Arguments and evidence for deism, theism, and miracles

[otseng]

We have agreed to debate the following:

Is there sufficient evidence to conclude the existence of a deistic God?

And if so, is there sufficient evidence to conclude a theistic worldview whereby this God intervenes in human affairs? Specifically, is there evidentiary justification for concluding that some claims of intervention are authentic whereas others aren't.

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A thread has been created for followers of this debate to post comments:
http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... hp?t=24538

[no evidence no belief]

If you don't accept premise 1, then I'll need to build a case that premise 1 is true and why it is a big deal.

Yes, I contest (or rather, don't understand exactly what you mean by) the first premise.

OK, I'll start arguing why premise 1 is true.

Great. And if you could, whenever you have a minute, give me an example of anything, anything at all, which would NOT be fine-tuned. It can be something existent, something nonexistent, something hypothetical, something imaginary, something logically impossible. ANYTHING.

Please give me an example of ANYTHING that you could say "This definitely wasn't fine tuned".

It seems to me that the situation is simple. The physical constants are the way they are, and the universe is the way it is as a result of that. If the constants were different, the universe would as a result be different as well. This is a basic fact you agreed to from the start.

Yes, the universe would be different if the physical constants were different. Why is that a big deal? It is not that our solar system would be in position B rather than position A or that the Milky Way would be at position C instead of D. It is that our solar system, our galaxy, would not exist at all.

Right. The universe with all it's stars and galaxies wouldn't exist, and something different would exist instead. So in what objective way is the universe existing preferable to something other than the universe existing? For example, if the constants were fine-tuned in such a way that the infinitely dense and infinitesimally small pre-big-bang spec of existence never exploded, and instead remained in a static state, how would that be in any way worse than the singularity exploding into the universe? Why is an exploded singularity (the universe) preferable to an un-exploded singularity? Why is an exploded dynamite stick preferable to an un-exploded one?

Basically, if the physical constants were not finely-tuned, no stars would exist, no planets would exist, no matter would exist.

Right. And if the physical constants were not fine-tuned to maintain the pre-big-bang spec unexploded, timelessness would not exist, nutrino streams would not exist, infinite density would not exist.

Why is a star preferable to an infinitely dense spec of matter/energy?

Why is a planet preferable to a naked stream of nutrinos?

Why is matter preferable to a timeless spec of non-matter?

Whatever you mean by "fine-tuning", do you agree that it could equally well be applied to both the universe existing, and the universe not existing (and something else existing instead)?

If you agree, can you please give me an example of something that isn't fine-tuned?

Yes, I'm repeating myself

Don't worry. I do that all the time

but I'm not sure you're accepting this since you simply claim that the universe would just be simply different.

I do accept completely that depending on the degree to which the causal chain is modified, it could result in the effect being either slightly different, or so different that it could be considered something else.

For example. Imagine a couple is having sex with a condom. If the condom breaks, a baby is born who will discover the cure for cancer when he grows up. If it doesn't break, nobody is born and cancer remains uncured for the next 400 years.

A tiny difference in the causes can have enormous differences with the effect.

So, imagine that 30 years after the condom broke, the proud parents of the doctor who cured cancer say to each other "Aren't we lucky that the condom broke? If it hadn't, our genius son would have never been born".

They sure are lucky. But can it be said that the condom was fine-tuned for breaking? If anything, the opposite is true. A condom is fine-tuned for NOT breaking. If you have evidence of a condom company that makes condoms fine-tuned to break, please talk to a lawyer, because you have a multimillion class-action lawsuit on your hands.

An analogy is a car. In order for a car to operate, all the components must be built and put together in a particular way.

What do you mean by operate? Do you mean that it serves the function of allowing a person in possession of petrol to move along a road at greater speed?

Because somebody stranded in the tundra as night falls, who needs protection from the freezing wind, might find a sealed car with no engine to be so operational that it saves his life, whereas a convertible with no roof but a perfectly functional engine and a full tank will not serve the function of saving the guy's life.

Imagine all of humanity died, and all the cars were left lying around. Packs of dogs, cats, lions were roaming the planet. How would one distinguish between an operational car and a non operational car, from the prospective of the animals?

From the prospective of a dog trying to mark his territory by peeing on things, a car is operational as long as its comparable in height to a tree stump.

A car which can run is preferable to one which cannot run to somebody who wants to get somewhere more quickly.

A car with no engine which can shelter you during the night from freezing wind in the tundra, is preferable to a perfectly running car with no roof, to a man who is freezing to death.

