a valid.. but onyl when it supports the beliefs you want. For example, Muslims and Hindu NDEs about Muslim and Hindu afterlives are invalid.

If everyone had similiar Christian NDE's then that would be something to write home about. But they don't.

Therefore, the ultimate difference isn't hard facts versus speculation. it is a difference in acceptable and unacceptable methodologies.

What exactly is this different methodology? Why are you hiding it from us? I believe its because this "different methodology" you propose is either nonexistent or is so full of problems that it would be devastating to your argument to present it. Its so much easier for you to talk it up instead of actually demonstrating its superiority.

This is like the slaveholder calling his slave uppity, just because he proposes that he sees himself as equal in the eyes of a deity.

Except this "slave holder" asked for the slave to explain and if what the slave says is true, he would set him free. SO when the slave holder gave him the chance, the slave didn't even try to explain and instead made excuse after excuse for why he couldn't explain.

I did not say that the other methodologies, ie. legal and experiential, are superior. I am just asking that they not be excluded out of hand. My ultimate point is that these two positions can not be reconciled as long as one side rejects the methodology of the other. So, the argument is really over appropriate methodology.

WHAT methodology? So far the only "methodology" you have proposed is to BLINDLY accept the testimony of others.

[instantc]

For the sake of argument, lets assume that scientists believe that all pain is caused by C-fibers. You claim that there is a logically possible world where pain could be felt. What does that even mean? Is there also a logically possible world where gravity is related to mass? So on that same line of reasoning is gravity proven wrong? I'm perplexed on how your ability to imagine something logical has any bearing on what ACTUALLY is.

We don't have to assume anything, the argument just focuses on a specific part of the brain/mind relationship. What it is trying to show, is that physical brain activity doesn't equal conscious experience.

A world is logically possible as long as it does not break any laws of logic. A world where heavier objects fall faster than less heavy objects is logically impossible, since it contradicts itself.

According to the fundamental laws of logic, identity is indeed a necessary relation, therefore the mere fact that in some possible world A is not B means that A in fact is not B. This has bearing in every possible world, including the real one.

Lastly, lets move on and also assume that your argument is valid therefore scientists have incorrectly correlated C-fibers with pain. How does that prove physicalism wrong? It seems that the only thing it does it demonstrate that scientists are wrong about the correlation they've drawn between C-fibers and pain. I don't see how that knocks down physicalism or proves the conceptual problem of mind/body is "not as simple as some think".

Well, I said it is a knock-down argument against the narrow reductionist view, which as far as I know holds that physical brain activity, such as C-Fibers firing, equals conscious experience, such as pain.

I don't know anything about C-fibers or what they do. I somehow doubt you have any deep understanding of them either. I'm also unaware of any neuroscientist, physicalist, dualist, or any expert of repute ever mentioning this argument you make.

This would be because science at its present stage cannot really say anything about this conceptual mind/body problem. Some neuroscientists, such as Alex Rosenberg, hold the narrow reductionist view, regardless of the fact that it contradicts itself logically. Others are not that ambitious and acknowledge that whatever the scientist observes in the brain, that does not equal the conscious experience of the subject, since it is logically possible for one to exist without the other.

[InReverse]

A world is logically possible as long as it does not break any laws of logic. A world where heavier objects fall faster than less heavy objects is logically impossible, since it contradicts itself.

I did not really understand the example (the relevance of mass, as there are obviously objects that fall faster or slower based on their aerodynamic properties) but a thing is certain: whatever world we may imagine,we are using our own internal models for it ( for example the intuition of objects falling in a certain way - this is tied to perception and is by no means "logical" ). Not only our models of the world are not perfect but we would really push them to their limit by conceiving things that do not normally exist in reality ( for example the p-zombie argument ). I don't see how we could reach an agreement based only on this sort of arguments.

As the problem of the brain / mind separation (or lack of it) involves both the physical and the mental I would say that valid arguments in this case would need to take both into account.

Well, I said it is a knock-down argument against the narrow reductionist view, which as far as I know holds that physical brain activity, such as C-Fibers firing, equals conscious experience, such as pain.

