Evidence for God's Existence

[WinePusher]

When I first joined this forum I remember McCulloch was creating a series of topics devoted to the various arguments for God's existence. I'd like to explore those issues in this thread and for the purpose of this thread God will be defined as a deistic, supernatural intelligent designer. We will not be using any theistic definition of God.

Teleological arguments prove God's existence based on the design and precise structure of the universe. The universe is structured in an improbable and an unlikely way. The physical laws that govern the universe are fine tuned to an extremely unlikely numerical value, and had these laws been set at any other parameter life could not exist. Statistically speaking, chance/coincidence is not an appropriate explanation, therefore a fine tuner/intelligent designer designed the universe.

Ontological arguments prove God's existence based on the definition of God. God is defined as a maximally great being, meaning that God can have no defects. Nonexistence is a defect, therefore God must exist. First of all, this argument pretty much destroys the ignostic position. Yes, I realize ignostics are willingly ignorant of all the philosophical scholarship surrounding God, but the fact is that the concept of God is pretty well defined. Therefore, the ignostics usergroup should be abolished.

Cosmological arguments prove God's existence based on the fact that the universe began to exist. Meaning, at one point in the distant past, the universe did not exist at all. The universe is itself contingent. Mathematically speaking, it is impossible for the chain of causes to regress backwards infinitely. Therefore, a non contingent first cause must exist. This cause supernatural, in the sense that it must be spaceless and timeless since space and time are bound by the universe.

Moral arguments prove God's existence based on the existence of objective morality. By objective morality I mean a moral statement or declaration. Something like 'killing is an innocent person for fun is wrong.' This is a moral declaration that is objectively true, regardless of any individuals personal opinion. Since an objective moral law exists, there must be a moral law giver. Another version of the moral argument would be the fact that the world would be morally absurd and irrational absent a moral law giver.


Questions:
1) Are these arguments logically valid and sound?

2) In light of these four philosophical arguments, will atheists please stop making the false, disingenuous claim that there is no evidence for God?

3) Are there any arguments against the existence of God?

[Ionian_Tradition]

The existence of the very phenomenon crying out for an explanation you believe can only be found through an appeal to design is itself the foundation of a counter argument, against theism, which can be formalized in the following syllogism:

P1: If Fine tuning exists, an omnipotent God does not.
P2: Fine tuning exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, an omnipotent God does not exist.

Far from demonstrating that design is the only possible explanation for fine tuning, the argument from fine tuning gives us reasonable grounds to question the very existence of an omnipotent God.

There is a major problem in your argumentation. P2 cannot be demonstrated, nor does the fine-tuning argument depend on it. What we observe is that the constants have life supporting values.

The natural constraints which render the fact of our existence so immensely improbable certainly exist. Observation has shown the existence of these natural constraints to be actual beyond reasonable dispute, and it is the existence of these natural constraints which renders fine tuning a legitimate problem for both physicists and cosmologists. I know of no individual even remotely familiar with the science who doubts that apparent fine tuning exists as a legitimate phenomenon to be explained.

As you have argued, if God exists, then these values are not 'fine-tuned' for life, but rather they are arbitrarily picked out of infinite possibilities. Therefore we cannot determine whether fine-tuning exists without first determining whether God exists, which is why your argument appears to fail.

If it is as you say that we cannot determine whether fine-tuning exists without first determining whether God exists, then it appears the argument from fine tuning becomes invalid. If the theist wishes to argue that fine tuning (the notion that the constants fall within a very narrow, and exceedingly improbable, range of life permitting values) is a legitimate phenomenon which requires explanation, the theist must reject the existence of an omnipotent God (a narrow range of life permitting values cannot exist per theism), thus removing him/her/it from the list of valid causal explanations for fine tuning. If the theist rather prefers to reject the existence of fine tuning all together, then the theist has begged the question by assuming the conclusion of the fine tuning argument (namely God's existence).

Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

It is an odd form of argumentation that assumes its conclusion by rejecting the existence of the very phenomenon it believes requires explanation only a God can provide.

Perhaps you're understanding of the PoE differs from my own but the argument, as I understand it, does not make the claim that if God exists then evil is inexplicable, rather it claims that if an omnibenevolent God exists then evil logically cannot. Therefore, the non-theists grants the existence of God for the purpose of showing that the existence of God (in a world of evil) is logically untenable via "reductio ad absurdum". If the argument from fine tuning were truly analogous to this, it would need to show that the presumption of naturalism, with regard to the apparent fine tuning of the constants, results in absurdity. It is not apparent to me that the argument has done so. Rather it seems the foundational premise of the argument, the existence of "fine tuning", has given us reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of an omnipotent God.

You are referring to the logical version of the PoE, while I'm referring to the evidential problem of evil. Obviously there is no logical inconsistency between naturalism and life supporting values of the constants in the universe.

If your desire is to form an inductive argument from fine tuning, the blade cuts both ways:

P1: Evidence for the immense improbability (fine tuning) of life exists.

P2. If God exists, the probability of life existing would be immensely more probable than it appears to be.

P3. (Therefore) the evidence in support of life's immense improbability (fine tuning) does not support the existence of a God.

