take the moral landscape challenge

[Dantalion]

So, Sam Harris just posted a challenge revolving around one of his more controversial books, the moral landscape with an almost guaranteed 1000 dollar winner.
I've seen many theists and atheists trying to refute the book's main premise, that morality can be scientifically approached.
I really look forward to what Sam considers the best refutations of his book, but how about we start here ?

A science of morality, would it work and why (not) ?


http://www.samharris.org/blog

[Dantalion]

how could science ever condemn me causing the worst possible misery for everyone else, in case it would lead to the greatest possible happiness for myself?

I'm not going to refute moral relativism again.
you are seriously asking me 'what if I'm a complete psychopath'.
Well, then you are a danger to humanity and should be treated as such.
Serious mental disorders do not negate the concept that the worst possible suffering for everybody is bad.
I think subtle situations pose a far greater threat to Harris' ideas than the 'what if I'm a deranged psychotic maniac' questions.

[olavisjo]

.

you are seriously asking me 'what if I'm a complete psychopath'.

You and Sam Harris bring these hidden assumptions into your arguments.

• We should be moral because we should not be complete psychopath.
  
  Why should we not be complete psychopaths?
  
  Because complete psychopaths are not moral, seriously, everyone should know that.

A complete psychopath puts himself ahead of others and does not care about others, is there any scientific evidence to suggest that there is something wrong with that?

[instantc]

how could science ever condemn me causing the worst possible misery for everyone else, in case it would lead to the greatest possible happiness for myself?

I'm not going to refute moral relativism again.
you are seriously asking me 'what if I'm a complete psychopath'.
Well, then you are a danger to humanity and should be treated as such.
Serious mental disorders do not negate the concept that the worst possible suffering for everybody is bad.
I think subtle situations pose a far greater threat to Harris' ideas than the 'what if I'm a deranged psychotic maniac' questions.

Is this supposed to be an argument? You do realize that you are on a debate forum, where you are supposed to make arguments and not merely declare your views, right?

So your answer is that science could condemn me exchanging misery of others for my own happiness, because of course it does and if I don't agree I am an idiot. Way to defend your moral theory!

[Dantalion]

We should be moral because we should not be complete psychopath.

We should be moral because we value well-being. I value not starving to death so I should eat. This fact does not change in the case of eating disorders.
Psychopathy is a disorder for a reason. It's completely detriment to the survival of the human species, the flourishing of societies and well-being of people without said disorders.
All I'm saying is that we should not let moral discussions depend on the morality of psychopaths. If you value suffering you are immoral.

Why should we not be complete psychopaths?

Because psychopathy is detriment to the well-being of the human race.
Also, you're acting as if psychopathy is a choice.

A complete psychopath puts himself ahead of others and does not care about others, is there any scientific evidence to suggest that there is something wrong with that?

Absolutely. Plenty of evidence for that in biology and the history of our species.
We would have been long extincted if it weren't for altruism.

[instantc]

If you value suffering you are immoral.

What is the scientific basis for this?

[Dantalion]

Is this supposed to be an argument? You do realize that you are on a debate forum, where you are supposed to make arguments and not merely declare your views, right?

I thought I was doing that, but if you did not take it that way the fault is on me.

So your answer is that science could condemn me exchanging misery of others for my own happiness, because of course it does and if I don't agree I am an idiot. Way to defend your moral theory!

no that's not what I said. (Also, we already condemn people who exchange misery of others for their own happiness)

First off, psychopathy is a serious mental disorder, of which amorality is a trait.
When you are discussing the morality of psychopaths you are discussing the vision of blind people.
Also, this isn't about individual cases. Smoking is bad for your health, but not every smoker gets sick or dies from it. Not everybody experiences the same consequences from unhealthy food. Still, the food is not healthy.
In the same way we can state action X is detriment to well-being, even if an extreme minority of people look like they get some positive experience from X.

Also, and this is very important, there is a huge difference between well-being and impulsive gratification. People who really get off on suffering do just that, they satisfy an urge. People like that feel hollow until they kill or inflict suffering, like a drug addict. That's not well-being at all, or else we could all just masturbate all day long and state that we are maximizing our well-being.

making an urge go away for a while is not maximizing well-being and minimizing suffering

[Dantalion]

If you value suffering you are immoral.

What is the scientific basis for this?

