On the Topic of Consciousness

[Divine Insight]

Maybe we should break this out.....

This topic is an offshoot from another thread which was on another topic altogether.

This thread is "On the Topic of Consciousness"

I wouldn't pass judgements. My biggest question is why you have a brain type that is willing to jump into the unknown with some assurance, while I seem to have a brain type that doesn't. If I don't know, I leave it at not knowing.

I don't think it comes down to just the brain alone. I think there are many other factors involved. Clearly even from a secular point of view it is recognize that the brain "evolves" as we grow as individuals based much on how we experience life, etc.

For example the very concept of the "unknown" may mean something entirely different to me than it does to you. I mean, sure we could get out a dictionary and look up the term, but that really wouldn't help much because what you believe you know and what I believe I know are going to clearly be two different things. Especially considering my last sentence of the above paragraph. Our knowledge and beliefs evolve in our own brains based upon our own experiences, which clearly are not going to be the same experiences.

Consciousness: I don't know of any scientist that makes his or her living studying it who declares they know what it is.

This is true, but there may be quite a few scientists who feel like Daniel Dennett. Even though he is just a philosopher.

[youtube][/youtube]

I don't disagree with much of what Dennett says about how the brain functions. I don't disagree at all. But he doesn't touch on the real issues as far as I'm concerned. Near the very end of the above video he state a kind of Deepity of his own, "It's not that the Emperor has no clothes, but rather the clothes have no Emperor". The idea intended to imply that we are attempting to push too much onto consciousness that doesn't need to be there.

But for me none of this is satisfying.

I don't disagree with the fact that the brain is indeed a functional portal for the experiences that we have in this incarnated life. Therefore everything he observes and states about how the brain functions and how it "creates" much of our experience, is not in question for me.

But none of that even begins to address the issue of exactly what it is that is actually having this experience. In other words, if the clothes have no Emperor, then what is it that is having an experience? The brain itself?

This becomes a problem for me, because insofar as we know, the brain itself is made of nothing more than matter and energy. If neither matter, nor energy are capable of having an experience, they why should a brain that is made of nothing more than matter and energy become an "Emperor" in its own right?

This is not an easy question, and I wouldn't hesitate to put this question to Dennett himself. In fact, I would like to hear his thoughts on this. Maybe he does address this sort of issue in one of his many lectures. If you find a lecture where he addressed this heart of the matter please share and I'll be glad to take a gander at it.

I've watched several of his lectures, and thus far I haven't been convinced of his conclusions.

To say it is supernatural vs natural seems a leap.

This is statement here goes back to what I had mentioned above, concerning how you and I may very well think differently due to our different experiences in life.

You speak of the term "supernatural" as though that's a meaningful term.

I have been a scientist my entire life. Isaac Newton, and certain Greek philosophies like Zeno and others were my childhood heroes. Albert Einstein was my next hero as I grew in my scientific knowledge. And today I hold many scientists in high regard and marvel at what they were able to discover and prove.

Just the same, in all of this, I have come to the profound realization that to date we cannot say what the true nature of reality genuinely is. Therefore does it even make any sense to speak of the supernatural, when we can't even say with certain what is natural?

So I'm not prepared to accept the insinuation that I'm "jumping off to assume something supernatural". All I'm doing is recognizing that we can't say where the boundaries of the natural world truly are.

So I don't feel that I'm actually leaping anywhere. I'm just recognizing that we can't know that things need to be restricted to what we believe to be a finite physical existence.

In fact, if you go back to Dennett's very argument perhaps you can see an irony there. He is proclaiming that we can't know nearly what we think we can know, yet he seems to think that he can make very clear conclusions from this evidence that our brains clearly trick us.

That's almost an oxymoron right there. If what Dennett says is true, that our brains can fool us considerably, then perhaps the entirety of physical reality is itself an illusion that we are being tricked into believing. What we believe to be "brains" may not be physical entities at all.

My position is that we know consciousness is affected by natural events, and we know nature exists... seems a very small slide to presume consciousness is a natural phenomenon. But not knowing, sure, I can't say it's not - but I haven't been offered ONE example of the supernatural. So, I simply can't presume it's supernatural. I can't even think of why I'd consider the supernatural when the supernatural has such a horrible track record.

Well, our difference of views here may indeed amount to the extremely different way we view the "supernatural". For you to say that the supernatural has a bad track record implies that you associate the term with just about any guess that anyone might come up with (and especially specific claims that have indeed been shown to be false).

Whilst those do indeed qualify as "supernatural", they may not qualify as the type of "supernatural" that I consider. In fact, the type of "supernatural" that I consider is actually quite natural. It simply amounts to nature that we haven't yet discovered or understood, so it's only in that sense that it seems to be supernatural to us, when in reality it may be perfectly natural.