A broken car reduced to a pile of rust, that a female dog in heat recently peed on, is preferable to a male dog as a location to mark his territory, than a brand new Ferrari with no female dog smell on it.

If people who needed to move quickly could fine-tune cars, they would fine-tune them to move quickly (and that's what they do).

If people who stumbled onto abandoned trucks on ice roads in the tundra at nightfall could fine-tune cars, they would fine-tune them to protect them overnight from the chilling wind.

If dogs intent on marking their territory could fine-tune cars, they would fine tune them to make the smell of their pee very easy to dissipate so other dogs could smell it.

The argument of fine-tuning is not whether a car is a Lexus or a BMW. The cars are different, but they both still run. The argument of fine-tuning is why the car can run.

Can you please explain to me why a car which can run is better than a car which cannot run, objectively? Can you tell me ONE way in which a running car is better than a non-running car, other than from the prospective of people with a goal to move around more quickly?

What caused the engine to work?

It was designed by people with a goal to move around more quickly

What caused the steering system to work?

It was designed by people with a goal to move around more quickly

What caused the coolant system to work?

It was designed by people with a goal to move around more quickly

If any of these systems did not exist, the car would not be able to operate.

It would not operate as a tool to move more quickly. It might still operate as a tool to protect oneself from the tundra's freezing wind at nightfall, or as a tool to mark your territory and remain the leader of your pack.

Each component is comparable to a physical constant.

Ok, so each physical constant was designed by someone with the goal of creating stars, planets and life, much like each component of the car was designed by someone with the goal of moving more quickly. That's your assertion.

I don't understand how this is anything other than a circular argument.

1) The universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
2) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
3) Therefore the universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
4) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
5) Therefore the universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
6) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
etc

The assertion that a person who designs cars with the purpose of moving around more quickly, can be demonstrated.

Can the assertion that someone who designs the universe with the purpose of creating life be demonstrated?

The notion that such an entity exists, is implicitly asserted by the fine-tuning argument. But that doesn't mean it's been demonstrated.

So your task is simple:
Demonstrate that premise 1 of your argument above is valid.

The only way to do so is this:
Demonstrate that God exists, that he prefers for the universe to be in one way rather than a different way, and that the "universe as it is" coincides with God's preference.

I don't see your logic here. The only way I can reconcile your statements is that God is the only explanation for fine-tuning. Demonstrating that premise 1 is valid does not require the assumption that God exists. One can accept premise 1 without even believing in God. I had presented that when I linked to the Wikipedia article.

Wow. I really don't understand your definition of fine-tuning, then. Because the definition of fine-tuning you've provided with every single one of the analogies you provided did require the assumption that a designer with intentionality existed. The analogy of the archer hitting the bullseye, the analogy of the car running. These definitely require a designer with intentionality.

By asserting that these examples which definitely imply intentionality are similar to the case in question of how the universe came to be, you are inevitable asserting by implication that the universe was fine-tuned by an entity with intentionality. The problem is that intentionality can be demonstrated in the analogies you presented, but not in the case of the universe.

It's also a fallacy of the undistributed middle again, because designed objects (like cars, arrows and condoms), and undesigned objects (like the human brain, galaxies and the universe) share the attribute that if they were different they wouldn't be the same. But that does NOT mean that they therefore share additional properties.

It is a logically fallacious to assert that because A and B share attribute X, therefore they also share attribute Y. It is logically fallacious to assert that because a car and the universe share the attribute that they would be different if they weren't the same (or that they would be non-existent if they didn't exist) therefore they also share the attribute of being fine-tuned.

Another issue I have is that I feel you have to get your definitions straight. Is fine-tuning possible in the absence of intentionality? If fine-tuning simply means "something which would be different or might not even exists, if circumstances that brought it about had been different", then sure. Of course, that means that there is NOTHING, whether real, non-real, existent, imaginary, fictional, conceptual, hypothetical, tangible, non-tangible, empirical, non-empirical, etc which isn't fine-tuned. The term is so broad that it's meaningless.

On the other hand, if fine-tuning has the general meaning spelled out by all of your analogies, then it of necessity PRESUPPOSES a fine-tuner with intentionality.

The problem in that case is that you can' just presupposes that crucial premises to your argument are true. Your general principle requires that every statement you make is backed by evidence and logic, including the premises to your argument, of course.

Evidence and logic justify the presupposition that a fine-tuning agency with intentionality and the goal of moving around more quickly exists in the case of cars.