The same scientific basis we use for all things medical and health-related.
There is nothing that says we absolutely ought to value health. But if we do not value health, we get sick, suffer, or die.
If we want to avoid that, health becomes something we can objectively strive towards, because we can objectively say X is bad for your teeth/lungs/sight/heart/bones/whatever.

Same with morality.
If we value well-being, we should avoid suffering.
And we can objectively say throwing acid in the faces of children is objectively not good.

[instantc]

If you value suffering you are immoral.

What is the scientific basis for this?

The same scientific basis we use for all things medical and health-related.
There is nothing that says we absolutely ought to value health. But if we do not value health, we get sick, suffer, or die.
If we want to avoid that, health becomes something we can objectively strive towards, because we can objectively say X is bad for your teeth/lungs/sight/heart/bones/whatever.

Same with morality.
If we value well-being, we should avoid suffering.
And we can objectively say throwing acid in the faces of children is objectively not good.

Something being immoral means that we ought not to do it. I asked 'on what scientific grounds is not valuing well-being immoral'. You answered 'there is nothing that says we ought to value health'. Thus, you affirm that there is no scientific basis for your claim, right?

I agree that if we don't value health we get sick, and if we do, then promoting health is good. That's not the question on the table though.

[Dantalion]

If you value suffering you are immoral.

What is the scientific basis for this?

The same scientific basis we use for all things medical and health-related.
There is nothing that says we absolutely ought to value health. But if we do not value health, we get sick, suffer, or die.
If we want to avoid that, health becomes something we can objectively strive towards, because we can objectively say X is bad for your teeth/lungs/sight/heart/bones/whatever.

Same with morality.
If we value well-being, we should avoid suffering.
And we can objectively say throwing acid in the faces of children is objectively not good.

Something being immoral means that we ought not to do it. I asked 'on what scientific grounds is not valuing well-being immoral'. You answered 'there is nothing that says we ought to value health'. Thus, you affirm that there is no scientific basis for your claim, right?

I agree that if we don't value health we get sick, and if we do, then promoting health is good. That's not the question on the table though.

there are no independent 'oughts'. If we value our health, there will be some things we ought to do and ought not to.
but taken out of any framework the question of 'ought we value our health' becomes meaningless.

There is scientific basis for my claims.
Psychology is the study of the human mind.
What you are doing is asking the question 'ought we study what is detriment or beneficiary to the workings of the human mind' and because I can't answer that question independent of any framework you'd argue that there is no scientific basis for psychological claims.

The framework 'the worst possible misery for everyone is bad' absolutely provides us with a scientific basis. throwing acid into faces becomes objectively worse than hugging somebody and making them feel cared for and supported.

So in that sense, the scientific basis for morality is the same as the scientific basis for medicine, or the scientific basis for every science.

who says gaining knowledge of the natural world is something we 'ought' to do ?
What is the scientific basis for claiming that knowledge of the world around us is something we ought to care for ?

I don't see these types of criticisms when it comes to biology, chemistry, physics, archaeology, anthropology etc, why should a science of morality fall under a separate level of scrutiny ?

Or am I just completely missing your point here ?

[Darias]

1)

Morality (of the objective or universal sort) isn't based on consensus

there is no such thing as universal morality. . .

‣ Self-referential incoherence

It is fallacious to claim that there is no universal morality, regardless of whether or not there actually is such a thing. To claim is to bear the burden of proof, and one cannot prove a negative assertion is true -- hence the invalidity of the claim.



2)

objective morality can only exist within a certain framework. . .

‣ Inconsistency

You just said that there's no such thing as objective morality. This statement contradicts the previous claim.



3)

if you value X, Y is objectively good/bad.

‣ Non sequitur

This statement is verging on the nonsensical. It does not logically follow; please rephrase.



4)

There is nothing consensus about stating throwing acid in people's faces is morally bad.

It is fine to state that acid attacks are immoral; and this can logically be shown as such. I do not claim that acid attacks are not immoral when I object to your use of fallacious arguments; if I did, then I myself would be committing a fallacy. My problem is not necessarily with the conclusion, but with how you arrive to that conclusion. This is important because the more fallacious an argument is, the less convincing it becomes.

Your appeal to the people in post 8, when you claim that consensus (albeit a single consensus) is all that is necessary to validate Harris' claims, is fallacious; truth claims cannot be validated via consensus.



5)

and appealing to the center of two extremes in the attempt to indicate what is correct, as Harris does in his TED talk when discussing Islamic veils vs. sexy tabloids, is also fallacious.