Given this, there only seems to be the natural. Just because we don't know how consciouness works doesn't means it's because of the gods, or the supernatural or something else, or even "natural vs. I don't know".

Nature exists.
Consciousness exists.

Given these two facts, why presume we can't explain consciousness eventually?

I already gave my answer to this earlier in this post. I'll repeat it here for clarity.

Copy and pasted from earlier in this very same post:

But none of that even begins to address the issue of exactly what it is that is actually having this experience. In other words, if the clothes have no Emperor, then what is it that is having an experience? The brain itself?

This becomes a problem for me, because insofar as we know, the brain itself is made of nothing more than matter and energy. If neither matter, nor energy are capable of having an experience, they why should a brain that is made of nothing more than matter and energy become an "Emperor" in its own right?

This is not an easy question, and I wouldn't hesitate to put this question to Dennett himself. In fact, I would like to hear his thoughts on this. Maybe he does address this sort of issue in one of his many lectures. If you find a lecture where he addressed this heart of the matter please share and I'll be glad to take a gander at it.

End of copy and paste

Yes, consciousness exists. And something is having an experience.

But what is it that is having an experience?

Energy and matter?

Electromagnetic fields?

Something else? Many people have suggested that the thing that is having an experience is some sort of "emergent property of complexity".

I suppose this is a valid philosophical idea, but it seems pretty strange to me that an abstract idea of an emergent property could have an experience.

So I'm still left with a deeper mystery.

To simply say that "consciousness" is a natural result of nature, still leaves me asking, "Who is the Emperor that is having this experience?"

If the clothes have no Emperor, then what is it that is having the experience of conscious awareness? The clothes?

It just seems strange to me that the clothes (i.e. matter and energy) should be able to have an experience.

So this simply leaves the door to the "supernatural" (i.e. nature that we simply don't yet understand) wide open.

I'm not saying that the secular view is necessarily wrong. I'm simply saying that the purely secular view seems every bit as strange to me as the supernatural view.

In other words, that view doesn't "hit the spot" as being an obvious conclusion to accept either.

I'm not going to automatically accept Dennetts "Deepity" that "The clothes have no Emperor" as being the profound answer to this question. That's just as absurd as any other Deepity, IMHO.

So this is where I'm coming from.

I'm not claiming that the supernatural necessarily has to exist. But I am claiming that, insofar as I can see, it's on precisely equal footing with any other conclusions at this point.

Seeing that they are on the same footing, I don't mind using intuition and gut feelings to consider one over the other. So with that in mind, I confess that I lean toward the mystical view. But clearly I could be wrong.

[keithprosser3]

But the conflict between atheist and theist is what unites us - two sides, but united in only one battle. Without the conflict to unite us we would be truly divided.

War is Peace
Freedom is slavery
Ignorance is strength

[keithprosser3]

But the conflict between atheist and theist is what unites us - two sides, but united in only one battle. Without the conflict to unite us we would be truly divided.

War is Peace
Freedom is slavery
Ignorance is strength

[Goat]

I don't see any use of trying to make a 'conceptual problem out of something without real world input of data.

That's the disagreement here, isn't it? You don't think that discussing the distinction of property dualism and reductionism is useful, as it is not an empirical problem. I'm well aware of your position and of the very standard empirical arguments you provide. I am not disagreeing with any of them, there is no disputation there.

I am asking whether a mental event is a physical event, and you are not even attempting to answer the problem. I'm guessing again that it's your materialistic convictions that cause you to vow for reductionism, since the arguments you give don't point to one direction anymore then the other.

Well, I am what is known as 'evidence based'. I don't see how the two can be separated. The mental event boils down to the biochemistry and neurological activity in the brain. I have not seen any way that can distinguish between the two that makes any kind of sense what so ever.

Consider this problem. Suppose I'm colorblind so I don't what it is like to see colors. I could learn everything there is to know about your brain and its functions, but I would still not know what it is like to see the color red for example. It seems like there is a further fact there, there is still something to know after all the empirical observation is done.

And?? Your point is??? For that matter, we know exactly what causes color blindness... that is the lack of a specific type of cone in the eye.

My point is that there seems to be facts about experience that cannot be accounted by empirical observation. In other words, there seems to be more to the conscious experience than that which we can observe in the brain. You have to either admit this, or then engage into the argument I put forward.

The point is that if you cured IC's colour blindness and showed him a British pillar box (or my new Ferrari 458) he'd say 'So that's what red looks like!'. There is no other way he could ever know what red looks like, no matter how much information about colour and brains he had.