[Ionian_Tradition]

It has come to my attention, through a similar discussion I've enjoyed on the topic of fine tuning, that a possible scenario does exist in which both the existence of God and fine tuning could be compatible. It is possible that God could create a state of affairs in which the emergence of a life permitting universe is extremely improbable through naturalistic mechanisms alone. Within the context of this state of affairs, God could exercise his/her/its volition by fine tuning a life permitting universe according to certain self imposed conceptual constraints. Though binding, these self imposed constraints do not undermine God's sovereignty. For this reason, I must retract my previous contention that fine tuning negates the possible existence of an omnipotent god, as it is patently unsound.

[instantc]

Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

It is an odd form of argumentation that assumes its conclusion by rejecting the existence of the very phenomenon it believes requires explanation only a God can provide.

Let's look at the argument (my quick sketch of it)

(1) The constants in the universe have life permitting values, if they were slightly different, life as we know it couldn't exist.
(2) The life-permitting values of the constants in the universe are due to chance, necessity or design
(3) Chance seems like an inappropriate explanation
(4) Physical necessity cannot apply to initial conditions
(5) Therefore positing a designer is warranted

Which premise do you challenge in your objection? As you have argued, (1) doesn't entail fine-tuning in a universe that is designed by God, so why is fine-tuning necessary for the argument to succeed?

[FarWanderer]

Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

It is an odd form of argumentation that assumes its conclusion by rejecting the existence of the very phenomenon it believes requires explanation only a God can provide.

Let's look at the argument (my quick sketch of it)

(1) The constants in the universe have life permitting values, if they were slightly different, life as we know it couldn't exist.
(2) The life-permitting values of the constants in the universe are due to chance, necessity or design
(3) Chance seems like an inappropriate explanation
(4) Physical necessity cannot apply to initial conditions
(5) Therefore positing a designer is warranted

Which premise do you challenge in your objection? As you have argued, (1) doesn't entail fine-tuning in a universe that is designed by God, so why is fine-tuning necessary for the argument to succeed?

(1) This is a useless premise so long as "as we know it" is there. Though the honesty in including it is appreciated.
(2) I disagree with this premise. There might not be a reason at all.
(3) "Chance" in the context of what? It is incoherent to apply probability to a set of initial conditions.
(4) Why not?
(5) A resticted designer is possible, but I see no reason to believe an omnipotent one.

[instantc]

Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

It is an odd form of argumentation that assumes its conclusion by rejecting the existence of the very phenomenon it believes requires explanation only a God can provide.

Let's look at the argument (my quick sketch of it)

(1) The constants in the universe have life permitting values, if they were slightly different, life as we know it couldn't exist.
(2) The life-permitting values of the constants in the universe are due to chance, necessity or design
(3) Chance seems like an inappropriate explanation
(4) Physical necessity cannot apply to initial conditions
(5) Therefore positing a designer is warranted

Which premise do you challenge in your objection? As you have argued, (1) doesn't entail fine-tuning in a universe that is designed by God, so why is fine-tuning necessary for the argument to succeed?

(1) This is a useless premise so long as "as we know it" is there. Though the honesty in including it is appreciated.
(2) I disagree with this premise. There might not be a reason at all.
(3) "Chance" in the context of what? It is incoherent to apply probability to a set of initial conditions.
(4) Why not?
(5) A resticted designer is possible, but I see no reason to believe an omnipotent one.

I'm not interested in endorsing the argument, I'm debating out of curiosity whether or not IT's objection to it is valid, which doesn't seem to be the case to me.

[keithprosser3]

IT retracted part of his argument in post #162 so I am not sure where that leaves things.

[Ionian_Tradition]

Furthermore, the life supporting values as such are sufficient for the fine-tuning argument to fail or succeed. Even though it's called the fine-tuning argument, it doesn't depend on P2 above.

It is an odd form of argumentation that assumes its conclusion by rejecting the existence of the very phenomenon it believes requires explanation only a God can provide.

Let's look at the argument (my quick sketch of it)

(1) The constants in the universe have life permitting values, if they were slightly different, life as we know it couldn't exist.
(2) The life-permitting values of the constants in the universe are due to chance, necessity or design
(3) Chance seems like an inappropriate explanation
(4) Physical necessity cannot apply to initial conditions
(5) Therefore positing a designer is warranted

Which premise do you challenge in your objection? As you have argued, (1) doesn't entail fine-tuning in a universe that is designed by God, so why is fine-tuning necessary for the argument to succeed?

Given the retraction of my previous contention, it appears to me that the only premise which one could reasonably question is 3. This, of course, would not render 5 less true (in so far as you have formulated it), though it would controvert the implicit claim that theism provides the ONLY warranted explanation for the constants and their seemingly improbable values.

With that said, a case could perhaps still be made that the probability that God should choose any arbitrary set of values out of the infinite number available is, potentially, infinitely more improbable than the notion that the universal constants are the product of chance alone. If this is the case, the theist has not met his/her burden of proof in demonstrating that the theistic explanation of the values we observe is more probable than any potential naturalistic account for said values.