Do we have a soul that only God can destroy?

[McCulloch]

While you may consider my statement an opinion, I will also defend it as truth. We have a soul with a consciousness that only God can destroy.

Do we have a soul with a consciousness that only God can destroy?

[HiddenHand]

It seems simple to me, religion is man made. Religion came up with the concept of ‘the soul’ so there is no soul.
Is that too simple?

Might be for some.

Makes perfect sense to me.

I just personally would like to know, if I have a soul (which I can't prove I don't) what the heck is it?

Guess I gotta pull out all those new age books in storage...

Cheers

[Danmark]

Before we even get to the existence of a soul, I think we need to establish who the 'observer' is. What, or to personify it, who is the observer behind my eyes? What is 'consciousness' and why are we self-aware, cognisant beings? Is my spirit the entity experiencing my bodily reality? If so, how did it come into being?

Or...

Is our consciousness an expression of some unseen, universal oneness that the Buddhists speak of? Is individuality an illusion? Or is consciousness purely a result of our evolved biological processes by which we have become self-aware?

Is consciousness a result of having a soul? Or have we conjured up the idea of a soul due to our self-awareness?

McCulloch, I know your OP is directed at baiting those who believe in souls but for me, these are the questions I would like the know the answer to. I hope they won't derail the topic too much.

Cheers

Why posit any of this? All each of us knows for certain is that I, the individual, experiences consciousness. Why speculate on some unseen observer beyond the self? Or speculate that somehow my consciousness involves others?

I'm not suggesting there is nothing beyond what I experience. My point is that we should not go off on speculative flights of fancy without some reason or evidence.

I am only asking questions. Is this not relevant to the discussion?

Cheers

I mean no disrespect and do not claim questions should not be asked. But I am suggesting the questions should have some basis for being asked.

If I say there is a rock at 'X' it is because I see it, I feel it, I touch it. Those senses tell me it is an object that others join me in naming it 'rock.'

When I contemplate my own consciousness, my awareness of the world around me and how I relate to it, I am relating that experience to myself, then sharing that with others. The others' descriptions match my own. So I have some sense that we experience the same phenomenon in the same or very similar ways.

But what are our joint reasons, our evidence or experience that suggests speculation about the qualities of that rock might include leprechauns inside the rock that have produced its exterior as a shelter for the leprechauns?

In other words, shouldn't our questions be guided by something other than bare speculation?

[instantc]

Why posit any of this? All each of us knows for certain is that I, the individual, experiences consciousness.

Actually I think that in materialism, there is no 'I', the illusion of the self is just different parts of the brain interacting with each other. The self cannot be the whole body, and there is no part of the brain, which would qualify for being the self. Materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist, therefore the self is an illusion. This is what Alexander, for example, argues in his book Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality.

The above may well be the case, but one might also consider property dualism, which holds that the mind is indeed a concrete but non-spatial property of the brain. This view can be supported by several conceptual philosophical arguments, which I find quite convincing.

[Suzy]

Why posit any of this? All each of us knows for certain is that I, the individual, experiences consciousness.

Actually I think that in materialism, there is no 'I', the illusion of the self is just different parts of the brain interacting with each other. The self cannot be the whole body, and there is no part of the brain, which would qualify for being the self. Materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist, therefore the self is an illusion. This is what Alexander, for example, argues in his book Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality.

The above may well be the case, but one might also consider property dualism, which holds that the mind is indeed a concrete but non-spatial property of the brain. This view can be supported by several conceptual philosophical arguments, which I find quite convincing.

That gave me a headache.
You are probably right. I give up on trying understanding it. Dumb blond!

[Danmark]

Why posit any of this? All each of us knows for certain is that I, the individual, experiences consciousness.

Actually I think that in materialism, there is no 'I', the illusion of the self is just different parts of the brain interacting with each other. The self cannot be the whole body, and there is no part of the brain, which would qualify for being the self. Materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist, therefore the self is an illusion. This is what Alexander, for example, argues in his book Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality.

The above may well be the case, but one might also consider property dualism, which holds that the mind is indeed a concrete but non-spatial property of the brain. This view can be supported by several conceptual philosophical arguments, which I find quite convincing.

What is your basis for claiming:
1. there is no 'I' in materialism
2. the self is an illusion
3. the self cannot be the whole body
4. that materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist
5. that the mind is 'concrete'

In other words, you have several assumptions inherent in your argument, but you offer no support for any of them.

Finally, what do you mean when you claim 'mind' is a 'non-spatial property of the brain?'

My mind assigns a very definite location for my self in space. Does your mind operate differently?

[instantc]

What is your basis for claiming:
1. there is no 'I' in materialism

Since materialism excludes the existence of something concrete but non-spatial, and there is no part of the brain which qualifies for being the self, one must conclude that the self is an illusion. I am not a neuroscientist, but I am merely citing Dr. Rosenberg's work here, http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disen ... o-reality/

3. the self cannot be the whole body

This would be simply because the illusion of the self does not vanish or change when you take parts of the body away. For example, if your leg is removed when you are asleep, you are still the same person in the morning, although with less physical capabilities, the experience of the self does not change.