I think the idea originally comes from this.

Yep, it's a well known argument against reductionism.

No, there is empirical data. While something might not be directly observed, the secondary effects are observed. There is data.. there is data that can be replicated. you are mixing things up with inferring something through data, direct observation, and making things up. There is actually data for the first two, but no evidence for the latter.

[instantc]

I don't see any use of trying to make a 'conceptual problem out of something without real world input of data.

That's the disagreement here, isn't it? You don't think that discussing the distinction of property dualism and reductionism is useful, as it is not an empirical problem. I'm well aware of your position and of the very standard empirical arguments you provide. I am not disagreeing with any of them, there is no disputation there.

I am asking whether a mental event is a physical event, and you are not even attempting to answer the problem. I'm guessing again that it's your materialistic convictions that cause you to vow for reductionism, since the arguments you give don't point to one direction anymore then the other.

Well, I am what is known as 'evidence based'. I don't see how the two can be separated. The mental event boils down to the biochemistry and neurological activity in the brain. I have not seen any way that can distinguish between the two that makes any kind of sense what so ever.

Consider this problem. Suppose I'm colorblind so I don't what it is like to see colors. I could learn everything there is to know about your brain and its functions, but I would still not know what it is like to see the color red for example. It seems like there is a further fact there, there is still something to know after all the empirical observation is done.

And?? Your point is??? For that matter, we know exactly what causes color blindness... that is the lack of a specific type of cone in the eye.

My point is that there seems to be facts about experience that cannot be accounted by empirical observation. In other words, there seems to be more to the conscious experience than that which we can observe in the brain. You have to either admit this, or then engage into the argument I put forward.

The point is that if you cured IC's colour blindness and showed him a British pillar box (or my new Ferrari 458) he'd say 'So that's what red looks like!'. There is no other way he could ever know what red looks like, no matter how much information about colour and brains he had.

I think the idea originally comes from this.

Yep, it's a well known argument against reductionism.

No, there is empirical data. While something might not be directly observed, the secondary effects are observed. There is data.. there is data that can be replicated. you are mixing things up with inferring something through data, direct observation, and making things up. There is actually data for the first two, but no evidence for the latter.

I have to ask, what the heck are you talking about?

I said, even after all the possible empirical research, there is still further facts to know about experience (what it is like to have one)

You said, 'yes so what?'

I said, if there is a fact about experience that cannot be learned or accounted by empirical research, then there is IN FACT more to experience than what can be accounted by empirical research.

You then put forward a mysterious response, 'no - there's data - you are making things up'

Data of what? What am I making up? What are you talking about?

What's happening here?

[JohnA]

I don't see any use of trying to make a 'conceptual problem out of something without real world input of data.

That's the disagreement here, isn't it? You don't think that discussing the distinction of property dualism and reductionism is useful, as it is not an empirical problem. I'm well aware of your position and of the very standard empirical arguments you provide. I am not disagreeing with any of them, there is no disputation there.

I am asking whether a mental event is a physical event, and you are not even attempting to answer the problem. I'm guessing again that it's your materialistic convictions that cause you to vow for reductionism, since the arguments you give don't point to one direction anymore then the other.

Well, I am what is known as 'evidence based'. I don't see how the two can be separated. The mental event boils down to the biochemistry and neurological activity in the brain. I have not seen any way that can distinguish between the two that makes any kind of sense what so ever.

Consider this problem. Suppose I'm colorblind so I don't what it is like to see colors. I could learn everything there is to know about your brain and its functions, but I would still not know what it is like to see the color red for example. It seems like there is a further fact there, there is still something to know after all the empirical observation is done.

And?? Your point is??? For that matter, we know exactly what causes color blindness... that is the lack of a specific type of cone in the eye.

My point is that there seems to be facts about experience that cannot be accounted by empirical observation. In other words, there seems to be more to the conscious experience than that which we can observe in the brain. You have to either admit this, or then engage into the argument I put forward.

The point is that if you cured IC's colour blindness and showed him a British pillar box (or my new Ferrari 458) he'd say 'So that's what red looks like!'. There is no other way he could ever know what red looks like, no matter how much information about colour and brains he had.

I think the idea originally comes from this.

Yep, it's a well known argument against reductionism.

No, there is empirical data. While something might not be directly observed, the secondary effects are observed. There is data.. there is data that can be replicated. you are mixing things up with inferring something through data, direct observation, and making things up. There is actually data for the first two, but no evidence for the latter.

I have to ask, what the heck are you talking about?

I said, even after all the possible empirical research, there is still further facts to know about experience (what it is like to have one)

You said, 'yes so what?'