Do evidence and logic support the presupposition that a fine-tuning agency with intentionality and the goal of creating galaxies, planets, life exists in the case of the universe? The last 9 arguments you attempted were, by your own admission, insufficient to demonstrate that such a hypothesis is any more feasible than its antithesis.

Let me start arguing for premise 1. The first constant I'll present is the fine-structure constant.

RICHARD FEYNMAN, Nobel laureate and physicist extraordinaire, called it a magic number and its value one of the greatest damn mysteries of physics. The number he was referring to, which goes by the symbol alpha and the rather more long-winded name of the fine-structure constant, is magic indeed. If it were a mere 4% bigger or smaller than it is, stars would not be able to sustain the nuclear reactions that synthesise carbon and oxygen. One consequence would be that squishy, carbon-based life would not exist.

http://www.economist.com/node/16930866

One of the most controversial questions in cosmology is why the fundamental constants of nature seem fine-tuned for life. One of these fundamental constants is the fine-structure constant, or alpha, which is the coupling constant for the electromagnetic force and equal to about 1/137.0359. If alpha were just 4% bigger or smaller than it is, stars wouldn't be able to make carbon and oxygen, which would have made it impossible for life as we know it to exist.

http://phys.org/news202921592.html

If alpha [the fine-structure constant] were bigger than it really is, we should not be able to distinguish matter from ether [the vacuum, nothingness], and our task to disentangle the natural laws would be hopelessly difficult. The fact however that alpha has just its value 1/137 is certainly no chance but itself a law of nature. It is clear that the explanation of this number must be the central problem of natural philosophy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine_stru ... ant#Quotes

You are not adding anything new. We already agree that if things were different they wouldn't be the same.

There is speculation that the fine-structure constant is not actually constant throughtout the universe, but varies at different points. But, this only strengthens the fine-tuning argument because the fine-tuning constant allows our region in space to have life.

Wow. Surely you realize the absurdity of what you're saying here, if you stop and think about it for a moment.

There are conditions that can make life either exist or not, and life forms in the areas where life can exist, and not in areas where life cannot.

Are you seriously alleging that the reason for that, is that the universe is fine tuned to accommodate life in the areas where "life was supposed to exist"? As opposed to the obvious fact that some areas of the universe are fit for life and others aren't, IRRESPECTIVE of what life "wants", and then, subsequent to this fact, life INEVITABLY HAPPENS to develop in the locations where it can, as opposed to the locations where it can't.

What you said is as absurd as saying that "it's cold in the north pole for the purpose of giving penguins an ideal habitat". That's laughable, man! Penguins are fine-tuned to the cold, the cold isn't fine tuned to the penguins. The north pole doesn't care AT ALL about penguins. The universe doesn't care about life.

Do you agree or disagree with the argument above, and that the lottery is fine tuned to Mr. smith winning it?

I assert that there is only one person who bought a lottery ticket, Mr. Smith. He only bought one ticket. And the odds of him winning was very low. With these conditions, yes, I agree that the lottery was fine-tuned for Mr. Smith to win it. In other words, if Mr Smith bought a single lottery ticket and the odds of him winning was one in a trillion and he actually did win it, then something fishy was going on that allowed him to win it.

First, I thought you agreed that unlikely things happened all the time. Did you change your mind?

Second, let me ask you this. Let's say that the winning ticket number was 4868248622. And lets say that Mr. Smith obtains that exact same ticket. Is your argument that, because only one person was playing, and only one ticket was bought, then the likelihood of him getting that exact ticket number 4868248622 is so low, that chance alone is not a sufficiently good explanation for the events?

In that case, what is the probability that he got ticket number 4868248621, just ONE number away from the winning ticket?

What is the probability of that happening? How does that compare with the probability of getting 4868248622, the winning ticket?

How about getting 4868248623? One number MORE than the winning ticket?

What if Mr. Smith got ticket number 2434124211? Every single digit being exactly half of every digit in the winning ticket?

What are the chances that he would get ticket number 39630342617? That number is exactly the same as his grandma's phone number back in sweden.

You said that if a number which had a chance in a trillion of coming up did indeed come up, then you would assume "something fishy was going on". Please give me an example of a number that could have come out for that lottery ticket which WOULDN'T have a chance in a trillion of coming out, and for which you'd have a good argument for NOT thinking something fishy was going on.

[otseng]

And if you could, whenever you have a minute, give me an example of anything, anything at all, which would NOT be fine-tuned. It can be something existent, something nonexistent, something hypothetical, something imaginary, something logically impossible. ANYTHING.