4. that materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist

That's why it is called 'materialism', energy and matter are both spatial by definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism

5. that the mind is 'concrete'

Did I say this?

Finally, what do you mean when you claim 'mind' is a 'non-spatial property of the brain?'

Property dualism holds that consciousness is a property of the brain, and that it cannot be reduced to physical brain activity. From these presumptions it logically follows that the consciousness is a non-physical property of the brain. There are several philosophical arguments, which support this theory, and I'd be glad to discus them in case someone here would be interested in that.

[Danmark]

Since materialism excludes the existence of something concrete but non-spatial, and there is no part of the brain which qualifies for being the self, one must conclude that the self is an illusion. I am not a neuroscientist, but I am merely citing Dr. Rosenberg's work here, http://onthehuman.org/2009/11/the-disen ... o-reality/

Let's take these one at a time. Materialism does not exclude the existence of things concrete. Just the opposite. Materialism holds that the only thing that exists is matter or energy; that all things are composed of material and all phenomena (including consciousness) are the result of material interactions.

I am completely baffled by your pronouncement that things concrete are not material. 'Concrete' is certainly not only material, it is a material.

[Danmark]

This would be simply because the illusion of the self does not vanish or change when you take parts of the body away. For example, if your leg is removed when you are asleep, you are still the same person in the morning, although with less physical capabilities, the experience of the self does not change.

Again you postulate without evidence that the self is an illusion. When a leg is removed, the self is diminished by exactly one leg. No more nor less. You are not the same person in the morning. You are the same person, minus one leg.

The 'experience of the self' does indeed change. The self is now the same, absent the leg. My self is now a self with one leg. This is true in a literal sense; however, since the part of the brain that includes two legs has not been removed, the brain may produced 'phantom limb' phenomena. This is easily explained simply by looking at materialist neuroscience experiments. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran for one has studied and published in this area.

[Danmark]

Property dualism holds that consciousness is a property of the brain, and that it cannot be reduced to physical brain activity. From these presumptions it logically follows that the consciousness is a non-physical property of the brain. There are several philosophical arguments, which support this theory, and I'd be glad to discus them in case someone here would be interested in that.

I believe you are confusing 'property dualism' with 'substance dualism.' Property dualism hold that consciousness IS a property that inheres in the material of the brain.
Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains)._ Wikipedia

In other words, you have got each of your contentions exactly backward.

[scourge99]

Why posit any of this? All each of us knows for certain is that I, the individual, experiences consciousness.

Actually I think that in materialism, there is no 'I', the illusion of the self is just different parts of the brain interacting with each other. The self cannot be the whole body, and there is no part of the brain, which would qualify for being the self. Materialism doesn't allow anything concrete but non-spatial to exist, therefore the self is an illusion. This is what Alexander, for example, argues in his book Disenchanted Naturalist's Guide to Reality.

The above may well be the case, but one might also consider property dualism, which holds that the mind is indeed a concrete but non-spatial property of the brain. This view can be supported by several conceptual philosophical arguments, which I find quite convincing.

A common strawman is to describe materialism as some strict philosophy that nothing but the material "exists". This commits the equivocation fallacy because there are many different meanings of the word "exist" that the fallacy-maker is waffling between to make their fallacious argument.

So what i would claim: only matter is known to PHYSICALLY exist. And matter behaves according to the laws of physics. Other things that "exist" do not physically exist but "exist" conceptually or as abstractions of complex interactions of matter (E.G., emergence). But that doesn't mean these other things aren't worth discussing or talking about. For example, a chair does not actually exist because it is really just a bunch of fermions and bosons behaving according to the laws of physics. "chair" is just a label we give to a particular configuration of matter. But it still makes sense to talk about chairs as distinct entities because talking about everything in terms of fermions and bosons is far too cumbersome and low level to be practical.

Morality, as another example, exists only as a high level concept. It only exists in the same sense justice and love exist and represent complex interactions.

Overall there is often a fundamental communication problem when it comes to this discussion because theists don't accept that all that exists (fundamentally) is matter and the laws of physics. They often believe that other realms of existence are out there where things like souls, consciousness, justice, gods, and other things "reside". Whereas to the non-theist (like myself) these other realms of existence are merely emergent, conceptual, or abstractions of matter (and the laws of physics). And the evidence strongly supports that. Theists often counter by claiming that it doesn't disprove their unverified, unevidenced, speculations. They fail to understand that we don't need to because they don't understand the burden if proof. For example, we didn't prove with absolute certainty that seizures weren't caused by demons or that angry gods didn't cause lightening. Rather, we found better explanations for these phenomena and discarded the demon/angry-god ideas to the trash heap.