I said, if there is a fact about experience that cannot be learned or accounted by empirical research, then there is IN FACT more to experience than what can be accounted by empirical research.

You then put forward a mysterious response, 'no - there's data - you are making things up'

Data of what? What am I making up? What are you talking about?

What's happening here?

I think you are being shown wrong, especially when I read Goat's response to you.

Eg. If there are more to be known about consciousness then it does not follow that empirical research can not be done. Your post is self-refuting.
Philosophy can only reflect on what science finds, it can not come up with its own evidence.

[Philbert]

Ignorance is strength

When it comes to the fundamental human condition that religion attempts to address, I agree, ignorance is strength.

As an atheist, I presume you favor an approach to these issues which is grounded in reality.

I agree, and propose the reality is that we are ignorant, in regards to the questions being discussed here.

Recognizing the reality of our ignorance, embracing it, and making good use of it is strength.

Floundering around in fantasy knowings of whatever flavor is weakness, a hiding place from the simple truth of our incredible smallness.

[Goat]

I don't see any use of trying to make a 'conceptual problem out of something without real world input of data.

That's the disagreement here, isn't it? You don't think that discussing the distinction of property dualism and reductionism is useful, as it is not an empirical problem. I'm well aware of your position and of the very standard empirical arguments you provide. I am not disagreeing with any of them, there is no disputation there.

I am asking whether a mental event is a physical event, and you are not even attempting to answer the problem. I'm guessing again that it's your materialistic convictions that cause you to vow for reductionism, since the arguments you give don't point to one direction anymore then the other.

Well, I am what is known as 'evidence based'. I don't see how the two can be separated. The mental event boils down to the biochemistry and neurological activity in the brain. I have not seen any way that can distinguish between the two that makes any kind of sense what so ever.

Consider this problem. Suppose I'm colorblind so I don't what it is like to see colors. I could learn everything there is to know about your brain and its functions, but I would still not know what it is like to see the color red for example. It seems like there is a further fact there, there is still something to know after all the empirical observation is done.

And?? Your point is??? For that matter, we know exactly what causes color blindness... that is the lack of a specific type of cone in the eye.

My point is that there seems to be facts about experience that cannot be accounted by empirical observation. In other words, there seems to be more to the conscious experience than that which we can observe in the brain. You have to either admit this, or then engage into the argument I put forward.

The point is that if you cured IC's colour blindness and showed him a British pillar box (or my new Ferrari 458) he'd say 'So that's what red looks like!'. There is no other way he could ever know what red looks like, no matter how much information about colour and brains he had.

I think the idea originally comes from this.

Yep, it's a well known argument against reductionism.

No, there is empirical data. While something might not be directly observed, the secondary effects are observed. There is data.. there is data that can be replicated. you are mixing things up with inferring something through data, direct observation, and making things up. There is actually data for the first two, but no evidence for the latter.

I have to ask, what the heck are you talking about?

I said, even after all the possible empirical research, there is still further facts to know about experience (what it is like to have one)

You said, 'yes so what?'

I said, if there is a fact about experience that cannot be learned or accounted by empirical research, then there is IN FACT more to experience than what can be accounted by empirical research.

You then put forward a mysterious response, 'no - there's data - you are making things up'

Data of what? What am I making up? What are you talking about?

What's happening here?

Isn't it obvious?? You talk about 'Red'. Although 'red' can not be experienced, that is not needed to understand that 'Red' is a particular part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and we can infer it exists by a number of different methods. .. and 'red' is defined as the electromagnetic spectrum as having the wavelength of approximately 640 nm. There are other ways to detect 'red' then through experience. That is because the experience comes from a real world phenomena, rather than just merely being generated within the brain.

[instantc]

Isn't it obvious?? You talk about 'Red'. Although 'red' can not be experienced, that is not needed to understand that 'Red' is a particular part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and we can infer it exists by a number of different methods. .. and 'red' is defined as the electromagnetic spectrum as having the wavelength of approximately 640 nm. There are other ways to detect 'red' then through experience. That is because the experience comes from a real world phenomena, rather than just merely being generated within the brain.

I ask again, what the heck are you talking about? Did I say that the only way to detect red is through experience? I said that if you have never seen color red, even if you learn everything there is to know about color red, you will still learn something new when you see the color red for the first time, namely the fact about what it is like to see color red. Academics have been battling with this problem of reductionism for ages with no proper way around it, you don't get to debunk it by saying 'no - there is data'.

[keithprosser3]

Did I say that the only way to detect red is through experience?

I think you would have been totally correct if you had. No 640nm light is involved if one merely dreams about owning a Ferrari 458 (which is the case with me, unfortunately), but my dream car was definitely red none the less.

[keithprosser3]

..