Hmm, how about a rock sitting in my front yard.

So in what objective way is the universe existing preferable to something other than the universe existing? For example, if the constants were fine-tuned in such a way that the infinitely dense and infinitesimally small pre-big-bang spec of existence never exploded, and instead remained in a static state, how would that be in any way worse than the singularity exploding into the universe? Why is an exploded singularity (the universe) preferable to an un-exploded singularity?

Ultimately, there would be no life in the universe.

An analogy is a car. In order for a car to operate, all the components must be built and put together in a particular way.

What do you mean by operate? Do you mean that it serves the function of allowing a person in possession of petrol to move along a road at greater speed?

Of course.

The argument of fine-tuning is not whether a car is a Lexus or a BMW. The cars are different, but they both still run. The argument of fine-tuning is why the car can run.

Can you please explain to me why a car which can run is better than a car which cannot run, objectively? Can you tell me ONE way in which a running car is better than a non-running car, other than from the prospective of people with a goal to move around more quickly?

I fail to see where you are going with these questions.

Ok, so each physical constant was designed by someone with the goal of creating stars, planets and life, much like each component of the car was designed by someone with the goal of moving more quickly. That's your assertion.

Yes, that's my assertion. But, it's possible that a functional car spontaneously came about by quantum fluctuations (or whatever non-teleological explanation you want to posit). The universe likewise could've come about by a quantum fluctuation in which the universe appears to be fine-tuned.

I don't understand how this is anything other than a circular argument.

1) The universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
2) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
3) Therefore the universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
4) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
5) Therefore the universe was designed by someone who had the goal of creating life
6) Therefore a designer who had the goal of creating life exists
etc

Sure, that is a circular argument. But, that is an argument that you've made, not me. Where have I made that argument? I already gave my argument in post 107. Instead of attacking a strawman, can you address the argument that I have already presented?

I really don't understand your definition of fine-tuning, then. Because the definition of fine-tuning you've provided with every single one of the analogies you provided did require the assumption that a designer with intentionality existed.

It's not my definition of fine-tuning, I've only offered the Wikipedia definition.

The analogy of the archer hitting the bullseye, the analogy of the car running. These definitely require a designer with intentionality.

Yes, a designer with intentionality is the best answer to these situations. But, it's not the only answer. With the bullseye, the archer could be lucky and have no skill whatsoever. Or, there could some invisible wire that is tied between the bow and the bullseye that the arrow travels on. Or a pile of monkeys with wrenches and hammers got lucky putting together a functional car from spare parts.

But, if you accept that all examples of fine-tuning require a designer with intentionality, then pretty much I rest my case with fine-tuning.

It's also a fallacy of the undistributed middle again, because designed objects (like cars, arrows and condoms), and undesigned objects (like the human brain, galaxies and the universe) share the attribute that if they were different they wouldn't be the same. But that does NOT mean that they therefore share additional properties.

I'm not arguing that they are simply different.

Another issue I have is that I feel you have to get your definitions straight. Is fine-tuning possible in the absence of intentionality?

Where have I defined that fine-tuning requires intentionality? As a matter of fact, I've repeatedly said that it does not require God.

If fine-tuning simply means "something which would be different or might not even exists, if circumstances that brought it about had been different", then sure. Of course, that means that there is NOTHING, whether real, non-real, existent, imaginary, fictional, conceptual, hypothetical, tangible, non-tangible, empirical, non-empirical, etc which isn't fine-tuned. The term is so broad that it's meaningless.

Mind you, you were the one that proposed that definition for fine-tuning. And, yes, I agree that if that is all you define fine-tuning to mean, then it is meaningless. You seem to consistently offer definitions for terms that is not based on any standard definitions. If you just make up your own definitions, no wonder they are meaningless. Since we both agree that it is meaningless, then we should not use your definitions.

On the other hand, if fine-tuning has the general meaning spelled out by all of your analogies, then it of necessity PRESUPPOSES a fine-tuner with intentionality.

If it also presupposes that there are no naturalistic explanation, then, yes, it leads only to an explanation that involves intention.

The problem in that case is that you can' just presupposes that crucial premises to your argument are true.

Again, premise 1 (The universe exhibits fine-tuning) does not presuppose God.

Your general principle requires that every statement you make is backed by evidence and logic, including the premises to your argument, of course.

Which I believe logic does support my argument.

Evidence and logic justify the presupposition that a fine-tuning agency with intentionality and the goal of moving around more quickly exists in the case of cars.