Strawman, there is no appealing to any center here.

‣ Exhibit A

As evidenced by the video, edited for your convenience, Dr. Harris did indeed employ the golden mean fallacy, not to mention a clever appeal to emotion leading up to that argument -- all of which resulted in applause. This may make Harris a skilled public speaker, but such tactics do not win him any points in the philosophy department.

First, he failed to explain why either of those extremes were demonstrably bad. He touched on the issue of voluntary behavior briefly before interrupting it with a gut-wrenching pause and an almost tearful description of brutality, in the fallacious attempt to establish the truth of his claim by hijacking the empathy of a western audience. He did the same thing with humor when he showed an image of sexy tabloids to an audience of adults, many of whom may have been concerned parents.

He did not point out the fact, that the one thing that determines the morality of any clothing style--be it a burka, a bikini, or something in-between--is whether or not force is involved. It is wrong to force anyone to wear or not to wear anything, as France does, because the initiation of force is immoral. The initiation of force is immoral because it is coercive by its very nature, and therefore non-consensual.

Whatever is conceptualized as "moral" or "the good" cannot simultaneously be unwanted and unwelcome (non-consensual) by both parties, but also idealized as a moral duty. This would be an example of special pleading where you are the exception to a moral rule. As Molyneux argues, rape, for example, is inherently immoral because two people cannot rape each other at the same time (ignoring physical limitations). The moment an interaction becomes voluntary is the moment aggression leaves the picture. In this case, that would be the moment rape becomes consensual bdsm.

Furthermore, anyone promoting a system of ethics that accepts unwanted, non-consesual behavior as "moral" is guilty of committing the ad consequentiam fallacy, an argument that in this case claims the true morality of a behavior is determined by its results, e.g, both parties experienced arousal during rape, therefore it was "justified," even though the victim didn't want it.



6)

I would appeal to the center of two extremes if I were to say that on a suffering scale where 1 is no suffering and 10 is eternal torture, 5 is the number to strive towards. I'm appealing to move as far away from 1 extreme as possible, not hit a fine note between 2 extremes.

‣ Ad temperantiam

Because you do not establish why either extreme is demonstrably immoral or bad, and because you appeal to the center of two opposites as morally preferable, you are guilty of committing a fallacy.

In attempting to move as far away from both extremes as you can, then you arrive at 5 (in this case) by default. In any case, even if you gave a range of numbers, you are still committing the golden mean fallacy, since it doesn't entail proposing specifics.

I believe you are approaching this as though you are talking about avoiding demonstrably fatal extremes, such as absolute zero and 7.2 trillion °F, in favor of a range of temperatures that allow for life: for both psychrophiles and hyperthermophiles, as well as human beings.

The problem is of course that there is nothing demonstrably immoral about either burkas or bikinis; both have their pros and cons. For example, more vitamin D or less skin cancer.

The only legitimate objection to either case is when and where force is involved. Arguably women living in Afghanistan are forced to be covered, whereas women living in France may not be. However, there is no compulsion involved in wearing bikinis apart from social pressures that allow for dissent (peer pressure). So when Dr. Harris claims that something between those two extremes might best serve human flourishing, I don't buy that argument. I argue that what bests serves humanity, as nothing more than a collection of individuals, is what bests serves individuals. And voluntary decision making and interaction is what will do just that -- no matter what it looks like. Rather than a moral landscape of holy mountains, evil valleys, and acceptable slopes, I argue for a world of countless different paths -- equal only in the sense that you elect to walk on them. This type of moral world is one that best serves diversity and peaceful interaction, as opposed one where top-down conformity, from those who claim to know what's "best," is forced upon others. Of course that world wouldn't eliminate the reality of highwaymen. The world I strive for is not one of utopia, but of rational consistency by those capable of reason.



7)

Philosophy and consistency aren't mind-games; without them you can't actually have a consistent, fallacy-free argument.

I agree, but never have I said otherwise. I've only spoken out against abstract philosophical thinking, the one that only serves to obfuscate and shift the focus to epistemology, which can be entertaining for a while but is very detriment to actual debate (imho).

I don't condemn you for your similar use of the abstract, as such abstract thinking is essential for discussions about morality. If I were to claim that your argument was false because you've debated in the same manner, then I would be guilty of tu quoque. My examples are meant to illustrate dilemmas more clearly, not to confuse or to restate the obvious. If my examples are too complicated then I'm not doing my job, so please ask if they don't make sense.



