I agree with this view in general. I personally don't see science as supporting atheism actually.
Now it's true that I am extremely atheistic toward the Abrahamic religions. But not for scientific reasons. I reject those religions based on their own self-contradictions and absurdities. When it comes to spirituality in general I'm definitely open-minded and agnostic. I even intuitively lean toward the spiritual. Albeit confessing that I can't know it to be true.
I just thought I'd post this here to see how others view this topic.
So please share your views.
[center] Spiritual Growth - A person's continual assessment
of how well they believe they are doing
relative to what they believe a personal God expects of them.
[/center]
I don't know why IC ducked answering my question of which type of teleporter distortion would be most or least acceptable. My own view is that the atoms don't matter, and neither does my outward appearance (as not far as my essential sense of identity is concerned). However if teleporting distorted by mind - by making me suddenly prefer brocolli over cheese-cake or Snoop Dog over Shostakovich - I would find that unacceptable.
I can imagine that teleporting would - or should be - unnacceptable to theists because while it is reasonable to suppose the teleporting of a body also teleports the mind, it is not clear that it would also teleport the soul.
From that i conclude that my conception of my self is that I am my thoughts, my preferences, my 'personality'. I am not my body, which is just as well as teleporting destroys my body and provides me (i.e. my identity) with another one.
Being a physicalist, I am content to think that my personality is a function of the configuration of my brain and nothing else. Thus as long as teleporting recreates the configuration of my brain, 'I' would be preserved by the process, even if the rest of my body is changed in form or indeed if my body (including my brain) is made of different atoms afterwards.
I think people who don't believe in souls should agree with me, but in my experience atheists and others who reject the existence of souls often claim they would not teleport because it leads to a loss of self, usually based on the idea that there is a clear two-step process of destruction of the orginal and the subsequent creation of a copy. Albeit what is created is an exact duplicate of, a duplicate has different identity to and original, as evinced by considering the case of being able to see the copy being formed as IC mentioned, or if the teleport goes wrong and the original is not destroyed resulting in, well in what? Two distinct I's?
Are any non-soulists who would not teleport, sor soul-believers who would on DCR, I wonder?
keithprosser3 wrote:
I don't know why IC ducked answering my question of which type of teleporter distortion would be most or least acceptable.
I didn't duck the question as much as I didn't understand it, since I don't know what you mean by 'acceptable'. If you mean which form of distortion would preserve the 'I', then my answer is that the I cannot be preserved in the process, as shown by the thought experiment. You and the reassembled you would be two different persons, as it is possible to 'reassemble' you while you are watching it and not be disassembled.
Suppose you are being teleported from place A to B. You could theoretically watch the atoms of your body being disassembled in place A and then reassembled again in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be the same person anymore? Probably yes. Now, suppose the same thing happened, except that this time you wouldn't be disassembled, but rather the new you would be assembled from different atoms, so that you could watch from place A yourself being fully assembled in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be you? I would say no, since you are still standing in place A.
My bolds of course. I took the first as implying a teleporter that used the same atoms to create the copy was ok (acceptable) because the copy is the same person as before but a teleporter that used different atoms was not ok (ie unacceptable) because the copy was a different person.
To me that implies you see yourself as your atoms, a view I don't agree with at all.
To me, IC does not consist of atoms - IC is an intelligence that types posts on DCR abd thereby exhibits a personality, the existence of a self. I do not think what is important about IC - what makes IC IC - would not be changed if he had, say, a haircut even though that does change the atoms he is made of. However, if IC suddenly changed in personality then IC would not be IC any more, even if that different IC occupied much the same body as before.
I'd be disappointed if my wife stopped loving me because I lost an arm in an accident, but if that accident also changed me from the sort of person I am into a foul mouthed alcoholic (or even more of one!) then it would surprise no-one if she left me. Surely then, I (in the most important sense of I) am not my current assemblage of atoms but my 'personality' for want or another word. And I see no reason why teleporting would necessarily change my personality even if every atom in my body was changed for a different one.
Suppose you are being teleported from place A to B. You could theoretically watch the atoms of your body being disassembled in place A and then reassembled again in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be the same person anymore? Probably yes. Now, suppose the same thing happened, except that this time you wouldn't be disassembled, but rather the new you would be assembled from different atoms, so that you could watch from place A yourself being fully assembled in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be you? I would say no, since you are still standing in place A.
My bolds of course. I took the first as implying a teleporter that used the same atoms to create the copy was ok (acceptable) because the copy is the same person as before but a teleporter that used different atoms was not ok (ie unacceptable) because the copy was a different person.
To me that implies you see yourself as your atoms, a view I don't agree with at all.