Again, the car analogy was to highlight your misconception of fine-tuning that things are just simply different. It does involve a difference, but it does not stop there.

The last 9 arguments you attempted were, by your own admission, insufficient to demonstrate that such a hypothesis is any more feasible than its antithesis.

Up until you admitted that there are differences between IH and NIH. Since you kept changing your definitions and positions, they are no longer equivalent. I already summarized the similarities and differences in post 98.

You are not adding anything new. We already agree that if things were different they wouldn't be the same.

Yes, I agree that things would not be the same. But I do not stop there. I also have stated that life would not be possible. However, we both agree that your statement that thing simply being different is "so broad that it's meaningless."

I assert that there is only one person who bought a lottery ticket, Mr. Smith. He only bought one ticket. And the odds of him winning was very low. With these conditions, yes, I agree that the lottery was fine-tuned for Mr. Smith to win it. In other words, if Mr Smith bought a single lottery ticket and the odds of him winning was one in a trillion and he actually did win it, then something fishy was going on that allowed him to win it.

First, I thought you agreed that unlikely things happened all the time. Did you change your mind?

Using the 1 in a trillion lottery example again, it's unlikely for any particular number to be chosen between 1 and a trillion. Each number has a 1 in a trillion chance of being picked. In this, each number is unlikely to be picked.

Second, let me ask you this. Let's say that the winning ticket number was 4868248622. And lets say that Mr. Smith obtains that exact same ticket. Is your argument that, because only one person was playing, and only one ticket was bought, then the likelihood of him getting that exact ticket number 4868248622 is so low, that chance alone is not a sufficiently good explanation for the events?

There is a 1 in a trillion chance of him winning it. It is possible for him to have won it by chance. But, when something has low odds, and it does happen, a better explanation is that it was intentional.

Let me ask again, with the fine-structure constant example, do you still assert that the universe does not exhibit fine-tuning? Because if you do still claim that, I'll continue to present other examples of constants that exhibit fine-tuning.

[no evidence no belief]

And if you could, whenever you have a minute, give me an example of anything, anything at all, which would NOT be fine-tuned. It can be something existent, something nonexistent, something hypothetical, something imaginary, something logically impossible. ANYTHING.

Hmm, how about a rock sitting in my front yard.

Well, a rock sitting in your front yard is clearly fine tuned, according to the definition of fine-tuned YOU provided.

The fine-tuned Universe is the proposition that the conditions that allow life in the Universe can only occur when certain universal fundamental physical constants lie within a very narrow range, so that if any of several fundamental constants were only slightly different, the Universe would be unlikely to be conducive to the establishment and development of matter, astronomical structures, elemental diversity, or life as it is understood

I'll now apply that same language to the rock in your front yard.

The "fine-tuned rock in Oliver's front yard" is the proposition that the conditions that allow a rock in Oliver's front yard can only occur when certain fundamental factors lie within a very narrow range, so that if any of several fundamental factors were only slightly different, Oliver's front yard would be unlikely to be conducive to the establishment and development of a rock as it is understood.

For example lets assume that before your house was built there, a chunk of rock collapsed from a nearby mountain and started rolling towards the field where your house will eventually be built. A tiny, tiny, tiny difference in the shape of the rock as it detached from the mountain would result in the rock rolling down to the valley according to a completely different pattern which could eventually cause it to stop rolling hundreds of yards away from your back yard. The shape of the rock as it detached from the mountain is just ONE of many fine-tuned conditions any one of which, had they been even slight different, would have resulted in the rock not existing in your front yard.

The difference between a rock existing in your front yard, and a rock NOT existing in your front yard could be caused by a tiny difference in the fine-tuning of the events that caused it.

There is absolutely no denying that according to the definition of fine-tuning you provided (to be perfectly clear, that YOU provided, not me, YOU) a rock in your front yard is fine-tuned. If circumstances leading it to being there had been different, it could very well not be there.

Look, before we go on to discussing anything else, let's just wrap up this portion of our debate.

Can we agree that if a concept describes EVERYTHING then it's a meaningless and useless repetition of the word "everything" and it's not an argument in favor of anything? You've already agreed to this, but please just confirm it.

Now, this is what I would propose: Please provide a list of 20 entities of any kind. It can be anything at all. Rocks in your backyard, telephone poles, galaxies, hobbits, Mike Tyson, the iPhone, a pile of manure, a flower, the sun, whatever you want. No exceptions. Nothing off limits.