8)

And if you fail to define "well-being" as Harris does, that also doesn't help. Science can certainly conclude that eating poorly and doing drugs has negative effects on one's health, but supporting a global, nanny-state government which bans those behaviors does not mean that everyone will be better off.

Doesn't he define well-being as that which promotes physical and mental health ?

I know he defines that what is moral is that which amounts to well being. I'm not sure if he defines "well being" in his book, but I did discover that he used "health" as an analogy to his definition in response to some reviews of his book.



9)

I'm sensing a pattern of you reacting to arguments I'm never making.If science concludes X is bad for one's health, and we value health, then taking steps against X would be a good thing. That doesn't mean you have to completely flip over to flawed political systems.

Apologies for the confusion. I did not mean to imply you favored a global government; Harris does however.

Moreover, there are many problems with his morality as health analogy. If we follow Harris' logic to its conclusion then unhealthy foods, tattoos (which carry risk of infection), extreme sports, driving, smoking, drinking are all now immoral -- all of these things pose serious risks to one's health. And, "we" (another abstract concept that doesn't exist) must takes steps against them -- most likely by way of state law as people have done for thousands of years.

You cannot define objective morality solely on the basis of what promotes good health.



10)

Only the individual can determine the ideal "good" for themselves.

I disagree, a psychopath who gets pleasure out of torturing is not 'good'.
There have to be standards, a framework in which moral claims are to be judged.

Allow me to clarify. By "ideal good" here, I mean well-being. And by well being, I mean anything an individual wants to do that is either objectively moral or amoral -- and by that I mean all things voluntary.

The perverse and irrational acts of someone suffering from psychosis obviously does not fall within this framework, as it is difficult to argue that a legally insane person is even mentally capable of consent, let alone understanding why their actions were wrong. And the unwilling victim of violent madness cannot be said to want to be harmed either.

Psychopaths on the other hand are typically those individuals who possess a diminished capacity for empathy, but since empathy is more or less a tool buttressing morality rather than the source of moral reasoning, psychopaths (who are largely not violent) are more than capable of behaving ethically, as their actions are just as self-interested as yours or mine.

Likewise a sadist is perfectly capable of sating his impulses in a consensual, healthy, voluntary manner. When his or her partner is a willing masochist, then their mutually consenting behavior cannot be condemned on moral grounds, even if such relationships involve the infliction of pain which may seem appalling to a majority of persons.

And, as I have been saying, the standard by which an action is moral, amoral, or immoral is whether or not that behavior is voluntary.



11)

Every victimless action you undertake for yourself is either ethically moral or amoral by default. Everything that can be done has costs and benefits. If we were all existing in something like out of The Matrix, you could not argue with the science that our health and happiness would be maximized -- but at the cost of freedom and the knowledge of our own condition.

the desire for freedom and knowledge is innate in human beings, therefore well-being would imply the presence of both I'd argue.

‣ Ad naturam

∵ Freedom and knowledge is natural
∵ [strike]That which is natural is good[/strike]
∵ Freedom and knowledge is good
∵ That which is good contributes to well being
∴ Therefore freedom and knowledge are a part of well being

I would also be careful to avoid claims as to what constitutes human nature -- if there even is such a thing. The desire for freedom and knowledge may not be innate, given that so many are willing to trade both for the illusion of security as well as comforting absurdities (e.g. favoring more privacy destroying state power or adhering to illogical religious beliefs).



12)

Matrix arguments are tricky, because if the cost is our freedom and knowledge, we don't know we're not free, so there is no desire for a 'better' situation in the first place. It's pretty obvious you have to know what you are lacking in order to strive to achieve it.

My point assumed knowledge of one's condition. In the film, when Mr. Anderson was presented with two different pills, he chose the red pill of knowledge. When Cypher was given the opportunity to choose, he took the blue pill of ignorant bliss. Both of these choices were valid because they were voluntary. However for the rest of the population, their condition was not one of their own choosing. Simply saying that "What they don't know can't hurt them" is an ex post facto justification for their present condition.



13)

Also,these scenarios are highly unrealistic, we shouldn't let the debate be poisoned by fantastical hypotheticals.
I would like to hear criticism that actually impacts our reality.