To me, IC does not consist of atoms - IC is an intelligence that types posts on DCR abd thereby exhibits a personality, the existence of a self. I do not think what is important about IC - what makes IC IC - would not be changed if he had, say, a haircut even though that does change the atoms he is made of. However, if IC suddenly changed in personality then IC would not be IC any more, even if that different IC occupied much the same body as before.
I'd be disappointed if my wife stopped loving me because I lost an arm in an accident, but if that accident also changed me from the sort of person I am into a foul mouthed alcoholic (or even more of one!) then it would surprise no-one if she left me. Surely then, I (in the most important sense of I) am not my current assemblage of atoms but my 'personality' for want or another word. And I see no reason why teleporting would necessarily change my personality even if every atom in my body was changed for a different one.
Yet, when a brain gets damaged, consciousness gets damaged. When it gets targeted with drugs that changes what neurons are firing, it changes too. It's not a blind guess... it is a conclusion based on observation.
You only need to drink a couple of stiff whiskys to observe that! Consciousness clearly does require the brain, at least as a substrate. We can definitely say a brain is neccessary for consciousness (at least in humans) but we can't say the brain is sufficient for consciousness. Consciousness may not be able to emerge from the brain unless there is something else present.
The effect of drugs and damage on the brain strongly suggests physicalism, but it doesn't quite prove it. I wish it did, because I'd love a purely physicalist, mechanistic model of consciousness - I'd get right down to programming my computer to be conscious!
Last edited by keithprosser3 on Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:08 pm, edited 2 times in total.
I agree with keith's conclusion. These observations would clearly suggest some form of link between the brain and consciousness, but anything further than that is speculation.
keithprosser3 wrote:
I'm a little confused. You wrote:
Suppose you are being teleported from place A to B. You could theoretically watch the atoms of your body being disassembled in place A and then reassembled again in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be the same person anymore? Probably yes. Now, suppose the same thing happened, except that this time you wouldn't be disassembled, but rather the new you would be assembled from different atoms, so that you could watch from place A yourself being fully assembled in place B. Would that new assemblage of atoms be you? I would say no, since you are still standing in place A.
My bolds of course. I took the first as implying a teleporter that used the same atoms to create the copy was ok (acceptable) because the copy is the same person as before but a teleporter that used different atoms was not ok (ie unacceptable) because the copy was a different person.
Sorry, I was confusing my own ideas. I wanted to say that at first glance it would seem that person A would still be person A after being disassembled and reassembled. Then, in the light of the second thought experiment that is shown to be false, as the person being disassembled and the new assemblage of atoms would be two different persons.
From which I infer you do not consider teleporting an acceptable means of transport? As I posted before I am surprised at how many people wouldn't use one, despite the clear evidence from Hollywood that teleporting is nearly entirely safe - as long as there are no flies anywhere about of course.
I'd be happy to teleport (in a fly-free area of course). My reasoning is this. I believe that my consciousness (or personality whatever you want to call it doesn't really matter) is the product of the action of my brain. My consciousness is not a static thing, but something continually produced by by my working brain, much as electricity is produced by a working dynamo. I note that when I sleep that 'dynamo' slows down, and when I am anaestetised it all but stops so consciousness is no longer produced. When I wake or come round the dynamo restarts and produces consciousness again. All I - KP3 - am is the product of a dynamo, but a dynamo that produces not electricity but KP3.
Teleporting reproduces an functionally equivalent dynamo (ifnot even I won;t use it!) and so the reproduced dynamo also produces KP3. That the new dyname produces a different KP3 is no more sensible than saying a copied dyname produces differnt electricity from the original, which make little sense as the electricity produced by a dynamo is different all the time anyway!
Maybe I am staking a lot on my consciousness being the product of my brains operation, but I feel safe in doing so because I can't imagine what else my consciousness can be. I think anyone who is not a dualist should have confidence in using a teleporter, but it seems that is not the case! Damn flies.
Last edited by keithprosser3 on Wed Sep 25, 2013 4:06 pm, edited 3 times in total.
As a side note, the common representation of teleporter technology (in hollywood) has seriously crazy ramifications and usage possibilities that are rarely touched upon (such as cloning and possible immortality)
keithprosser3 wrote:
Teleporting reproduces an functionally equivalent dynamo (ifnot even I won;t use it!) and so the reproduced dynamo also produces KP3. That the new dyname produces a different KP3 is no more sensible than saying a copied dyname produces differnt electricity from the original,
If, then, you are watching yourself being reassembled from another set of atoms, would you be both of those persons? If not, then the new assemblage of atoms at place B is not you in either thought experiment.