If I can demonstrate that according to YOUR definition (again, to be perfectly clear, YOUR definition, not mine, YOURS) of fine-tuning, all of these things are fine tuned, then can you maybe start taking into consideration that maybe, just maybe, the word fine-tuned as per YOUR (not my) definition, is just a vague and meaningless term for the set "everything"?

To be perfectly clear, this is the challenge. You will write down an object/concept/entity/person/hypothetical of any kind.

I will attempt to adapt that word to the description of fine-tuning YOU provided, and then provide specific details of the circumstances which would make the selected word applicable to YOUR definition, much like I did above with the rock in your front yard.

If I am able to do this, we agree that the definition of fine-tuning YOU provided is just a meaningless, useless and vague synonym of "everything", we can scrap the argument from fine-tuning without me even having to bring forward my main counterargument, and we can move on to whatever argument you have next.

If I am not able to do this, we can try to figure out what the next step is.

Again, this is what you have to do: Think of ANYTHING which would still be the same even if the circumstances that had caused it were different, or which would still exist even if the circumstances that caused it to exist were different enough that they would cause it to not exist.

[otseng]

And if you could, whenever you have a minute, give me an example of anything, anything at all, which would NOT be fine-tuned. It can be something existent, something nonexistent, something hypothetical, something imaginary, something logically impossible. ANYTHING.

Hmm, how about a rock sitting in my front yard.

Well, a rock sitting in your front yard is clearly fine tuned, according to the definition of fine-tuned YOU provided.

The fine-tuned Universe is the proposition that the conditions that allow life in the Universe can only occur when certain universal fundamental physical constants lie within a very narrow range, so that if any of several fundamental constants were only slightly different, the Universe would be unlikely to be conducive to the establishment and development of matter, astronomical structures, elemental diversity, or life as it is understood

The rock in my front yard is not finely-tuned for anything.

Now, if you are asking if there's anything not impacted by the fine-tuning of the physical constants, then there's nothing that I can think of that is not affected by it. This is because without the fine-tuning of constants, not much would be here.

For example lets assume that before your house was built there, a chunk of rock collapsed from a nearby mountain and started rolling towards the field where your house will eventually be built. A tiny, tiny, tiny difference in the shape of the rock as it detached from the mountain would result in the rock rolling down to the valley according to a completely different pattern which could eventually cause it to stop rolling hundreds of yards away from your back yard. The shape of the rock as it detached from the mountain is just ONE of many fine-tuned conditions any one of which, had they been even slight different, would have resulted in the rock not existing in your front yard.

You are applying your definition of fine-tuning. And we have agreed that your definition is meaningless.

There is absolutely no denying that according to the definition of fine-tuning you provided (to be perfectly clear, that YOU provided, not me, YOU) a rock in your front yard is fine-tuned. If circumstances leading it to being there had been different, it could very well not be there.

Again, you fail to understand the meaning of fine-tuning as I presented in the Wikipedia article.

Can we agree that if a concept describes EVERYTHING then it's a meaningless and useless repetition of the word "everything" and it's not an argument in favor of anything? You've already agreed to this, but please just confirm it.

I've agreed that your definition of fine-tuning is meaningless. The Wikipedia definition is not meaningless.

The problem is that there is no reason why the constants should take on the values that they do. There is no naturalistic law that constrains the constants to have values that allow the universe to ultimately produce sentient life. This is the problem of fine-tuning. How can one account for all these constants to take on values that allow for life?

I will attempt to adapt that word to the description of fine-tuning YOU provided, and then provide specific details of the circumstances which would make the selected word applicable to YOUR definition, much like I did above with the rock in your front yard.

That's a pointless exercise for me to provide words so that you can misapply the definition of fine-tuning with.

[no evidence no belief]

Oliver, winning the lottery is better than not winning the lottery, from the prospective of the person who won.

Why is a universe conducive to life better than a universe not conducive to life, and from who's prospective?

[otseng]

Why is a universe conducive to life better than a universe not conducive to life, and from who's prospective?

Fine-tuning itself doesn't make any claim what type of universe is "better". But, it only asks why is it the case that our universe has constants that has values that allows for life to exist. So, regardless of what type of universe is better, the problem of fine-tuning still exists.

But, personally, I would say that having life is better than a lifeless universe. It could be conceivable that a universe exists where there is no life at all, just a bunch of rocks and gas and stuff. And it would exist that way until that universe has a heat death. Wouldn't it seem odd if this dead universe was what constituted reality? And this is exactly what we would expect if the constants could take arbitrary values.