I'd like to extend your example, keeping the "narrow" reductionist view:
-Suppose that what equals conscious experience is not the firing of a certain neuron or population of neurons, but the activity in a certain area during a slightly longer period of time. During that time, a subject would have experienced pain, and we would also be able to measure the brain activity with some arbitrarily chosen device.
-Suppose the device is precise enough so that after multiple trials we would be able to differentiate between pain and other "mind states", based on reports from the subject (from his personal experience) and the actual measurements.
-The accuracy of the device might not be 100%, but most of the time it will predict the subject's sensation of "pain" based only on the measurements from his brain.
-What is the role of the mind if its state can be accurately predicted from a purely physical state of the brain? What is the purpose of the brain activity we just observed if the mind is separate? Why are they correlated?

Others are not that ambitious and acknowledge that whatever the scientist observes in the brain, that does not equal the conscious experience of the subject, since it is logically possible for one to exist without the other.

What you mean by "logically possible" is actually the result of your personal experience. This is why I think this kind of arguments won't bring us closer to an understanding of this problem.

[instantc]

A world is logically possible as long as it does not break any laws of logic. A world where heavier objects fall faster than less heavy objects is logically impossible, since it contradicts itself.

I did not really understand the example (the relevance of mass, as there are obviously objects that fall faster or slower based on their aerodynamic properties)

A world where heavier objects fall faster than less heavy objects, as Aristotle thought is the case, contradicts itself logically in the following thought experiment. Suppose I chain together a heavy and a light object, I would then have an even heavier object and it should fall even faster. But then again the lighter object would also work as a brake for the heavier object and slow it down, which leads to an obvious contradiction.

whatever world we may imagine,we are using our own internal models for it ( for example the intuition of objects falling in a certain way - this is tied to perception and is by no means "logical" ). Not only our models of the world are not perfect but we would really push them to their limit by conceiving things that do not normally exist in reality ( for example the p-zombie argument ). I don't see how we could reach an agreement based only on this sort of arguments.

What you mean by "logically possible" is actually the result of your personal experience. This is why I think this kind of arguments won't bring us closer to an understanding of this problem.

The logical argument shows the conceptual problem, which I think cannot be overcome in a laboratory. The problem is that whatever we observe in the brain using our present technology, that does not logically equal conscious experience, no matter how clear and infallible the relationship between the two might be.

For example, we can say that rain equals water falling down from clouds in droplets after condensing and becoming sufficiently heavy. Try to imagine a world where it is raining but water does not fall down from the sky. As rain equals falling water droplets, there is no logically possible world where there is rain but no falling water, the contradiction is easy to see. However, a world where there are minds but no brain activity does not seem to contradict itself logically.

[InReverse]

For example, we can say that rain equals water falling down from clouds in droplets after condensing and becoming sufficiently heavy. Try to imagine a world where it is raining but water does not fall down from the sky. As rain equals falling water droplets, there is no logically possible world where there is rain but no falling water, the contradiction is easy to see. However, a world where there are minds but no brain activity does not seem to contradict itself logically.

I hate to point out the obvious but we're not thinking with the rain (yes, "rain"). So our problem is a bit harder to solve because regardless of where you consider "thinking" to be implemented, you're using that to study the problem. That's why I think a similar argument (logical) would be irrelevant in our case.

Side note: To me your statement about minds and brain activity does seem quite contradictory (I made some simplifying assumptions).

[instantc]

For example, we can say that rain equals water falling down from clouds in droplets after condensing and becoming sufficiently heavy. Try to imagine a world where it is raining but water does not fall down from the sky. As rain equals falling water droplets, there is no logically possible world where there is rain but no falling water, the contradiction is easy to see. However, a world where there are minds but no brain activity does not seem to contradict itself logically.

I hate to point out the obvious but we're not thinking with the rain (yes, "rain"). So our problem is a bit harder to solve because regardless of where you consider "thinking" to be implemented, you're using that to study the problem. That's why I think a similar argument (logical) would be irrelevant in our case.

Well, before you can disregard the argument, you should show what's wrong with it. Either you must show why a world where there are minds but no brains contradicts itself logically, or you must show why this particular problem, exceptional as it is, is above the fundamental laws of logic.