Fantastical hypotheticals like "the worst possible of all worlds, rife with infinite, unending suffering?" I can't even comprehend what that would look like or feel like. Nevertheless, I will refrain, and try to use analogies that are "closer to home" if you prefer, but it's a bit unfair if you continue to dabble in "extreme" abstractions yourself.



14)

If you prefer that type of life and you elect to be placed in a pod, then I have no ethical argument that I can use to condemn you. If we are all forced to live like that because someone more knowledgeable or more powerful believes it's for our "own good," then I could argue against that easily.

True, but I don't see why conjuring up these bizarre hypotheticals should impact the pratical discussion.
I get your point, but we can 'what if insert impossible scenario X' our way out of everything, so to me these things are pretty meaningless in an actual debate.

Okay, try this. If you prefer to don a burka, then I have no ethical argument that I can use to condemn you. If you are forced to wear one, or to not wear one (depending on whether or not you live in Afghanistan or France) because your husband or the interior minister believes it's for your own good as a woman -- this would also be easy to argue against. Rejecting force is a principle that remains the same in regards to everything that doesn't cause harm to others -- whether it's a stasis pod, a burka, or marijuana joint.



15)

Harris is a consequentialist because he uses utilitarian arguments. To some extent they are valid. I could argue that many people, including myself, would be better off without pointless wars and horrible diseases. But I cannot define what is maximally good for everyone.

Neither can I and does he. What you CAN objectively work with however is saying certain acts are cruel and wrong, and we can try to move away from those actions.

I agree that certain actions are always cruel and wrong, objectively so. I don't know what "try to move away from those actions" entails. For Sam Harris it may very well involve legislation. For me, it means avoiding the practice of initiating force in my own life, since I have no control over what others do, including those that run the state. In short I favor advocacy in lieu of legislative efforts because the former is voluntary and the latter necessitates force. How hypocritical would it be of me to favor the initiation of force, in the form of murder and theft in order to solve the problem of murder and theft? This, by the way, is why I am a voluntaryist, or anarchist. Oh, the places you find yourself in when you follow logic and reason...



16)

It's not about creating utopia's. . .

‣ Straw man

No one said anything about utopia. I certainly never proposed utopia. I'd like to think that practicing voluntary self-interested behavior and rejecting the initiation of force is a more plausible and practical solution than genetic transhumanism.



17)

it's about creating a framework wherein we can objectively condemn certain atrocities and strive towards growing away from such practices. Or at least that's what it's about to me.

Apart from the repeated usage of "we," I agree with that sentiment. However, I want to stress that science is just an amoral tool. It is not a proper framework for establishing objective morality. Reason and logic must be included to make sense of the data.

The framework for objective reality already exists, and it is grounded in reason, not health.



18)

I also don't think that force and violence can best bring about the moral world Sam Harris prefers us all to live in. Science can clearly point to what's healthier, etc., but that does not imply that soda and excessive video-gaming should be prohibited by penalty of law, nor does it mean that depraving a person of those things would make them happier, smarter, or more productive.

But that's another discussion. It certainly can be the case that without X, people would be smarter. We could stimulate what DOES make us smarter without falling into totalitarian thinking. In the discussion of 'how far should law go' I don't think you and I would disagree.

This isn't another discussion. Objective morality or ethics involves the rejection of the initiation of force. It's impossible to mention this unless I buy Harris' definition of well-being and morality, in which case this post wouldn't exist.



19)

The best way to change the world is by persuasion. Arguably it is far better for organ donors to volunteer to give their organs rather than a lottery system be put into place, or having every second child caged for future harvest. Can you imagine the panic and paranoia that would plague society if at any time anyone of us could be sacrificed for the benefit of others? Violence like this is horribly inefficient and does not produce the best results for everyone, even when those results can be shown to be good.

True, but again a strawman. Nobody is advocating any kind of 'the ends justify the means' ideology. If Harris would argue we should kill all poor and sick people to minimize their suffering, which he doesn't, thn you would have a point.

Well, I was illustrating the problem with utilitarianism using consequentialist reasoning. The same idea can be found in this Harvard lecture. I never meant to imply that Sam Harris favored butchering innocent people. However, I do argue that Sam Harris does favor institutionalized extortion in the name of alleviating poverty. Unconditional generosity incentivizes dependency and unemployment. If you want to "help," you should do it on your own dime. Instead, everyone is forced to pay for counterproductive programs like foreign aid and public welfare which either don't alleviate the problem or make it far worse than it should be.



-