[no evidence no belief]

Why is a universe conducive to life better than a universe not conducive to life, and from who's prospective?

Fine-tuning itself doesn't make any claim what type of universe is "better". But, it only asks why is it the case that our universe has constants that has values that allows for life to exist. So, regardless of what type of universe is better, the problem of fine-tuning still exists.

But, personally, I would say that having life is better than a lifeless universe. It could be conceivable that a universe exists where there is no life at all, just a bunch of rocks and gas and stuff. And it would exist that way until that universe has a heat death. Wouldn't it seem odd if this dead universe was what constituted reality? And this is exactly what we would expect if the constants could take arbitrary values.

Your vague, unsubstantiated, hazy, generalized, highly speculative and very very personal opinion that a universe without life would, quote, "seem odd" (whatever that might mean) is NOT in any way helpful.

While I most certainly value and appreciate your opinion because you're clearly a smart guy, I don't think your opinion is conducive to determining whether logic and evidence support your deistic position more than alternative positions.

So let's set aside that which, as per the bolded portion of your post above, you yourself admit is just a personal opinion, and let's instead discuss the specifics of the logical argument you are proposing.

You wrote: "Fine-tuning itself doesn't make any claim [about] what type of universe is "better".

That statement leaves wiggle room. I want to be 100% certain we're on the same page.

Here is an assertion:

"A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

Here is a simple yes or no question:

Is the assertion above one of the explicit or implicit necessary premises of the argument for God from fine-tuning?

Please go through the entirety of the fine-tuning argument in your head, from premise 1, all the way down to "therefore God exists", and then answer the question above, with a simple yes, or with a simple no.

By all means, elaborate on your answer once you've given it, but please don't dodge the opportunity to start with a simple yes or no. The proposition above either is or is not one of the explicit or implicit premises of the argument.

[no evidence no belief]

While I wait for your answer to my post above, here are two additional considerations.

Consider this assertion: A system which has physical constants other than the universe DOES NOT EXIST. Nothing exists other than the universe.

Is that assertion one of the (implicit or explicit) premises of fine-tuning? I would imagine it has to be, because if the universe is NOT the only system with physical constants, if there is stuff outside the universe governed by physical constants, if there are, potentially, trillions of parallel universes, then fine-tuning is kaput, right?

I mean, if there is a chance in a billion of winning the lottery and only one person buys a ticket and wins, it may or may not be, as you said, that there is "something fishy going on". But if there is a chance in a billion of winning and a billion people buy a ticket all at once, or if a single person buys a ticket today and then someone buys another ticket in 100 years and so on for hundreds of billions of years, the fact that one of those billion eventually wins is not "fishy". It's mathematically inevitable, right? It would be fishy if somebody DIDN'T win, right?

Fine-tuning is already dead in the water as far as I'm concerned unless you demonstrate that presence of life is BETTER than absence of life. But it's doubly dead if you cannot demonstrate quite conclusively that the universe is the only thing that exists.

You have asserted in the past that you believe that there is only one universe. I responded after some confusion by stating that I am not convinced either way.

Now the time has come for you to back up your claim that no universe exists other than this one. So, please disprove the mathematics of string theory to start off with, then go on to debunk the empirical evidence for stuff outside the universe such as the asymmetry of the universe caused by the gravitational pull of stuff outside the universe. If you manage to do that, please don't forget to acknowledge me as your inspiration in your Nobel Prize acceptance speech.

Since the existence of only one universe is a necessary premise of fine-tuning, please don't go further until you've demonstrated that no universe (or other environment controlled by physical constants) exists or as ever existed concurrently or antecedent to this universe, or that it ever will at any point in the future.


Second, earlier in our debate, you said "There is no naturalistic law that constrains the constants to have values that allow the universe to ultimately produce sentient life". Could you kindly provide a link to the peer-reviewed scientific paper where this has been demonstrated?

If not, exactly what do you hope to accomplish by stating as fact that which is instead just speculation? As Einstein famously asked "Did God have a choice in creating the universe?". How do you know that there is a large number of ways in which the physical constants could be arranged in a universe? Maybe there was a pre-big-bang singularity and by random fluctuations trillions of different combinations of physical constants were generated every second, none of which would result in any activity. It could be that the only set of physical constants that is stable enough to result in a big bang in the first place is THIS ONE. Therefore the answer to "how come does this universe suitable for life exist" is "BECAUSE THIS IS THE ONLY UNIVERSE THAT COULD EXIST, FOR REASONS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH LIFE".

I'm not saying that this is the case. I'm saying that I don't know if this is the case or not. Do you know? If yes, how? If you don't know, then do you acknowledge that your argument is based on a premise which you don't know if it's true or not?


In short:

From the previous post:
Please let me know if "a universe conducive to life being better than one not conducive to life" is a necessary premise (implicit or explicit) to your argument.

Also:
You have asserted that there is only one universe. Now please prove that this is true. Prove that no system governed by physical constants has ever existed, currently exists, or will ever exist other than our universe. Again, if my question here played any part in starting you on the path to presenting this evidence to to the world, please do consider acknowledging me as an inspiration in your best selling book "How I debunked string theory".

Lastly:
Lastly, you have asserted that there are no physical restrictions to the ways in which physical constants could be arranged. You have asserted that there is a huge number of combinations of physical constants that could result in a big bang. If you can prove this, I think you'll become one of the most famous scientists in the world. You will not have to provide the evidence for that assertion here. I'll just listen to President Obama outlining the explanation and evidence in layman's terms as he officially congratulates you at a Rose Garden ceremony.

[otseng]

Why is a universe conducive to life better than a universe not conducive to life, and from who's prospective?

Fine-tuning itself doesn't make any claim what type of universe is "better". But, it only asks why is it the case that our universe has constants that has values that allows for life to exist. So, regardless of what type of universe is better, the problem of fine-tuning still exists.

But, personally, I would say that having life is better than a lifeless universe. It could be conceivable that a universe exists where there is no life at all, just a bunch of rocks and gas and stuff. And it would exist that way until that universe has a heat death. Wouldn't it seem odd if this dead universe was what constituted reality? And this is exactly what we would expect if the constants could take arbitrary values.

Your vague, unsubstantiated, hazy, generalized, highly speculative and very very personal opinion that a universe without life would, quote, "seem odd" (whatever that might mean) is NOT in any way helpful.

That is why I said it was my personal opinion. But, I would disagree that it is highly speculative. And I would highly doubt that I was the only person who held this view.

While I most certainly value and appreciate your opinion because you're clearly a smart guy, I don't think your opinion is conducive to determining whether logic and evidence support your deistic position more than alternative positions.

That is why I said in the first paragraph that the fine-tuning argument does not make a statement about what type of universe is "better".

The point of argument is not my second paragraph (which I prefaced that is was my opinion), but the first paragraph (which is dealing with the fine-tuning argument).

You wrote: "Fine-tuning itself doesn't make any claim [about] what type of universe is "better".

Yes, I wrote that. Do you disagree with that?

Here is an assertion:

"A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

Here is a simple yes or no question:

Is the assertion above one of the explicit or implicit necessary premises of the argument for God from fine-tuning?

Please go through the entirety of the fine-tuning argument in your head, from premise 1, all the way down to "therefore God exists", and then answer the question above, with a simple yes, or with a simple no.

By all means, elaborate on your answer once you've given it, but please don't dodge the opportunity to start with a simple yes or no. The proposition above either is or is not one of the explicit or implicit premises of the argument.

I've never read anywhere, from either Christians or non-Christians, that this is either an explicit or implicit premise of the fine-tuning argument.

But, I can see it as an implicit premise. If it wasn't the case, and life and non-life was of equal value, then finding the odds of life arising and the odds of life not arising would be of equal value. So, I'll say that yes, it is an implicit premise.

[no evidence no belief]

Here is an assertion:

"A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

Here is a simple yes or no question:

Is the assertion above one of the explicit or implicit necessary premises of the argument for God from fine-tuning?

I'll say that yes, it is an implicit premise.

Ok thank you.

As you surely agree, an argument's conclusion can only be true if the premises are true.

You have declared that the assertion below is a premise of your argument: "A universe conducive to life is objectively and intrinsically better/superior/preferable/more desirable than a universe not conducive to life".

Before we can establish what conclusion follows from the premises, we have to determine that all premises are true, starting from this one.

Please explain why a universe conducive to life is superior to one not conducive to life. As per your general principle, please demonstrate that logic and evidence support the notion that the premise in question is true, to a greater degree than they support competing notions.

In other words, please answer the question I asked earlier.

"Oliver, winning the lottery is better than not winning the lottery, from the prospective of the person who won.

Why is a universe conducive to life better than a universe not conducive to life, and from who's prospective?"

You do understand that if the superiority of a life-conducive universe is a premise of your argument, and all you have is you personal opinion that the premise is true, then your argument fails, right?